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ARISTOTLE
THE METAPHYSICS

II

BOOKS X—XIV

THE OECONOMICA
THE MAGNA MORALIA

ARISTOTLE

THE METAPHYSICS

BOOKS X—XIV

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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THE OECONOMICA

AND

THE MAGNA MORALIA

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

	PAGE
THE METAPHYSICS :	
BOOK X.	2
BOOK XI.	52
BOOK XII.	122
BOOK XIII.	176
BOOK XIV.	256
INDEX	307

THE OECONOMICA :

INTRODUCTION	323
BOOK I.	326
BOOK II.	344
BOOK III.	400
INDEX	420

I

1062 a
16 I. Τὸ ἐν ὅτι μὲν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ἐν τοῖς περὶ
τοῦ ποσαχῶς διηρημένοις εἴρηται πρότερον· πλεο-
ναχῶς δὲ λεγομένου οἱ συγκεφαλαιούμενοι τρόποι
εἰσὶ τέτταρες τῶν πρώτων καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ λεγομέ-
νων ἔν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Τό τε γὰρ
20 συνεχές ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ μάλιστά γε τὸ φύσει καὶ μὴ
ἀφ᾽ ἡ μὴδὲ δεσμῶ· καὶ τούτων μᾶλλον ἐν καὶ πρό-
τερον οὐ ἀδιαιρετωτέρα ἢ κίνησις καὶ μᾶλλον
ἀπλῇ. "Ἐτι τοιοῦτον καὶ μᾶλλον τὸ ὅλον καὶ
ἔχον τινὰ μορφήν καὶ εἶδος· μάλιστα δ' εἴ τι φύσει
τοιοῦτον καὶ μὴ βία, ὥσπερ ὅσα κόλλη ἢ γόμφῳ ἢ
25 συνδέσμῳ, ἀλλὰ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ αἷτιον αὐτῷ τοῦ
συνεχὲς εἶναι. τοιοῦτον δὲ τῷ μίαν τὴν κίνησιν
εἶναι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τόπῳ καὶ χρόνῳ, ὥστε φανε-
ρόν, εἴ τι φύσει κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχει τῆς πρώτης τὴν
πρώτην, οἷον λέγω φορᾶς κυκλοφορίαν, ὅτι τοῦτο
πρώτον μέγεθος ἔν. Τὰ μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐν ἡ¹
30 συνεχὲς ἢ ὅλον, τὰ δὲ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος εἰς ἡ. τοιαῦτα

¹ ἡ Christ: ἡ.

^a V. vi.

^b This description applies to the celestial spheres.

BOOK X

I. That "one" has several meanings has been already stated^a in our distinction of the various meanings of terms. But although it has a number of senses, the things which are primarily and essentially called one, and not in an accidental sense, may be summarized under four heads :

BOOK X
UNITY AND
OTHER
GENERAL
ATTRIBUTES
OF SUB-
STANCE.

(i.) That which is continuous, either absolutely or in particular that which is continuous by natural growth and not by contact or ligature ; and of these things those are more strictly and in a prior sense one whose motion is more simple and indivisible.

"The one" ^{MOORE}
(1) the con-
tinuous.

(ii.) Of this kind in a still higher degree is that which is a whole and has a definite shape or form, particularly that which is such by nature and not by constraint (like things which are joined by glue or nails or by being tied together), but which contains in itself the cause of its continuity. A thing is of this kind if its motion is one and indivisible in respect of place and time ; so that clearly if a thing has as its principle of motion the primary kind of motion (*i.e.* locomotion) in its primary form (*i.e.* circular locomotion), it is in the primary sense *one* spatial magnitude.^b

(2) the
whole.

Some things, then, are one in this sense, *qua* continuous or whole ; the other things which are one are those whose formula is one. Such are the 4

- 1052 ^a δὲ ὧν ἡ νόησις μία· τοιαῦτα δὲ ὧν ἀδιαίρετος· ἀδιαίρετος δὲ τοῦ ἀδιαιρέτου εἶδει ἡ ἀριθμῶ. ἀριθμῶ μὲν οὖν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀδιαίρετον, εἶδει δὲ τὸ τῷ γνωστῷ καὶ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ὥσθ' ἐν ᾧ εἴη πρῶτον τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις αἴτιον τοῦ ἐνός. λέγεται
 88 μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐν τοσαυταχῶς, τό τε συνεχὲς φύσει καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ καθόλου.
- 1052 ^b πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν τῷ ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι τῶν μὲν τὴν κίνησιν τῶν δὲ τὴν νόησιν ἢ τὸν λόγον. Δεῖ δὲ κατανοεῖν ὅτι οὐχ ὡσαύτως ληπτέον λέγεσθαι ποιά τε ἐν λέγεται, καὶ τί ἐστι τὸ ἐν εἶναι, καὶ τίς αὐτοῦ λόγος. λέγεται μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐν τοσαυταχῶς, καὶ
 6 ἕκαστον ἔσται ἐν τούτων, ᾧ ἂν ὑπάρχη τις τούτων τῶν τρόπων· τὸ δὲ ἐν εἶναι ὅτε μὲν τούτων τινὲ ἔσται, ὅτε δὲ ἄλλῳ, ὃ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐγγὺς τῷ ὀνόματι ἐστι, τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐκείνα, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ στοιχείου καὶ αἰτίου εἰ δέοι λέγειν ἐπὶ τε τοῖς πράγμασι διορίζοντα καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ὄρον ἀποδιδόντα.
- 10 ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς στοιχείον τὸ πῦρ (ἔστι δ' ἴσως καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον), ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πυρὶ καὶ στοιχείῳ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὡς μὲν πρᾶγμα τι καὶ φύσις τὸ πῦρ στοιχείον, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα σημαίνει τὸ τοδὶ συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ, ὅτι ἐστὶ τι ἐκ τούτου ὡς πρῶτου ἐνυπάρχοντος.
- 15 οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ αἰτίου καὶ ἐνός καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀπάντων.

^a The reference is doubtless to Anaximander. Cf. Vol. I. *Intro.* p. x.

things of which the concept is one, *i.e.* of which the concept is indivisible; and this is indivisible when the object is indivisible (iii.) in form or (iv.) in number. Now in number the individual is indivisible, and in form that which is indivisible in comprehension and knowledge; so that that which causes the unity of substances must be one in the primary sense. Such, then, in number are the meanings of "one": the naturally continuous, the whole, the individual, and the universal. All these are one because they are indivisible; some in motion, and others in concept or formula.

But we must recognize that the questions, "What sort of things are called one?" and "What is essential unity, and what is the formula?" must not be taken to be the same. "One" has these several meanings, and each thing to which some one of these senses applies will be one; but essential unity will have now one of these senses and now something else, which is still nearer to the *term* one, whereas they are nearer to its *denotation*. This is also true of "element" and "cause," supposing that one had to explain them both by exhibiting concrete examples and by giving a definition of the term. There is a sense in which fire is an element (and no doubt so too is "the indeterminate" or some other similar thing, of its own nature), and there is a sense in which it is not; because "to be fire" and "to be an element" are not the same. It is as a concrete thing and as a stuff that fire is an element; but the term "element" denotes that it has this attribute: that something is made of it as a primary constituent. The same is true of "cause" or "one" and all other such terms.

(3) the individual,
(4) the universal.

None of these particular senses gives

the connotation of unity.

Διὸ καὶ τὸ ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαίρετῳ ἐστὶν εἶναι,
 ὅπερ τόδε¹ ὄντι καὶ ἰδίᾳ χωριστῶ² ἢ τόπῳ ἢ εἴδει
 ἢ διανοίᾳ, ἢ καὶ τὸ³ ὅλῳ καὶ ἀδιαίρετῳ, μά-
 λιστα δὲ τὸ μέτρῳ⁴ εἶναι πρώτῳ⁵ ἐκάστου γένους
 καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ
 20 ἄλλα ἐλήλυθεν. μέτρον γὰρ ἐστὶν ὧ τὸ ποσὸν
 γινώσκεται· γινώσκεται δὲ ἢ ἐνὶ ἡ ἀριθμῶ τὸ
 ποσὸν ἢ ποσόν, ὃ δὲ ἀριθμὸς ἅπας ἐνί, ὥστε πᾶν
 τὸ ποσὸν γινώσκεται ἢ ποσὸν τῷ ἐνί, καὶ ὧ
 πρώτῳ ποσὰ γινώσκεται τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐν· διὸ τὸ
 ἐν ἀριθμοῦ ἀρχὴ ἢ ἀριθμός. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ ἐν
 25 τοῖς ἄλλοις λέγεται μέτρον τε ὧ ἕκαστον πρώτῳ⁶
 γινώσκεται, καὶ τὸ μέτρον ἐκάστου ἐν ἐν μήκει,
 ἐν πλάτει, ἐν βάθει, ἐν βάρει, ἐν τάχει (τὸ γὰρ
 βάρος καὶ τάχος κοινὸν ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις· διττὸν γὰρ
 ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν, οἷον βάρος τό τε ὀποσηνοῦν ἔχον
 ῥοπήν καὶ τὸ ἔχον ὑπεροχὴν ῥοπῆς, καὶ τάχος τό
 30 τε ὀποσηνοῦν κίνησιν ἔχον καὶ τὸ ὑπεροχὴν κινή-
 σεως· ἔστι γάρ τι τάχος καὶ τοῦ βραδέος, καὶ βάρος
 τοῦ κουφοτέρου). Ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τούτοις μέτρον καὶ
 ἀρχὴ ἐν τι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς γραμ-
 μαῖς χρῶνται ὡς ἀτόμῳ τῇ ποδιαίᾳ. πανταχοῦ
 γὰρ τὸ μέτρον ἐν τι ζητοῦσι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον· τοῦτο
 35 δὲ τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἢ τῷ ποιῶ ἢ τῷ ποσῶ. ὅπου μὲν
 οὖν δοκεῖ μὴ εἶναι ἀφελεῖν ἢ προσθεῖναι, τοῦτο
 1053 a ἀκριβὲς τὸ μέτρον· διὸ τὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀκριβέ-
 στατον· τὴν γὰρ μονάδα τιθέασι πάντῃ ἀδιαίρετον·
 ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μιμούνται τὸ τοιοῦτον· ἀπὸ γὰρ

¹ τῷδε A^b.² ἰδίᾳ χωριστῶ A^b Alexander (?): ἀχωρίστῳ E.J.F.³ τὸ Bonitz: τῷ.⁴ μέτρῳ Aldine: μέτρον.⁵ πρώτῳ Christ: πρώτον.⁶ τε . . . πρώτῳ] ὧ πρώτῳ τε ἕκαστον E.J.F.

Hence "to be one" means "to be indivisible" ^{"The one is essentially a measure."} (being essentially a particular thing, distinct and separate in place or form or thought), or "to be whole and indivisible"; but especially "to be the first measure of each kind," and above all of quantity; for it is from this that it has been extended to the other categories. Measure is that by which quantity 9 is known, and quantity *qua* quantity is known either by unity or by number, and all number is known by unity. Therefore all quantity *qua* quantity is known by unity, and that by which quantities are primarily known is absolute unity. Thus unity is the starting- 10 point of number *qua* number. Hence in other cases too "measure" means that by which each thing is primarily known, and the measure of each thing is a unit—in length, breadth, depth, weight and speed. (The terms "weight" and "speed" are common to 11 both contraries, for each of them has a double meaning; e.g., "weight" applies to that which has the least amount of gravity and also to that which has an excess of it, and "speed" to that which has the least amount of motion and also to that which has excess of it; for even the slow has some speed, and the light some weight.)

In all these cases, then, the measure and starting- 12 point is some indivisible unit (since even in the case of lines we treat the "one-foot line" as indivisible). For everywhere we require as our measure an indivisible unit; i.e., that which is simple either in quality or in quantity. Now where it seems im- 13 possible to take away or add, there the measure is exact. Hence the measure of number is most exact, for we posit the unit as in every way indivisible; and in all other cases we follow this

1058 a

σταδίου καὶ ταλάντου καὶ ἀεὶ τοῦ μείζονος λάθοι
 ἂν καὶ προστεθὲν τι καὶ ἀφαιρεθὲν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπὸ
 5 ἐλάττονος. ὥστε ἀφ' οὗ πρώτου κατὰ τὴν αἴσθη-
 σιν μὴ ἐνδέχεται, τοῦτο πάντες ποιοῦνται μέτρον
 καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν καὶ βάρους καὶ μεγέθους·
 καὶ τότε οἴονται εἰδέναι τὸ ποσὸν ὅταν εἰδῶσι διὰ
 τούτου τοῦ μέτρου. καὶ δὴ καὶ κίνησιν τῇ ἀπλῇ
 κινήσει καὶ τῇ ταχίστῃ· ὀλιγιστὸν γὰρ αὕτη ἔχει
 10 χρόνον· διὸ ἐν τῇ ἀστρολογίᾳ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν ἀρχῇ
 καὶ μέτρον· τὴν κίνησιν γὰρ ὁμαλὴν ὑποτίθενται
 καὶ ταχίστην τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, πρὸς ἣν κρίνουσι
 τὰς ἄλλας. καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ διέσεις, ὅτι ἐλάχιστον,
 καὶ ἐν φωνῇ στοιχείον. καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἐν τι
 οὕτως, οὐχ ὥς κοινόν τι τὸ ἐν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
 15 οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τὸ μέτρον, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε
 πλείω, οἷον αἱ διέσεις δύο, αἱ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν
 ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, καὶ αἱ φωναὶ πλείους αἷς με-
 τρουῦμεν, καὶ ἡ διάμετρος δυσὶ μετρεῖται [καὶ ἡ
 πλευρά],¹ καὶ τὰ (τοιαῦτα)² μεγέθη πάντα. οὕτω δὴ
 πάντων μέτρον τὸ ἐν, ὅτι γνωρίζομεν ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶν
 20 ἡ οὐσία διαιροῦντες ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ
 εἶδος. διὰ³ τοῦτο τὸ ἐν ἀδιαίρετον, ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον
 ἐκάστων ἀδιαίρετον. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ πᾶν ἀδιαίρετον,

¹ Goebel.² τοιαῦτα addidi.³ καὶ διὰ E³J.

* i.e., the enharmonic (or quarter-tone proper) and the chromatic, which was $\frac{1}{4}$ of a tone (Aristoxenus i. 21). There was also the *δίεσις ἡμιολία*, which was $\frac{1}{2}$ of a tone (id. ii. 51).

² The meaning seems to be that the diameter consists of two parts, one equal to the side, and the other representing its

example, for with the furlong or talent or in general with the greater measure an addition or subtraction would be less obvious than with a smaller one. Therefore the first thing from which, according to our ¹⁴ perception, nothing can be subtracted is used by all men as their measure of wet and dry, weight and magnitude; and they think that they know the quantity only when they know it in terms of this measure. And they know motion too by simple motion and the most rapid, for this takes least time. Hence in astronomy a unit of this kind is the starting- ¹⁵ point and measure; for they assume that the motion of the heavens is uniform and the most rapid, and by it they judge the others. In music the measure is the quarter-tone, because it is the smallest interval; and in language the letter. All these are examples of units in this sense—not in the sense that unity is something common to them all, but in the sense which we have described. The measure is not ¹⁶ always numerically one, but sometimes more than one; e.g., there are two quarter-tones, distinguished not by our hearing but by their theoretical ratios ^a; and the articulate sounds by which we measure speech are more than one; and the diagonal of a square is measured by two quantities,^b and so are all magnitudes of this kind. Thus unity is the measure of all things, because we learn of what the substance is composed by dividing it, in respect of either quantity or form. Hence unity is indivisible, ¹⁷ because that which is primary in each class of things is indivisible. But not every unit is indivisible in

excess over the side; the two parts being incommensurate are measured by different units (Ross). καὶ ἡ πλεονέχεια, I think, be a gloss.

1058 a

οἷον πούς καὶ μονάς, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντῃ, τὸ δ' εἰς
 ἀδιαίρετα πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν θετέον,¹ ὥσπερ εἴρηται
 ἤδη· ἴσως γὰρ πᾶν συνεχές διαιρετόν. Ἄει δέ
 25 συγγενές τὸ μέτρον· μεγεθῶν μὲν γὰρ μέγεθος, καὶ
 καθ' ἕκαστον μήκους μήκος, πλάτους πλάτος,
 φωνῶν φωνή, βάρους βάρος, μονάδων μονάς. οὕτω
 γὰρ δεῖ λαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι ἀριθμῶν ἀριθμός·
 καίτοι ἔδει, εἰ ὁμοίως· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀξιοί, ἀλλ'
 30 ὥσπερ εἰ μονάδων μονάδας ἀξιώσει μέτρον ἀλλὰ μὴ
 μονάδα· ὁ δ' ἀριθμός πλήθος μονάδων. Καὶ τὴν
 ἐπιστήμην δὲ μέτρον τῶν πραγμάτων λέγομεν καὶ
 τὴν αἴσθησιν διὰ τὸ αὐτό, ὅτι γνωρίζομέν τι αὐταῖς,²
 ἐπεὶ μετροῦνται μᾶλλον ἢ μετροῦσιν. ἀλλὰ συμ-
 βαίνει ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἄλλου ἡμᾶς μετροῦντος
 35 ἐγνωρίσαμεν πηλίκοι ἐσμέν τῷ τὸν πῆχυν ἐπὶ
 τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν ἐπιβάλλειν. Πρωταγόρας δ' ἄν-
 θρωπὸν φησι πάντων εἶναι μέτρον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸν
 1058 b ἐπιστήμονα εἰπὼν ἢ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· τούτους δ'
 ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὁ μὲν αἴσθησιν ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμην, ἃ
 φάμεν εἶναι μέτρα τῶν ὑποκειμένων. οὐθέν δὲ
 λέγων περιττὸν φαίνεται³ τι λέγειν. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν
 τὸ ἐν⁴ εἶναι μάλιστα ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα ἀφ-
 5 ὀρίζοντι μέτρον τι, καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ, εἴτα

¹ θετέον Forster; ἐθέλει.² αὐταῖς Bekker.³ λέγων . . . φαίνεται Alexander et fecit E³: λέγοντες . . . φαίνονται.⁴ ἐν A^b γρ. E Alexander.

^a What Protagoras really meant was (apparently) that appearances are true relatively to the percipient. *Of.* IV. iv. 27, and see Burnet, *Greek Philosophy* (Part I. Thales to Plato), § 92.

the same sense—*e.g.* the foot and the arithmetical unit; but the latter is absolutely indivisible, and the former must be classed as indivisible with respect to our power of perception, as we have already stated; since presumably everything which is continuous is divisible.

The measure is always akin to the thing measured. 18
The measure of magnitude is magnitude, and in particular the measure of length is a length; of breadth, a breadth; of sounds, a sound; of weight, a weight; of units, a unit; for this is the view that we must take, and not that the measure of numbers is a number. The latter, indeed, would necessarily be true, if the analogy held good; but the supposition is not analogous—it is as though one were to suppose that the measure of units is units, and not a unit; for number is a plurality of units.

We also speak of knowledge or sense-perception 19
as a measure of things for the same reason, because through them we come to know something; whereas really they are measured themselves rather than measure other things. But our experience is as though someone else measured us, and we learned our height by noticing to what extent he applied his foot-rule to us. Protagoras says that "man is 20
the measure of all things," meaning, as it were, the scholar or the man of perception; and these because they possess, the one knowledge, and the other perception, which we hold to be the measures of objects. Thus, while appearing to say something exceptional, he is really saying nothing.^a

Obviously, then, unity in the strictest sense, if we 21
make our definition in accordance with the meaning of the term, is a measure; particularly of quantity,

τοῦ ποιού, φανερόν. ἔσται δὲ τοιοῦτον τὸ μὲν ἂν ἢ ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ ἂν κατὰ τὸ ποιόν· διόπερ ἀδιαίρετον τὸ ἐν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἢ ἐν.

II. Κατὰ δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν ζητητέον
 10 ποτέρως ἔχει, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαφορήμασιν ἐπήλθομεν, τί τὸ ἐν ἐστὶ καὶ πῶς δεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν, πότερον ὡς οὐσίας τινὸς οὐσης αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνός, καθάπερ οἱ τε Πυθαγόρειοί φασι πρότερον καὶ Πλάτων ὕστερον, ἢ μᾶλλον ὑπόκειται τις φύσις, καὶ πῶς¹ δεῖ γνωριμωτέρως λεχθῆναι καὶ μᾶλλον
 15 ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ φύσεως· ἐκεῖνων γὰρ ὁ μὲν τις φιλίαν εἶναι φησι τὸ ἐν, ὁ δ' ἀέρα, ὁ δὲ τὸ ἄπειρον.

Εἰ δὲ μηδὲν τῶν καθόλου δυνατόν οὐσίαν εἶναι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ οὐσίας καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἴρηται λόγοις, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐσίαν ὡς ἐν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ δυνατόν εἶναι (κοινὸν γάρ) ἄλλ'
 20 ἢ κατηγορήμα μόνον, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν· τὸ γὰρ ὄν καὶ τὸ ἐν καθόλου κατηγορεῖται μάλιστα πάντων· ὥστε οὔτε τὰ γένη φύσεις τινὲς καὶ οὐσῖαι χωρισταὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν γένος ἐνδέχεται εἶναι διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας δι' ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν οὐδὲ τὴν οὐσίαν. Ἐπὶ δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων
 25 ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν· λέγεται δ' ἰσαχῶς τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ἐν· ὥστ' ἐπεὶ περ ἐν τοῖς ποιοῖς ἐστὶ τι τὸ ἐν καὶ τις φύσις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ποσοῖς, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὅλως ζητητέον τί τὸ ἐν, ὥσπερ καὶ τί τὸ ὄν,

¹ πῶς Schwegler: πῶς codd.: sechusit Christ.

^a III. iv. 24-27.

^a Anaximenes.

^a VII. xiii.

^b Empedocles.

^d Anaximander.

ⁱ Cf. III. iii. 7.

and secondarily of quality. Some things will be of this kind if they are indivisible in quantity, and others if in quality. Therefore that which is one is indivisible, either absolutely or *qua* one.

II. We must inquire, with regard to the substance and nature of unity, in which sense it exists. This is the same question which we approached in our discussion of difficulties^a: *what* unity is, and what view we are to take of it; whether that unity itself is a kind of substance—as first the Pythagoreans, and later Plato, both maintain—or whether rather some nature underlies it, and we should give a more intelligible account of it, and more after the manner of the physicists; for of them one^b holds that “the One” is Love, another^c Air, and another^d the Indeterminate.

Unity is not a substance, but a predicate co-extensive with Being.

Now if no universal can be a substance (as we have² stated in our discussion^e of substance and being), and being itself cannot be a substance in the sense of one thing existing alongside the many (since it is common to them), but only as a predicate, then clearly neither can unity be a substance; because being and unity are the most universal of all predicates. Therefore (a) genera are not certain entities³ and substances separate from other things; and (b) unity cannot be a genus, for the same reasons that being and substance cannot.^f

Further, the nature of unity must be the same for all categories. Now being and unity have the same⁴ number of meanings; so that since in the category of qualities unity is something definite, *i.e.* some definite entity, and similarly in the category of quantity, clearly we must also inquire in general what unity is, just as in the case of being; since it is

1058 b

ὥς οὐχ ἱκανὸν ὅτι τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔν γε χρώμασιν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν χρώμα, οἷον
 30 τὸ λευκόν, εἰ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκ τούτου καὶ τοῦ μέλανος
 φαίνεται γιγνόμενα, τὸ δὲ μέλαν στέρησις λευκοῦ,
 ὥσπερ καὶ φωτὸς σκότος [τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ στέρησις
 φωτός]². ὥστε εἰ τὰ ὄντα ἦν χρώματα, ἦν ἂν
 ἀριθμὸς τις τὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ τίνων; δῆλον δὴ ὅτι
 χρωμάτων· καὶ τὸ ἐν ἦν ἂν τι ἔν, οἷον τὸ λευκόν.
 35 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ μέλη τὰ ὄντα ἦν, ἀριθμὸς ἂν ἦν,
 διέσεων μέντοι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀριθμὸς ἡ οὐσία αὐτῶν.
 1058 a καὶ τὸ ἐν ἦν ἂν τι οὐ ἡ οὐσία οὐ τὸ ἐν ἀλλὰ διέσεις.
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φθόγγων στοιχείων ἂν ἦν
 τὰ ὄντα ἀριθμὸς, καὶ τὸ ἐν στοιχεῖον φωνῆεν.
 καὶ εἰ σχήματα εὐθύγραμμα, σχημάτων ἂν ἦν
 ἀριθμὸς, καὶ τὸ ἐν τὸ τρίγωνον. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος
 4 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν. ὥστ' εἶπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ποιοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ποσοῖς καὶ ἐν
 κινήσει ἀριθμῶν ὄντων καὶ ἐνός τινος ἐν ἅπασιν,
 ὃ τε ἀριθμὸς τινῶν καὶ τὸ ἐν τι ἔν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοῦτο
 αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνάγκη ὡσαύτως
 ἔχειν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει ἐπὶ πάντων. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν
 10 τὸ ἐν ἐν ἅπαντι³ γένει ἐστὶ τις φύσις, καὶ οὐδενὸς
 τοῦτο γ' αὐτὸ ἡ φύσις τὸ ἐν, φανερόν· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
 ἐν χρώμασι χρώμα ἐν ζητητέον αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, οὕτω
 καὶ ἐν οὐσίᾳ οὐσίαν μίαν αὐτὸ⁴ τὸ ἐν· ὅτι δὲ
 ταῦτ' σημαίνει πως τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν, δῆλον τῷ
 15 εἶναι ἐν μηδεμιᾷ (οἷον οὗτ' ἐν τῇ τί ἐστὶν οὗτ' ἐν

² cf A^bE: εἴτα.³ παντὶ EJ.² Jaeger.⁴ αὐτό τε A^b.

not enough to say that its nature is simply unity or being. But in the sphere of colours unity is a 5 colour, *e.g.* white ; that is if all the other colours are apparently derived from white and black, and black is a privation of white, as darkness is of light. Thus if all existing things were colours, all existing things would be a number ; but of what ? Clearly of 6 colours. And unity would be some one colour, *e.g.* white. Similarly if all existing things were tunes, there would be a number—of quarter-tones ; but their substance would not be a number ; and unity would be something whose substance is not unity but a quarter-tone. Similarly in the case of sounds, existing things would be a number of letters, and unity would be a vowel ; and if existing things were 7 right-lined figures, they would be a number of figures, and unity would be a triangle. And the same principle holds for all other genera. Therefore if in the categories of passivity and quality and quantity and motion there is in every category a number and a unity, and if the number is of particular things and the unity is a particular unity, and its substance is not unity, then the same must be true in the case of substances, because the same is true in all cases.

It is obvious, then, that in every genus " one " is 8 a definite entity, and that in no case is its nature merely unity ; but as in the sphere of colours the One-itself which we have to seek is one colour, so too in the sphere of substance the One-itself is one substance. And that in a sense unity means the same 9 as being is clear (*a*) from the fact that it has a meaning corresponding to each of the categories, and is contained in none of them—*e.g.*, it is contained

1054 a

τῇ ποιόν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν), καὶ τῷ μὴ προσκατηγορεῖσθαι ἕτερόν τι τὸ εἰς ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τό τι ἢ ποιόν ἢ ποσόν) καὶ (τῷ)¹ τὸ ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἐκάστω εἶναι.

- 20 III. Ἀντίκειται δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ πλείους τρόπους, ὧν ἓνα τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὡς ἀδιαίρετον καὶ διαιρετόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἢ διηρημένον ἢ διαιρετόν πλῆθος τι λέγεται, τὸ δὲ ἀδιαίρετον ἢ μὴ διηρημένον ἐν. ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ ἀντιθέσεις τετραχῶς,
25 καὶ τούτων κατὰ στέρησιν λέγεται θάτερον, ἐναντία ἂν εἴη, καὶ οὔτε ὡς ἀντίφασις οὔτε ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι λεγόμενα. λέγεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ δηλοῦται τὸ ἐν, ἐκ τοῦ διαιρετοῦ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον αἰσθητὸν τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ τὸ διαιρετόν ἢ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, ὥστε τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον τὸ πλῆθος
30 τοῦ ἀδιαίρετου διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἑνός, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει τῶν ἐναντίων διεγράψαμεν, τὸ ταὐτὸ καὶ ὁμοιον καὶ ἴσον, τοῦ δὲ πλείους τὸ ἕτερον καὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἄνισον.

Λεγομένου δὲ τοῦ ταυτοῦ πολλαχῶς, ἓνα μὲν τρόπον κατ' ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν ἐνίστε αὐτό, τοῦτο δ'
35 ἐὰν καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἐν ᾗ, οἷον σὺ σαυτῷ καὶ
1054 b τῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ ἐν· ἔτι δ' ἐὰν ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας εἰς ᾗ, οἷον αἱ ἴσαι γραμμαὶ εὐθέαι αἱ αὐταί, καὶ τὰ ἴσα καὶ² ἰσογώνια τετράγωνα, καίτοι πλείω· ἀλλ' ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἰσότης ἐνότης.

Ὅμοια δὲ ἐὰν μὴ ταῦτὰ ἀπλῶς ὄντα, μηδὲ κατὰ

¹ τῷ Christ: τῷ εἶναι Ross.

² καὶ τὰ EJ.

* Cf. IV. ii. 6-8.

^b Cf. IV. ii. 9.

^c Or "the same." Cf. V. ix.

^d Or "like." Cf. V. ix. 5.

neither in substance nor in quality, but is related to them exactly as being is; (b) from the fact that in "one man" nothing more is predicated than in "man" ^a (just as Being too does not exist apart from some thing or quality or quantity); and (c) because "to be one" is "to be a particular thing."

III. "One" and "Many" are opposed in several ways. Unity and Plurality are opposed as being indivisible and divisible; for that which is divided or divisible is called a plurality, and that which is indivisible or undivided is called one. Then since opposition is of four kinds, and one of the present pairs of opposites is used in a privative sense, they must be contraries, and neither contradictories nor relative terms. Unity is described and explained by ² its contrary—the indivisible by the divisible—because plurality, i.e. the divisible, is more easily perceptible than the indivisible; and so in formula plurality is prior to the indivisible, on account of our powers of perception.

To Unity belong (as we showed by tabulation in our distinction of the contraries ^b) Identity, Similarity and Equality; and to Plurality belong Otherness, Dissimilarity and Inequality.

"Identity" ^c has several meanings. (a) Some- ³ times we speak of it in respect of number. (b) We ^{Identity.} call a thing the same if it is one both in formula and in number, e.g., you are one with yourself both in form and in matter; and again (c) if the formula of the primary substance is one, e.g., equal straight lines are the same, and equal quadrilaterals with equal angles, and there are many more examples; but in these equality means unity.

Things are "similar" ^d (a) if, while not being the ⁴

1054 ^b

τὴν οὐσίαν ἀδιάφορα τὴν συγκεκλιμένην, κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ταῦτά ἢ, οἷον τὸ μείζον τετράγωνον τῷ μικρῷ ὁμοιον, καὶ αἱ ἀνισοὶ εὐθεῖαι· αὗται γὰρ ὁμοιαὶ μὲν, αἱ αὐταὶ δὲ ἀπλῶς οὐ. τὰ δὲ εἰάν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἔχοντα, ἐν οἷς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ἐγγίγνεται, μήτε μᾶλλον ἢ μήτε ἥττον. τὰ δὲ εἰάν ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ¹⁰ πάθος καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶδει, οἷον τὸ λευκόν, σφόδρα καὶ ἥττον, ὁμοιά φασιν εἶναι ὅτι ἐν τὸ εἶδος αὐτῶν. τὰ δὲ εἰάν πλείω ἔχη ταῦτά ἢ ἕτερα, ἢ ἀπλῶς, ἢ τὰ πρόχειρα, οἷον καττίτερος ἀργύρῳ ἢ λευκόν,¹ χρυσὸς δὲ πυρὶ ἢ ξανθὸν καὶ πυρρόν. Ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον πολλαχῶς ¹⁵ λέγεται. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄλλο ἀντικειμένως καὶ τὸ ταῦτό, διὸ ἅπαν² πρὸς ἅπαν ἢ ταῦτό ἢ ἄλλο· τὸ δ' εἰάν μὴ καὶ ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὁ λόγος εἰς, διὸ σὺ καὶ ὁ πλησίον ἕτερος· τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὥς τὰ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον ἢ ταῦτό διὰ τοῦτο πᾶν πρὸς πᾶν λέγεται, ὅσα λέγεται ἐν καὶ ὄν· ²⁰ οὐ³ γὰρ ἀντίφασίς ἐστι τοῦ ταυτοῦ· διὸ οὐ λέγεται ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων (τὸ δὲ μὴ ταῦτό λέγεται), ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὄντων πάντων· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἢ οὐχ ἐν πέφυκε ὅσα⁴ ὄν καὶ ἐν. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον καὶ ταῦτόν οὕτως ἀντίκειται, διαφορὰ δὲ καὶ ἐτερότης ἄλλο.

¹ ἢ λευκόν ex Alexandro Ross: ἢ λευκός Schwegler: ἢ χρυσῷ codd.

² ἅπαν Ab Alexander: τᾶν EJ.

³ οὐδὲ Ab.

⁴ πέφυκε ὅσα Apelt: πεφυχ' ὅσα Ross: πεφυκός Ab: πεφυκός καὶ EJΓ Alexander.

^a Cf. V. ix. 4.

^b *sc.* as opposed to "same" in sense (a); § 3 above.

same absolutely or indistinguishable in respect of similarity their concrete substance, they are identical in form ; *e g.*, the larger square is similar to the smaller, and unequal straight lines are similar. These are similar, but not absolutely the same. (b) If, having the same form, and being capable of difference in degree, they have no difference of degree. (c) If things have an attribute which is the same and one in form—*e.g.* white—in different degrees, we say that they are similar because their form is one. (d) If the respects in which they are the same are more than those in which they differ, either in general or as regards their more prominent qualities ; *e g.*, tin is similar to silver, as being white ; and gold to fire, as being yellow or flame-coloured.

Thus it is obvious that " Other " ^a and " Unlike " ^b also have several meanings. (a) In one sense " other " is used in the sense opposite to " the same " ; thus everything in relation to every other thing is either " the same " or " other." ^{Otherness and Dissimilarity} (b) In another sense things are " other " unless both their matter and their formula are one ; thus you are " other " than your neighbour. (c) The third sense is that which is found in mathematics.^b Therefore everything in relation to everything else is called either " other " or " the same " ; that is, in the case of things of which unity and being are predicated ; for " other " is not the contradictory of " the same," and so it is not predicated of non-existent things (they are called " not the same "), but it is predicated of all things which exist ; for whatever is by nature existent and one is either one or not one with something else. ⁷

" Other " and " same," then, are opposed in this way ; but " difference " ^a is distinct from " other-^{Difference}

1054 b

τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ οὐκ ἕτερον οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι
 25 τινὲ ἕτερον· πᾶν γὰρ ἢ ἕτερον ἢ ταυτὸ ὃ τι ἂν ᾖ ὄν·
 τὸ δὲ διάφορον τινὸς τινὲ διάφορον, ὥστε ἀνάγκη
 ταυτὸ τι εἶναι ᾧ διαφέρουσιν. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ
 γένος ἢ εἶδος· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ διαφέρον διαφέρει ἢ
 γένει ἢ εἶδει, γένει μὲν ὧν μὴ ἐστὶ κοινὴ ἢ ὕλη
 μηδὲ γένεσις εἰς ἄλληλα, οἷον ὅσων ἄλλο σχῆμα
 30 τῆς κατηγορίας, εἶδει δὲ ὧν τὸ αὐτὸ γένος (λέγεται
 δὲ γένος ὁ ἅμψω τὸ αὐτὸ λέγονται κατὰ τὴν
 οὐσίαν τὰ διάφορα). Τὰ δ' ἐναντία διάφορα,
 καὶ ἡ ἐναντίωσις διαφορὰ τις. ὅτι δὲ καλῶς τοῦτο
 ὑποτιθέμεθα, δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς· πάντα γὰρ
 διαφέροντα¹ φαίνεται καὶ ταῦτα, οὐ μόνον ἕτερα
 35 ὄντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τὸ γένος ἕτερα, τὰ δ' ἐν τῇ
 1055 a αὐτῇ συστοιχίᾳ τῆς κατηγορίας, ὥστ' ἐν ταυτῷ
 γένει καὶ ταῦτ' αὐτῷ γένει.² διώριστα δ' ἐν ἄλλοις
 ποῖα τῷ γένει ταῦτ' ἢ ἕτερα.

IV. Ἐπεὶ δὲ διαφέρειν ἐνδέχεται ἀλλήλων τὰ
 διαφέροντα πλεῖον καὶ ἑλαττον, ἐστὶ τις καὶ μεγίστη
 40 διαφορὰ, καὶ ταύτην λέγω ἐναντίωσιν. ὅτι δ' ἡ
 μεγίστη ἐστὶ διαφορὰ, δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.
 τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένει διαφέροντα οὐκ ἔχει ὁδὸν εἰς
 ἄλληλα, ἀλλ' ἀπέχει πλέον καὶ ἀσύμβλητα· τοῖς δ'
 εἶδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ γενέσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰσὶν
 ὡς ἐσχάτων. τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐσχάτων διάστημα μέγιστον,

¹ διαφέροντά τε EJ: διαφέροντά τι Bonitz.

² εἶδει EJ.

ness." For that which is "other" than something 8
 else need not be other in a particular respect, since
 everything which is existent is either "other" or
 "the same." But that which is different from some-
 thing is different in some particular respect, so that
 that in which they differ must be the same sort of
 thing; *i.e.* the same genus or species. For every- 9
 thing which is different differs either in genus or in
 species—in genus, such things as have not common
 matter and cannot be generated into or out of each
 other, *e.g.* things which belong to different categories;
 and in species, such things as are of the same genus
 (genus meaning that which is predicated of both the
 different things alike in respect of their substance).

The contraries^a are different, and contrariety is a 10
 kind of difference. That this is rightly premised is
 made clear by induction; for the contraries are
 obviously all different, since they are not merely
 "other," but some are other in genus, and others are
 in the same line of predication, and so are in the same
 genus and the same in genus. We have distin-
 guished elsewhere^b what sort of things are the same
 or other in genus. Contrariety.

IV. Since things which differ can differ from one
 another in a greater or less degree, there is a certain
 maximum difference, and this I call contrariety.
 That it is the maximum difference is shown by in-
 duction. For whereas things which differ in genus
 have no means of passing into each other, and are
 more widely distant, and are not comparable, in the
 case of things which differ in species the contraries
 are the extremes from which generation takes place;
 and the greatest distance is that which is between 2
 the extremes, and therefore also between the con- Contrariety
is maximum
difference.

1055 a

- 10 ὥστε καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μέγιστον
 ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει τέλειον. μέγιστόν τε γὰρ οὐ μὴ
 ἔστιν ὑπερβολή, καὶ τέλειον οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ἔξω λαβεῖν
 τι δυνατόν· τέλος γὰρ ἔχει ἡ τελεία διαφορά, ὥσπερ
 καὶ τᾶλλα τῷ τέλει ἔχειν λέγεται τέλεια. τοῦ δὲ
 15 τέλους οὐθὲν ἔξω· ἔσχατον γὰρ ἐν παντί καὶ περι-
 ἔχει. διὸ οὐδὲν ἔξω τοῦ τέλους, οὐδὲ προσδεῖται
 οὐδενὸς τὸ τέλειον. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἐναντιότης
 ἐστὶ διαφορά τέλειος, ἐκ τούτων δηλόν· πολλαχῶς
 δὲ λεγομένων τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀκολουθήσει τὸ τελείως
 οὕτως ὡς ἂν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίοις εἶναι ὑπάρχη αὐτοῖς.
 20 Τούτων δὲ ὄντων φανερόν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐνὶ
 πλείῳ ἐναντία εἶναι (οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἐσχάτου ἐσχατώ-
 τερον εἶη ἂν τι, οὔτε τοῦ ἐνὸς διαστήματος πλείῳ
 δυοῖν ἔσχατα), ὅλως τε εἰ ἔστιν ἡ ἐναντιότης δια-
 φορά, ἡ δὲ διαφορά δυοῖν, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τέλειος.
 Ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅρους ἀληθεῖς εἶναι
 τῶν ἐναντίων. καὶ γὰρ πλείστον διαφέρει ἡ τέλειος
 25 διαφορά (τῶν τε γὰρ γένει διαφερόντων οὐκ ἔστιν
 ἑξωτέρῳ λαβεῖν καὶ τῶν εἶδει· δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι
 πρὸς τὰ ἔξω τοῦ γένους οὐκ ἔστι διαφορά, τούτων
 δ' αὕτη μεγίστη), καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει πλείστον
 διαφέροντα ἐναντία (μεγίστη γὰρ διαφορά τούτων
 30 ἡ τέλειος), καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δεκτικῷ πλείστον
 διαφέροντα ἐναντία¹ (ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ἡ αὕτη τοῖς ἐναν-

¹ τὰναντία E¹J.

traries. But in every class the greatest thing is complete. For (a) that is greatest which cannot be exceeded, and (b) that is complete outside which nothing proper to it can be found. For complete difference implies an end, just as all other things are called complete because they imply an end. And ³ there is nothing beyond the end; for in everything the end is the last thing, and forms the boundary. Thus there is nothing beyond the end, and that which is complete lacks nothing.

From this argument, then, it is clear that contrariety is maximum difference; and since we speak of contraries in various senses, the sense of completeness will vary in accordance with the sense of contrariety which applies to the contraries.

This being so, evidently one thing cannot have ⁴ more than one contrary (since there can be nothing more extreme than the extreme, nor can there be more than two extremes of one interval); and in *general this is evident, if contrariety is difference,* and difference (and therefore complete difference) is between two things. One thing cannot have more than one contrary.

The other definitions of contraries must also be ⁵ true, for (i.) complete difference is the maximum difference; since (a) we can find nothing beyond it, whether things differ in genus or in species (for we have shown that difference in relation to things outside the genus is impossible; this is the maximum difference between them); and (b) the things which differ most in the same genus are contraries; for complete difference is the maximum difference between these. (ii.) The things which differ most ⁶ in the same receptive material are contraries; for contraries have the same matter. (iii.) The most

1055 a τίοις), καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν πλείστον
 διαφέροντα· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ ἐν γένος ἡ
 μία, ἐν οἷς ἡ τελεία διαφορὰ μεγίστη. Πρώτη
 δὲ ἐναντίωσις ἕξις καὶ στέρησις ἐστίν· οὐ πᾶσα δὲ
 33 στέρησις (πολλαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται ἡ στέρησις), ἀλλ'
 ἥτις ἂν τελεία ᾖ. τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐναντία κατὰ ταῦτα
 λεχθήσεται, τὰ μὲν τῷ ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν ἢ
 ποιητικὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ τῷ λήψειν εἶναι καὶ ἀπο-
 βολεῖν τούτων ἢ ἄλλων ἐναντίων. εἰ δὲ ἀντίκειται
 1055 b μὲν ἀντίφασις καὶ στέρησις καὶ ἐναντιότης καὶ τὰ
 πρὸς τι, τούτων δὲ πρῶτον ἀντίφασις, ἀντιφάσεως
 δὲ μηδὲν ἐστὶ μεταξύ, τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων ἐνδέχεται,
 ὅτι μὲν οὐ ταυτόν ἀντίφασις καὶ τὰναντία δηλον·
 ἡ δὲ στέρησις ἀντίφασίς τις ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ τὸ
 5 ἀδύνατον ὅλως ἔχειν, ἢ ὁ ἂν πεφυκὸς ἔχειν μὴ ἔχειν,
 ἐστέρηται ἢ ὅλως ἢ πῶς ἀφορισθέν· πολλαχῶς γὰρ
 ἡδὴ τοῦτο λέγομεν, ὥσπερ διήρηται ἡμῖν ἐν ἄλλοις.
 ὥστ' ἐστὶν ἡ στέρησις ἀντίφασίς τις ἢ ἀδυναμία
 διορισθεῖσα ἢ συνειλημμένη τῷ δεκτικῷ. διὸ
 ἀντιφάσεως μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶ μεταξύ, στέρησεως δὲ
 10 τινός ἐστιν· ἴσον μὲν γὰρ ἢ οὐκ ἴσον πᾶν, ἴσον δ'
 ἢ ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, μόνον ἐν τῷ δεκτικῷ
 τοῦ ἴσου. εἰ δὲ αἱ γενέσεις τῇ ὕλῃ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων,
 γίνονται δὲ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ εἶδους καὶ τῆς τοῦ εἶδους
 ἕξεως ἢ ἐκ στέρησεώς τινος τοῦ εἶδους καὶ τῆς

^a This is not a proper example of privation. Cf. V, xxii.

^b Ibid.

different things which come under the same faculty are contraries; for one science treats of one class of things, in which complete difference is the greatest.

"Positive state" and "privation" constitute 7
primary contrariety—not every form of privation Primary contrariety.
(for it has several senses), but any form which is complete. All other contraries must be so called with respect to these; some because they possess these, others because they produce them or are productive of them, and others because they are acquisitions or losses of these or other contraries. Now if the types of opposition are contradiction, 8
privation, contrariety and relation, and of these The forms of opposition.
the primary type is contradiction, and an intermediate is impossible in contradiction but possible between contraries, obviously contradiction is not Privation.
the same as contrariety; and privation is a form of contradiction; for it is either that which is totally 9
incapable of possessing some attribute,^a or that which would naturally possess some attribute but does not, that suffers privation—either absolutely or in some specified way. Here we already have several meanings, which we have distinguished elsewhere.^b Thus privation is a kind of contradiction or incapacity which is determinate or associated with the receptive material. This is why although there is no inter- 10
mediate in contradiction, there is one in some kinds of privation. For everything is either equal or not equal, but not everything is either equal or unequal; if it is, it is only so in the case of a material which admits of equality. If, then, processes of material generation start from the contraries, and proceed either from the form and the possession of the form, or from some privation of the form or shape, clearly

1053 b

- μορφῆς, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐναντίωσις στέρησις ἂν
 16 τις εἴη πᾶσα, ἡ δὲ στέρησις ἴσως οὐ πᾶσα ἐναν-
 τιότης. αἷτιον δ' ὅτι πολλαχῶς ἐνδέχεται ἐστερη-
 σθαι τὸ ἐστερημένον· ἐξ ὧν γὰρ αἱ μεταβολαὶ
 ἐσχάτων, ἐναντία ταῦτα. Φανερόν δὲ καὶ διὰ
 τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. πᾶσα γὰρ ἐναντίωσις ἔχει στέρησιν
 θάτερον¹ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως πάντα·
 20 ἀνισότης μὲν γὰρ ἰσότητος, ἀνομοιότης δὲ ὁμοιότη-
 τος, κακία δὲ ἀρετῆς. διαφέρει δὲ ὥσπερ εἶρηται·
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι μόνον ἢ ἐστερημένον, τὸ δ' εἶναι ἢ
 ποτὲ ἢ ἐν τινι, οἷον ἂν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ τινὶ ἢ τῷ κυρίῳ, ἢ
 πάντῃ. διὸ τῶν μὲν ἔστι μεταξύ, καὶ ἔστιν οὔτε
 ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος οὔτε κακός, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν,
 25 ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον. ἔτι τὰ μὲν
 ἔχει τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὠρισμένον, τὰ δ' οὔ. ὥστε
 φανερόν ὅτι αἰεὶ θάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων λέγεται
 κατὰ στέρησιν· ἀπόχρη δὲ καὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰ
 γένη τῶν ἐναντίων, οἷον τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ πολλά· τὰ γὰρ
 ἄλλα εἰς ταῦτα ἀνάγεται.
- 80 V. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν ἐνὶ² ἐναντίον, ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις
 πῶς ἀντίκειται τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ πολλά καὶ τὸ ἴσον τῷ
 μεγάλῳ καὶ τῷ μικρῷ. εἰ γὰρ τὸ³ πότερον αἰεὶ ἐν
 ἀντιθέσει λέγομεν, οἷον πότερον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν,
 καὶ πότερον λευκὸν ἢ οὐ λευκὸν (πότερον δὲ ἄνθρω-
 85 πος ἢ λευκὸν οὐ λέγομεν, εἰ μὴ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ
 ζητοῦντες, οἷον πότερον ἦλθε Κλέων ἢ Σωκράτης·
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν οὐδενὶ γένει τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 τοῦτο· ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀντικείμενα μόνον

¹ θατέρον EJ.² ἐνὶ ἐστὶν EJ.³ εἰ γὰρ τὸ A^b γρ. E Alexander (?): τὸ γὰρ EJ.

all contrariety must be a form of privation, although presumably not all privation is contrariety. This 11 is because that which suffers privation may suffer it in several senses ; for it is only the extremes from which changes proceed that are contraries.

This can also be shown by induction. Every contrariety involves privation as one of its contraries, but not always in the same way : inequality involves the privation of equality, dissimilarity that of similarity, evil that of goodness. And the differences are 12 as we have stated : one case is, if a thing is merely deprived ; another, if it is deprived at a certain time or in a certain part—*e.g.* at a certain age or in the important part—or entirely. Hence in some cases there is an intermediate (there are men who are neither good nor bad), and in others there is not—a thing must be either odd or even. Again, some have 13 a determinate subject, and others have not. Thus it is evident that one of a pair of contraries always has a privative sense ; but it is enough if this is true of the primary or generic contraries, *e.g.* unity and plurality ; for the others can be reduced to them.

V. Since one thing has one contrary, it might be asked in what sense unity is opposed to plurality, and the equal to the great and to the small. For if we always use the word "whether" in an antithesis—*e.g.*, "whether it is white or black," or "whether it is white or not" (but we do not ask "whether it is a man or white," unless we are proceeding upon some assumption, and asking, for instance, whether it was Cleon who came or Socrates. This is not a 2 necessary disjunction in any class of things, but is derived from the use in the case of opposites—for it is only opposites that cannot be true at the same

Problems connected with opposition. The opposition of "equal" to "greater" and "smaller."

1055 b

οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ὑπάρχειν· ᾧ καὶ ἐνταῦθα χρήται
 1056 a ἐν τῷ πρότερος ἦλθεν· εἰ γὰρ ἅμα ἐνεδέχετο, γελοῖον
 τὸ ἐρώτημα. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὕτως, ὁμοίως ἐμπίπτει εἰς
 ἀντίθεσιν, εἰς τὸ ἐν ἧ πολλά, οἷον πρότερον ἀμφό-
 τεροι ἦλθον ἢ ἄτερος)—εἰ δὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένους
 αἰ τοῦ ποτέρου ἢ ζήτησις, λέγεται δὲ πρότερον
 5 μείζον ἢ ἔλαττον, ἢ ἴσον, τίς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀντίθεσις πρὸς
 ταῦτα τοῦ ἴσου; οὔτε γὰρ θατέρῳ μόνῳ ἐναντίον
 οὗτ' ἀμφοῖν· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τῷ μείζονι ἢ τῷ ἐλάτ-
 τονι; ἔτι τῷ ἀνίσῳ ἐναντίον τὸ ἴσον· ὥστε πλείο-
 σιν ἔσται ἢ ἐνί. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον σημαίνει τὸ αὐτὸ
 10 ἅμα ἀμφοῖν, εἴη μὲν ἂν ἀντικείμενον ἀμφοῖν· καὶ
 ἡ ἀπορία βοηθεῖ τοῖς φάσκουσι τὸ ἄνισον δυάδα
 εἶναι. ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει ἐν δυοῖν ἐναντίον· ὅπερ
 ἀδύνατον.

Ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἴσον μεταξὺ φαίνεται μεγάλου
 καὶ μικροῦ, ἐναντίωσις δὲ μεταξὺ οὐδεμία¹ οὔτε
 φαίνεται οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ δυνατόν· οὐ γὰρ
 ἂν εἴη τελεία μεταξύ τινος οὔσα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
 15 ἔχει αἰ ἐαυτῆς τι μεταξύ. Λέπεται δὴ ἡ ὡς
 ἀπόφασιν ἀντικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς στέρησιν. θατέρου μὲν
 δὴ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦ μεγάλου
 ἢ μικροῦ; ἀμφοῖν ἄρα ἀπόφασις στερητική. διὸ
 καὶ πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω τὸ πρότερον λέγεται, πρὸς δὲ
 θάτερον οὐ, οἷον πρότερον μείζον ἢ ἴσον, ἢ πρότερον

¹ om. EJ.^a Held by the Platonists. Cf. XIV. i. 4, 5.

time—and we have this same use here in the question “which of the two came?” for if both alternatives were possible, the question would be absurd; but even so the question falls into an antithesis: that of “one” or “many”—*i.e.*, “whether both came, or one”)—if, then, the question “whether” is always 3 concerned with opposites, and we can ask “whether it is greater or smaller, or equal,” what is the nature of the antithesis between “equal” and “greater or smaller”? It is contrary neither to one only, nor to both: for (a) it is no more contrary to the greater than to the smaller; (b) “equal” is contrary to “unequal,” and thus it will be contrary to more than one thing; (c) if “unequal” means the same 4 as both “greater” and “smaller” at the same time, “equal” must still be opposed to them both. This difficulty supports the theory ^a that “the unequal” is a duality. But the result is that one thing is contrary to two; which is impossible.

Further, it is apparent that “equal” is inter- 5 mediate between “great” and “small,” but it is not apparent that any contrariety is intermediate, nor can it be, by definition; for it could not be complete if it were the intermediate of something, but rather it always has something intermediate between itself and the other extreme.

It remains, then, that it is opposed either as negation or as privation. Now it cannot be so opposed to one of the two, for it is no more opposed to the great than to the small. Therefore it is a 6 privative negation of both. For this reason we say “whether” with reference to both, and not to one of the two—*e.g.*, “whether it is greater or equal,” or “whether it is equal or smaller”; there are

1058 a

20 ἴσων ἢ ἔλαττον· ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τρία. οὐ στέρησις δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἴσον ὃ μὴ μείζον ἢ ἔλαττον, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς πέφυκεν ἐκεῖνα. Ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἴσον

τὸ μήτε μέγα μήτε μικρόν, πεφυκὸς δὲ ἢ μέγα ἢ μικρόν εἶναι· καὶ ἀντίκειται ἀμφοῖν ὡς ἀπόφασις στερητικῆς, διὸ καὶ μεταξύ ἐστίν. καὶ τὸ μήτε

25 ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν ἀντίκειται ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλ' ἀνώνυμον· πολλαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται ἐκάτερον καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ δεκτικόν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μήτε λευκὸν μήτε μέλαν. ἐν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο λέγεται, ἀλλ' ὠρισμένα πως τὰ χρώματα ἐφ' ὧν λέγεται στερητικῶς

30 ἢ ἀπόφασις αὕτη· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ φαιὸν ἢ ὠχρόν εἶναι ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι ἄλλο. Ὡστε οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶσιν οἱ νομίζοντες ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι πάντα,

ὥστε ἔσεσθαι ὑποδήματος καὶ χειρὸς μεταξύ τὸ μήτε ὑπόδημα μήτε χεῖρα, ἐπεὶ περὶ καὶ τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ὡς

33 πάντων ἐσομένου τινὸς μεταξύ. οὐκ ἀνάγκη δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀντικειμένων συναποφασίς ἐστίν ὧν ἔστι μεταξύ τι καὶ διάστημά τι

1058 b πέφυκεν εἶναι· τῶν δ' οὐκ ἔστι διαφορά· ἐν ἄλλῳ γὰρ γένει ὧν αἱ συναποφάσεις, ὥστ' οὐχ ἐν τῷ ὑποκείμενον.

VI. Ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις. εἰ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῷ ἐνὶ ἀπλῶς ἀντίκειται, συμβαίνει ἕνια ἀδύνατα. τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὀλίγον ἢ ὀλίγα ἔσται· τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ τοῖς

¹ εἴτερ E.

* Cf. iii. 8.

always three alternatives. But it is not a necessary privation; for not everything is equal which is not greater or smaller, but only things which would naturally have these attributes

The equal, then, is that which is neither great nor 7 small, but would naturally be either great or small; and it is opposed to both as a privative negation, and therefore is intermediate between them. And that which is neither good nor bad is opposed to both, but it has no name (for each of these terms has several meanings, and there is no one material which is receptive of both); that which is neither white nor black is better entitled to a name, although even this 8 has no single name, but the colours of which this negation is privatively predicated are to a certain extent limited; for it must be either grey or buff or something similar.

Therefore those persons are wrong in their criticism 9 who imagine that all terms are used analogously, so that that which is neither a shoe nor a hand will be intermediate between "shoe" and "hand," because that which is neither good nor bad is intermediate between good and bad—as though there must be an intermediate in all cases; but this does not necessarily follow. For the one is a joint negation 10 of opposites where there is an intermediate and a natural interval; but in the other case there is no question of difference, since the joint negation applies to things which are in different genera, and therefore the substrate is not one.^a

VI. A similar question might be raised about "one" and "many." For if "many" is absolutely opposed to "one," certain impossibilities result. The opposition of "one" to "many"
(1) One will be few; for "many" is also opposed to

1056 b

ὀλίγοις ἀντίκειται. ἔτι τὰ δύο πολλά, εἴπερ τὸ
 διπλάσιον πολλαπλάσιον, λέγεται δὲ κατὰ¹ τὰ δύο².
 ὥστε τὸ ἐν ὀλίγον· πρὸς τί γὰρ πολλά τὰ δύο εἰ
 μὴ πρὸς ἓν τε καὶ τὸ ὀλίγον; οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔστιν
 10 ἕλαττον. ἔτι εἰ³ ὡς ἐν μήκει τὸ μακρὸν καὶ βραχύ,
 οὕτως ἐν πλήθει τὸ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον, καὶ ὁ ἂν ἢ
 πολὺ καὶ πολλά, καὶ τὰ πολλά πολὺ (εἰ μὴ τι ἄρα
 διαφέρει ἐν συνεχεῖ εὐορίστῳ), τὸ ὀλίγον πληθὺς
 τι ἔσται. ὥστε τὸ ἐν πληθὺς τι, εἴπερ καὶ ὀλίγον·
 15 τοῦτο δὲ ἀνάγκη, εἰ τὰ δύο πολλά. ἀλλ' ἴσως τὰ
 πολλά λέγεται μὲν πως καὶ [τὸ]⁴ πολὺ, ἀλλ' ὡς
 διαφέρον, οἷον ὕδωρ πολὺ, πολλά δ' οὐ. ἀλλ' ὅσα
 διαιρετά, ἐν τούτοις λέγεται, ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ἓαν
 ἢ πληθὺς ἔχον ὑπεροχὴν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ πρὸς τι (καὶ
 τὸ ὀλίγον ὡσαύτως πληθὺς ἔχον ἔλλειψιν), τὸ δὲ
 20 ὡς ἀριθμός, ὃ καὶ ἀντίκειται τῷ ἐνὶ μόνον. οὕτως
 γὰρ λέγομεν ἐν ἢ πολλά, ὥσπερ εἴ τις εἴποι ἐν
 καὶ ἓνα ἢ λευκὸν καὶ λευκά, καὶ τὰ μεμετρημένα
 πρὸς τὸ μέτρον [καὶ τὸ μετρητόν].⁵ οὕτως καὶ τὰ
 πολλαπλάσια λέγεται· πολλά γὰρ ἕκαστος ὁ⁶ ἀρι-
 θμός ὅτι ἓνα καὶ ὅτι μετρητὸς ἐνὶ ἕκαστος, καὶ ὡς
 25 τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἐνί, οὐ τῷ ὀλίγῳ. οὕτως μὲν
 οὖν ἐστὶ πολλά καὶ τὰ δύο, ὡς δὲ πληθὺς ἔχον ὑπερ-
 οχὴν ἢ πρὸς τι ἢ ἀπλῶς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον.
 ὀλίγα δ' ἀπλῶς τὰ δύο· πληθὺς γὰρ ἔστιν ἔλλειψιν
 ἔχον πρῶτον (διὸ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπέστη Ἀναξ-

¹ καὶ A^b.² δύο διπλάσια A^b.³ om. A^b Γ Alexander.⁴ τὸ om. Alexander, secl. Bonitz.⁵ Jaeger.⁶ ὁ om. rec.^a i.e., a fluid, which cannot be described as "many."

"few." (2) Two will be many; since "twofold" ² is "manifold," and "twofold" is derived from two. Therefore one will be few; for in what relation can two be many if not in relation to one, which must therefore be few? for there can be nothing less. (3) If "much" and "little" are in plurality what "long" and "short" are in length, and if whatever is "much" is also "many," and "many" is "much" ³ (unless indeed there is a difference in the case of a plastic continuum^a), "few" will be a plurality. Therefore one will be a plurality, if it is few; and this necessarily follows if two is many. Presumably, however, although "many" in a sense means "much," there is a distinction; *e.g.*, water is called "much" but not "many." To all things, however, ⁴ which are divisible the term "many" is applicable: in one sense, if there is a plurality which involves excess either absolutely or relatively (and similarly "few" is a plurality involving defect); and in another in the sense of number, in which case it is opposed to "one" only. For we say "one or many" just as if we were to say "one and ones," or "white thing and white things," or were to compare the things measured with the measure. Multiples, too, are spoken of in this way; for every ⁵ number is "many," because it consists of "ones," and because every number is measurable by one; and also as being the opposite of one, and not of few. In this sense even two is many; but as a plurality involving excess either relatively or absolutely it is not many, but the first plurality. Two is, however, absolutely few; because it is the first plurality involving defect (hence Anaxagoras ⁶

^a Cf. I. iii. 9.

1056 b

αγόρας εἰπὼν ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν ἄπειρα
 80 καὶ πλήθει καὶ μικρότητι· ἔδει δ' εἰπεῖν ἀντὶ
 τοῦ "καὶ μικρότητι" "καὶ ὀλιγότητι". οὐ γὰρ
 ἄπειρα), ἐπεὶ τὸ ὀλίγον οὐ διὰ τὸ ἔν, ὥσπερ τινές
 φασιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ δύο. Ἀντίκειται δὴ τὸ ἔν
 καὶ τὰ πολλὰ τὰ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς ὡς μέτρον μετρητῶ·
 ταῦτα δὲ ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι, ὅσα μὴ καθ' αὐτὰ τῶν
 85 πρὸς τι. διήρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν ἄλλοις ὅτι διχῶς
 λέγεται τὰ πρὸς τι, τὰ μὲν ὡς ἐναντία, τὰ δ' ὡς
 1057 ἂ ἐπιστήμη πρὸς ἐπιστητόν, τῷ λέγεσθαι τι ἄλλο πρὸς
 αὐτό. Τὸ δὲ ἐν ἔλαττον εἶναι τινός, ὅλον τοῦν
 δυοῖν, οὐδὲν κωλύει· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἔλαττον καὶ ὀλίγον.
 τὸ δὲ πλήθος ὅλον γένος ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ· ἔστι
 γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πλήθος ἐνὶ μετρητόν. καὶ ἀντίκειται
 9 πῶς τὸ ἐν καὶ ἀριθμός, οὐχ ὡς ἐναντίον, ἀλλ'
 ὥσπερ εἴρηται τῶν πρὸς τι ἑνια· ἥ γὰρ μέτρον,
 τὸ δὲ μετρητόν, ταύτῃ ἀντίκειται. διὸ οὐ πᾶν ὁ
 ἂν ἥ ἐν ἀριθμός ἐστιν, ὅλον εἴ τι ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστιν.
 ὁμοίως δὲ λεγομένη ἡ ἐπιστήμη πρὸς τὸ ἐπιστητόν
 οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδωσιν· δόξειε μὲν γὰρ ἂν μέτρον
 10 ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐπιστητόν τὸ μετρούμενον,
 συμβαίνει δὲ ἐπιστήμην μὲν πᾶσαν ἐπιστητόν
 εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐπιστητόν μὴ πᾶν ἐπιστήμην, ὅτι
 τρόπον τινὰ ἡ ἐπιστήμη μετρεῖται τῷ ἐπιστητῷ.
 Τὸ δὲ πλήθος οὔτε τῷ ὀλίγῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ

^a sc. "and then the absurdity of his view would have been apparent, for," etc. Aristotle assumes that Anaxagoras meant "smallness" (μικρότης) to be the opposite of "multitude" (πλῆθος); but he meant just what he said—that the particles of which things consist are infinitely many

was not right in leaving the subject by saying "all things were together, infinite both in multitude and in smallness"; instead of "in smallness" he should have said "in fewness,"^a for things cannot be infinite in fewness), since fewness is constituted not by one, as some hold, but by two.

In the sphere of numbers "one" is opposed to "many" as the measure to the measurable, *i.e.*, as relative terms are opposed which are not of their own nature relative. We have distinguished elsewhere^b that things are called "relative" in two senses—either as being contraries, or as knowledge is related to the knowable, A being related to B because B is described in relation to A.

There is no reason why one should not be fewer⁸ than something, *e.g.* two; for if it is fewer it is not therefore few. Plurality is, as it were, a genus of number, since number is a plurality measurable by one. And in a sense one and number are opposed; not, however, as being contrary, but as we have said some relative terms to be; for it is *qua* measure and measurable that they are opposed. (Hence not⁹ everything which is one is a number—*e.g.*, a thing which is indivisible.) But although the relation between knowledge and the knowable is said to be similar to this, it turns out not to be similar. For it would seem that knowledge is a measure, and the knowable that which is measurable by it; but it happens that whereas all knowledge is knowable, the knowable is not always knowledge, because in a way knowledge is measured by the knowable.^c

Plurality is contrary neither to the few (whose 10

and infinitely small. See Bowman in *Class. Review* xxx. 42-44. ^b V. xv. 8, 9. ^c Cf. ch. i. 19.

μὲν τὸ πολὺν ὡς ὑπερέχον πληθὺς ὑπερεχομένῳ
 16 πληθῆναι, οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ πάντως· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ
 εἴρηται, ὅτι διαιρετὸν τὸ δ' ἀδιαίρετον, τὸ δ' ὡς
 πρὸς τι, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητῷ, ἐὰν ᾗ
 ἀριθμὸς τὸ δ' ἐν μέτρον.

VII. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τι
 μεταξύ καὶ ἐνίων ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων
 20 εἶναι τὰ μεταξύ· πάντα γὰρ τὰ μεταξύ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
 γένει ἔστι καὶ ὧν ἔστι μεταξύ. μεταξύ μὲν γὰρ
 ταῦτα λέγομεν εἰς ὅσα μεταβάλλειν ἀνάγκη πρό-
 τερον τὸ μεταβάλλον· οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπάτης ἐπὶ
 τὴν νήτην εἰ μεταβαίνει τῷ ὀλιγίστῳ, ἥξει πρό-
 τερον εἰς τοὺς μεταξύ φθόγγους· καὶ ἐν χρώμασιν
 25 εἰ [ἥξει]¹ ἐκ τοῦ λευκοῦ εἰς τὸ μέλαν, πρότερον ἥξει
 εἰς τὸ φοινικοῦν καὶ φαιὸν ἢ εἰς τὸ μέλαν· ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. μεταβάλλειν δ' ἐξ ἄλλου
 γένους εἰς ἄλλο γένος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμ-
 βεβηκός, οἷον ἐκ χρώματος εἰς σχῆμα. ἀνάγκη
 ἄρα τὰ μεταξύ καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ ὧν μεταξύ εἰσὶν ἐν
 30 τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι. Ἄλλὰ μὴν πάντα γε τὰ
 μεταξύ ἔστιν ἀντικειμένων τινῶν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ
 μόνων καθ' αὐτὰ ἔστι μεταβάλλειν. διὸ ἀδύνατον
 εἶναι μεταξύ μὴ ἀντικειμένων· εἴη γὰρ ἂν μετα-
 βολὴ καὶ μὴ ἐξ ἀντικειμένων. τῶν δ' ἀντικειμένων
 ἀντιφάσεως μὲν οὐκ ἔστι μεταξύ (τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστιν
 35 ἀντίφασις, ἀντίθεσις ἧς ὁτῶν θάτερον μῶριον
 πάρεστιν, οὐκ ἐχούσης οὐθὲν μεταξύ), τῶν δὲ
 λοιπῶν τὰ μὲν πρὸς τι, τὰ δὲ στέρησις, τὰ δὲ

¹ Christ.

real contrary is the many, as an excessive plurality to an exceeded plurality) nor in *all* senses to one ; but they are contrary in one sense (as has been said) as being the one divisible and the other indivisible ; and in another as being relative (just as knowledge is relative to the knowable) if plurality is a number and one is the measure.

VII. Since there can be, and in some cases is, ^{Inter-}an intermediate between contraries, ^{mediaten.}intermediates must be composed of contraries ; for all intermediates are in the same genus as the things between which they are intermediate. By intermediates we mean ²those things into which that which changes must first change. *E.g.*, if we change from the highest string to the lowest by the smallest gradations we shall first come to the intermediate notes ; and in the case of colours if we change from white to black we shall come to red and grey before we come to black ; and similarly in other cases. But change ³from one genus into another is impossible except accidentally ; *e.g.*, from colour to shape. Therefore intermediates must be in the same genus as one another and as the things between which they are intermediate.

But all intermediates are between certain opposites, for it is only from these *per se* that change is possible. Hence there can be no intermediate between things ⁴which are not opposites ; for then there would be change also between things which are not opposites. Of things which are opposites, contradiction has no intermediate term (for contradiction means this : an antithesis one term of which must apply to any given thing, and which contains no intermediate term) ; of the remaining types of opposites some

1057 a

ἐναντία ἐστίν. τῶν δὲ πρὸς τι ὅσα μὴ ἐναντία οὐκ ἔχει μεταξύ. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ

1057 b

γένοι ἐστίν· τί γὰρ ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἐπιστητοῦ μεταξύ; ἀλλὰ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἐν ταύτῳ γένοι τὰ μεταξύ, ὥσπερ δέδευκται, καὶ μεταξύ ἐναντίων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἐναντίων. ἢ γὰρ ἔσται τι γένος

s

αὐτῶν, ἢ οὐθέν. καὶ εἰ μὲν γένος ἔσται οὕτως ὥστ' εἶναι πρότερόν τι τῶν ἐναντίων, αἱ διαφοραὶ πρότεραι ἐναντίαι ἔσονται αἱ ποιήσασαι τὰ ἐναντία εἶδη ὡς γένους· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ γένους καὶ τῶν διαφορῶν τὰ εἶδη. οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν ἐναντία, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν διακριτικὸν χρῶμα τὸ δὲ

10

συγκριτικὸν χρῶμα, αὗται αἱ διαφοραὶ τὸ διακριτικὸν καὶ συγκριτικὸν πρότεραι· ὥστε ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις πρότερα. ἀλλὰ μὴν τά γε ἐναντίως διαφέροντα μᾶλλον ἐναντία, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καὶ τὰ μεταξύ ἐκ τοῦ γένους ἔσται καὶ τῶν διαφορῶν· οἷον ὅσα χρώματα τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανός

15

ἐστὶ μεταξύ, ταῦτα δεῖ ἐκ τοῦ γένους λέγεσθαι (ἔστι δὲ γένος τὸ χρῶμα) καὶ ἐκ διαφορῶν τινῶν. αὗται δὲ οὐκ ἔσονται τὰ πρῶτα ἐναντία· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔσται ἕκαστον ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν. ἕτεραι ἄρα μεταξύ ἄρα τῶν πρώτων ἐναντίων αὗται* ἔσονται, αἱ πρῶται δὲ διαφοραὶ τὸ διακριτικὸν καὶ συγκριτικόν. ὥστε ταῦτα πρῶτα ζητητέον ὅσα ἐναντία μὴ ἐν γένοι, ἐκ τίνος τὰ μεταξύ αὐτῶν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένοι ἐκ τῶν ἀσυνθέτων

* This is Plato's definition. Cf. *Timaeus* 67 D, E.

are relative, others privative, and others contrary. Those relative opposites which are not contrary 5 have no intermediate. The reason for this is that they are not in the same genus—for what is intermediate between knowledge and the knowable?—but between great and small there is an intermediate. Now since intermediates are in the same genus, as has been shown, and are between contraries, they must be composed of those contraries. For the contraries must either belong to a genus or not. And if there is a genus in such a way that it is some- 6 thing prior to the contraries, then the differentiae which constitute the contrary species (for species consist of genus and differentiae) will be contraries in a prior sense. *E.g.*, if white and black are con- 7 traries, and the one is a penetrative ^a and the other a compressive colour, these differentiae, “penetrative” and “compressive,” are prior, and so are opposed to each other in a prior sense. But it is the 8 species which have contrary differentiae that are more truly contraries; the other, *i.e.* intermediate, species will consist of genus and differentiae. *E.g.*, all colours which are intermediate between white and black should be described by their genus (*i.e.* colour) and by certain differentiae. But these differentiae 9 will not be the primary contraries; otherwise everything will be either white or black. Therefore they will be different from the primary contraries. Therefore they will be intermediate between them, and the primary differentiae will be “the penetrative” and “the compressive.” Thus we must first investigate the contraries which are not contained in a genus, and discover of what their intermediates are composed. For things which are in the same genus 10

1057 b

τῷ γένει συγκείσθαι ἢ ἀσύνθετα εἶναι. τὰ μὲν
οὖν ἐναντία ἀσύνθετα ἐξ ἀλλήλων, ὥστε ἀρχαί· τὰ
δὲ μεταξὺ ἢ πάντα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων
25 γίγνεται τι, ὥστ' ἔσται μεταβολή· εἰς τοῦτο πρὶν
ἢ εἰς αὐτά· ἐκατέρου γὰρ καὶ ἦττον ἔσται καὶ
μᾶλλον. μεταξὺ ἄρα ἔσται καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἐναντίων.
καὶ τᾶλλα ἄρα πάντα σύνθετα τὰ μεταξὺ· τὸ γὰρ
τοῦ μὲν μᾶλλον τοῦ δ' ἦττον σύνθετόν πως ἐξ
ἐκείνων ὧν λέγεται εἶναι τοῦ μὲν μᾶλλον τοῦ δ'
ἦττον. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερα πρότερα ὁμογενή
30 τῶν ἐναντίων, ἅπαντ' ἂν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εἴη τὰ
μεταξὺ. ὥστε καὶ τὰ κάτω πάντα, καὶ τὰναντία
καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ, ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐναντίων ἔσονται.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ἐν τε ταύτῳ γένει πάντα
καὶ μεταξὺ ἐναντίων καὶ σύγκειται ἐκ τῶν ἐναν-
τίων πάντα,¹ δῆλον.

35 VIII. Τὸ δ' ἕτερον τῷ εἶδει τινός τι ἕτερόν ἐστι,
καὶ δεῖ τοῦτο ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν· οἷον εἰ ζῶον ἕτερον
τῷ εἶδει, ἄμφω ζῶα. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐν γένει τῷ
αὐτῷ εἶναι τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον
1058 a γένος καλῶ, ὃ² ἀμφω ἐν ταύτῳ λέγεται, μὴ κατὰ
συμβεβηκὸς ἔχον διαφοράν, εἴθ' ὥς ὕλη ὅν εἴτ'

¹ ἅπαντα A^b.² ὁ A^b; ᾧ Bekker.

must either be composed of differentiae which are not compounded with the genus, or be incomposite. Contraries are not compounded with one another, and are therefore first principles; but intermediates are either all incomposite or none of them. Now from the contraries something is generated in such a way that change will reach it before reaching the contraries themselves (for there must be something which is less in degree than one contrary and greater than the other). Therefore this also will be intermediate between the contraries. Hence all the 11 other intermediates must be composite; for that which is greater in degree than one contrary and less than the other is in some sense a compound of the contraries of which it is said to be greater in degree than one and less than the other. And since there is nothing else homogeneous which is prior to the contraries, all intermediates must be composed of contraries. Therefore all the lower 12 terms, both contraries and intermediates, must be composed of the primary contraries. Thus it is clear that intermediates are all in the same genus, and are between contraries, and are all composed of contraries.

VIII. That which is "other in species" than something else is "other" in respect of something; and that something must apply to both. *E.g.*, if an animal is other in species than something else, they must both be animals. Hence things which are other in species must be in the same genus. The sort of thing I mean by "genus" is that in virtue of which two things are both called the same one thing; and which is not accidentally differentiated, whether regarded as matter or otherwise. For not 2

The meaning of "other in species."

1058 a

- ἄλλως. οὐ μόνον γὰρ δεῖ τὸ κοινὸν ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ἄμφω ζῶα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἑκατέρῳ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἵππον τὸ δὲ ἄνθρωπον·
 6 διὸ¹ τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν ἕτερον ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ τῷ εἶδει. ἔσται δὴ καθ' αὐτὰ τὸ μὲν τοιονδί ζῶον τὸ δὲ τοιονδί, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἵππος τὸ δ' ἄνθρωπος. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην ἑτερότητα τοῦ γένους εἶναι (λέγω γὰρ γένους διαφορὰν ἑτερότητα ἢ ἕτερον ποιεῖ τοῦτο αὐτό). ἐναντίωσις τοῖνυν ἐστὶ αὕτη. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.
 10 πάντα γὰρ διαιρεῖται τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις, καὶ ὅτι τὰναντία ἐν ταύτῳ γένει, δέδεικται· ἢ γὰρ ἐναντιότης ἦν διαφορὰ τελεία. ἢ δὲ διαφορὰ ἢ εἶδει πᾶσα τινός τι· ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό τε καὶ γένος ἐπ' ἄμφοιν (διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ συστοιχίᾳ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία τῆς κατηγορίας, ὅσα εἶδει διάφορα καὶ μὴ
 15 γένει, ἑτερά τε ἀλλήλων μάλιστα· τελεία γὰρ ἢ διαφορὰ, καὶ ἅμα ἀλλήλοις οὐ γίννεται)· ἢ ἄρα διαφορὰ ἐναντίωσις ἐστίν. Τοῦτο ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐτέροις εἶναι τῷ εἶδει, τὸ ἐν ταύτῳ γένει ὄντα ἐναντίωσιν ἔχειν ἄτομα ὄντα (ταῦτά δὲ τῷ εἶδει, ὅσα μὴ ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν ἄτομα ὄντα)· ἐν γὰρ τῇ
 20 διαιρέσει καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεταξὺ γίννονται ἐναντιώσεις πρὶν εἰς τὰ ἄτομα ἐλθεῖν. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι πρὸς

¹ διὰ recc.

* Aristotle does not use induction to prove his point; indeed he does not prove it at all.

^b In ch. iv.

^c Or "category."

^d i.e., indivisible species and individuals.

only must the common quality belong to both, *e.g.*, that they are both animals, but the very animality of each must be different; *e.g.*, in one case it must be equinity and in the other humanity. Hence the common quality must for one be other in species than that which it is for the other. They must be, then, of their very nature, the one *this* kind of animal, and the other *that*; *e.g.*, the one a horse and the other a man. Therefore this difference must be "otherness of genus" (I say "otherness of genus" because by "difference of genus" I mean an "otherness" which makes the genus itself other); this, then, will be a form of contrariety. This is obvious by induction.^a For all differentiation is by opposites, and we have shown^b that contraries are in the same genus, because contrariety was shown to be complete difference. But difference in species is always difference from something in respect of something; therefore this is the same thing, *i.e.* the genus, for both. (Hence too all contraries^c which differ in species but not in genus are in the same line of predication,^d and are other than each other in the highest degree; for their difference is complete, and they cannot come into existence simultaneously.) Hence the difference is a form of contrariety.

To be "other in species," then, means this: to be in the same genus and involve contrariety, while being indivisible (and "the same in species"^e applies to all things which do not involve contrariety, while being indivisible); for it is in the course of differentiation and in the intermediate terms that contrariety appears, before we come to the indivisibles.^f Thus it is evident that in relation^g

1058 ^a τὸ καλούμενον¹ γένος οὔτε ταὐτὸν οὔτε ἕτερον
 τῷ εἶδει οὐθέν ἐστι τῶν ὡς γένους εἰδῶν (προσ-
 ηκόντως². ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ἀποφάσει δηλοῦται, τὸ δὲ γένος
 ὕλη οὐ λέγεται γένος, μὴ ὡς τὸ τῶν Ἑρακλειδῶν,
 25 ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει), οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν ταύτῳ
 γένει, ἀλλὰ διοίσει τῷ γένει ἐκείνων, εἶδει δὲ τῶν
 ἐν ταύτῳ γένει. ἐναντίωσιν γὰρ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν
 διαφορὰν οὐ διαφέρει εἶδει· αὕτη δ' ὑπάρχει τοῖς
 ἐν ταύτῳ τῷ γένει οὔσι μόνοις.

IX. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις διὰ τί γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς οὐκ
 30 εἶδει διαφέρει, ἐναντίου τοῦ θήλεος καὶ τοῦ ἄρρενος
 ὄντος, τῆς δὲ διαφορᾶς ἐναντιώσεως· οὐδὲ ζῶον
 θῆλυ καὶ ἄρρεν ἕτερον τῷ εἶδει, καίτοι καθ' αὐτὸ
 τοῦ ζώου αὕτη ἡ διαφορὰ καὶ οὐχ ὡς λευκότης ἢ
 μελανία, ἀλλ' ἢ ζῶον καὶ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν
 ὑπάρχει. ἔστι δ' ἡ ἀπορία αὕτη σχεδὸν ἢ αὕτη
 35 καὶ διὰ τί ἡ μὲν ποιεῖ τῷ εἶδει ἕτερα ἐναντίωσις,
 ἡ δ' οὐ, οἷον τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ πτερωτόν, λευκότης
 δὲ καὶ μελανία οὔ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν οἰκεῖα πάθη τοῦ
 1058 ^b γένους, τὰ δ' ἥττον; καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἔστι τὸ μὲν λόγος
 τὸ δ' ὕλη, ὅσαι μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶν ἐναντιότητες
 εἶδει ποιοῦσι διαφορὰν, ὅσαι δ' ἐν τῷ συνελημ-
 μένῳ τῇ ὕλῃ οὐ ποιοῦσιν. διὸ ἀνθρώπου λευκότης
 οὐ ποιεῖ οὐδὲ μελανία, οὐδὲ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου
 5 ἐστὶ διαφορὰ κατ' εἶδος πρὸς μέλανα ἄνθρωπον,
 οὐδ' ἂν ὄνομα ἐν τεθῇ. ὡς ὕλη γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος,

¹ καλούμενον ὡς A^b: καθόλου ὡς uel κατηγορούμενον Bonitz.

² προσηκόντων JΓ.

to what is called genus no species is either the same or other in species (and this is as it should be, for the matter is disclosed by negation, and the genus is the matter of that of which it is predicated as genus; not in the sense in which we speak of the genus or clan of the Heraclidae,^a but as we speak of a genus in nature); nor yet in relation to things which are not in the same genus. From the latter it will differ in genus, but in species from things which are in the same genus. For the difference of things which differ in species must be a contrariety; and this belongs only to things which are in the same genus.

IX. The question might be raised as to why woman does not differ in species from man, seeing that female is contrary to male, and difference is contrariety; and why a female and a male animal are not other in species, although this difference belongs to "animal" *per se*, and not as whiteness or blackness does; "male" and "female" belong to it *qua* animal. This problem is practically the same ² as "why does one kind of contrariety (*e.g.* "footed" and "winged") make things other in species, while another (*e.g.* whiteness and blackness) does not?" The answer may be that in the one case the attributes are peculiar to the genus, and in the other they are less so; and since one element is formula and the other matter, contraries in the formula produce difference in species, but contraries in the concrete whole do not. Hence the whiteness ³ or blackness of a man does not produce this, nor is there any specific difference between a white man and a black man; not even if one term is assigned to each. For we are now regarding "man" as

What constitutes
"otherness
in species"?

1068 b

οὐ ποιεῖ δὲ διαφορὰν ἢ ὕλη· οὐδ' ¹ ἀνθρώπου γὰρ εἶδη εἰσὶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τοῦτο, καίτοι ἕτεροι αἱ σάρκες καὶ τὰ ὀστέα ἐξ ὧν ὅδε καὶ ὅδε· ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον ἕτερον μὲν, εἶδει δ' οὐχ ἕτερον, ὅτι ἐν τῷ
 10 λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντίωσις· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἄτομον. ὁ δὲ Καλλίας ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος μετὰ τῆς ὕλης· καὶ ὁ λευκὸς δὴ ἄνθρωπος ὅτι Καλλίας λευκός· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λευκός. οὐδὲ χαλκοῦς δὴ κύκλος καὶ ξύλινος, οὐδὲ τρίγωνον χαλκοῦν καὶ κύκλος ξύλινος, οὐ διὰ τὴν ὕλην
 15 εἶδει διαφέρουσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἔνεστιν ἐναντίωσις.

Πότερον δ' ἡ ὕλη οὐ ποιεῖ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει, οὐσά πως ἑτέρα, ἢ ἔστιν ὡς ποιεῖ; διὰ τί γὰρ ὁδὶ ὁ ἵππος τουδὶ (τοῦ) ² ἀνθρώπου ἕτερος τῷ εἶδει; καίτοι σὺν τῇ ὕλῃ οἱ λόγοι αὐτῶν. ἢ ὅτι ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐναντίωσις; καὶ γὰρ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ μέλανος ἵππου. καὶ ἔστι γε
 20 εἶδει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ ὁ μὲν λευκὸς ὁ δὲ μέλας, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ ἄμφω λευκὰ ἦν, ὁμοίως ἂν ἦν εἶδει ἕτερα. Τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν καὶ θήλυ τοῦ ζώου οἰκεία μὲν πάθη, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τῷ σώματι. διὸ τὸ αὐτὸ σπέρμα θήλυ ἢ ἄρρεν γίγνεται παθόν τι πάθος.

25 Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ τῷ εἶδει ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν διαφέρει εἶδει τὰ δ' οὐ, εἴρηται.

¹ αὐδ' J: οὐδὲν A^b: οὐκ E.² Ross.

matter, and matter does not produce difference ; and for this reason, too, individual men are not species of " man," although the flesh and bones of which this and that man consist are different. The concrete whole is " other," but not " other in species," because there is no contrariety in the formula, and this is the ultimate indivisible species. But Callias is 4 definition *and* matter. Then so too is " white man," because it is the individual, Callias, who is white. Hence " man " is only white accidentally. Again, a bronze circle and a wooden one do not differ in species ; and a bronze triangle and a wooden circle differ in species not because of their matter, but because there is contrariety in their formulae.

But does not matter, when it is " other " in a 5 particular way, make things " other in species " ? Probably there is a sense in which it does. Otherwise why is this particular horse " other in species " than this particular man, although the definitions involve matter ? Surely it is because there is contrariety in the definition, for so there also is in " white man " and " black horse " ; and it is a contrariety in species, but not because one is white and the other black ; for even if they had both been white, they would still be " other in species."

" Male " and " female " are attributes peculiar to 6 the animal, but not in virtue of its substance ; they are material or physical. Hence the same semen may, as the result of some modification, become either female or male.

We have now stated what " to be other in species " means, and why some things differ in species and others do not.

X. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει, τὸ δὲ φθαρτὸν καὶ τὸ ἀφθαρτὸν ἐναντία (στέρησις γὰρ ἀδυναμία διωρισμένη), ἀνάγκη ἕτερον εἶναι τῷ γένει τὸ φθαρτὸν καὶ τὸ ἀφθαρτὸν. νῦν μὲν οὖν
 80 ἐπ' αὐτῶν εἰρήκαμεν τῶν καθόλου ὀνομάτων, ὥστε δόξειεν ἂν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὅτι οὖν ἀφθαρτὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν ἕτερα εἶναι τῷ εἶδει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι καὶ ἄμα, εἰ ἢ τῶν καθόλου, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἴη ἂν καὶ λευκὸς καὶ μέλας, καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· εἴη γὰρ
 85 ἂν μὴ ἄμα ὁ αὐτὸς λευκὸς καὶ μέλας· καίτοι ἐναντίον τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι. ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει ἐνίοις, οἷον καὶ
 1058 a τὰ νῦν εἰρημμένα καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατον, ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ φθαρτὸν καὶ τὸ ἀφθαρτὸν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ φθαρτὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται μὴ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ φθαρτὸν τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπαρχόντων ἐστὶν οἷς ὑπάρχει· ἢ
 90 ἔσται ταῦτό καὶ ἐν φθαρτὸν καὶ ἀφθαρτὸν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ τὸ φθαρτὸν. ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἄρα ἢ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν τὸ φθαρτὸν ἐκάστω τῶν φθαρτῶν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀφθάρτου· τῶν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπαρχόντων ἅμφω. ἢ ἄρα καὶ καθ' ὁ πρῶτον τὸ
 10 μὲν φθαρτὸν τὸ δ' ἀφθαρτὸν, ἔχει ἀντίθεσιν, ὥστε ἀνάγκη γένει ἕτερα εἶναι. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι εἶδη τοιαῦτα οἷα λέγουσί τινες· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ μὲν φθαρτὸς ὁ δ' ἄ-

* It appears that in this chapter (apart from § 5, which may be a later addition) the terms *εἶδος* and *γένος* are used in a non-technical sense. Cf. Ross on 1058 b 28.

X. Since contraries are other in form,^a and "the perishable" and "imperishable" are contraries (for privation is a definite incapacity), "the perishable" must be "other in kind" than "the imperishable." But so far we have spoken only of the universal terms; and so it might appear to be unnecessary that *anything* perishable and imperishable should be "other in form," just as in the case of white and black. For the same thing may be both at the same time, if it is a universal (e.g., "man" may be both white and black); and it may still be both if it is a particular, for the same person may be white and black, although not at the same time. Yet white is contrary to black. But although some contraries (e.g. those which we have just mentioned, and many others) can belong to certain things accidentally, others cannot; and this applies to "the perishable" and "the imperishable." Nothing is accidentally perishable; for that which is accidental may not be applicable; but perishability is an attribute which applies necessarily when it is applicable at all. Otherwise one and the same thing will be imperishable as well as perishable, if it is possible for perishability not to apply to it. Thus perishability must be either the substance or in the substance of every perishable thing. The same argument also applies to the imperishable; for both perishability and imperishability are attributes which are necessarily applicable. Hence the characteristics in respect of which and in direct consequence of which one thing is perishable and another imperishable are opposed; and therefore they must be other in kind. Thus it is obvious that there cannot be Forms such as some thinkers

Difference in kind between perishable and imperishable things

ARISTOTLE

1059 a

φθαρτος. καίτοι τῷ εἶδει ταῦτά λέγεται εἶναι τὰ
εἶδη τοῖς τισὶ καὶ οὐχ ὁμώνυμα· τὰ δὲ γένει
ἕτερα πλεῖον διέστηκεν ἢ τὰ εἶδει.

^a i.e., the individual man is perishable and the Idea of man imperishable; and these must be other in kind (γένει non-technical). But the Platonists hold that the Idea is the same

METAPHYSICS, X. x. 5

and an imperishable "man." ^a Yet the Forms are said to be the same in species as the particulars, and not merely to share a common predicate with them; but things which are other in genus differ more widely than things which are other in species.

in species as the particular. This is impossible if it is other in genus (*γενει* technical).

I. "Οτι μὲν ἡ σοφία περὶ ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη τίς
 ἐστι, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐν οἷς διηπόρηται πρὸς
 20 τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων εἰρημένα περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν.
 ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πότερον μίαν ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι
 δεῖ τὴν σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην ἢ πολλὰς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
 μίαν, μία γ' ἐστὶν αἰ τῶν ἐναντίων· αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ
 οὐκ ἐναντίαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ μία, ποίας δεῖ θεῖναι
 ταύτας; "Ἐτι τὰς ἀποδεικτικὰς ἀρχὰς θεωρῆσαι
 30 μιᾶς ἢ πλειόνων; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μιᾶς, τί μᾶλλον
 ταύτης ἢ ὁποιασοῦν; εἰ δὲ πλειόνων, ποίας δεῖ
 ταύτας θεῖναι; "Ἐτι πότερον πασῶν τῶν οὐσιῶν
 ἢ οὐ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ πασῶν, ποίων χαλεπὸν ἀπο-
 δοῦναι· εἰ δὲ πασῶν μία, ἄδηλον πῶς ἐνδέχεται
 πλειόνων τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. "Ἐτι πότε-
 80 ρον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας μόνον ἢ καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα¹;
 εἰ γὰρ περὶ γε τὰ συμβεβηκότα ἀπόδειξις ἐστίν,
 περὶ τὰς οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστιν· εἰ δὲ ἑτέρα, τίς
 ἑκάτερα καὶ ποτέρα σοφία; ἢ² μὲν γὰρ ἀπο-

¹ συμβεβηκότα ἀπόδειξις ἐστίν EJ Alexander: om. A^b.

² ἢ . . . ἢ Luthe: ἢ . . . ἢ codd.

^a I. iii.-x.

^b Cf. III. i. 5, ii. 1-10.

^c Cf. III. i. 5, ii. 10-15, where the problem takes a slightly different form.

^d Cf. III. i. 6, ii. 15-17.

^e Cf. III. i. 8-10, ii. 18-19.

BOOK XI

I. That Wisdom is a science of first principles is clear from our introductory remarks,^a in which we raised objections to the statements of other thinkers about the first principles. It might be asked, however, whether we should regard Wisdom as one science or as more than one.^b If as one, it may be objected that the objects of one science are always contraries ; but the first principles are not contraries. And if it is not one, what sort of sciences are we to suppose them to be ?

see I., with
Summary
of Books
III., IV. and
VI. see, I, II
The main
problems
of Meta-
physics.

Again, is it the province of one science, or of more than one, to study the principles of demonstration ?^c If of one, why of it rather than of any other ? And if of more than one, of what sort are we to suppose them to be ?

Again, are we to suppose that Wisdom deals with all substances or not ?^d If not with all, it is hard to lay down with what kind it does deal ; while if there is one science of them all, it is not clear how the same science can deal with more than one subject.

Again, is this science concerned only with substances, or with attributes as well ?^e For if it is a demonstration of attributes, it is not concerned with substances ; and if there is a separate science of each, what is each of these sciences, and which of them is Wisdom ? *Qua* demonstrative, the science of attri-

1059 a

δεικτική σοφία ἢ περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα, ἥ¹ δὲ περὶ
τὰ πρῶτα ἢ τῶν οὐσιῶν. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τὰς

35 ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς εἰρημέναις αἰτίας τὴν ἐπιζητου-
μένην² ἐπιστήμην θετόν· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τὸ οὐ
ἔνεκεν· τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τοῖς
πρακτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν κινήσει· καὶ
τοῦτο πρῶτον κινεῖ (τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ τέλος), τὸ
δὲ πρῶτον κινήσαν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις.
ὅλως δ' ἀπορίαν ἔχει πότερόν ποτε περὶ τὰς

1059 b

αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ἢ ζητουμένη νῦν ἐπιστήμη
ἢ οὐ, περὶ δέ τινος ἐτέρας. εἰ γὰρ περὶ ἄλλας,
ἢ περὶ τὰ εἶδη εἴη ἂν ἢ περὶ τὰ μαθηματικά. τὰ
μὲν γὰρ εἶδη ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον· ὁμῶς δὲ ἀπο-
ρίαν ἔχει, καὶ εἶναι τις αὐτὰ θῆ, διὰ τί ποτ' οὐχ

5 ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ
τῶν ἄλλων ὧν ἔστιν εἶδη· λέγω δ' ὅτι τὰ μαθη-
ματικά μὲν μεταξὺ τε τῶν εἰδῶν τιθέασιν καὶ τῶν
αἰσθητῶν ὅσον τρίτα τινὰ παρὰ τὰ εἶδη τε καὶ τὰ
δεῦρο, τρίτος δ' ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν αὐδ' ἵππος
παρ' αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς καθ' ἕκαστον· εἰ δ' αὖ μή
10 ἔστιν ὡς λέγουσι, περὶ ποῖα θετόν πραγματεύεσθαι
τὸν μαθηματικόν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ περὶ τὰ δεῦρο· τού-
των γὰρ οὐθέν ἐστιν ὅσον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ζητοῦσι
τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. οὐδὲ μὴν περὶ τὰ μαθηματικά ἢ
ζητουμένη νῦν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη· χωριστὸν γὰρ
αὐτῶν οὐθέν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσιῶν
φθαρταὶ γάρ.

¹ ἥ . . . ἥ . . . Luthe: ἡ . . . ἡ codd.

² ζητουμένη EJ.

^a *Physics* II. iii.

^b Cf. III. i. 7, ii. 20-30.

^c This phrase has no technical sense here; cf. I. ix. 4.

butes appears to be Wisdom ; but *qua* concerned with that which is primary, the science of substances.

Nor must we suppose that the science which we are 4 seeking is concerned with the causes described in the *Physics*.^a It is not concerned with the final cause ; for this is the Good, and this belongs to the sphere of action and to things which are in motion ; and it is this which first causes motion (for the *end* is of this nature) ; but there is no Prime Mover in the sphere of immovable things. And in general it is a difficult 5 question whether the science which we are now seeking is concerned with sensible substances, or not with sensible substances, but with some other kind ^b If with another kind, it must be concerned either with the Forms or with mathematical objects. Now clearly the Forms do not exist. (But nevertheless, even if we posit them, it is a difficult question as to why the same rule does not apply to the other things of which there are Forms as applies to the objects of mathematics. I mean that they posit the objects of 6 mathematics as intermediate between the Forms and sensible things, as a third class besides the Forms and the things of our world ; but there is no " third man " ^c or " horse " besides the Ideal one and the particulars. If on the other hand it is not as they make out, what sort of objects are we to suppose to be the concern of the mathematician ? Not surely the things of our world ; for none of these is of the kind which the mathematical sciences investigate.) Nor indeed is the science which we are now seeking 7 concerned with the objects of mathematics ; for none of them can exist separately. But it does not deal with sensible substances either ; for they are perishable.

1059 b

15 "Ὅλως δ' ἀπορήσειέ τις ἂν ποίας ἐστιν ἐπιστήμης τὸ διαπορῆσαι περὶ τῆς τῶν μαθηματικῶν ὕλης. οὔτε γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἔχοντα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως τὴν τοῦ φυσικοῦ πᾶσαν εἶναι πραγματείαν, οὐδὲ μὴν τῆς σκοπούσης περὶ ἀποδείξεώς τε καὶ
20 ἐπιστήμης· περὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ γένος τὴν ζήτησιν ποιεῖται. λείπεται τοίνυν τὴν προκειμένην φιλοσοφίαν περὶ αὐτῶν τὴν σκέψιν ποιείσθαι.

Διαπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις εἰ δεῖ θεῖναι τὴν ζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τὰ καλούμενα ὑπὸ τινων στοιχεῖα· ταῦτα δὲ πάντες ἐνυπάρχοντα τοῖς
25 συνθέτοις τιθέασιν. μᾶλλον δ' ἂν δόξειε τῶν καθόλου δεῖν εἶναι τὴν ζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην· πᾶς γὰρ λόγος καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐσχάτων, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν οὕτω τῶν πρώτων γενῶν. ταῦτα δὲ γίνονται ἂν τό τε ὄν καὶ τὸ ἔν· ταῦτα γὰρ μάλιστ' ἂν ὑποληφθείη περιέχειν τὰ
30 ὄντα πάντα καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχαῖς εἰκέναι διὰ τὸ εἶναι· πρώτα τῇ φύσει· φθαρέντων γὰρ αὐτῶν συναναιρεῖται καὶ τὰ λοιπά· πᾶν γὰρ ὄν καὶ ἔν. ἥ δὲ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη μετέχειν εἰ θήσει τις αὐτὰ γένη, διαφορὰ δ' οὐδεμία τοῦ γένους μετέχει, ταύτῃ δ' οὐκ ἂν δόξειε δεῖν αὐτὰ τιθέναι
35 γένῃ οὐδ' ἀρχάς. ἔτι δ' εἰ μᾶλλον ἀρχὴ τὸ ἀπλούστερον τοῦ ἡττον τοιούτου, τὰ δ' ἐσχάτα τῶν ἐκ τοῦ γένους ἀπλούστερα τῶν γενῶν (ἄτομα

¹ πᾶν A^b Alexander (?): πάντα E.J.

* i.e., intelligible matter (cf. VII. x. 18). This problem is not raised in Book III.

* Cf. III. i. 10, iii.

In general the question might be raised, to what science it pertains to discuss the problems concerned with the matter ^a of mathematical objects. It is not ⁸ the province of physics, because the whole business of the physicist is with things which contain in themselves a principle of motion and rest; nor yet of the science which inquires into demonstration and scientific knowledge, for it is simply this sort of thing which forms the subject of its inquiry. It remains, therefore, that it is the science which we have set ourselves to find that treats of these subjects.

One might consider the question whether we should ⁹ regard the science which we are now seeking as dealing with the principles which by some are called elements.^b But everyone assumes that these are present in composite things; and it would seem rather that the science which we are seeking must be concerned with universals, since every formula and every science is of universals and not of ultimate species; so that in this case it must deal with the primary genera. These would be Being and Unity; ¹⁰ for these, if any, might best be supposed to embrace all existing things, and to be most of the nature of first principles, because they are by nature primary; for if they are destroyed, everything else is destroyed with them, since everything exists and is one. But ¹¹ inasmuch as, if Being and Unity are to be regarded as genera, they must be predicable of their differentiae, whereas no genus is predicable of any of its differentiae, from this point of view it would seem that they should be regarded neither as genera nor as principles. Further, since the more simple is more nearly ¹² a principle than the less simple, and the ultimate subdivisions of the genus are more simple than the

1059 b

γάρ), τὰ γένη δ' εἰς εἶδη πλείω καὶ διαφέροντα
 διαιρεῖται, μᾶλλον ἂν ἀρχὴ δόξειεν εἶναι τὰ εἶδη
 τῶν γενῶν. ἥ δὲ συναναιρεῖται τοῖς γένεσι τὰ
 1060 a εἶδη, τὰ γένη ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἔοικε μᾶλλον· ἀρχὴ γὰρ
 τὸ συναναιροῦν. τὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχοντα
 ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν ἕτερα.

II. Ἐτι πότερον δεῖ τιθέναι τι παρὰ τὰ καθ'
 ἕκαστα ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ τούτων ἢ ζητουμένη ἐπιστήμη;
 5 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἄπειρα. τά γε μὴν παρὰ τὰ καθ'
 ἕκαστα γένη ἢ εἶδη ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' οὐδετέρου τούτων
 ἢ ζητουμένη νῦν ἐπιστήμη· διότι γὰρ ἀδύνατον
 τοῦτο, εἶρηται. καὶ γὰρ ὅλως ἀπορίαν ἔχει πότερον
 δεῖ τινὰ ὑπολαβεῖν οὐσίαν εἶναι χωριστὴν παρὰ
 τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰς δεῦρο, ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ
 10 ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ ὄντα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν σοφίαν
 ὑπάρχειν. ζητεῖν μὲν γὰρ εἰκόκαμεν ἄλλην τινά,
 καὶ τὸ προκείμενον τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡμῖν, λέγω δὲ τὸ
 ἰδεῖν εἴ τι χωριστὸν καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μηδενὶ τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν ὑπάρχον. ἔτι δ' εἰ παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς
 οὐσίας ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία, παρὰ ποίας τῶν
 15 αἰσθητῶν δεῖ τιθέναι ταύτην εἶναι; τί γὰρ μᾶλλον
 παρὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ τοὺς ἵππους ἢ τῶν ἄλλων
 ζώων θήσει τις αὐτὴν ἢ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ὅλως; τό
 γε μὴν ἴσας ταῖς αἰσθηταῖς καὶ φθαρταῖς οὐσίαις

^a Cf. III. i. 11, iv. 1-8.

^b Ch. i. 11-13.

genera (because they are indivisible), and the genera are divided into a number of different species, it would seem that species are more nearly a principle than genera. On the other hand, inasmuch as 13 species are destroyed together with their genera, it seems more likely that the genera are principles; because that which involves the destruction of something else is a principle. These and other similar points are those which cause us perplexity.

II. Again, ought we to assume the existence of something else besides particular things, or are they the objects of the science which we are seeking? ^a It is true that they are infinite in number; but then the things which exist besides particulars are genera or species, and neither of these is the object of the science which we are now seeking. We have explained ^b why this is impossible. Indeed, in general ² it is a difficult question whether we should suppose that there is some substance which exists separately besides sensible substances (*i.e.* the substances of our world), or that the latter constitute reality, and that it is with them that Wisdom is concerned. It *seems* that we are looking for some other kind of substance, and that this is the object of our undertaking: I mean, to see whether there is anything which exists separately and independently, and does not appertain to any sensible thing. But again, if ³ there is another kind of substance besides sensible substances, to what kind of sensible things are we to suppose that it corresponds? Why should we suppose that it corresponds to men or horses rather than to other animals, or even to inanimate objects in general? And yet to manufacture a set of eternal substances equal in number to those which are

αἰδίους ἐτέρας κατασκευάζειν ἐκτὸς τῶν εὐλόγων
 δόξειεν ἂν πίπτειν. εἰ δὲ μὴ χωριστὴ τῶν σω-
 20 μάτων ἢ ζητουμένη νῦν ἐστὶν ἀρχή, τίνα ἂν τις
 ἄλλην θεῖη μᾶλλον¹ τῆς ὕλης; αὕτη γε μὴν
 ἐνεργεία μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, δυνάμει δ' ἔστιν. μᾶλλον
 τ' ἂν ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα ταύτης δόξειεν εἶναι τὸ
 εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφή· τοῦτο δὲ φθαρτόν, ὥσθ' ὅλως
 οὐκ ἔστιν αἰδῖος οὐσία χωριστὴ καὶ καθ' αὐτήν.
 25 ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· ἔοικε γὰρ καὶ ζητεῖται σχεδὸν ὑπὸ
 τῶν χαριεστάτων ὥς οὐσά τις ἀρχὴ καὶ οὐσία
 τοιαύτη· πῶς γὰρ ἔσται τάξις μὴ τινος ὄντος
 αἰδίου καὶ χωριστοῦ καὶ μένοντος; Ἐπεὶ δ' εἶπερ
 ἔστι τις οὐσία καὶ ἀρχὴ τοιαύτη τὴν φύσιν οἶαν
 νῦν ζητοῦμεν, καὶ αὕτη μία πάντων καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ
 τῶν αἰδίων τε καὶ φθαρτῶν, ἀπορίαν ἔχει διὰ τί
 30 ποτε τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς οὐσης τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν αἰδία
 τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν ἀρχήν, τὰ δ' οὐκ αἰδία· τοῦτο γὰρ
 ἄτοπον. εἰ δ' ἄλλη μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τῶν φθαρτῶν
 ἄλλη δὲ τῶν αἰδίων, εἰ μὲν αἰδῖος καὶ ἡ τῶν
 φθαρτῶν, ὁμοίως ἀπορήσομεν· διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ
 αἰδίου τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐσης καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀρχήν
 35 αἰδία; φθαρτῆς δ' οὐσης ἄλλη τις ἀρχὴ γίνεταί
 ταύτης κάκεινης ἐτέρα, καὶ τοῦτ' εἰς ἄπειρον
 πρόεισιν.

Εἰ δ' αὖ τις τὰς δοκούσας μάλιστ' ἀρχὰς
 ἀκινήτους εἶναι, τό τε ὄν καὶ τὸ ἔν, θήσει, πρῶτον

¹ θεῖη μᾶλλον] μᾶλλον θεῖη A¹.

* Forms which are induced in matter are perishable, although not subject to the process of destruction; they are at one time and are not at another (cf. VII. xv. 1). The only pure form (i.e., the only form which is independent of matter in any and every sense) is the prime mover (XII. vii.).

^b Cf. III. i. 12, iv. 11-23.

sensible and perishable would seem to fall outside the bounds of plausibility. Yet if the principle 4 which we are now seeking does not exist in separation from bodies, what can we suppose it to be if not matter? Yes, but matter does not exist actually, but only potentially. It might seem rather that a more appropriate principle would be form or shape; but this is perishable^a; and so in general there is no eternal substance which exists separately and independently. But this is absurd, because it seems 5 natural that there should be a substance and principle of this kind, and it is sought for as existing by nearly all the most enlightened thinkers. For how can there be any order in the universe if there is not something eternal and separate and permanent?

Again, if there is a substance and principle of such 6 a nature as that which we are now seeking, and if it is one for all things, *i.e.* the same for both eternal and perishable things, it is a difficult question as to why, when the principle is the same, some of the things which come under that principle are eternal, and others not; for this is paradoxical.^b But if 7 there is one principle of perishable things, and another of eternal things, if the principle of perishable things is also eternal, we shall still have the same difficulty; because if the principle is eternal, why are not the things which come under that principle eternal? And if it is perishable, it must have another principle behind it, and that principle must have another behind it; and the process will go on to infinity.

On the other hand, if we posit the principles 8 which seem most unchangeable, Being and Unity,^c

^a Cf. III. I. 13, iv. 24-34.

1000 ^b μὲν εἰ μὴ τόδε τι καὶ οὐσίαν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν
σημαίνει, πῶς ἔσονται χωρισταὶ καὶ καθ' αὐτάς;
τοιαύτας δὲ ζητοῦμεν τὰς αἰδίους τε καὶ πρώτας
ἀρχάς. εἴ γε μὴν τόδε τι καὶ οὐσίαν ἐκάτερον
αὐτῶν δηλοῖ, πάντ' ἐστὶν οὐσίαι τὰ ὄντα· κατὰ
⁶ πάντων γὰρ τὸ ὄν κατηγορεῖται, κατ' ἐνίων δὲ
καὶ τὸ ἐν. οὐσίαν δ' εἶναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ψεῦδος.
ἔτι δὲ τοῖς τὴν πρώτην ἀρχὴν τὸ ἐν λέγουσι καὶ
τούτ' οὐσίαν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός καὶ τῆς ὕλης τὸν
ἀριθμὸν γεννῶσι πρῶτον, καὶ τοῦτον οὐσίαν φά-
σκουσιν εἶναι, πῶς ἐνδέχεται τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθές
¹⁰ εἶναι; τὴν γὰρ δυάδα καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστον
ἀριθμῶν τῶν συνθέτων πῶς ἐν δεῖ νοῆσαι; περὶ
τούτου γὰρ οὔτε λέγουσιν οὐδὲν οὔτε ῥᾶδιον εἰπεῖν.

Εἴ γε μὴν γραμμᾶς ἢ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα (λέγω δὲ
ἐπιφανείας τὰς πρώτας) θήσῃ τις ἀρχάς, ταῦτά γ'
οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐσίαι χωρισταί, τομαὶ δὲ καὶ διαιρέσεις
¹⁵ αἱ μὲν ἐπιφανειῶν αἱ δὲ σωμάτων, αἱ δὲ στιγμαὶ
γραμμῶν, ἔτι δὲ πέρατα τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων· πάντα
δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει καὶ χωριστὸν οὐδὲν
ἐστίν. ἔτι πῶς οὐσίαν ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ
ἐνός καὶ στιγμῆς; οὐσίας μὲν γὰρ πάσης γένεσις
ἔστι, στιγμῆς δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· διαίρεσις γὰρ ἡ στιγμῆ.
²⁰ Παρέχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ τὸ πᾶσαν μὲν ἐπιστήμην
εἶναι τῶν καθόλου καὶ τοῦ τοιουδί, τὴν δ' οὐσίαν
μὴ τῶν καθόλου εἶναι, μᾶλλον δὲ τόδε τι καὶ
χωριστόν, ὥστ' εἰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη,

¹ γ' γρ. J, Bonitz: δ' EJ: γὰρ A^b.

^a i.e., intelligible surfaces, etc.

^b Cf. III. i. 15, v.

^c so. which is liable to generation or destruction.

(a) unless each of them denotes a particular thing and a substance, how can they be separate and independent? but the eternal and primary principles for which we are looking are of this nature. (b) If, ⁹ however, each of them denotes a particular thing and a substance, then all existing things are substances; for Being is predicated of everything, and Unity also of some things. But that all things are ¹⁰ substances is false. (c) As for those who maintain that Unity is the first principle and a substance, and who generate number from Unity and matter as their first product, and assert that it is a substance, how can their theory be true? How are we to conceive of 2 and each of the other numbers thus composed, as one? On this point they give no explanation; nor is it easy to give one.

But if we posit lines or the things derived from ¹¹ them (I mean surfaces in the primary sense^a) as principles,^b these at least are not separately existing substances, but sections and divisions, the former of surfaces and the latter of bodies (and points are sections and divisions of lines); and further they are limits of these same things. All these things are integral parts of something else, and not one of them exists separately. Further, how are we to suppose ¹² that there is a substance of unity or a point? for in the case of every substance^c there is a process of generation, but in the case of the point there is not; for the point is a division.

It is a perplexing fact also that whereas every science treats of universals and types, substance is not a universal thing, but rather a particular and separable thing; so that if there is a science that

1060 b

πῶς δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν οὐσίαν εἶναι; "Ἐτι
 πότερον ἔστι τι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον ἢ οὐ; λέγω δὲ
 25 τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ μετὰ ταύτης. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μή, τὰ
 γε ἐν ὕλῃ 'φθαρτὰ πάντα' εἰ δ' ἔστι τι, τὸ εἶδος
 ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ μορφή. τοῦτ' οὖν ἐπὶ τίνων ἔστι
 καὶ ἐπὶ τίνων οὐ, χαλεπὸν ἀφορίσαι· ἐπ' ἐνίων
 γὰρ δῆλον οὐκ ὄν χωριστὸν τὸ εἶδος, οἷον οἰκίας.
 "Ἐτι πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ εἶδει ἢ ἀριθμῷ αἱ αὐταί;
 30 εἰ γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἔν,¹ πάντ' ἔσται ταῦτα.

III. "Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐπιστήμη
 τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν καθόλου καὶ οὐ κατὰ μέρος, τὸ δ'
 ὄν πολλαχῶς καὶ οὐ καθ' ἓνα λέγεται τρόπον· εἰ
 μὲν οὖν ὁμωνύμως κατὰ δὲ κοινὸν μηδέν, οὐκ ἔστιν
 35 ὑπὸ μίαν ἐπιστήμην (οὐ γὰρ ἐν γένος τῶν τοιούτων),
 εἰ δὲ κατὰ τι κοινόν, εἴη ἂν ὑπὸ μίαν ἐπιστήμην.

"Ἔοικε δὴ τὸν εἰρημένον λέγεσθαι τρόπον καθάπερ
 τό τε ἱατρικὸν καὶ ὑγιεινόν· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐκά-
 1061 a τερον πολλαχῶς λέγομεν. λέγεται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν
 τρόπον ἕκαστον τῷ τὸ μὲν πρὸς ἱατρικὴν ἐπι-
 στήμην ἀνάγεσθαί πως, τὸ δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ
 δ' ἄλλως, πρὸς ταῦτό δ' ἕκαστον. ἱατρικὸς γὰρ
 λόγος καὶ μαχαίριον λέγεται τῷ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς
 6 ἱατρικῆς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ταύτῃ χρήσιμον.
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὑγιεινόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι σημαντικὸν
 ὑγιείας, τὸ δ' ὅτι ποιητικόν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς τρόπος
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ τὸ

¹ # om. EJT.

* Cf. III. i. 14, vi. 7-9.

* This section belongs to the problem discussed in §§ 1-5 above.

* Cf. III. i. 12, iv. 8-10.

* This chapter corresponds to IV. I., ii., with which it should be compared.

deals with first principles, how can we suppose that substance is a first principle? ^a

Again, is there anything besides the concrete ¹³ whole (I mean the matter and the form in combination) or not? ^b If not, all things in the nature of matter are perishable; but if there is something, it must be the form or shape. It is hard to determine in what cases this is possible and in what it is not; for in some cases, e.g. that of a house, the form clearly does not exist in separation.

Again, are the first principles formally or numerically the same? ^c If they are numerically one, all things will be the same.

III. Since the science of the philosopher is concerned with Being *qua* Being universally,^d and not with some part of it, and since the term Being has several meanings and is not used only in one sense, if it is merely equivocal and has no common significance it cannot fall under one science (for there is no one class in things of this kind); but if it has a common significance it must fall under one science.

The subject
matter of
Meta-
physics.

Now it would seem that it is used in the sense ² which we have described, like "medical" and "healthy," for we use each of these terms in several senses; and each is used in this way because it has a reference, one to the science of medicine, and another to health, and another to something else; but each refers always to the same concept. A diagnosis and a scalpel are both called medical, because the one proceeds from medical science and the other is useful to it. The same is true of "healthy"; one thing is so called because it is indicative, and another because it is productive, of health; and the same applies to all other cases.

1061 a

ὄν ἅπαν λέγεται· τῷ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν πάθος ἢ
 ἕξις ἢ διάθεσις ἢ κίνησις ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν
 10 τοιούτων εἶναι λέγεται ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὄν. ἐπεὶ δὲ
 παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἓν τι καὶ κοινὸν ἢ ἀναγωγὴ
 γίγνεται, καὶ τῶν ἐναντιώσεων ἐκάστη πρὸς τὰς
 πρώτας διαφορὰς καὶ ἐναντιώσεις ἀναχθῆσεται τοῦ
 ὄντος, εἴτε πλῆθος καὶ ἐν εἴθ' ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνο-
 μοιότης αἱ πρώται τοῦ ὄντος εἰσὶ διαφοραί, εἴτ'
 15 ἄλλαι τινές· ἔστωσαν γὰρ αὗται τεθεωρημέναι.
 διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἀναγωγὴν πρὸς
 τὸ ὄν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐν γίνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ
 ταυτὸν ἄλλο δ' ἐστίν, ἀντιστρέφει γε· τό τε γὰρ
 ἐν καὶ ὄν πως, τό τε ὄν ἐν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ
 τὰ ἐναντία πάντα τῆς αὐτῆς καὶ μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης
 20 θεωρῆσαι, λέγεται δ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν κατὰ στέρησιν
 (καίτοι γ' ἔνια ἀπορήσειέ τις ἂν πῶς λέγεται κατὰ
 στέρησιν, ὧν ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον τι, καθάπερ ἀδίκου
 καὶ δικαίου), περὶ πάντα δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν
 στέρησιν δεῖ τιθέναι, μὴ τοῦ ὅλου λόγου, τοῦ
 τελευταίου δὲ εἰδους· οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ὁ δικαίος καθ'
 25 ἕξιν τινὰ πειθαρχικὸς τοῖς νόμοις, οὐ πάντως ὁ
 ἀδίκος ἔσται τοῦ ὅλου στερούμενος λόγου, περὶ δὲ
 τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις ἐκλείπων πη, καὶ ταύτῃ
 ἢ στέρησις ὑπάρξει αὐτῷ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. καθάπερ δ' ὁ μαθηματικὸς
 περὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται
 30 (περιελὼν γὰρ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖ, οἷον
 βάρος καὶ κούφότητα καὶ σκληρότητα καὶ τούναν-

* Cf. IV. ii. 9 n.

Now it is in this same way that everything which exists is said to *be* ; each thing is said to be because it is a modification or permanent or temporary state or motion or some other such affection of Being *qua* Being. And since everything that is can be referred 4 to some one common concept, each of the contraries too can be referred to the primary differentiae and contraries of Being—whether the primary differentiae of Being are plurality and unity, or similarity and dissimilarity, or something else ; for we may take them as already discussed.^a It makes no 5 difference whether that which *is* is referred to Being or Unity ; for even if they are not the same but different, they are in any case convertible, since that which is one also in a sense *is*, and that which *is* is one.

Now since the study of contraries pertains to one 6 and the same science, and each contrary is so called in virtue of privation (although indeed one might wonder in what sense they can be called contraries in virtue of privation when they admit of a middle term—*e.g.* "unjust" and "just"), in all such cases we must regard the privation as being not of the whole definition but of the ultimate species. *E.g.*, if the just man is "one who is obedient to the laws in virtue of some volitional state," the unjust man will not be entirely deprived of the whole definition, but will be "one who is in some respect deficient in obedience to the laws" ; and it is in this respect that the privation of justice will apply to him (and the same holds good in all other cases). And just as the mathematician 7 makes a study of abstractions (for in his investigations he first abstracts everything that is sensible, such as weight and lightness, hardness and its con-

1001 a

τίον, ἔτι δὲ καὶ θερμότητα καὶ ψυχρότητα καὶ τὰς
 ἄλλας¹ αἰσθητὰς ἐναντιώσεις, μόνον δὲ καταλείπει
 τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές, τῶν μὲν ἐφ' ἑν τῶν δ' ἐπὶ
 δύο τῶν δ' ἐπὶ τρία, καὶ τὰ πάθη τὰ τούτων ἢ
 80 ποσά ἐστι καὶ συνεχῇ, καὶ οὐ καθ' ἕτερόν τι
 θεωρεῖ, καὶ τῶν μὲν τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλα θέσεις

1001 b

σκοπεῖ καὶ τὰ ταύταις ὑπάρχοντα, τῶν δὲ τὰς
 συμμετρίας καὶ ἀσυμμετρίας, τῶν δὲ τοὺς λόγους,
 ἀλλ' ὁμως μίαν πάντων καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τίθεμεν
 ἐπιστήμην τὴν γεωμετρικὴν), τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
 ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὸ ὄν. τὰ γὰρ τούτῳ συμβεβηκότα
 5 καθ' ὅσον ἐστὶν ὄν, καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις αὐτοῦ ἢ
 ὄν, οὐκ ἄλλης ἐπιστήμης ἢ φιλοσοφίας θεωρῆσαι.
 τῇ φυσικῇ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἢ ὄντα, μᾶλλον δ' ἢ
 κινήσεως μετέχει, τὴν θεωρίαν τις ἀπονεύμειεν ἄν.
 ἢ γε μὴν διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ σοφιστικὴ τῶν συμ-
 βεβηκότων μὲν εἰσι τοῖς οὖσιν, οὐχ ἢ δ' ὄντα,
 10 οὐδέ περὶ τὸ ὄν αὐτὸ καθ' ὅσον ὄν ἐστίν. ὥστε
 λείπεται τὸν φιλόσοφον, καθ' ὅσον ὄντ' ἐστίν, εἶναι
 περὶ τὰ λεχθέντα θεωρητικόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τό τε ὄν
 ἅπαν καθ' ἑν τι καὶ κοινόν λέγεται πολλαχῶς λεγό-
 μενον, καὶ τὰναντία τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον (εἰς τὰς πρῶ-
 τας γὰρ ἐναντιώσεις καὶ διαφορὰς τοῦ ὄντος ἀν-
 15 ἀγεται), τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα δυνατόν ὑπὸ μίαν ἐπιστήμην
 εἶναι, διαλύουσ' ἂν ἢ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀπορία λεχθεῖσα,
 λέγω δ' ἑν ἢ διηπορεῖτο πῶς ἔσται πολλῶν καὶ
 διαφόρων ὄντων τῷ γένει μία τις ἐπιστήμη.

IV. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ μαθηματικὸς χρήται τοῖς
 κοινοῖς ἰδίως, καὶ τὰς τούτων ἀρχὰς ἂν εἴη

¹ ἄλλας A^b: ἄλλας τὰς EJ Alexander (?).

^a i.e., identity, otherness, etc.

^b Ch. 1. 1.

^c Also the problem stated in ch. 1. 3.

1081 b

²⁰ θεωρῆσαι τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας. ὅτι γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων ἴσων ἀφαιρεθέντων ἴσα τὰ λειπόμενα, κοινὸν μὲν ἔστιν ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ποσῶν, ἡ μαθηματικὴ δ' ἀπολαβοῦσα περὶ τι μέρος τῆς οἰκείας ὕλης ποιεῖται τὴν θεωρίαν, οἷον περὶ γραμμὰς ἢ γωνίας ἢ ἀριθμούς ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν τι ποσῶν, οὐχ ²⁵ ἢ δ' ὄντα ἀλλ' ἢ συνεχές αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἐφ' ἐν ἡ δύο ἢ τρία· ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία περὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει μὲν, ἢ τούτων ἑκάστῳ τι¹ συμβέβηκεν, οὐ σκοπεῖ, περὶ τὸ ὄν δὲ ἢ ὄν τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον θεωρεῖ. τὸν αὐτὸν δ' ἔχει τρόπον καὶ περὶ τὴν φυσικὴν ἐπιστήμην τῇ μαθηματικῇ· τὰ συμβεβηκότα γὰρ ἢ ³⁰ φυσικὴ καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς θεωρεῖ τὰς τῶν ὄντων ἢ κινούμενα καὶ οὐχ ἢ ὄντα. τὴν δὲ πρώτην εἰρήκαμεν ἐπιστήμην τούτων εἶναι καθ' ὅσον ὄντα τὰ ὑποκειμένα ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ ἕτερόν τι. διὸ καὶ ταύτην καὶ τὴν μαθηματικὴν ἐπιστήμην μέρη τῆς σοφίας εἶναι θετέον.

V. "Ἔστι δέ τις ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀρχὴ περὶ ἣν ³⁵ οὐκ ἔστι διεψεῦσθαι, τούναντίον δὲ ἀναγκαῖον αἰετοποιεῖν, λέγω δὲ ἀληθεύειν, οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ^{1082 a} τὸ αὐτὸ καθ' ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοῦτον αὐτοῖς ἀντικείμενα τὸν τρόπον. καὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδείξεις, πρὸς τόνδε δ' ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκ πιστοτέρας ἀρχῆς αὐτοῦ τούτου ποι² ἡσασθαι συλλογισμόν,³ δεῖ δὲ γ', εἴπερ ἔσται τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀποδεδειχθαι. πρὸς δὲ τὸν λέγοντα τὰς

¹ τι Γ Bessarion Alexander: τί codd.² τὸν συλλογισμόν EJ.

^a This chapter corresponds to IV. ill. 1-6, and answers the problem stated in ch. i. 2.

province of Primary Philosophy to study the principles of these as well.^a That when equals are taken 2 from equals the remainders are equal is an axiom common to all quantities; but mathematics isolates ^{meta-} ^{physics} a particular part of its proper subject matter and studies it separately; *e.g.* lines or angles or numbers or some other kind of quantity, but not *qua* Being, but only in so far as each of them is continuous in one, two or three dimensions. But philosophy does not investigate particular things in so far as each of them has some definite attribute, but studies that which *is*, in so far as each particular thing *is*. The same 3 applies to the science of physics as to mathematics, for physics studies the attributes and first principles of things *qua* in motion, and not *qua* Being; but Primary Science, as we have said, deals with these things only in so far as the subjects which underlie them are existent, and not in respect of anything else. Hence we should regard both physics and mathematics as subdivisions of Wisdom.

V. There is a principle in existing things about which we cannot make a mistake^b; of which, on the contrary, we must always realize the truth—viz. that the same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be, nor admit of any other similar pair of opposites. Of such axioms although there is a proof *ad hominem*, there is no absolute proof; because there 2 is no principle more convincing than the axiom itself on which to base an argument, whereas there must be such a principle if there is to be absolute proof.^c But he who wants to convince an opponent who 3

Argument
in support
of the Law
of Contradiction^a

^b This chapter corresponds to IV. iii. 7—iv. 31. § 1 = IV. iii. 7-12.

^c §§ 2-5 = IV. iv. 2-19.

1062 a

ἀντικειμένας φάσεις τῷ δεικνύντι διότι ψεύδος, λη-
 πτόν τι τοιοῦτον ὃ ταὐτὸ μὲν ἔσται τῷ μὴ ἐν-
 δέχεσθαι ταὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι καθ' ἓνα καὶ τὸν
 αὐτὸν χρόνον, μὴ δόξει δ' εἶναι ταυτόν· οὕτω γὰρ
 10 μόνως ἂν ἀποδειχθείη πρὸς τὸν φάσκοντα ἐνδέ-
 χεσθαι τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις ἀληθεύεσθαι κατὰ
 τοῦ αὐτοῦ. τοὺς δὴ μέλλοντας ἀλλήλοις λόγου
 κοινωνήσῃν δεῖ τι συνιέναι αὐτῶν¹. μὴ γιγνομένου
 γὰρ τούτου πῶς ἔσται κοινωνία τούτοις πρὸς ἀλ-
 λήλους λόγου; δεῖ τοίνυν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον
 15 εἶναι γνώριμον καὶ δηλοῦν τι, καὶ μὴ πολλά, μόνον
 δὲ ἓν· ἂν δὲ πλείω² σημαίῃ, φανερόν ποιεῖν ἐφ' ὃ
 φέρεται τοῦνομα τούτων. ὃ δὴ λέγων εἶναι τοῦτο
 καὶ μὴ εἶναι, τοῦτο ὃ³ φησιν οὐ φησιν, ὥσθ' ὃ
 σημαίνει τοῦνομα τοῦτ' οὐ φησι σημαίνει· τοῦτο
 δ' ἀδύνατον. ὥστ' εἴπερ σημαίνει τι τὸ εἶναι τόδε,
 20 τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἀδύνατον ἀληθεύειν κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ.⁴
 Ἔτι δ' εἴ τι σημαίνει τοῦνομα καὶ τοῦτ' ἀληθεύεται,
 δεῖ τοῦτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι· τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅν οὐκ
 ἐνδέχεται ποτε μὴ εἶναι· τὰς ἀντικειμένας ἄρα οὐκ
 ἐνδέχεται φάσεις⁵ ἀληθεύειν κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. Ἔτι
 δ' εἰ μὴτὲν μᾶλλον ἢ φάσις ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἀλη-
 25 θεύεται, ὃ λέγων ἄνθρωπον ἢ οὐκ ἄνθρωπον οὐδὲν
 μᾶλλον ἀληθεύσει. δόξειε δὲ καὶ οὐχ ἵππον εἶναι
 φάσκων τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ οὐχ ἦττον ἀλη-
 θεύειν ἢ οὐκ ἄνθρωπον, ὥστε καὶ ἵππον φάσκων
 εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀληθεύσει· τὰς γὰρ ἀντικειμένας

¹ αὐτῶν Alexander, Bessarion: αὐτῶν codd.² πλείονα EJ.³ ὃ θλως εἶναι EJ.⁴ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ sim. A^b.⁵ φάσεις καὶ ἀποφάσεις EJ.

makes opposite statements that he is wrong must obtain from him an admission which shall be identical with the proposition that the same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be, but shall seem not to be identical with it. This is the only method of proof which can be used against one who maintains that opposite statements can be truly made about the same subject. Now those who intend to join in discussion must understand one another to some extent ; for without this how can there be any common discussion between them ? Therefore each of the terms which they use must be intelligible and signify something ; not several things, but one only ; or if it signifies more than one thing, it must be made clear to which of these the term is applied. Now he who says that A is and is not denies what he asserts, and therefore denies that the term signifies what it does signify. But this is impossible. Therefore if " to be so-and-so " has a definite meaning, the opposite statement about the same subject cannot be true.

Again, if the term has a definite significance and this is truly stated, it must of necessity be so.^a But that which of necessity is can never not be. Hence opposite statements about the same subject cannot be true.

Again, if the assertion is no more true than the negation, it will be no more true to say " A is man " than to say " A is not man." ^b But it would also be admitted that it is more or at least not less true to say that a man is not a horse than to say that he is not a man ; and therefore, since it was assumed that opposite statements are equally true, it will be true

^a § 6 = IV. iv. 14-16.

^b With this section of IV. iv. 26-30.

1062 a

ὁμοίως ἦν ἀληθεύειν. συμβαίνει τοίνυν τὸν αὐτὸν
 30 ἀνθρωπον εἶναι καὶ ἵππον ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζώων.

Ἀπόδειξις μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία τούτων ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς,
 πρὸς μέντοι τὸν ταῦτα τιθέμενον ἀπόδειξις. ταχέως
 δ' ἂν τις καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Ἡράκλειτον τοῦτον
 ἐρωτῶν¹ τὸν τρόπον ἠνάγκασεν ὁμολογεῖν μηδέποτε
 τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις δυνατὸν εἶναι κατὰ τῶν
 20 αὐτῶν ἀληθεύειν. νῦν δ' οὐ συνιείς² ἑαυτοῦ τί
 ποτε λέγει ταύτην ἔλαβε τὴν δόξαν. ὅλως δ' εἰ τὸ
 λεγόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἀληθές, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸ
 1062 b τοῦτο εἶη ἀληθές, λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐνδέχασθαι τὸ αὐτὸ
 καθ' ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ
 εἶναι. καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ διηρημένων αὐτῶν οὐδὲν
 μᾶλλον ἢ κατάφασις ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἀληθεύεται, τὸν
 5 αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τοῦ συναμφοτέρου καὶ τοῦ
 συμπεπλεγμένου καθάπερ μίας τινας καταφάσεως
 οὐσης οὐθὲν ἦττον³ ἢ ἀπόφασις ἢ τὸ ὅλον ὡς
 ἐν καταφάσει τιθέμενον ἀληθεύεται.⁴ ἔτι δ' εἰ
 μηθὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθῶς καταφῆσαι, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο
 ψεῦδος εἶη τὸ φάναι μηδεμίαν ἀληθῆ κατάφασιν
 10 ὑπάρχειν. εἰ δ' ἔστι τι, λύοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον
 ὑπὸ τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνισταμένων καὶ παντελῶς ἀν-
 αιρούντων τὸ διαλέγεσθαι.

VI. Παραπλήσιον δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ
 λεχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἔφη
 πάντων εἶναι χρημάτων⁵ μέτρον ἀνθρωπον, οὐδὲν
 15 ἕτερον λέγων ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι

¹ ἐρωτήσας E.J.² συνιείς E.J.³ ἦττον scripsi (μᾶλλον codd.), ci. Ross, sed mauult retento μᾶλλον ἢ ante ἢ transponere.⁴ ἀληθεύεται A^b; ἀληθεύεται Alexander: ἀληθές ἐσται E.J.⁵ εἶναι χρημάτων] χρημάτων εἶναι A^b.

to say that the same person is also a horse. It follows therefore, that the same person is a man and a horse, or any other animal.

Thus, although there is no absolute proof of these 8 axioms, there is an *ad hominem* proof where one's opponent makes these assumptions.^a Perhaps even Heraclitus himself, if he had been questioned on these lines, would have been compelled to admit that opposite statements can never be true of the same subjects: as it is, he adopted this theory through ignorance of what his doctrine implied. In general,^b 9 if what he says is true, not even this statement itself (I mean "that the same thing can at one and the same time be and not be") will be true; because 10 just as, when they are separated, the affirmation is no more true than the negation, so in the same way, if the complex statement is taken as a single affirmation, the negation will be just as true as the whole statement regarded as an affirmation. And further, 11 if nothing can be truly affirmed, then this very statement—that there is no such thing as a true affirmation—will be false. But if there is such a thing, the contentions of those who raise objections of this kind and utterly destroy rational discourse may be considered to be refuted.^c

VI. Very similar to the views which we have just mentioned is the dictum of Protagoras^d; for he said that man is the measure of all things, by which he meant simply that each individual's impressions

Criticism of the views which deny the Law of Contradiction.

^a § 8 = IV. iii. 10.

^b §§ 9-11 = IV. iv. 31.

^c Cf. IV. viii. 4, 5.

^d This chapter forms a summary of IV. v.-viii. §§ 1-3 = IV. v. 1-5.

1062 b

παρίως. τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει
καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι,
καὶ τὰλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λεγόμενα
φάσεις, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις τοιοῦδὶ μὲν φαίνεσθαι τὸδε
εἶναι καλὸν τοιοῦδὶ δὲ τοῦναντίον, μέτρον δ' εἶναι τὸ
20 φαινόμενον ἐκάστῳ. λύοιτο δ' ἂν αὕτη ἡ ἀπορία
θεωρήσασι πόθεν ἐλήλυθεν¹ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὑπολήψεως
ταύτης. ἔοικε γὰρ ἐνίοις μὲν ἐκ τῆς τῶν φυσιο-
λόγων δόξης γεγενῆσθαι, τοῖς δ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ταῦτὰ
περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἅπαντας γινώσκειν, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦδὶ
μὲν ἡδὺ τὸδε φαίνεσθαι τοιοῦδὶ δὲ τοῦναντίον. τὸ
25 γὰρ μηδὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι, πᾶν δ' ἐξ ὄντος,
σχεδὸν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν περὶ
φύσεως. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ λευκὸν γίγνεται λευκοῦ
τελέως ὄντος καὶ οὐδαμῇ μὴ λευκοῦ [νῦν δὲ γεγενη-
μένον μὴ λευκόν],² γίγνεται³ ἂν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος λευκοῦ
τὸ γιγνόμενον [μὴ]³ λευκόν. ὥστε ἐκ μὴ ὄντος
30 γίγνεται³ ἂν κατ' ἐκείνους, εἰ μὴ ὑπῆρχε λευκὸν τὸ
αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ λευκόν.³ οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ διαλύειν τὴν
ἀπορίαν ταύτην· εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς πῶς
ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίγνεται τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ πῶς ἐξ
ὄντος.

Τό γε μὴν ὁμοίως προσέχειν ταῖς δόξαις καὶ
ταῖς φαντασίαις τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς διαμφορητούν-
85 των εὐηθες· δηλὸν γὰρ ὅτι τοὺς ἐτέρους αὐτῶν
ἀνάγκη διεψεῦσθαι. φανερόν δὲ τοῦτ' ἐκ τῶν
1068 a γιγνομένων κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν· οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὸ
αὐτὸ φαίνεται τοῖς μὲν γλυκὺ τοῖς δὲ τοῦναντίον,

¹ ἐλήλυθεν om. A^b Alexander.² Bonitz.³ λευκόν . . . καὶ μὴ λευκόν A^b Alexander: μὴ λευκόν . . .
καὶ λευκόν.

are positively true. But if this is so, it follows that 2
 the same thing is and is not, and is bad and good,
 and that all the other implications of opposite state-
 ments are true ; because often a given thing seems
 beautiful to one set of people and ugly to another,
 and that which seems to each individual is the
 measure. This difficulty will be solved if we con- 3
 sider the origin of the assumption. It seems prob-
 able that it arose in some cases from the doctrine
 of the natural philosophers, and in others from the
 fact that everyone does not form the same opinion
 about the same things, but to some a given thing
 seems sweet and to others the contrary. For that 4
 nothing comes from what is not, but everything from
 what is, is a doctrine common to nearly all natural
 philosophers.^a Since, then, a thing does not become
 white which was before completely white and in
 no respect not-white, that which becomes white
 must come from what was not-white. Hence ac-
 cording to this theory there would be generation
 from what is not, unless the same thing were origin-
 ally white *and* not-white. However, it is not hard 5
 to solve this difficulty. We have explained in the
Physics ^b in what sense things which are generated
 are generated from what is not, and in what sense
 from what is.

But to attach equal importance to the opinions
 and impressions of disputing parties is foolish,
 because clearly one side or the other must be wrong.^c
 This is evident from what happens in the sphere of 6
 sensation ; for the same thing never seems to some
 people sweet and to others the contrary unless one

^a With §§ 4, 5 cf. IV. v. 6.

^b *Physics* I. vii.-ix.

^c §§ 5-7 = IV. v. 23-27.

1068 a

μὴ διεφθαρμένων καὶ λελωβημένων τῶν ἐτέρων τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ κριτήριον τῶν λεχθέντων χυμῶν. τούτου δ' ὄντος τοιούτου τοὺς ἐτέρους μὲν ὑποληπτόν μέτρον εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους¹ οὐχ ὑποληπτόν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο λέγω καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτ' ἀξιούν ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν ὑποβάλλουσι τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ποιούσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς φαίνεσθαι δύο, δύο δὲ² εἶναι διὰ τὸ φαίνεσθαι τοσαῦτα, καὶ πάλιν ἐν τοῖς γὰρ μὴ κινούσι τὴν ὄψιν ἐν φαίνεται τὸ ἐν. ὅλως δὲ ἀτοπον ἐκ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τὰ δεῦρο μεταβάλλοντα καὶ μηδέποτε διαμένοντα ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ἐκ τούτου περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν κρίσιν ποιέσθαι. δεῖ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐχόντων καὶ μηδεμίαν μεταβολὴν ποιουμένων τάληθές θηρέειν. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐχ ὅτ' ἐν τοιαυτῇ πάλιν δ' ἄλλοια φαίνεται, ταῦτα δ' αἰεὶ καὶ μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς κοινωνοῦντα. Ἐπὶ δ' εἰ κίνησις ἐστὶ, καὶ κινούμενόν τι, κινεῖται δὲ πᾶν ἐκ τινος καὶ εἰς τι· δεῖ ἄρα τὸ κινούμενον εἶναι ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐξ οὗ κινήσεται καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἰς τοδὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀντίφασιν μὴ συναληθεύεσθαι³ κατ' αὐτούς. καὶ εἰ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν συνεχῶς τὰ δεῦρο ῥεῖ καὶ κινεῖται, καὶ τις τοῦτο θεῖη καίπερ οὐκ ἀληθές ὄν, διὰ τί κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν οὐ

¹ ἐτέρους E.J.² δὲ JΓ: δ' EA^b: ᾧ Bessarion, Bonitz: incl. Christ.³ ἀληθεύεσθαι E.J.^a i.e., that the same thing has contrary qualities.^b §§ 8, 9 (first half) = IV. v. 21, 22.

of the parties has the organ of sense which distinguishes the said flavours injured or impaired. Such being the case, the one party should be taken as the "measure," and the other not. And I hold ⁷ the same in the case of good and bad, and of beautiful and ugly, and of all other such qualities. For to maintain this view ^a is just the same as to maintain that what appears to us when we press the finger below the eye and make a thing seem two instead of one must be two because it appears to be so, and then afterwards that it must be one; because if we do not interfere with our sight that which is one appears to be one. And in general it is absurd to ⁸ form our opinion of the truth from the appearances of things in this world of ours which are subject to change and never remain in the same state ^b; for it is by reference to those things which are always in the same state and undergo no change that we should prosecute our search for truth. Of this kind ⁹ are the heavenly bodies; for these do not appear to be now of one nature and subsequently of another, but are manifestly always the same and have no part in change of any kind.

Again, if there is motion there is also something which is moved; and everything is moved from something and into something. Therefore that which is moved must be in that from which it is to be moved, and must also not be in it; and must be moved into so-and-so and must also come to be in it; but the contradictory statements cannot be true at the same time, as our opponents allege. And if the things of our world are in a state of continuous flux and motion in respect of quantity, and we assume this although it is not true, why should

1088 a

μενεῖ¹; φαίνονται γὰρ οὐχ ἥκιστα τὰ κατὰ τὰς
 20 ἀντιφάσεις ταύτου κατηγορεῖν ἐκ τοῦ τὸ ποσὸν
 ὑπειληφέναι μὴ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων, διό² καὶ
 εἶναι τετράπηχυν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐκ εἶναι. ἡ δ' οὐσία
 κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ὠρισμένης φύσεως, τὸ δὲ
 ποσὸν τῆς ἀορίστου. Ἔτι διὰ τί προστάττοντος

τοῦ ἱατροῦ τοδὶ τὸ σιτίον προσενέγκασθαι προσ-
 30 φέρονται; τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἄρτος ἐστὶν ἢ οὐκ
 ἐστίν; ὥστ' οὐθὲν ἂν διέχοι φαγεῖν ἢ μὴ φαγεῖν.
 νῦν δ' ὡς ἀληθεύοντες περὶ αὐτὸ καὶ ὄντος τοῦ
 προσταχθέντος σιτίου τούτου προσφέρονται τοῦτο.
 καίτοι γ' οὐκ ἔδει μὴ διαμενούσης παγίως μηδε-
 μιᾶς φύσεως ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ πασῶν
 35 κινουμένων καὶ ῥεουσῶν. Ἔτι δ' εἰ μὲν ἀλλοιού-
 μεθα αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε διαμένομεν οἱ αὐτοί, τί καὶ
 θαυμαστὸν εἰ μηδέποθ' ἡμῖν ταῦτά φαίνεται

1088 b

καθάπερ τοῖς κάμνουσιν; καὶ γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ
 μὴ ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι τὴν ἔξιν καὶ ὄθ' ὑγίαινον, οὐχ
 ὁμοία φαίνεται τὰ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, αὐτὰ μὲν
 οὐδεμιᾶς διὰ γε τοῦτο μεταβολῆς κοινωνοῦντα τὰ
 αἰσθητά, αἰσθήματα δ' ἕτερα ποιοῦντα τοῖς κάμ-
 5 νοῦσι καὶ μὴ τὰ αὐτά. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἔχειν
 καὶ τῆς εἰρημένης μεταβολῆς γιγνομένης ἴσως
 ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ μεταβάλλομεν ἀλλ' οἱ
 αὐτοὶ διατελοῦμεν ὄντες, εἴη ἂν τι μένον. Πρὸς
 μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐκ λόγου τὰς εἰρημένας ἀπορίας

¹ μενεῖ Richards, Alexander (?): μένει.

² διὰ τὸ E.J.

^a Cf. IV. v. 20, 21.

^b Cf. IV. iv. 39-42.

^c With this section cf. IV. v. 7-14.

^d With this section cf. IV. v. 3, 4, vi. 1-3.

they not be constant in respect of quality? ^a It appears that not the least reason why our opponents predicate opposite statements of the same thing is that they start with the assumption that quantity is not constant in the case of bodies; hence they say that the same thing is and is not six feet long. But ¹¹ essence depends upon quality, and this is of a determinate, whereas quantity is of an indeterminate nature.

Again, when the doctor orders them to adopt some article of diet, why do they adopt it? ^b For on their view it is no more true that a thing is bread than that it is not; and therefore it would make no difference whether they ate it or not. But as it is, they adopt a particular food as though they knew the truth about it and it were the food prescribed; yet they ought not to do so if there were no fixed ¹² and permanent nature in sensible things and everything were always in a state of motion and flux.

Again, if we are always changing and never remain the same, is it any wonder that to us, as to the diseased, things never appear the same? ^c For to ¹³ the diseased, since they are not in the same physical condition as when they were well, sensible qualities do not appear to be the same; although this does not mean that the sensible things themselves partake of any change, but that they cause different, and not the same, sensations in the diseased. Doubtless the same must be true if the change which we have referred to takes place in us. If, however, ¹⁴ we do not change but remain always the same, there must be something permanent.

As for those who raise the aforesaid difficulties on dialectical grounds, ^d it is not easy to find a solution

1088 b

ἔχοντας οὐ ῥάδιον διαλύσαι μὴ τιθέντων τι καὶ
 10 τούτου μηκέτι λόγον¹ ἀπαιτούντων· οὕτω γὰρ
 πᾶς λόγος καὶ πᾶσα ἀπόδειξις γίνεται· μηδὲν γὰρ
 τιθέντες ἀναιροῦσι τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ὅλως λόγον.
 ὥστε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τοιούτους οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, πρὸς
 δὲ τοὺς διαπορούντας ἐκ τῶν παραδεδομένων ἀπο-
 ριών ῥάδιον ἀπαντᾶν καὶ διαλύειν τὰ ποιοῦντα τὴν
 15 ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς. δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

Ὡστε φανερόν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὰς
 ἀντικειμένας φάσεις περὶ ταύτου καθ' ἓνα χρόνον
 ἀληθεύειν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐναντία, διὰ τὸ λέγεσθαι κατὰ
 στέρησιν πᾶσαν ἐναντιότητα. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπ'
 ἀρχὴν τοὺς λόγους ἀναλύουσι τοὺς τῶν ἐναντίων.
 Ὁμοίως δ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀνὰ μέσον οὐδὲν οἷόν τε
 20 κατηγορεῖσθαι καθ' ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. λευκοῦ
 γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου λέγοντες αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε
 λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν ψευσόμεθα· συμβαίνει γὰρ εἶναι
 λευκὸν αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ εἶναι· θάτερον γὰρ τῶν συμ-
 πεπλεγμένων ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ, τοῦτο δ'
 ἐστὶν ἀντίφασις τοῦ λευκοῦ. Οὔτε δὴ καθ' Ἡρά-
 25 κλειτον ἐνδέχεται λέγοντας ἀληθεύειν, οὔτε κατ'
 Ἀναξαγόραν. εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τὰναντία τοῦ
 αὐτοῦ κατηγορεῖν· ὅταν γὰρ ἐν παντὶ φῇ παντὸς
 εἶναι μοῖραν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι φῇσι γλυκὺ ἢ
 πικρὸν ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν ὅποιοι οὖν ἐναντιώσεων, εἴπερ

¹ λόγον μηκέτι A^b.

^a Cf. IV. vi. 10, 11.

^b Cf. IV. vii. where, however, the point which is proved is that there can be no intermediate between contradictories.

^c Cf. ch. v. 8.

^d Cf. IV. vii. 8-viii. 5.

which will convince them unless they grant some assumption for which they no longer require an explanation; for every argument and proof is possible only in this way. If they grant no assumption, they destroy discussion and reasoning in general. Thus there is no arguing with people of this kind; 15 but in the case of those who are perplexed by the traditional difficulties it is easy to meet and refute the causes of their perplexity. This is evident from what has been already said.

Thus from these considerations it is obvious that 16 opposite statements cannot be true of the same thing at one time; nor can contrary statements, since every contrariety involves privation. This is clear if we reduce the formulae of contraries to their first principles.^a

Similarly no middle term can be predicated of one and the same thing of which one of the contraries is predicated.^b If, when the subject is white, we say 17 that it is neither white nor black, we shall be in error; for it follows that it is and is not white, because the first of the two terms in the complex statement will be true of the subject, and this is the contradictory of white.

Thus we cannot be right in holding the views either of Heraclitus ^c or of Anaxagoras.^d If we could, it 18 would follow that contraries are predicable of the same subject; for when he ^e says that in everything there is a part of everything, he means that nothing is sweet any more than it is bitter, and similarly with any of the other pairs of contraries; that is,

^a Anaxagoras. What he really meant was that even the sweetest things contain some bitter particles. Cf. fr. 11 (Diels); Burnet, *E.G.P.* § 129.

1068 b

ἐν ᾧ παντὶ πᾶν ὑπάρχει μὴ δυνάμει μόνον ἀλλ'
 30 ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ ἀποκεκριμένον. Ὅμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ

πάσας ψευδεῖς οὐδ' ἀληθεῖς τὰς φάσεις δυνατόν
 εἶναι, δι' ἁλλὰ τε πολλὰ τῶν συναχθέντων ἂν δυσ-
 χερῶν διὰ ταύτην τὴν θέσιν, καὶ διότι ψευδῶν μὲν
 οὐσῶν πασῶν οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτό τις φάσκων ἀληθεύσει,
 35 ἀληθῶν δὲ ψευδεῖς εἶναι πάσας λέγων οὐ ψεύσεται.

VII. Πᾶσα δ' ἐπιστήμη ζητεῖ τινὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ
 αἰτίας περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑφ' αὐτὴν ἐπιστητῶν,
 1064 a ὅλον ἰατρικὴ καὶ γυμναστικὴ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἑκάστη
 τῶν ποιητικῶν καὶ μαθηματικῶν. ἑκάστη γὰρ
 τούτων περιγραφημένη τι γένος αὐτῇ περὶ τοῦτο
 πραγματεύεται ὥς ὑπάρχον καὶ ὄν, οὐχ ἧ δὲ ὄν,
 ἀλλ' ἑτέρα τις αὕτη παρὰ ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας
 5 ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη. τῶν δὲ λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν
 ἑκάστη λαβοῦσά πως τὸ τί ἐστὶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει
 πειράται δεικνύναι τὰ λοιπὰ μαλακώτερον ἢ ἀκρι-
 βέστερον. λαμβάνουσι δὲ τὸ τί ἐστὶν αἱ μὲν δι'
 αἰσθησεως αἱ δ' ὑποτιθέμεναι· διὸ καὶ δῆλον ἐκ
 τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπαγωγῆς ὅτι τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ τί
 10 ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τις ἡ

περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμη, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πρακτικῆς
 ἑτέρα καὶ ποιητικῆς ἔσται. ποιητικῆς μὲν γὰρ ἐν
 τῷ ποιοῦντι καὶ οὐ τῷ ποιουμένῳ τῆς κινήσεως
 ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν εἴτε τέχνη τις εἴτ' ἄλλη
 τις δυνάμις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς πρακτικῆς
 15 οὐκ ἐν τῷ πρακτῷ, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τοῖς πράττουσιν ἡ
 κίνησις. ἡ δὲ τοῦ φυσικοῦ περὶ τὰ ἔχοντ' ἐν

¹ δι' διὰ τῆς E.J.

^a This chapter corresponds to VI. i.; cf. also IV. iii. 1-6 and ch. iv. above. It also answers the problem stated in ch. i. 2.

if everything is present in everything not merely potentially but actually and in differentiation.

Similarly *all* statements cannot be false, nor all 10 true. Among many other difficulties which might be adduced as involved by this supposition there is the objection that if all statements were false, not even this proposition itself would be true; while if they were all true it would not be false to say that they are all false.

VII. Every science inquires for certain principles and causes with respect to every knowable thing which comes within its scope ^a; *e.g.*, the sciences of medicine and physical culture do this, and so does each of the other productive and mathematical sciences. Each one of these marks out for itself some class of objects, and concerns itself with this as with something existent and real, but not *qua* real; it is another science distinct from these which does this. Each of the said sciences arrives in some 2 way at the essence in a particular class of things, and then tries to prove the rest more or less exactly. Some arrive at the essence through sense-perception, and some by hypothesis; hence it is obvious from such a process of induction that there is no demonstration of the reality or essence.

Distinction
of meta-
physics from
physics and
mathe-
matics.

Now since there is a science of nature, clearly it 3 must be different from both practical and productive science. In a productive science the source of motion is in the producer and not in the thing produced, and is either an art or some other kind of potency; and similarly in a practical science the motion is not in the thing acted upon but rather in the agent. But 4 the science of the natural philosopher is concerned with things which contain in themselves a source of

1084 a

ἑαυτοῖς κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἔστιν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν
 οὔτε πρακτικὴν οὔτε ποιητικὴν ἀλλὰ θεωρητικὴν
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν φυσικὴν ἐπιστήμην, δῆλον ἐκ
 τούτων· εἰς ἓν γάρ τι τούτων τῶν γενῶν ἀνάγκη
 πίπτειν αὐτήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ τί ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον
 20 ἐκάστη πως τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἰδέναι καὶ τούτῳ
 χρῆσθαι ἀρχῇ, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν πῶς ὀριστέον τῷ
 φυσικῷ καὶ πῶς ὁ τῆς οὐσίας λόγος ληπτέος, πό-
 τερον ὡς τὸ σιμόν, ἢ μᾶλλον ὡς τὸ κοῖλον. τούτων
 γὰρ ὁ μὲν τοῦ σιμοῦ λόγος μετὰ τῆς ὕλης λέγεται
 τῆς τοῦ πράγματος, ὁ δὲ τοῦ κοίλου χωρὶς τῆς
 25 ὕλης· ἡ γὰρ σιμότης ἐν ῥινὶ γίνεται, διὸ καὶ ὁ
 λόγος αὐτῆς μετὰ ταύτης θεωρεῖται· τὸ σιμόν γάρ
 ἐστὶ ῥῖς κοίλη. φανερόν οὖν ὅτι καὶ σαρκὸς καὶ
 ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν μορίων μετὰ τῆς ὕλης
 αἰετὸν τὸν λόγον ἀποδοτέον. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις
 ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν καὶ χωριστόν, σκεπτέον
 30 πότερόν ποτε τῇ φυσικῇ τὴν αὐτὴν θετέον ταύτην
 εἶναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἑτέραν. ἡ μὲν οὖν φυσικὴ περὶ
 τὰ κινήσεως ἔχοντ' ἀρχὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ
 μαθηματικὴ θεωρητικὴ μὲν καὶ περὶ μένοντά τις
 αὕτη, ἀλλ' οὐ χωριστά. περὶ τὸ χωριστόν ἄρα ὄν
 καὶ ἀκίνητον ἑτέρα τούτων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἐπι-
 35 στημῶν ἐστὶ τις, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τις οὐσία τοιαύτη,
 λέγω δὲ χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος, ὅπερ πειρασόμεθα
 δεῖκνύναι. καὶ εἴπερ ἔστι τις τοιαύτη φύσις ἐν
 τοῖς οὖσις, ἐνταῦθ' ἂν εἴη πού καὶ τὸ θεῖον, καὶ
 1084 b αὕτη ἂν εἴη πρώτη καὶ κυριωτάτη ἀρχή. δῆλον
 τοίνυν ὅτι τρία γένη τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν

¹ καὶ τὸ EJ.

^a XII. vi., vii.

motion. From this it is clear that natural science must be neither practical nor productive, but speculative; since it must fall under one of these classes. And since every science must have some knowledge 5 of the essence and must use it as a starting-point, we must be careful to observe how the natural philosopher should define, and how he should regard the formula of essence—whether in the same way as the term “snub,” or rather as the term “concave.” For 6 of these the formula of “snub” is stated in conjunction with the matter of the object, whereas that of “concave” is stated apart from the matter; since snubness is only found in the nose, which is therefore included in the formula, for “the snub” is a concave nose. Thus it is obvious that the formula of “flesh” and “eye” and the other parts of the body must always be stated in conjunction with their matter.

Since there is a science of Being *qua* Being and 7 separately existent, we must inquire whether this should be regarded as identical with natural science or rather as a distinct branch of knowledge. Physics deals with things which contain a source of motion in themselves, and mathematics is speculative and is a science which deals with permanent things, but not with things which can exist separately. Hence there 8 is a science distinct from both of these, which deals with that which exists separately and is immovable; that is, if there really is a substance of this kind—I mean separately existent and immovable—as we shall endeavour to prove.^a And if there is an entity of this kind in the world of reality, here surely must be the Divine, and this must be the first and most fundamental principle. Evidently, then, there are 9 three kinds of speculative science: physics, mathe-

ἐστί, φυσική, μαθηματική, θεολογική. βέλτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ τῶν θεωρητικῶν [ἐπιστημῶν]¹ γένος, τούτων δ' αὐτῶν ἡ τελευταία λεχθεῖσα· περὶ τὸ
 5 τιμώτατον γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, βελτίων δὲ καὶ χείρων ἐκάστη λέγεται κατὰ τὸ οἰκείον ἐπιστητόν.

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, πότερόν ποτε τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὃν ἐπιστήμην καθόλου δεῖ θείναι ἢ οὐ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ μαθηματικῶν ἐκάστη περὶ ἓν τι γένος ἀφωρισμένον ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ καθόλου κοινὴ περὶ πάντων. εἰ
 10 μὲν οὖν αἱ φυσικαὶ οὐσίαι πρῶται τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶ, καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ πρώτη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη· εἰ δ' ἔστιν ἑτέρα φύσις καὶ οὐσία χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος, ἑτέραν ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῆς εἶναι καὶ προτέραν τῆς φυσικῆς καὶ καθόλου τῷ προτέραν.

15 VIII. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀπλῶς ὃν κατὰ πλείους λέγεται τρόπους, ὧν εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι² λεγόμενος, σκεπτέον πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία τῶν παραδεδομένων ἐπιστημῶν πραγματεύεται περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός, δηλόν· οὔτε γὰρ οἰκοδομικὴ σκοπεῖ τὸ συμβησόμενον
 20 τοῖς τῇ οἰκίᾳ χρησιμομένοις, οἷον εἰ λυπηρῶς ἢ τούναντίον οἰκήσουσιν, οὔθ' ὑφαντικὴ οὔτε σκυτοτομικὴ οὔτε ὀψοποικὴ, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἴδιον ἐκάστη τούτων σκοπεῖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μόνον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οἰκείον τέλος. οὐδ' (εἰ τὸ)³ μουσικόν καὶ γραμματικόν, οὐδὲ τὸν ὄντα μουσικόν ὅτι γενόμενος γραμματικὸς ἅμα ἔσται τὰ ἀμ-

¹ ἐπιστημῶν A^b: om. cel.

² εἶναι om. EJ.

³ εἰ τὸ Bullinger; εἰ Bonitz, τὸ Christ: ἢ JI, ut uid. E¹: om. A^b.

* Sections 1-9 of this chapter correspond to VI. ii.-iv.

matics, and theology. The highest class of science is the speculative, and of the speculative sciences themselves the highest is the last named, because it deals with the most important side of reality; and each science is reckoned higher or lower in accordance with the proper object of its study.

The question might be raised as to whether the science of Being *qua* Being should be regarded as universal or not. Each of the mathematical sciences 10 deals with some one class of things which is determinate, but universal mathematics is common to all alike. If, then, natural substances are the first of existing things, physics will be the first of the sciences; but if there is some other nature and substance which exists separately and is immovable, then the science which treats of it must be different from and prior to physics, and universal because of its priority.

VIII. Since the term Being in its unqualified sense is used with several meanings, of which one is accidental Being, we must first consider Being in this sense.^a Clearly none of the traditional sciences concerns itself with the accidental; the science of building does not consider what will happen to the occupants of the house, *e.g.* whether they will find it unpleasant or the contrary to live in; nor does the science of weaving or of shoemaking or of confectionery. Each of these sciences considers only what 2 is proper to it, *i.e.* its particular end. As for the question whether "the cultured" is also "the lettered," or the quibble^b that "the man who is cultured, when he has become lettered, will be both

^a This is a different form of the "quibble" in VI. ii. 4. Here the fallacy obviously consists in the wrong application of the word *ἅμα* ("at once" or "at the same time").

1084 b

25 φότερα,¹ πρότερον οὐκ ὦν, ὃ δὲ μὴ αἰεὶ ὄν ἐστιν, ἐγένετο τοῦτο, ὥσθ' ἅμα μουσικός ἐγένετο καὶ γραμματικός,—τοῦτο δὲ οὐδεμία ζητεῖ τῶν ὁμο-
 λογουμένως οὐσῶν ἐπιστημῶν, πλὴν ἡ σοφιστική·
 περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός γὰρ αὕτη μόνη πραγματεύεται,
 διό Πλάτων οὐ κακῶς εἴρηκε φήσας τὸν σοφιστὴν
 80 περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν διατρίβειν. ὅτι δ' οὐδ' ἐνδεχόμενόν
 ἐστὶν εἶναι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἐπιστήμην φανερόν
 ἔσται πειραθεῖσιν ἰδεῖν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ συμβε-
 βηκός.

Πᾶν δὴ φαμέν εἶναι τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 (ἀνάγκης δ' οὐ τῆς κατὰ τὸ βίαιον λεγομένης, ἀλλ'
 35 ἡ χρώμεθα ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις), τὸ δ' ὡς
 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τὸ δ' οὐθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐτ' αἰεὶ
 καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἔτυχεν· οἷον ἐπὶ κυνὶ
 γένοιτ' ἂν ψυχρός, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' οὐθ' ὡς αἰεὶ καὶ ἐξ
 1085 a ἀνάγκης οὐθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνεταί, συμβαίη
 δέ ποτ' ἂν. ἔστι δὴ τὸ συμβεβηκός ὃ γίνεταί
 μὲν, οὐκ αἰεὶ δ' οὐδ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
 πολὺ. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός, εἴρηται,
 διότι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τοῦ τοιούτου, δῆλον·
 5 ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα τοῦ αἰεὶ ὄντος ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ
 τὸ πολὺ, τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκός ἐν οὐδετέρῳ τούτων
 ἐστίν.

Ὅτι δὲ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ὄντος οὐκ εἰσὶν
 αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται ὅλαιπερ τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ
 ὄντος, δῆλον· ἔσται γὰρ ἅπαντ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης. εἰ
 γὰρ τόδε μὲν ἔστι τοῦδε ὄντος, τόδε δὲ τοῦδε,
 10 τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ὅπως ἔτυχεν ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης ἔσται καὶ οὐ τοῦτ' ἦν αἴτιον ἕως τοῦ

¹ ἅμα ἔσται τὰ ἀμφοτέρω] τὰ ἀμφοτέρω ἅμα ἔσται A^b.

at once although he was not before ; but that which is but was not always so must have come to be ; therefore he must have become at the same time cultured and lettered"—none of the recognized sciences³ considers this, except sophistry. This is the only science which concerns itself with the accidental, and hence Plato was not far wrong in saying^a that the sophist spends his time in the study of unreality. But that it is not even possible for there to be a science of the accidental will be apparent if we try to see what the accidental really is.

Of some things we say that they are so always and⁴ of necessity (necessity having the sense not of compulsion, but that which we use in logical demonstration^b), and of others that they are so usually, but of others that they are so neither usually nor always and of necessity, but fortuitously. *E.g.*, there might be a frost at midsummer, although this comes about neither always and of necessity nor usually ; but it might happen sometimes. The accidental, then, is⁵ that which comes about, but not always nor of necessity nor usually. Thus we have now stated what the accidental is ; and it is obvious why there can be no science of such a thing, because every science has as its object that which is so always or usually, and the accidental falls under neither of these descriptions.

Clearly there can be no causes and principles of the⁶ accidental such as there are of that which is *per se* ; otherwise everything would be of necessity. For if A is when B is, and B is when C is, and C is not fortuitously but of necessity, then that of which C was the cause will also be of necessity, and so on

^a *Sophist* 254 A.

^b Cf. VI. ii. 6.

τελευταίου λεγομένου αἰτιατοῦ (τοῦτο δ' ἦν κατὰ συμβεβηκός). ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἅπαντ' ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ὁποτέρως ἔτυχε καὶ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ παντελῶς ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων ἀναιρεῖται.
 15 καὶ μὴ ὃν δὲ ἀλλὰ γιγνόμενον τὸ αἷτιον ὑποτεθῇ, ταῦτά¹ συμβήσεται· πᾶν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενήσεται. ἢ γὰρ αὖριον ἔκλειψις γενήσεται ἂν τότε γένηται, τοῦτο δ' ἂν ἕτερόν τι, καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν ἄλλο· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἀπὸ πεπερασμένου χρόνου τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν μέχρι αὖριον ἀφαιρουμένου χρόνου ἥξει ποτὲ εἰς τὸ ὑπάρχον. ὥστ'
 20 ἐπεὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ἅπαντ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μετὰ τοῦτο γενήσεται, ὥστε πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι.

Τὸ δ' ὡς ἀληθές² ὃν καὶ³ κατὰ συμβεβηκός τὸ μὲν ἔστιν ἐν συμπλοκῇ διανοίας⁴ καὶ πάθος ἐν ταύτῃ· διὸ περὶ μὲν τὸ οὕτως ὃν οὐ ζητοῦνται αἱ ἀρχαί,
 25 περὶ δὲ τὸ ἔξω ὃν καὶ χωριστόν τὸ δ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ' ἀόριστον, λέγω δὲ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τοῦ τοιούτου δ' ἄτακτα καὶ ἄπειρα τὰ αἷτια. Τὸ δὲ ἔνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἔστιν· τύχη δ' ἔστιν ὅταν τι τούτων γένηται κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ὃν ἔστι τὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτό τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός,
 30 οὕτω καὶ αἷτιον. ἢ τύχη δ' αἷτία⁵ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἔνεκά του γιγνομένοις. διὸ περὶ ταῦτο τύχη καὶ διάνοια· προαίρεσις γὰρ οὐ χωρὶς διανοίας. τὰ δ' αἷτια ἀόριστα ἀφ' ὧν ἂν γένοιτο τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης· διὸ

¹ ταῦτα E.² ἀληθῶς EJ Alexander.³ καὶ μὴ A^b γρ. E Alexander.⁴ τῆς διανοίας EJ.⁵ αἷτιον A^b.^a This section is taken from *Physics* II. v., vi.

down to the last *causatum*, as it is called. (But this 7
 was assumed to be accidental.) Therefore everything
 will be of necessity, and the element of chance, i.e.
 the possibility of a thing's either happening or not, is
 entirely banished from the world of events. Even if
 we suppose the cause not to exist already but to be
 coming to be, the result will be the same; for every-
 thing will come to be of necessity. The eclipse to-
 morrow will come about if A does, and A will if B
 does, and B if C does; and in this way if we keep
 on subtracting time from the finite time between
 now and to-morrow, we shall at some point arrive at
 the present existing condition. Therefore since this
 exists, everything subsequent to it will happen of
 necessity, and so everything happens of necessity.

As for "what is" in the sense of what is *true* or 9
 what is *accidental*, the former depends upon a com-
 bination in thought, and is an affection of thought Being as truth
 (hence we do not look for the principles of Being in
 this sense, but only for those of objective and separ-
 able Being): the latter is not necessary but indeter-
 minate (I mean the accidental); and of such a thing
 the causes are indefinite and cannot be reduced to a
 system.

Teleology is found in events which come about in 10
 the course of nature or as a result of thought.^a It is Chance.
 "chance" (or "luck") when one of these comes
 about by accident; for a thing may be a cause, just
 as it may exist, either *per se* or accidentally. Chance
 is an accidental cause of normally purposive teleo-
 logical events. Hence chance and thought have the 11
 same sphere of action, for there is no purpose without
 thought. Causes from which chance results may
 come about are indeterminate; hence chance is

- 1065 a ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ καὶ αἴτιον κατὰ συμ-
 85 βεβηκός, ἀπλῶς δὲ οὐδενός. ἀγαθὴ δὲ τύχη καὶ
 1065 b κακὴ ὅταν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαῦλον ἀποβῇ· εὐτυχία δὲ
 καὶ δυστυχία περὶ μέγεθος τούτων. Ἐπεὶ δ'
 οὐθὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός πρότερον τῶν καθ' αὐτό,
 οὐδ' ἄρ' αἴτια. εἰ ἄρα τύχη ἢ τὸ αὐτόματον αἴτιον
 τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, πρότερον νοῦς αἴτιος¹ καὶ φύσις.
- 6 IX. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ μόνον, τὸ δὲ
 δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ μὲν ὄν,
 τὸ δὲ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν. οὐκ ἔστι δέ τις²
 κίνησις παρὰ τὰ πράγματα· μεταβάλλει γὰρ αἰεὶ
 κατὰ τὰς τοῦ ὄντος κατηγορίας. κοινὸν δ' ἐπὶ
 τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ³ οὐδ' ἐν μιᾷ κατηγορίᾳ.
- 10 ἕκαστον δὲ διχῶς ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν (οἷον τὸ τόδε· τὸ
 μὲν γὰρ μορφή αὐτοῦ τὸ δὲ στέρσις· καὶ κατὰ τὸ
 ποιὸν τὸ μὲν λευκὸν τὸ δὲ μέλαν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ
 ποσὸν τὸ μὲν τέλειον τὸ δὲ ἀτελές, καὶ κατὰ φοράν
 τὸ μὲν ἄνω τὸ δὲ κάτω, ἢ κοῦφον καὶ βαρὺ), ὥστε
 κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς τοσαῦτ' εἶδη ὅσα τοῦ
 ὄντος.
- 16 Διηρημένου δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τοῦ μὲν
 δυνάμει τοῦ δ' ἐντελεχείᾳ, τὴν τοῦ δυνάμει ἢ

¹ αἴτιον J.² τι JΓ: om. Λ^b.³ om. Λ^b.

⁴ The argument is stated more fully and clearly in *Physics* II. vi. ad fin. Chance produces indirectly the effects produced directly by mind; and spontaneity is similarly related

inscrutable to human calculation, and is a cause only accidentally, but in the strictest sense is a cause of nothing. It is "good" or "bad luck" when the result is good or bad, and "good" or "bad fortune" when the result is on a large scale.

Since nothing accidental is prior to that which is *per se*, neither are accidental causes prior. Therefore if chance or spontaneity is the cause of the universe, mind and nature are prior causes.^a

IX. A thing may exist only actually or potentially, or actually and potentially; it may be a substance or a quantity or one of the other categories. There is no motion^b apart from things, for change is always in accordance with the categories of Being^c; and there is nothing which is common to these and in no one category. Each category belongs to all its members in two ways—*e.g.* substance, for this is sometimes the form of the thing and sometimes its privation; and as regards quality there is white and black; and as regards quantity, complete and incomplete; and as regards spatial motion there is up and down or light and heavy—so that there are as many forms of motion and change as there are of Being.^d

Now since every kind of thing is divided into the potential and the real, I call the actualization of the to nature. But the indirect cause presupposes the direct. The argument is directed against the Atomists. Cf. *Physics* II. iv., 196 a 24, Simplicius 327. 24, Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* I. § 66 ("nulla cogente natura, sed concursu quodam fortuito").
^b The discussion of motion in this chapter consists of extracts from *Physics* III. 1-iii.

^c *i.e.*, change is substantial (generation and destruction); quantitative (increase and decrease); qualitative (alteration); spatial (locomotion). Cf. ch. xii. 1, 2.

^d This is inaccurate; see previous note.

τοιούτων ἐστὶν ἐνέργειαν λέγω κίνησιν. ὅτι δ' ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ἐνθένδε δῆλον· ὅταν γὰρ τὸ οἰκοδομητόν, ἢ¹ τοιούτον αὐτὸ λέγομεν εἶναι, ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ,² οἰκοδομεῖται, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο οἰκοδόμησις.
 20 ὁμοίως μάθησις, ἰάτρευσις [καὶ κύλισις],³ βάδισις, αἰσις, γήρανσις, αἰδρυνσις. συμβαίνει δὲ κινεῖσθαι ὅταν ἢ⁴ ἐντελέχεια ἢ⁵ αὐτή, καὶ οὔτε πρότερον οὔθ' ὕστερον. ἢ δὴ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, ὅταν ἐντελεχεία ὢν ἐνεργῇ, οὐχ ἢ αὐτὸ ἀλλ'⁶ ἢ κινήτῳ, κίνησις ἐστίν. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἢ ὧδε. ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ χαλκὸς δυνάμει ἀνδριάς· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐχ ἢ τοῦ
 25 χαλκοῦ ἐντελέχεια, ἢ χαλκός, κίνησις ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν χαλκῷ εἶναι καὶ δυνάμει τινί, ἐπεὶ εἰ ταῦτόν ἦν ἀπλῶς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἦν ἂν ἢ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἐντελέχεια κίνησις τις. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ταῦτο (δῆλον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δύνασθαι ὑγιαίνειν καὶ δύνασθαι κάμναι οὐ ταῦτόν—καὶ γὰρ
 30 ἂν τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ κάμναι ταῦτόν ἦν—τὸ δ' ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὑγιαῖνον καὶ νοσοῦν, εἴθ' ὑγρότης εἴθ' αἷμα, ταῦτό καὶ ἐν). ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ χρῶμα ταῦτόν καὶ ὁρατόν, ἢ τοῦ δυνατοῦ ἢ δυνατόν ἐντελέχεια κίνησις ἐστίν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν⁷ ἐστὶν αὕτη, καὶ ὅτι συμβαίνει τότε κινεῖ-

¹ ἢ A^b.² ἢ Bekker.³ καὶ κύλισις A^b Physics: om. cet.⁴ ἢ . . . ἢ E¹ Physics: vulgo ἢ . . . ἢ.⁵ οὐχ ἢ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο A^b Alexander Porphyryon.⁶ οὐν A^b Physics: γὰρ E¹ P.

* What Aristotle means by this is explained more clearly in the following sections, which may be summarized thus. The material substrate, e.g. bricks, etc., which is potentially a house, may be regarded (a) as potential material; in this

potential as such,^a motion. That this is a true state-³
 ment will be clear from what follows. When the
 "buildable" in the sense in which we call it such^{potential as such.}
 exists actually, it is being built; and this is the
 process of building. The same is true of the pro-
 cesses of learning, healing, walking, jumping, age-
 ing, maturing. Motion results when the complete
 reality itself exists, and neither sooner nor later.
 The complete reality, then, of that which exists⁴
 potentially, when it is completely real and actual,
 not *qua* itself but *qua* movable, is motion. By *qua*
 I mean this. The bronze is potentially a statue;
 but nevertheless the complete reality of the bronze
qua bronze is not motion. To be bronze is not the
 same as to be a particular potentiality; since if it
 were absolutely the same by definition the complete
 reality of the bronze would be a kind of motion;
 but it is not the same. (This is obvious in the case⁵
 of contraries; for the potentiality for health and
 the potentiality for illness are not the same—for if
 they were, health and illness would be the same too
 —but the substrate which becomes healthy or ill,
 whether it is moisture or blood, is one and the same.)
 And since it is not the same, just as "colour" and
 "visible" are not the same, it is the complete
 reality of the potential *qua* potential that is motion.
 It is evident that it is this, and that motion results⁶

sense it is actualized as bricks before building begins; (b)
 as potentially a house; in this sense when it is actualized it
 is no longer buildable but built, i.e., it is no longer potential;
 (c) as potentially buildable into a house. In this sense its
 actualization is contemporaneous with the process of building,
 and is incomplete (§ 11), and should not be described as
ἐντελέχεια or "complete reality." But Aristotle often uses
 this term as synonymous with the vaguer *τέλεια*.

1085 b

σθαι ὅταν ἡ ἐντελέχεια ᾗ αὐτῇ,¹ καὶ οὔτε πρότερον
 οὔθ' ὕστερον, δηλόν. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἕκαστον ὅτε
 μὲν ἐνεργεῖν ὅτε δὲ μὴ, ὅλον τὸ οἰκοδομητὸν ἢ
 οἰκοδομητὸν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἰκοδομητοῦ ἐνέργεια ἢ
 οἰκοδομητὸν οἰκοδόμησις ἔστιν. ἡ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔστιν,
 ἡ οἰκοδόμησις, ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἡ οἰκία· ἀλλ' ὅταν οἰκία
 ᾖ, οὐκέτι οἰκοδομητὸν ἔσται· οἰκοδομεῖται δὲ τὸ
 οἰκοδομητὸν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα οἰκοδόμησιν τὴν ἐνέρ-
 γειαν εἶναι, ἢ δ' οἰκοδόμησις κίνησις τις· ὁ δ' αὐτὸς
 λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων.

Ὅτι δὲ καλῶς εἴρηται, δηλόν ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι
 λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι
 διορίσαι ἄλλως αὐτήν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ τις γένει
 δύναται· ἂν θεῖναι αὐτήν· δηλόν δ' ἐξ ὧν λέγουσιν· οἱ
 μὲν γὰρ² ἑτερότητα καὶ ἀνισότητα καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν,
 ὧν οὐδὲν ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἡ μεταβολὴ
 οὐτ' εἰς ταῦτα οὐτ' ἐκ τούτων μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκ τῶν
 ἀντικειμένων. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ εἰς ταῦτα τιθέναι ὅτι
 ἀόριστόν τι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ κίνησις, τῆς δ' ἐτέρας
 συστοιχίας αἱ ἀρχαὶ διὰ τὸ στερητικαὶ εἶναι ἀόρι-
 στοί· οὔτε γὰρ τόδε οὔτε τοιόνδε οὐδεμία αὐτῶν
 οὔτε τῶν λοιπῶν κατηγοριῶν. τοῦ δὲ δοκεῖν
 ἀόριστον εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν αἴτιον ὅτι οὐτ' εἰς
 δύναμιν τῶν ὄντων οὐτ' εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἔστι θεῖναι
 αὐτήν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ δυνατόν ποσόν εἶναι κινεῖται ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης, οὔτε τὸ ἐνεργεῖα ποσόν· ἢ τε κίνησις

¹ αὐτῇ Christ: αὐτῇ.² γὰρ om. KJ.

² Pythagoreans and Platonists. Cf. I. v. 6, Plato, *Sophist* 256 D.

³ The criticism implied is: If motion is identified with otherness, inequality, etc., then these concepts must be either

when the complete reality itself exists, and neither sooner nor later. For everything may sometimes be actual, and sometimes not; e.g. the "buildable" *qua* "buildable"; and the actualization of the "buildable" *qua* "buildable" is the act of building. For the actualization is either this—the act of building—or a house. But when the house exists, it will no longer be buildable; the buildable is that which is *being* built. Hence the actualization must be the act of building, and the act of building is a kind of motion. The same argument applies to the other kinds of motion.

That this account is correct is clear from what the 8 other authorities say about motion, and from the fact that it is not easy to define it otherwise. For one thing, it could not be placed in any other class; this is clear from the fact that some people^a identify it with otherness and inequality and not-being, none of which is necessarily moved; moreover change is 9 no more into these or out of them than into or out of their opposites.^b The reason for placing motion in this class is that it is considered to be indeterminate, and the principles in one of the columns of contraries are indeterminate, being privative; for none of them is a determinate thing or quality or any of the other categories. The reason for con- 10 sidering motion to be indeterminate is that it cannot be associated either with the potentiality or with the actuality of things; for neither that which is potentially nor that which is actually of a certain size is necessarily moved. And motion is considered 11

(a) subjects of motion, which is absurd, or (b) termini of motion, in which case the same must be true of their contraries, since motion is between contraries.

1086 a

ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τις, ἀτελὴς δέ· αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἀτελές τὸ δυνατόν οὐ ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστίν· ἢ γὰρ εἰς στέρησιν ἀνάγκη θεῖναι ἢ εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀπλῆν, τούτων δ' οὐδὲν φαίνεται ἐνδεχο-
 26 μενον. ὥστε λείπεται τὸ λεχθὲν εἶναι καὶ ἐνέργειαν καὶ [μὴ]¹ ἐνέργειαν τὴν εἰρημένην, ἰδεῖν μὲν χαλεπὴν ἐνδεχομένην δ' εἶναι. Καὶ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἢ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινητῷ, δῆλον· ἐντελέχεια γὰρ ἐστὶ τούτου ὑπὸ τοῦ κινητικοῦ, καὶ ἡ τοῦ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἄλλη ἐστίν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι
 30 ἐντελέχειαν ἀμφοῖν· κινητικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῷ δύνασθαι, κινεῖν δὲ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἐνεργητικὸν τοῦ κινητοῦ, ὥσθ' ὁμοίως μία ἢ² ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια ὥσπερ τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα ἐν πρὸς δύο καὶ δύο πρὸς ἓν, καὶ τὸ ἀναντες καὶ τὸ κάταντες, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι οὐχ ἓν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κινουντος καὶ κινουμένου.

80 X. Τὸ δ' ἀπειρον ἢ τὸ ἀδύνατον διελθεῖν τῷ μὴ πεφυκέναι διέναι, καθάπερ ἡ φωνὴ ἀόρατος, ἢ τὸ διέξοδον ἔχον ἀτελεύτητον, ἢ ὁ μόλις, ἢ ὁ
 1086 b πεφυκὸς ἔχειν μὴ ἔχει διέξοδον ἢ πέρασ· ἔτι προσθέσει ἢ ἀφαιρέσει ἢ ἀμφω. Χωριστὸν μὲν δὴ αὐτό τι ὄν, αἰσθητὸν δ' <οὐ>,³ οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι.

¹ Bonitz.² ἢ om. Ab.³ οὐ ci. Ross: αἰσθητὸν δ' om. E.^a Cf. note on § 2 (end) above, and IX. vi. 7-10.^b This chapter consists of extracts from *Physics* III. iv., v., vii.

to be a kind of actualization, but incomplete^a; the reason of this is that the potential, of which it is the actualization, is incomplete.

Thus it is difficult to comprehend what motion is; for we must associate it either with privation or with potentiality or with absolute actuality; and apparently none of these is possible. There remains, 12 then, the account which we have given; that it is an actuality, and an actuality of the kind which we have described, which is hard to visualize but capable of existing.

That motion is in the movable is evident; for it is the complete realization of the movable by that which is capable of causing motion, and the actualization of that which is capable of causing motion is identical with that of the movable. For it must be 13 a complete realization of them both; since a thing is capable of moving because it has the potentiality, but it moves only when it is active; but it is upon the movable that it is capable of acting. Thus the actuality of both alike is one; just as there is the same interval from one to two as from two to one, and the hill up and the hill down are one, although their *being* is not one; the case of the mover and the thing moved is similar.

X.^b The infinite is either (a) that which cannot be traversed because it is not its nature to be traversed (just as sound is by nature invisible); or (b) that which admits of an endless traverse; or (c) scarcely admits of traverse; or (d) which, though it would naturally admit of traverse or limit, does not do so. Further, it may be infinite in respect of addition or of subtraction or of both.

The infinite has several meanings.

That the infinite should be a separate independent 14 it cannot be

εἰ γὰρ μήτε μέγεθος ἐστὶ μήτε πλῆθος, οὐσία δ' αὐτό¹ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ μὴ συμβεβηκός, ἀδιαίρετον ἔσται· τὸ γὰρ διαιρετὸν ἢ μέγεθος ἢ πλῆθος. εἰ δὲ ἀδιαίρετον, οὐκ ἄπειρον, εἰ μὴ καθάπερ ἡ φωνὴ ἀόρατος· ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτω λέγουσιν οὐδ' ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἀδιέξοδον. Ἔτι πῶς ἐνδέχεται καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι ἄπειρον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἀριθμὸς καὶ μέγεθος, ὧν πάθος τὸ ἄπειρον; ἔτι εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐκ ἂν εἴη στοιχείον τῶν ὄντων ἢ ἄπειρον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀόρατον τῆς διαλέκτου, καίτοι ἡ φωνὴ ἀόρατος. καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνεργεία εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον, δηλόν. ἔσται γὰρ ὅ τι οὖν αὐτοῦ ἄπειρον μέρος τὸ λαμβανόμενον· τὸ γὰρ ἀπείρων εἶναι καὶ ἄπειρον τὸ αὐτό, εἴπερ οὐσία τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου. ὥστε ἢ ἀδιαίρετον, ἢ εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρετόν, εἰ μεριστόν. πολλὰ δ' εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον ἄπειρα· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀέρος ἀὴρ μέρος, οὕτως ἄπειρον ἀπείρων, εἰ ἔστιν οὐσία καὶ ἀρχή. ἀμεριστόν ἄρα καὶ ἀδιαίρετον. ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον τὸ ἐντελεχεῖα ὄν ἄπειρον· ποσὸν γὰρ εἶναι ἀνάγκη. κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἄρα ὑπάρχει. ἀλλ' εἰ οὕτως, εἴρηται ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἀρχήν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο ᾧ συμβέβηκε, τὸν ἀέρα ἢ τὸ ἄρτιον. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ ζήτησις καθόλου, ὅτι δ' ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς

¹ αὐτοῦ A^b.

* The Pythagorean and Platonic view.

^b Aristotle has argued that they do not in I. ix. 16-25.

* According to Anaximenes; cf. Theophrastus, *Phys. Opin.* fr. 2 (Ritter and Preller 26).

^d According to the Pythagoreans. Cf. I. v. 5 n.

entity,^a and yet imperceptible, is impossible. For 2
 if it is neither magnitude nor plurality, but infinity ^{as a separate entity}
 itself is the essence of it, and not merely an accident,
 it must be indivisible; because that which is divisible
 is either magnitude or plurality. And if it is in-
 divisible it cannot be infinite, except in the same way
 as sound is invisible. But this is not what people
 mean by infinite; and it is not the infinite in this
 sense that we are investigating, but the infinite in
 the sense of the untraversable.

Again, how can the infinite exist independently 3
 unless number and magnitude, of which infinity is an
 attribute, also exist independently? ^b And further,
 if the infinite is accidental, it cannot, *qua* infinite, be
 an element of things; just as the invisible is not an
 element of speech, although sound is invisible. It
 is clear also that the infinite cannot exist actually.
 Otherwise any part of it which we might take would 4
 be infinite; for infinity and the infinite are the
 same, if the infinite is substance and is not predi-
 cated of a subject. Therefore it is either indivisible,
 or if it is partible, the parts into which it is divisible
 are infinite. But the same thing cannot be many
 infinities; for just as a part of air is air, so a part
 of the infinite will be infinite, if the infinite is a
 substance and principle. Therefore it is impartible 5
 and indivisible. But this is impossible of the actu-
 ally infinite, because it must be some quantity.
 Therefore infinity is an accidental attribute. But if
 so, as we have said, it cannot be it that is a principle,
 but that of which it is an accident: air ^c or "the
 even."^d

The foregoing inquiry is general; but what ^{Prove that the infinite does not}
 follows will show that the infinite does not exist in

1066 b

οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐνθένδε δῆλον· εἰ γὰρ σώματος λόγος τὸ ἐπιπέδοις ὠρισμένον, οὐκ εἴη ἂν ἄπειρον σῶμα, οὐτ' αἰσθητὸν οὔτε νοητὸν, οὐτ' ἀριθμὸς ὡς κεχωρισμένος καὶ ἄπειρος· ἀριθμητὸν γὰρ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἢ τὸ ἔχον ἀριθμόν. φυσικῶς δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον· οὔτε γὰρ σύνθετον οἷόν τε εἶναι, οὔθ' ἀπλοῦν. σύνθετον μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔσται σῶμα, εἰ¹ πεπέρανται τῷ πλήθει τὰ στοιχεῖα. δεῖ γὰρ ἰσάζειν τὰναντία 80 καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐν αὐτῶν ἄπειρον· εἰ γὰρ ὁττωῦν² λείπεται ἢ θατέρου σώματος δύναμις, φθαρθήσεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου τὸ πεπερασμένον. ἕκαστον δ' ἄπειρον εἶναι ἀδύνατον· σῶμα γὰρ ἔστι τὸ πάντῃ ἔχον διάστασιν, ἄπειρον δὲ τὸ ἀπεράντως διεστηκός, ὥστ' εἰ τὸ ἄπειρον σῶμα, πάντῃ ἔσται ἄπειρον. οὐδὲ ἐν δὲ καὶ ἀπλοῦν ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἄπειρον εἶναι 85 σῶμα, οὔθ' ὡς λέγουσιν οἱ τινες, παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐξ οὗ γεννώσι ταῦτα (οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ³ τοιοῦτο σῶμα παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα· ἅπαν⁴ γὰρ ἐξ οὗ⁵ ἐστὶ καὶ δια- 1067 λύεται εἰς τοῦτο,⁶ οὐ φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ τὰ ἀπλὰ σώματα), οὐδὲ πῦρ οὐδ' ἄλλο τι τῶν στοιχείων οὐθέν· χωρὶς γὰρ τοῦ ἄπειρον εἶναί τι αὐτῶν ἀδύνατον τὸ ἅπαν, καὶ ἢ πεπερασμένον, ἢ εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι ἐν τι αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν 8 ἅπαντα γίνεσθαι ποτε πῦρ. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐνός, ὃ ποιοῦσι παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα οἱ φυσικοί.

¹ ἐπείπερ A^b.² ὁπασσοῦν Physics E, Simplicius (F): ὁπασσοῦν A^b Physics FI Philoponus.³ γὰρ τὸ A^b.⁴ ἅπαντα A^b.⁵ ὧν A^b.⁶ ταῦτα A^b.⁷ περὶ EJ.* This is proved in *Physics* I. vi.^b sc. and so no other body can exist beside it.

sensible things. If the definition of a body is "that 6
 which is bounded by surfaces," then no body, whether exist in
 sensible or intelligible, can be infinite: nor can sensible
 there be any separate and infinite number, since things
 number or that which involves number is numerable.
 This is clearly shown by the following concrete
 argument. The infinite can neither be composite
 nor simple. For (a) it cannot be a composite body
 if the elements are limited in number^a; for the 7
 contraries must be equal, and no one of them must
 be infinite; for if the potency of one of the two
 corporeal elements is in any way inferior, the finite
 element will be destroyed by the infinite. And
 every element cannot be infinite, because body is
 that which has extension in all directions, and the
 infinite is that which is extended without limit; so
 that if the infinite is corporeal it will be infinite in
 all directions.^b Nor (b) can the infinite be any simple 8
 body; neither, as some^c hold, something which is
 apart from the elements and from which they suppose
 the elements to be generated (for there is no such
 body apart from the elements; everything can be
 resolved into that of which it consists, but we do not
 see things resolved into anything apart from the
 simple bodies), nor fire nor any other element.
 Apart from the question of how any of them could 9
 be infinite, the All, even if it is finite, cannot be or
 become any one of the elements, as Heraclitus says^d
 all things at certain times become fire. The same
 argument applies as to the One which the physicists

^a Anaximander. It seems, however, that by ἀνέκον he meant "indeterminate" or "undifferentiated," although he no doubt regarded this principle as "infinite" as well. Cf. notes on I. vii. 3, XII. ii. 3.

^d Cf. frs. 20-22 (Bywater).

πάν γὰρ μεταβάλλει ἐξ ἐναντίου, οἷον ἐκ θερμοῦ εἰς ψυχρόν.

Ἔτι τὸ αἰσθητὸν σῶμα πού, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τόπος ὅλου καὶ μορίου, οἷον τῆς γῆς. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ὁμο-
 10 ειδές, ἀκίνητον ἔσται ἢ αἰεὶ οἰσθήσεται. τοῦτο δὲ
 ἀδύνατον· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον κάτω ἢ ἄνω ἢ ὀπουοῦν;
 οἷον εἰ βῶλος εἴη, ποῦ αὕτη κινήσεται ἢ μενεῖ; ὁ
 γὰρ τόπος τοῦ συγγενοῦς αὐτῇ¹ σώματος ἄπειρος.
 καθέξει οὖν τὸν ὅλον τόπον; καὶ πῶς; τίς οὖν
 ἢ μονή καὶ ἢ κίνησις; ἢ πανταχοῦ μενεῖ—οὐ
 15 κινήσεται² ἄρα—ἢ πανταχοῦ κινήσεται³—οὐκ ἄρα
 στήσεται. εἰ δ' ἀνόμοιον τὸ πᾶν, ἀνόμοιοι καὶ οἱ
 τόποι, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν οὐχ ἓν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ παντός
 ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ ἅπτεσθαι, εἴτα ἢ πεπερασμένα ταῦτ'
 ἔσται ἢ ἄπειρα εἶδει. πεπερασμένα μὲν οὖν οὐχ
 οἷόν τε· ἔσται γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἄπειρα τὰ δ' οὐ, εἰ τὸ
 20 πᾶν ἄπειρον, οἷον πῦρ ἢ ὕδωρ· φθορά δὲ τὸ τοιοῦ-

¹ τοῦ συγγενοῦς αὐτῇ Physics: αὐτῆς τοῦ συγγενοῦς.

² κινήσεται E.J Physics.

³ κινήσεται Bekker: κινήσεται E Physics: om. A¹J.

^a The argument seems to be: Since all change is from contrary to contrary, and it is impossible that either (a) one of the elements should be contrary to the rest, or (b) one material principle should be contrary to all four elements, it follows that no one element, and similarly that no one material principle apart from the elements, can be the ultimate material principle of the universe.

^b i.e., the region of the universe which is proper to a given element is proper also to any part of that element. The proper region of earth is the centre, of fire the circumference of the universe. Cf. *De Caelo* I. ii.

^c Ross is evidently right in taking this to refer to the rest

1087 a

τον τοῖς ἐναντίοις. εἰ δ' ἄπειρα καὶ ἀπλᾶ, καὶ οἱ τόποι ἄπειροι καὶ ἔσται ἄπειρα τὰ στοιχεῖα· εἰ δέ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον, καὶ οἱ τόποι πεπερασμένοι, καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀνάγκη πεπεράνθαι. Ὅλως δ' ἀδύνατον

ἄπειρον εἶναι σῶμα καὶ τόπον τοῖς σώμασιν, εἰ πᾶν
 25 σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἢ βάρος ἔχει ἢ κουφότητα. ἢ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἢ ἄνω οἰσθήσεται, ἀδύνατον δέ τὸ ἄπειρον ἢ πᾶν ἢ τὸ ἡμῖν¹ ὁποτερονοῦν πεπονθῆναι· πῶς γὰρ διελεῖς; ἢ πῶς τοῦ ἀπείρου ἔσται τὸ μὲν κάτω τὸ δ' ἄνω, ἢ ἔσχατον καὶ μέσον; ἔτι πᾶν σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἐν τόπῳ, τόπου δέ εἶδη ἔξ, ἀδύ-
 30 νατον δ' ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ σώματι ταῦτ' εἶναι. ὅλως δ' εἰ ἀδύνατον τόπον ἄπειρον εἶναι, καὶ σῶμα ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τόπῳ πού, τοῦτο δὲ σημαίνει ἢ ἄνω ἢ κάτω ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν τι, τούτων δ' ἕκα-
 στον πέρας τι. Τὸ δ' ἄπειρον οὐ ταῦτόν ἐν με-
 γέθει καὶ κινήσει καὶ χρόνῳ ὥς μία τις φύσις, ἀλλὰ
 35 τὸ ὕστερον λέγεται κατὰ τὸ πρότερον, οἷον κίνησις κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος ἐφ' οὗ κινεῖται ἢ ἀλλοιοῦται ἢ αὖξεται, χρόνος δὲ διὰ τὴν κίνησιν.

1087 b

XI. Μεταβάλλει δὲ τὸ μεταβάλλον τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥς τὸ μουσικὸν βαδίζει,² τὸ δὲ τῷ τούτου τι μεταβάλλειν ἀπλῶς λέγεται μεταβάλλειν, οἷον ὅσα κατὰ μέρη· ὑγιάζεται γὰρ τὸ σῶμα, ὅτι
 5 ὁ ὀφθαλμός. ἔστι δέ τι ὁ καθ' αὐτὸ πρῶτον κινεῖται, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ κινητόν. ἔστι δέ [τι]³ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κινούντος ὡσαύτως· κινεῖ

¹ ἡμῖν ἢ A^b.² βαδίζειν E¹J.³ aecl. Bonitz: om. Bessarion, Physics.^a sc. in kind or number.^b Cf. § 6 n.^c Cf. § 14 n.^d i.e., above and below, before and behind, right and left (*Physics* 205 b 31).^e Cf. V. xlii. 5.

contraries. But if the parts are infinite^a and simple, the regions proper to them are infinite and the elements will be infinite. And since this is impossible,^b the regions are finite^c and the whole must be finite.

In general, there cannot be an infinite body *and* 13
a place for bodies if every body which is sensible has either weight or lightness; for it will have to move either towards the centre or upwards, and the infinite—either the whole or the half—cannot do either; for how can you divide it? How can the infinite be part up and part down, or part extreme and part centre? Further, every sensible body is in some 14
place, and of place there are six kinds,^d but these cannot exist in an infinite body. In general, if an infinite place is impossible, so is an infinite body; because that which is in a place is somewhere, and this means either up or down or one of the other kinds of place, and each of these is a limit.

The infinite is not the same in the sense that it is 15
one nature whether it applies to magnitude or to motion or to time; the posterior is derived from the prior sense, *e.g.* motion is called infinite in virtue of the magnitude involved when a thing is moved or changed or increased, and time is so called on account of motion.^e

XI. That which changes either changes accident- Modes of
ally, as when "the cultured" walks; or is said to change and
change in general because something in it changes, motion.
as in the case of things which change in their parts;
the body becomes healthy because the eye does.
But there is something which is moved directly *per se*, 2
i.e. the essentially movable. The same applies to
that which moves, for it moves sometimes accident-

γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ δὲ¹ κατὰ μέρος τὸ δὲ
καθ' αὐτό· ἔστι δέ τι τὸ κινεῖν πρῶτον· ἔστι δέ
τι τὸ κινούμενον· ἔτι ἐν ᾧ² χρόνῳ, καὶ ἐξ οὗ, καὶ
10 εἰς ὅ. τὰ δ' εἶδη καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ ὁ τόπος, εἰς ᾧ
κινεῖνται τὰ κινούμενα, ἀκίνητά ἐστιν, ὅλον ἐπι-
στήμη καὶ θερμότης· ἔστι δ' οὐχ ἡ θερμότης
κίνησις ἀλλ' ἡ θέρμανσις. Ἡ δὲ μὴ κατὰ συμ-
βεβηκὸς μεταβολή οὐκ ἐν ᾧ πασι ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ'
ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ μεταξύ καὶ ἐν ἀντιφάσει.
15 τούτου δὲ πίστις ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. μεταβάλλει
δὲ τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκεί-
μενον, ἢ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς οὐκ ὑποκείμενον,
ἢ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς οὐκ ὑποκείμενον, ἢ οὐκ ἐξ
ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον. λέγω δὲ ὑποκεί-
μενον τὸ καταφάσει δηλούμενον. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη
20 τρεῖς εἶναι μεταβολάς· ἡ γὰρ ἐξ οὐκ ὑποκειμένου
εἰς μὴ ὑποκείμενον οὐκ ἔστι μεταβολή· οὔτε γὰρ
ἐναντία οὔτε ἀντίφασίς ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀντίθεσις.
ἡ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον
κατ' ἀντίφασιν γένεσις ἐστιν, ἡ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἀπλῆ,
ἡ δὲ τινὸς τίς· ἡ δ' ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑπο-
κείμενον φθορά, ἡ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἀπλῆ, ἡ δὲ τινὸς
25 τίς. εἰ δὴ τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγεται πλεοναχῶς, καὶ μήτε
τὸ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι,
μήτε τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν τὸ τῷ ἀπλῶς ὄντι ἀντι-
κείμενον (τὸ γὰρ μὴ λευκὸν ἢ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ὅμως ἐν-
δέχεται κινεῖσθαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός· εἴη γὰρ ἂν

¹ μὲν E.J.² ἐτι ἐν ᾧ ἐν τινι A^b.

* The change from positive to positive is omitted here (but cf. § 7). Aristotle no doubt intended to use it as an example of non-substantial change, e.g. from "poor man" to "rich man"; but since this can be regarded as change from "poor man" to "not-poor man," or "not-rich man"

ally, sometimes partially, and sometimes *per se*. There is something that moves directly, and something that is moved; and also a time in which, and something from which, and something into which it is moved. But the forms and modifications and place into which moving things are moved are immovable; *e.g.* knowledge and warmth. It is not warmth that is motion, but the process of warming.

Non-accidental change is not found in all things, 3 but only between contraries and intermediates and contradictories. We can convince ourselves of this by means of induction. That which changes changes either from positive into positive, or from negative into negative, or from positive into negative, or from negative into positive. By "positive" I mean that 4 which is denoted by an affirmation. Thus there must be three forms of change; for that which is from negative into negative is not change, because they are neither contraries nor contradictories, since they entail no opposition. The change from the negative into its contradictory positive is generation—absolute change absolute generation, and qualified change qualified generation; and the change from the positive to the negative is destruction—absolute change absolute destruction, and qualified change qualified destruction.^a Now if "what is not" has 5 several meanings, and neither that which implies a combination or separation of terms,^b nor that which relates to potentiality and is opposed to unqualified Being, admits of motion ("not-white" or "not-good," however, admits of motion accidentally,

to "rich man," he includes it as a qualified type of substantial change.

^a *i.e.*, falsity. Cf. IX. x. 1.

1087 b

30 ἄνθρωπος τὸ μὴ λευκόν· τὸ δ' ἀπλῶς μὴ τόδε οὐδαμῶς), ἀδύνατον τὸ' μὴ ὄν κινεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὴν γένεσιν κίνησιν εἶναι· γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ὁμῶς ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ὑπάρχει τὸ μὴ ὄν κατὰ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἀπλῶς.

35 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡρεμεῖν. ταῦτά τε δὴ συμβαίνει δυσχερῇ, καὶ εἰ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ἐν τόπῳ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ· εἴη γὰρ ἂν πού. οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ φθορὰ κινήσεις· ἐναντίον γὰρ κινήσει
1088 a κινήσεις ἢ ἡρεμία, φθορὰ δὲ γενέσει. ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα κινήσεις μεταβολή τις, μεταβολαὶ δὲ τρεῖς αἰ εἰρημέναι, τούτων δ' αἰ κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν οὐ κινήσεις, αὗται δ' εἰσὶν αἰ κατ' ἀντίφασιν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον κίνησιν
εἶναι μόνην. τὰ δ' ὑποκείμενα ἢ ἐναντία ἢ μεταξύ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ στέρησις κείσθω ἐναντίον), καὶ δηλοῦται καταφάσει, οἷον τὸ γυμνὸν καὶ νωδὸν καὶ² μέλαν.

XII. Εἰ οὖν αἰ κατηγορίαι διήρηνται οὐσία, ποιότητι, τόπῳ, τῷ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, τῷ πρὸς τι,
10 τῷ ποσῷ, ἀνάγκη τρεῖς εἶναι κινήσεις, ποιοῦ, ποσοῦ, τόπου· κατ' οὐσίαν δ' οὐ, διὰ τὸ μὴθὲν εἶναι οὐσία ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ τοῦ πρὸς τι· ἔστι γὰρ

¹ τὸ JT Themistius: γὰρ τὸ EA^{b1} Physics. ² καὶ τὸ E.J.

^a § 3.

^b Aristotle generally distinguishes eight categories (originally ten, but he seems to have abandoned κείσθαι "position" and εἶναι "state" at an early date); here he omits "time" as being relative to motion (it is that by which motion can be numerically estimated; cf. XII. vi. 3, *Physics* 219 b 1) and therefore neither the subject nor the terminus of motion. Cf. Ross *ad loc.*

because "not-white" may be a man; but that which is "not so-and-so" in an absolute sense does not admit of it at all), then "what is not" cannot be moved. If this is so, generation cannot be motion; for it is "what is not" that is generated. For even 6 if the generation is in the highest degree accidental, still it is true to say that not-being is predicable of that which is generated absolutely. And the argument applies similarly to rest. Thus not only do these difficult conclusions follow, but also that everything which is moved is in a place, whereas "what is not" is not in a place; for then it would be somewhere. Nor is destruction motion; for the contrary of motion is motion or rest, but the contrary of destruction is generation. And since every motion is a kind 7 of change, and the three kinds of change are those which we have described,^a and of these those which relate to generation and destruction are not motions, and these are the changes between contradictories, the change from positive to positive must alone be motion. The subjects are either contraries or intermediates (for privative terms may also be regarded as contraries) and are denoted by a positive term—e.g. "naked" or "toothless" or "black."

XII. Now since the categories are distinguished as substance, quality, place, activity or passivity, relation and quantity,^b there must be three kinds of motion, in respect of quality, quantity and place. There is no motion ^c in respect of substance, because substance has no contrary; nor of the relative,

There are three kinds of motion or change—of quality, quantity and place.

^a There is, however, change in respect of substance (generation and destruction), but this is between contradictories and is not motion in the strict sense. Cf. xi. 6, and § 4 below. The distinction between motion and change is not always maintained.

1068^a βάλλει ὅτι ᾧ ὑπάρχει ἐκείνο μεταβάλλει, ὅτε μὲν
 εἰς ἐπιστήμην ὅτε δὲ εἰς ἄγνοιαν.¹ "Ἐτι εἰς ἀπει-
 ρον βαδιέεται, εἰ ἔσται μεταβολῆς μεταβολὴ καὶ
 85 γενέσεως γένεσις. ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τὴν προτέραν,
 1068^b εἰ ἢ ὑστέρα· οἷον εἰ ἢ ἀπλὴ γένεσις ἐγίγνετό ποτε,
 καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐγίγνετο². ὥστε οὐπω ἦν τὸ
 γιγνόμενον ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τι γιγνόμενον [ἢ] γιγνό-
 μενον³ ἤδη.⁴ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐγίγνετό ποτε, ὥστ' οὐκ
 ἦν πω τότε γιγνόμενον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπείρων οὐκ
 5 ἔστι τι πρῶτον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστ' οὐδὲ
 τὸ ἐχόμενον. οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὖν οὔτε κινεῖσθαι
 οἷόν τε οὔτε μεταβάλλειν οὐδέν. "Ἐτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ
 κίνησις ἢ ἐναντία καὶ ἡρέμησις, καὶ γένεσις καὶ
 φθορά· ὥστε τὸ γιγνόμενον, ὅταν γένηται γιγνό-
 μενον, τότε φθείρεται· οὔτε γὰρ εὐθὺς γιγνόμενον
 10 οὐθ' ὕστερον· εἶναι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ φθειρόμενον. "Ἐτι
 δεῖ ὕλην ὑπεῖναι τῷ γιγνομένῳ καὶ μεταβάλλοντι.
 τίς οὖν ἔσται;—ὥσπερ τὸ ἀλλοιωτὸν σῶμα ἢ ψυχὴ,
 οὕτω τί τὸ γιγνόμενον κίνησις ἢ γένεσις; καὶ ἔτι

¹ Smith: *ἐγίγνετο* codd., Physics.

² ἀπλῶς ἐγίγνετο A^b.

³ τι γιγνόμενον γιγνόμενον Bonitz: τι γιγνόμενον ἢ γενόμενον
 E: τι γιγνόμενον ἀπλῶς ἢ γενόμενον J: τι γιγνόμενον καὶ γιγ-
 νόμενον Physics FI: γιγνόμενον τι ἢ γενόμενον A^b: γιγνόμενον
 τὸ Physics E.

⁴ ἤδη A^b Physics: *et* δὲ EJ.

^a *sc.* which is absurd.

^b That which comes to be must cease to be, and it can
 cease to be only when it exists. Therefore if that which comes
 to be comes to be coming to be, it must cease to be when it

ing to forgetting because the *subject* changes, now in the direction of knowledge and now in that of ignorance.

Further, we shall have an infinite series if there is 6 to be change of change and becoming of becoming, because if the latter of two becomings comes to be Second proof. from the former, the former must come to be too. *E.g.*, if simple becoming was once coming to be, that which comes to be something was also once coming to be. Therefore that which simply comes to be was not yet, but there was already something coming to be coming to be something. But this too was at one 7 time coming to be, and therefore it was not at that time coming to be something. But in infinite series there is no first term, and therefore in this series the first term cannot exist, nor can any subsequent term. Therefore nothing can be either generated or moved or changed.

Further, the same thing which admits of motion Third proof admits also of the contrary motion and of rest, and that which admits of generation admits also of destruction. Therefore that which comes to be, 8 when it has come to be coming to be, is then in course of perishing ^a; for it does not perish as soon as it is coming to be coming to be, nor afterwards, because that which is perishing must *exist*.^b

Further, there must be some matter underlying Fourth proof. that which is coming to be or changing. What then will it be? What is it that becomes motion or generation in the same way as it is body or soul that undergoes change? And moreover what is

is coming to be; before this it does not exist, but is only coming to be coming to be, and after this it is not "that which comes to be" but "that which has come to be."

1088 b

τί εἰς ὃ κινεῦνται; δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὴν τοῦδε ἐκ
 τοῦδε εἰς τόδε κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν.¹ πῶς οὖν; οὐ
 16 γὰρ ἔσται μάθησις τῆς μαθήσεως, ὥστ' οὐδὲ
 γένεσις γενέσεως. Ἐπεὶ δ' οὗτ' οὐσίας οὔτε
 τοῦ πρὸς τι οὔτε τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν, λείπεται
 κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ ποσὸν καὶ τόπον κίνησιν εἶναι.
 τούτων γὰρ ἐκάστω ἐναντίωσις ἔστιν. λέγω δὲ τὸ
 ποιὸν οὐ τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ (καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ποιόν)
 20 ἀλλὰ τὸ παθητικὸν καθ' ὃ λέγεται πάσχειν ἢ ἀπαθές
 εἶναι. τὸ δὲ ἀκίνητον τό τε ὅλως ἀδύνατον κινήθη-
 ναι καὶ τὸ μόλις ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ ἢ βραδέως
 ἀρχόμενον, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν κινεῖσθαι, μὴ
 δυνάμενον² δὲ ὅτε πέφυκε καὶ οὐ καὶ ὥς· ὁ καλῶ
 ἡρεμεῖν τῶν ἀκινήτων μόνον· ἐναντίον γὰρ ἡρεμία
 25 κινήσει, ὥστε στέρησις ἂν εἴη τοῦ δεκτικοῦ.
 26 Ἄμα κατὰ τόπον ὅσα ἐν ἐνὶ τόπῳ πρώτῳ, καὶ
 27 χωρὶς ὅσα ἐν ἄλλῳ. (ἐναντίον κατὰ τόπον τὸ
 31 κατ' εὐθείαν ἀπέχον πλείστον.)³ ἀπτεσθαι δὲ ὧν
 28 τὰ ἄκρα ἄμα. μεταξὺ δ' εἰς ὃ πέφυκε πρότερον

¹ ἢ γένεσιν Physics E³HI Alexander Simplicius: μὴ κίνησιν
 codd. γρ. Alexander: καὶ μὴ κίνησιν Physics E¹: μὴ κίνησιν ἢ
 γένεσιν Physics F: μὴ κίνησιν ἀπλῶς Lasseron.

² μὴ δυνάμενον] καὶ δυνάμενον, μὴ κινούμενον Physics.

³ ἐναντίον . . . πλείστον hic posui: habent codd. post
 μεταβάλλον l. 30.

^a Cf. V. xiv.

^b i.e., when they occupy one place to the exclusion of any-
 thing else. Cf. *Physics* 209 a 33-b 1.

^c I have transferred this sentence from the end of the
 section, where it is placed in the text, on the ground that it
 fits more naturally here. I suspect that it, like the displaced

that which is the terminus of the motion? For that which we are considering must be a motion or generation of A from B into C. How then can these conditions be fulfilled? There can be no learning of learning, and therefore there can be no generation of generation.

Since there is no motion of substance or of the relative or of activity and passivity, it remains that there is motion in respect of quality, quantity and place; for each of these admits of contrariety. By "quality" I mean not that which is in the substance (for indeed even the differentia is a quality), but the passive quality in virtue of which a thing is said to be acted upon or to be immune from being acted upon.^a The immovable is either that which is wholly incapable of being moved, or that which is scarcely moved in the course of a long time or is slow in starting, or that which would naturally be moved but cannot be moved at the time when and from the place whence and in the way in which it would naturally be moved. *This last is the only kind of immovable thing which I recognize as being at rest; for rest is contrary to motion, and so must be a privation of that which admits of motion.*

Things are "together in place" which are in the primary sense^b in one place, and "separate" which are in different places. "Contrary in place" is that which is at a maximum distance in a straight line.^c Things are said to be "in contact" whose extremes are together in place. An "intermediate" is that at which a changing thing which changes

Motion is in respect of quality, quantity and place

Various definitions

portion of § 13, was originally a marginal note which was later inserted in the body of the text, but in the wrong position.

1088 b

39 ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον μετα-

30 βάλλει κατὰ φύσιν τὸ συνεχῶς μεταβάλλον. (ἐπεὶ

(1089 a) 3 δὲ πᾶσα μεταβολὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις, ταῦτα δὲ

4 τὰ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἀντίφασις, ἀντιφάσεως δὲ οὐδὲν

5 ἀνὰ μέσον, δῆλον ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις τὸ μεταξύ.)¹

ἐξῆς δὲ οὐ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὄντος, θέσει ἢ εἶδει ἢ

(1088 b) 82 ἄλλως πως ἀφορισθέντος, μηθὲν μεταξύ ἐστὶ τῶν

88 ἐν ταύτῳ γένει καὶ οὐ ἐφεξῆς ἐστίν, οἷον γραμμαὶ

94 γραμμῆς ἢ μονάδες μονάδος ἢ οἰκίας οἰκία· ἄλλο

95 δ' οὐθὲν κωλύει μεταξύ εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξῆς τινὸς

1089 a ἐφεξῆς καὶ ὕστερόν τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἐξῆς τῶν

2 δύο, οὐδ' ἢ νουμηνία τῆς δευτέρας. ἐχόμενον δὲ

ὃ ἂν ἐξῆς ὦν ἀπτηται. τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς ὅπερ ἐχό-

6 μενόν τι. λέγω² δὲ συνεχὲς ὅταν ταὐτὸ γένηται

καὶ ἐν τὸ ἐκατέρου πέρας οἷς ἀπτονται καὶ συν-

έχονται, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὸ συνεχὲς ἐν τούτοις ἐξ ὧν

ἐν τι πέφυκε γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν σύναψιν. Καὶ

10 ὅτι πρῶτον τὸ ἐφεξῆς, δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ ἐφεξῆς³ οὐχ

ἀπτεται, τοῦτο δ' ἐφεξῆς· καὶ εἰ συνεχὲς, ἀπτεται,

εἰ δ' ἀπτεται, οὐπω συνεχὲς. ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν

ἀφή, οὐκ ἔστι σύμφυσις ἐν τούτοις. ὥστ' οὐκ

ἔστι στιγμὴ μονάδι ταυτόν· ταῖς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει

τὸ ἀπτεσθαι, ταῖς δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐφεξῆς· καὶ τῶν

μὲν μεταξύ τι, τῶν δ' οὐ.

¹ ἐπεὶ δὲ . . . μεταξύ hic ponenda ci. Prantl.

² λέγω] ἢ ἀπτόμενον. λέγεται A^b.

³ ἐξῆς E.J.

* I have followed Prantl's suggestion in transferring this sentence from the end of § 13.

^b i.e., the first day of the month.

continuously in accordance with its nature naturally arrives before it arrives at the extreme into which it is changing. Since all change takes place between (13) opposites, and these are either contraries or contradictories, and contradictories have no middle term, clearly it is to the sphere of contraries that the intermediate belongs." "Successive" is that which 12 comes after the beginning (the order being determined by position or form or in some other way) and has nothing of the same class between itself and that which it succeeds; *e.g.* lines in the case of a line, and units in that of a unit, and a house in the case of a house (but there is nothing to prevent something else from coming between). For that which is successive is a thing which is successive and posterior to some other thing. 1 is not successive to 2, nor is the new moon^b to the second day of the month. "Contiguous" is that which is successive 13 and in contact. The "continuous" is a species of the contiguous. I call two things continuous when 14 their respective boundaries, by which they are kept together in contact, become one and the same; hence clearly the continuous belongs to the sphere of things whose nature it is to become one by contiguity.

Clearly "successive" is the most ultimate term; for the successive need not be in contact, but contact implies succession; and if there is continuity there is contact, but if there is contact there is not necessarily continuity; and where there is no con- 15 tact there is no coalescence. Therefore a point is not the same as a unit; for points admit of contact, whereas units do not, but only of succession; and between points there is something intermediate, but between units there is not.

Λ

1089 a

I. Περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία· τῶν γὰρ οὐσιῶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἷτια ζητοῦνται. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὡς
 20 ὅλον τι τὸ πᾶν, ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον μέρος· καὶ εἰ τῷ
 ἐφεξῆς, καὶ οὕτω πρῶτον ἡ οὐσία, εἴτα τὸ ποιόν,
 εἴτα τὸ ποσόν. ἅμα δ' οὐδ' ὄντα ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς
 ταῦτα,¹ ἀλλὰ ποιότητες καὶ κινήσεις, ἡ² καὶ τὸ οὐ
 λευκὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ εὐθύ· λέγομεν γοῦν εἶναι καὶ
 ταῦτα, ὅλον "ἔστιν οὐ λευκόν." ἔτι οὐδὲν τῶν
 25 ἄλλων χωριστόν. μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι
 ἔργῳ· τῆς γὰρ οὐσίας ἐζήτουν ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα
 καὶ αἷτια. οἱ μὲν οὖν νῦν τὰ καθόλου οὐσίας
 μᾶλλον τιθέασιν· τὰ γὰρ γένη καθόλου, ἃ φασιν
 ἀρχὰς καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ λογικῶς
 ζητεῖν· οἱ δὲ πάλαι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα,³ ὅλον πῦρ καὶ
 30 γῆν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ κοινὸν σῶμα. Οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς,
 μία μὲν αἰσθητή—ἡ μὲν αἰθὴρ ἡ δὲ φθαρτή, ἣν
 πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὅλον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα [ἡ δ'
 αἰθὴρ]⁴—ἡ ἀνάγκη τὰ στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε
 πολλά· ἄλλη δὲ ἀκίνητος, καὶ ταύτην φασὶν τινες

¹ τὰλλα A^b γρ. E Themistius.

² ἡ EA^{bi} Themistius.

³ ἕκαστον EJ.

⁴ om. Themistius, Alexander apud Averroem.

^a Cf. ch. x. 14, XIV. iii. 9.

^b Platonists.

^c i.e., the celestial bodies.

BOOK XII

I. Our inquiry is concerned with substance ; for it is the principles and causes of substances that we are investigating. Indeed if the universe is to be regarded as a whole, substance is its first part ; and if it is to be regarded as a succession,^a even so substance is first, then quality, then quantity. Moreover, the latter hardly exist at all in the full sense, but are merely qualifications and affections of Being. Otherwise "not-white" and "not-straight" would also exist ; at any rate we say that they too "are," *e.g.*, "it is not white." Further, none of the other 2 categories is separately existent. Even the ancients in effect testify to this, for it was of substance that they sought the principles and elements and causes. Present-day thinkers^b tend to regard universals as substance, because genera are universal, and they hold that these are more truly principles and substances because they approach the question theoretically ; but the ancients identified substance with particular things, *e.g.* fire and earth, and not with body in general.

BOOK XII
SUBSTANCE,
AND ESPECIALLY
NOT-WHITE
AND NOT-STRAIGHT.
Substance is
the primary
reality.

Now there are three kinds of substance. One is 3 *sensible* (and may be either eternal^c or perishable ; the latter, *e.g.* plants and animals, is universally recognized) ; of this we must apprehend the elements, whether they are one or many. Another is 4

Substance
may be
(a) sensible
and eternal,

1089 a

35 εἶναι¹ χωριστήν, οἱ μὲν εἰς δύο διαιροῦντες, οἱ δὲ εἰς
 μίαν φύσιν τιθέντες τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, οἱ
 δὲ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον τούτων. ἐκεῖναι μὲν δὴ

1089 b

φυσικῆς (μετὰ κινήσεως γάρ), αὕτη δ' ἑτέρας, εἰ
 μηδεμία αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴ κοινή. Ἡ δ' αἰσθητὴ οὐσία
 μεταβλητὴ. εἰ δ' ἡ μεταβολὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμέ-
 5 νων ἢ τῶν μεταξὺ, ἀντικειμένων δὲ μὴ πάντων (οὐ
 λευκὸν γὰρ ἢ φωνή) ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἀνάγκη
 ὑπεῖναι τι τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν· οὐ
 γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει.

II. Ἐτι τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον οὐχ
 ὑπομένει· ἔστιν ἄρα τι τρίτον παρὰ τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ
 10 ὕλη. εἰ δὴ αἱ μεταβολαὶ τέτταρες, ἢ κατὰ τὸ τί² ἢ
 κατὰ τὸ ποῖον ἢ ποσὸν ἢ πού, καὶ γέनेσις μὲν ἢ
 ἀπλὴ καὶ φθορὰ ἢ κατὰ τόδε, αὐξήσις δὲ καὶ φθίσις
 ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλοίωσις δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὸ πάθος,
 φθορὰ δὲ ἢ κατὰ τόπον, εἰς ἐναντιώσεις ἂν εἰεν
 τὰς καθ' ἑκάστον αἱ μεταβολαί. ἀνάγκη δὴ μετα-
 15 βάλλειν τὴν ὕλην δυναμένην ἅμφω· ἐπεὶ δὲ διττὸν
 τὸ ὄν, μεταβάλλει πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος εἰς τὸ
 ἐνεργεῖα ὄν, οἷον ἐκ λευκοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖα
 λευκόν (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ' αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως)-
 ὥστε οὐ μόνον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται γίνε-
 σθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ὄντος γίνεταί πάντα,

¹ φασὶ τινες εἶναι] τινὲς εἶναι φασι A^b.

² τί scripsi: τί.

^a These three views were held respectively by Plato, Xenocrates and Speusippus. Cf. VII. ii. 3, 4; XIII. i. 4, and see Vol. I. Introd. p. xxiv.

^b Cf. X. vii.

^c i.e., contrary qualities. Cf. VIII. v. 1.

immutable, which certain thinkers hold to exist separately; some dividing it into two classes, others combining the forms and the objects of mathematics into a single class, and others recognizing only the objects of mathematics as of this nature.^a The first two kinds of substance come within the scope of physics, since they involve motion; the last belongs to some other science, if there is no principle common to all three.

Sensible substance is liable to change. Now if δ change proceeds from opposites or intermediates—not however from all opposites (for speech is not white), but only from the contrary^b—then there must be something underlying which changes into the opposite contrary; for the contraries^c do not change.

II. Further, something persists, whereas the contrary does not persist. Therefore besides the contraries there is some third thing, the *matter*. Now if change is of four kinds, in respect either of substance or of quality or of quantity or of place, and if change of substance is generation or destruction in the simple sense, and change of quantity is increase or decrease, and change of affection is alteration, and change of place is locomotion, then changes must be in each case into the corresponding contrary state. It must be the matter, then, which admits of both contraries, that changes. And since "that which is" is twofold, everything changes from that which is potentially to that which is actually; e.g. from potentially white to actually white. The same applies to increase and decrease. Hence not only may there be generation accidentally from that which is not, but also everything is generated from that which is, but is poten-

(b) sensible and perishable; (c) non-sensible and immutable.

Sensible substance is liable to change, which implies matter.

The four kinds of change.

1069 b

- 20 δυνάμει μέντοι ὄντος, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνεργεία.
καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἐν· βέλτιον γὰρ ἢ
"ὁμοῦ πάντα"—καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μίγμα
καὶ Ἀναξिमάνδρου, καὶ ὡς Δημόκριτός φησιν—"ἦν
ὁμοῦ πάντα δυνάμει, ἐνεργεία δ' οὐ". ὥστε τῆς
ὑλῆς ἂν εἶεν ἡμμένοι. πάντα δ' ὑλὴν ἔχει ὅσα
25 μεταβάλλει, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν· καὶ τῶν αἰδίων ὅσα μὴ
γενητὰ¹ κινητὰ δὲ φορᾶ, ἀλλ' οὐ γενητήν,² ἀλλὰ
ποθεν ποί. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις ἐκ ποίου μὴ
ὄντος ἢ γένεσις· τριχῶς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν. εἰ δὴ τι ἔστι
δυνάμει, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐξ
30 ἑτέρου. οὐδ' ἱκανὸν ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα·
διαφέρει γὰρ τῇ ὑλῇ, ἐπεὶ διὰ τί ἄπειρα ἐγένετο
ἀλλ' οὐχ ἓν; ὁ γὰρ νοῦς εἰς, ὥστ' εἰ καὶ ἡ ὑλὴ
μία, ἐκείνο ἐγένετο ἐνεργεία οὐ ἡ ὑλὴ ἦν δυνάμει.
τρία δὴ τὰ αἷτια καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαί, δύο μὲν
ἡ ἐναντίωσις, τῆς τὸ μὲν λόγος καὶ εἶδος τὸ δὲ
στέρησις, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὑλὴ.
- 85 III. Μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὑλὴ οὔτε
τὸ εἶδος, λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα. πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει

¹ γενητὰ . . . γενητήν A^b.^a Fr. 1 (Diels).^b In this passage I follow Ross's punctuation and interpretation, which seem to me to be certainly right. Anaxagoras's undifferentiated infinity of homoeomerous particles (although contrasted with the unifying principle of Mind, cf. I. viii. 14) can be regarded as in a sense a unity. Again, μίγμα (as Ross points out) in its Aristotelian sense of "complete fusion" is a fair description of Anaximander's "indeterminate." The general meaning of the passage is that in each of the systems referred to the material principle in its elemental state should have been described as existing only potentially.^c Cf. ch. i. 3, VIII. i. 7, 8.

tially and is not actually. And this is the "one" of 3
 Anaxagoras: for his "all things were together,"^a
 and the "mixture" of Empedocles and Anaximander
 and the doctrine of Democritus would be better
 expressed as "all things were together potentially,
 but not actually."^b Hence these thinkers must have 4
 had some conception of matter. All things which
 change have matter, but different things have different
 kinds; and of eternal things such as are not generable
 but are movable by locomotion have matter; matter,
 however, which admits not of generation, but of
 motion from one place to another.^c

Different
 things have
 different
 kinds of
 matter.

One might raise the question from what sort of
 "not-being" generation takes place; for not-being
 has three senses.^d If a thing exists through a poten-
 tiality, nevertheless it is not through a potentiality
 for any chance thing; different things are derived
 from different things. Nor is it satisfactory to say 5
 that "all things were together," for they differ in
 their matter, since otherwise why did they become
 an infinity and not one? For Mind is one; so that
 if matter is also one, only that could have come to
 be in actuality whose matter existed potentially. The
 causes and principles, then, are three; two being the
 pair of contraries, of which one is the formula or form
 and the other the privation, and the third being the
 matter.^e

There are
 three
 principles,
 form, priva-
 tion, matter.

III. We must next observe^f that neither matter
 nor form (I mean in the proximate sense) is generated.

Generation
 of sub-
 stance.

^a i.e., (1) the negation of a category, (2) falsity, (3) un-
 realized potentiality. Cf. XIV. ii. 10.

^b This classification is found in *Physics* I. vi., vii., but
 is foreign to the main treatise of the *Metaphysics*. See
 Vol. I. Introd. p. xxviii.

^f See Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxii.

- 1070 a τι καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος καὶ εἰς τι· ὑφ' οὗ μὲν, τοῦ
 πρώτου κινουμένου· ὁ δέ, ἡ ὕλη· εἰς ὃ δέ, τὸ εἶδος.
 εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν εἰσιν, εἰ μὴ μόνον ὁ χαλκὸς γίγ-
 νεται στρογγύλος ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ ὁ
 χαλκός· ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι. Μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι
 ὁ ἐκάστη ἐκ συνωνύμων γίννεται οὐσία¹. τὰ γὰρ φύσει
 οὐσῖαι καὶ τὰλλα· ἢ γὰρ τέχνη ἢ φύσει γίννεται
 ἢ τύχη ἢ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ. ἢ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν
 ἄλλῳ, ἢ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ (ἄνθρωπος γὰρ
 ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ), αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἰτίαι στερήσεις
 τούτων.
 10 Οὐσῖαι δὲ τρεῖς, ἡ μὲν ὕλη τότε τι οὖσα τῷ
 11 φαίνεσθαι (ὅσα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀφ᾽ ἧ καὶ μὴ συμφύσει,
 20 ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον, ὅλον πῦρ, σάρξ, κεφαλὴ.
 ἅπαντα γὰρ ὕλη ἐστί, καὶ τῆς μάλιστ' οὐσίας ἢ
 21, 22 τελευταία²), ἡ δὲ φύσις τότε τι καὶ ἕξις τις εἰς ἣν³.
 13 ἔτι τρίτη ἢ ἐκ τούτων ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα, ὅλον Σω-
 κράτης ἢ Καλλίας. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τινῶν τὸ τότε τι
 14 οὐκ ἐστὶ παρὰ τὴν συνθέτην οὐσίαν (ὅλον οἰκίας τὸ
 15 εἶδος, εἰ μὴ ἢ τέχνη· οὐδ' ἐστὶ γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ

¹ ἡ οὐσία A^b.

² ὅλον . . . τελευταία hic ponenda vidit Alexander: habent codd. post τούτων 19 infra.

³ καὶ ἕξις τις εἰς ἣν Bessarion, fort. Alexander· εἰς ἣν καὶ ἕξις τις codd.

^a In natural reproduction the generative principle is obviously in the parent. But the offspring is in a sense a part of the parent, and so Aristotle identifies the two.

^b Cf. XI. viii. 12 n.

^c Aristotle is contrasting proximate with primary matter. Fire, the primary matter of a man, is a simple undifferentiated element which cannot be perceived as such, and has no individuality. The head, and the other parts of the body,

METAPHYSICS, XII. III. 1-4

All change is of some subject by some agent into some object. The agent is the immediate mover; the subject is the matter; and the object is the form. Thus the process will go on to infinity if not only the bronze comes to be round, but also roundness or bronze comes to be; there must, then, be some stopping-point.

Proximate matter and form are not generated

We must next observe that every substance is 2 generated from something which has the same name ("substances" including not only natural but all other products). Things are generated either by art or by nature or by chance or spontaneously. Art is a generative principle in something else; nature is a generative principle in the subject itself^a (for man begets man); the other causes are privations of these.^b

Modes of generation.

There are three kinds of substance: (i.) matter, 3 which exists individually in virtue of being apparent^c (for everything which is characterized by contact and not by coalescence is matter and substrate; e.g. fire, flesh and head; these are all matter, and the last is the matter of a substance in the strictest sense); (ii.) the "nature"^d (existing individually)—i.e. a kind of positive state which is the terminus of motion; and (iii.) the particular combination of these, e.g. Socrates or Callias. In some cases the individuality does not exist apart from the composite substance (e.g., the form of a house does not exist separately, except as the art of building; nor are these forms liable to generation and destruction; there is a considered merely as in contact and not as forming an organic unity, are the proximate matter of a man; they are perceptible and individual. Flesh (in general) represents the matter in an intermediate stage.

Three kinds of substance: (1) matter, (4, 5) (2) individual nature, (3) their particular combination.

^a i.e., form.

1070 a

10 τούτων, ἀλλ' ἄλλον τρόπον εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἰκία
 17 τε ἡ ἄνευ ὕλης καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ πᾶν τὸ κατὰ τέ-
 18 χην), ἀλλ' εἶπερ, ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει· διὸ δὴ οὐ κακῶς
 10 Πλάτων¹ ἔφη ὅτι εἶδη ἐστὶν ὅποσα φύσει, εἶπερ
 21 ἔστιν εἶδη ἄλλα τούτων. Τὰ μὲν οὖν κινουῦντα
 22 αἴτια ὡς προγεγενημένα ὄντα, τὰ δ' ὡς ὁ λόγος ἅμα.
 ὅτε γὰρ ὑγιαίνει ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τότε καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια
 ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς χαλκῆς σφαίρας ἅμα καὶ
 25 ἡ χαλκὴ σφαῖρα. εἰ δὲ καὶ ὕστερόν τι ὑπομένει,
 σκεπτόν· ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον εἰ ἡ
 ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον (μὴ πᾶσα, ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς· πᾶσαν γὰρ
 ἀδύνατον ἴσως). φανερόν δὴ ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ διὰ γε
 ταύτ' εἶναι τὰς ιδέας· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον
 γεννᾷ, ὁ καθ' ἑκαστον τὸν τινά. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 80 ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν· ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη ὁ λόγος τῆς
 ὑγείας ἐστὶ.

IV. Τὰ δ' αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἄλλα ἄλλων ἔστιν
 ὡς, ἔστι δ' ὡς, ἂν καθόλου λέγῃ τις καὶ κατ'
 ἀναλογίαν, ταυτὰ πάντων. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν τις
 πότερον ἕτεραι ἢ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν
 85 οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι, καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην δὴ τῶν
 κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον εἰ ταυτὰ πάν-
 των· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔσται τὰ πρὸς τι καὶ ἡ
 1070 b οὐσία. τί οὖν τοῦτ' ἔσται; παρὰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν
 καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ κατηγορούμενα οὐδὲν ἐστὶ κοινόν·

¹ ὁ Πλάτων Ab.^a i.e., in the mind of the architect or doctor.^b See Vol. I. Introd. p. xxi.^c i.e., such as to survive after death.

distinct sense in which "house" and "health" and every artificial product, considered in the abstract, do or do not exist^a ; if it does so at all, it does so in the case of natural objects. Hence Plato was not far wrong in saying^b that there are as many Forms as there are kinds of natural objects ; that is if there are Forms distinct from the things of our world.

Moving causes are causes in the sense of pre-5 existent things, but formal causes coexist with their effects. For it is when the man becomes healthy that health exists, and the shape of the bronze sphere comes into being simultaneously with the bronze sphere. Whether any form remains also afterwards^c is another question. In some cases there is nothing to prevent this, e.g. the soul may be of this nature^d (not all of it, but the intelligent part ; for presumably all of it cannot be). Clearly then there is no need on these grounds for the Ideas to exist ; for man begets man, the individual begetting the particular person. And the same is true of the arts, for the art of medicine is the formula of health.

IV. In one sense the causes and principles are different for different things ; but in another, if one speaks generally and analogically, they are the same for all. For the question might be raised whether the principles and elements of substances and of relations are the same or different ; and similarly with respect to each of the other categories. But it is absurd that they should be the same for all ; for then relations and substance would have the same constituents. What then can their common con-2 stituent be ? For there is nothing common to and yet distinct from substance and the other predicable categories, yet the element is prior to that of which

Different
things have
different
causes.

πρότερον δὲ τὸ στοιχεῖον ἢ ὧν¹ στοιχεῖον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἡ οὐσία στοιχεῖον τῶν πρὸς τι, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας. ἔτι πῶς ἐνδέχεται πάντων εἶναι ταῦτ' στοιχεῖα; οὐδὲν γὰρ οἷόν τ' εἶναι τῶν στοιχείων τῷ ἐκ² στοιχείων συγκεκμημένῳ τὸ αὐτό, οἷον τῷ ΒΑ τὸ Β ἢ Α (οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν νοητῶν στοιχείον ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ ἐν ἢ τὸ ὄν· ὑπάρχει γὰρ ταῦτα ἐκάστω καὶ τῶν συνθέτων). οὐδὲν ἄρ' ἐστὶ αὐτῶν οὗτ' οὐσία οὔτε πρὸς τι·
 10 ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον. οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄρα πάντων ταῦτα στοιχεῖα.

Ἡ ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐστὶ μὲν ὥς, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς οὐ, οἷον ἴσως τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων ὡς μὲν εἶδος τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἢ στέρησις, ὕλη δὲ τὸ δυνάμει ταῦτα πρῶτον καθ' αὐτό, οὐσίαι δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων ὧν
 15 ἀρχαὶ ταῦτα, ἢ εἴ τι ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ γίνονται ἐν, οἷον σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν· ἕτερον γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐκείνων εἶναι τὸ γενόμενον. τούτων μὲν οὖν ταῦτα στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχαί, ἄλλων δ' ἄλλα· πάντων δὲ οὕτω μὲν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἐστίν, τῷ ἀνάλογον δέ, ὥσπερ εἴ τις εἴποι ὅτι ἀρχαὶ εἰσι τρεῖς, τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ὕλη. ἀλλ' ἕκαστον τούτων ἕτερον
 20 περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἐστίν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι λευκόν, μέλαν, ἐπιφάνεια· φῶς, σκότος, ἀήρ, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα

¹ ὧν ἐστὶ τὸ Εἶ.

² ἐκ τῶν Εἶ.

* Unity and being are called intelligibles as being the most universal predicates and as contrasted with particulars, which are sensible.

^b This apparently refers to the elements; fire and air are hot matter, water and earth cold matter.

it is an element. Moreover substance is not an element of relations, nor is any of the latter an element of substance. Further, how can all the categories have the same elements? For no element ³ can be the same as that which is composed of elements; *e.g.*, neither B nor A can be the same as BA (nor indeed can any of the "intelligibles,"^a *e.g.* Unity or Being, be an element; for these apply in every case, even to composite things); hence no element can be either substance or relation. But it must be one or the other. Therefore the categories have not all the same elements.

The truth is that, as we say, in one sense all things ⁴ have the same elements and in another they have not. *E.g.*, the elements of sensible bodies are, let us say, ^{but analogically the causes are the same for all things.} (1) as form, the hot, and in another sense the cold, which is the corresponding privation; as matter, that which directly and of its own nature is potentially hot or cold. And not only these are substances, but so are (2) the compounds ^b of which they are principles, and (3) any unity which is generated from hot and cold, *e.g.* flesh or bone; for the product of hot and cold must be distinct from them. These things, then, ⁵ have the same elements and principles, although specifically different things have specifically different elements; we cannot, however, say that all things have the same elements in this sense, but only by analogy: *i.e.*, one might say that there are three principles, form, privation and matter. But each of ⁶ these is different in respect of each class of things, *e.g.*, in the case of colour they are white, black, surface; or again there is light, darkness and air, of which day and night are composed. And since not only things which are inherent in an object are its

1070 b

αἷτια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς οἶον τὸ κινοῦν, δῆλον
 ὅτι ἕτερον ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον· αἷτια δ' ἄμφω·
 25 καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαιρεῖται ἡ ἀρχή, τὸ δ' ὡς κινοῦν
 ἢ ἰστὰν ἀρχὴ τις καὶ οὐσία. ὥστε στοιχεῖα μὲν
 κατ' ἀναλογίαν τρία, αἷτιαί δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ τέτταρες·
 ἄλλο δ' ἐν ἄλλῳ, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἷτιον ὡς κινοῦν
 ἄλλο ἄλλῳ. ὑγίεια, νόσος, σῶμα· τὸ κινοῦν ἱατρική.
 εἶδος, ἀταξία τοιαδί, πλίνθιοι· τὸ κινοῦν οἰκοδομική.
 30 [καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαιρεῖται ἡ ἀρχή.]¹ ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ
 κινοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀνθρώπῳ² ἄνθρωπος,
 ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀπὸ διανοίας τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον,
 τρόπον τινὰ τρία αἷτια ἂν εἴη, ὡδὶ δὲ τέτταρα.
 ὑγίεια γάρ πως ἢ ἱατρική, καὶ οἰκίας εἶδος ἢ
 οἰκοδομική, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ· ἐτι
 35 παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὡς³ πρῶτον πάντων κινοῦν πάντα.

V. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν χωριστὰ τὰ δ' οὐ
 1071 a χωριστὰ, οὐσίαι ἐκεῖνα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντων
 αἷτια ταῦτά,⁴ ὅτι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνευ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ
 πάθη καὶ αἱ κινήσεις. ἔπειτα ἔσται ταῦτα ψυχὴ
 ἴσως καὶ σῶμα, ἢ νοῦς καὶ ὀρεξεις καὶ σῶμα. ἐτι
 δ' ἄλλον τρόπον τῷ ἀνάλογον ἀρχαὶ αἱ αὐταί, οἶον
 5 ἐνέργεια καὶ δύναμις· ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἄλλα τε
 ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλως. ἐν ἐνίοις μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτε
 μὲν ἐνεργεῖα ἐστὶν ὅτε δὲ δυνάμει, οἶον οἶνος ἢ

¹ καὶ . . . ἀρχή om. A^b Alexander.² ἀνθρώπῳ Zeller: ἀνθρώποις E Alexander: om. A^bJ.³ τὸ ὡς Bonitz: ὡς τὸ.⁴ ταῦτά Christ: ταῦτα.

^a For the first time the ultimate efficient cause is distinguished from the proximate. Aristotle is leading up to the description of the Prime Mover which occupies the latter half of the book.

^b See Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxii.

causes, but also certain external things, *e.g.* the moving cause, clearly "principle" and "element" are not the same; but both are causes. Principles are divided into these two kinds, and that which moves a thing or brings it to rest is a kind of principle and substance. Thus analogically there are three ⁷ elements and four causes or principles; but they are different in different cases, and the proximate moving cause is different in different cases. Health, disease, body; and the moving cause is the art of medicine. Form, a particular kind of disorder, bricks; and the moving cause is the art of building. And since in the ⁸ sphere of natural objects the moving cause of man is man, while in the sphere of objects of thought the moving cause is the form or its contrary, in one sense there are three causes and in another four. For in a sense the art of medicine is health, and the art of building is the form of a house, and man begets man; but besides these there is that which as first of all things moves all things.^a

V. Now since some things can exist in separation and others cannot, it is the former that are substances. And therefore all things have the same causes, because without substance there can be no affections and motions. Next we shall see ^b that these causes are probably soul and body, or mind, appetite and body.^c Again, there is another sense in which by analogy the principles are the same, *viz.* actuality and potentiality; but these are different for different things, and apply to them in different ways. For in some cases the same thing ² exists now actually and now potentially; *e.g.* wine

Actuality and potentiality are causes common to all things.

^a Aristotle is thinking of animals and human beings, which are substances in the truest sense.

1071 a

σὰρξ ἢ ἄνθρωπος (πίπτει δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὰ εἰρημένα αἷτια· ἐνεργεία μὲν γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, εἰς ἣν ἢ χωριστόν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἁμφοῖν, στέρησις τε¹ οἶον
 10 σκότος ἢ κάμνον, δυνάμει δὲ ἢ ὕλη· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ δυνάμενον γίνεσθαι ἁμφω). ἄλλως δ' ἐνεργεία καὶ δυνάμει διαφέρει, ὧν μὴ ἐστὶν ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη, ὧν (ἐνίων)² οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου αἷτιον τὰ τε στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ
 15 γῆ ὡς ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἴδιον εἶδος, καὶ ἐπὶ³ τι ἄλλο ἔξω, οἶον ὁ πατήρ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ λοξὸς κύκλος, οὔτε ὕλη ὄντα οὔτ' εἶδος οὔτε στέρησις οὔτε ὁμοειδέες, ἀλλὰ κινούμενα. Ἔτι δὲ ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅτι τὰ μὲν καθόλου ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, τὰ δ' οὐ. πάντων δὴ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ πρῶτον τοδὶ⁴ καὶ ἄλλο
 20 ὁ δυνάμει. ἐκεῖνα μὲν οὖν καθόλου⁵ οὐκ ἐστὶν· ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καθόλου, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλὰ Πηλεὺς Ἀχιλλέως, σοῦ δὲ ὁ πατήρ, καὶ τοδὶ τὸ Β τουδὶ τοῦ ΒΑ, ὅλως δὲ τὸ Β τοῦ ἀπλῶς ΒΑ. ἔπειτα εἰ δὴ⁶ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἀλλὰ
 25 δὲ ἄλλων αἷτια καὶ στοιχεῖα, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τῶν

¹ τε Ross: δὲ.² ὧν ἐνίων Ross: ὧν codd. Alexander: καὶ ὧν γρ. E, Themistius: ἢ ὧν Zeller.³ εἰ EJ.⁴ τῷ εἶδει A^b: τὸ εἶδει recc.⁵ καθόλου A^b: τὰ καθόλου EJ Alexander.⁶ εἰ δὴ Rolfes: εἰδῆ A^bJ² Alexander: ἡδῆ EJ²: τὰ εἰδῆ Christ.

* i.e., of acquiring either of the contrary qualities distinguished by the form and the privation.

² The sun, moving in the ecliptic, approaches nearer to the earth in summer, causing generation, and recedes farther

or flesh or man (actuality and potentiality also fall under the causes as already described; for the form exists actually if it is separable, and so does the compound of form and matter, and the privation, *e.g.* darkness or disease; and the matter exists potentially, for it is this which has the potentiality of becoming both^a); but the distinction in virtue³ of actuality and potentiality applies in a different sense to cases where the matter of cause and effect is not the same, in some of which the form is not the same but different. *E.g.*, the cause of a man is (i) his elements: fire and earth as matter, and the particular form; (ii) some external formal cause, *viz.* his father; and besides these (iii) the sun and the ecliptic,^b which are neither matter nor form nor privation nor identical in form with him, but cause motion.

Further, we must observe that some causes can be stated universally, but others cannot. The proximate principles of all things are the proximate actual individual and another individual which exists potentially.^c Therefore the proximate principles are not universal. For it is the particular that is the principle of particulars; "man" in general is the principle of "man" in general, but there is no such person as "man," whereas Peleus is the principle of Achilles and your father of you, and this particular B of this particular BA; but B in general is the principle of BA regarded absolutely. Again,⁵ even if the causes of substances are universal, still, as has been said,^d different things, *i.e.* things which from the earth in winter, causing destruction. *Cf.* ch. vi. 10 n., *De Gen. et Corr.* 336 a 32.

^c *i.e.*, the proximate efficient cause and proximate matter.

^d Ch. iv. 6.

1071 a

μὴ ἐν ταυτῷ γένει, χρωμάτων, ψόφων, οὐσιῶν, ποσότητος, πλὴν τῷ ἀνάλογον· καὶ τῶν ἐν ταυτῷ εἶδει ἕτερα, οὐκ εἶδει, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἄλλο, ἢ τε σὴ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ κινήσαν¹ καὶ ἢ ἐμή, τῷ καθόλου δὲ λόγῳ ταυτά. Τὸ δὲ

80 ζητεῖν τίνες ἀρχαὶ ἢ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ ποιῶν, πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς γε² λεγομένων ἐστὶν ἐκάστου, διαιρεθέντων δὲ οὐ ταυτὰ ἀλλ' ἕτερα, πλὴν ὡδὶ καὶ πάντων· ὡδὶ μὲν ταυτὰ ἢ τὸ³ ἀνάλογον, ὅτι ὕλη,

85 εἶδος, στέρησις, τὸ κινεῖν, καὶ ὡδὶ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν αἷτια ὡς αἷτια πάντων, ὅτι ἀναιρεῖται ἀναιρουμένων· ἔτι τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχεία· ὡδὶ δὲ ἕτερα πρῶτα ὅσα τὰ ἐναντία αἱ μήτε ὡς γένη λέγεται

1071 b μήτε πολλαχῶς λέγεται· καὶ ἔτι αἱ ὕλαι. Τίνες μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ πόσαι, καὶ πῶς αἱ αὐταὶ καὶ πῶς ἕτεραι, εἴρηται.

VI. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι, δύο μὲν αἱ φυσικαί, μία δὲ ἡ ἀκίνητος, περὶ ταύτης λεκτέον,

¹ καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ κινήσαν] καὶ τὸ κινήσαν καὶ τὸ εἶδος A^b.

² γε Christ: τε.

³ τὸ Ross: τῷ.

^a i.e., the prime mover.

^b i.e., individual forms and privations of individual things.

^c Ch. i. 8, 4.

are not in the same genus, as colours, sounds, substances and quantity, have different causes and elements, except in an analogical sense; and the causes of things which are in the same species are different, not in species, but because the causes of individuals are different: your matter and form and moving cause being different from mine, although in their universal formula they are the same.

As for the question what are the principles or ⁶ elements of substances and relations and qualities, whether they are the same or different, it is evident that when the terms "principle" and "element" are used with several meanings they are the same for everything; but when the meanings are distinguished, they are not the same but different; except that in a certain sense they are the same for all. In a certain sense they are the same or analogous, because (a) everything has matter, form, privation and a moving cause; (b) the causes of substances may be regarded as the causes of all things, since if substances are destroyed everything is destroyed; and further (c) that which is first in complete reality ^a is the cause of all things. In another sense, however, ⁷ proximate causes are different; there are as many proximate causes as there are contraries which are predicated neither as genera nor with a variety of meanings ^b; and further the particular material causes are different.

Thus we have stated what the principles of sensible things are, and how many they are, and in what sense they are the same and in what sense different.

VI. Since we have seen ^c that there are three kinds of substance, two of which are natural and one immutable, we must now discuss the last named

There must be an eternal immutable substance.

1071 b

5 ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι αἰδίον τινὰ¹ οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον. αἶ
 τε γὰρ οὐσῖαι πρῶται τῶν ὄντων, καὶ εἰ πᾶσαι
 φθαρταί, πάντα φθαρτά. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον κίνησιν ἢ
 γενέσθαι ἢ φθαρῆναι· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἦν· οὐδὲ χρόνον·
 οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι μὴ
 ὄντος χρόνου. καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἄρα οὕτω συνεχὴς
 10 ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος· ἡ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡ κινήσεώς τι
 πάθος. κίνησις δ' οὐκ ἔστι συνεχὴς ἀλλ' ἡ ἢ κατὰ
 τόπον, καὶ ταύτης ἡ κύκλις. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ
 ἔσται² κινητικὸν ἢ ποιητικόν, μὴ ἐνεργοῦν δέ τι, οὐκ
 ἔσται³ κίνησις· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δύναμιν ἔχον μὴ
 ἐνεργεῖν. οὐθὲν ἄρα ὄφελος οὐδ' εἰ οὐσίας ποιή-
 15 σωμεν αἰδίους, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ εἶδη, εἰ μὴ τις δυνα-
 μένη ἐνέσται ἀρχὴ μεταβάλλειν. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ'
 αὕτη ἰκανή, οὐδ' ἄλλη οὐσία παρὰ τὰ εἶδη· εἰ γὰρ
 μὴ ἐνεργήσῃ, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις. ἔτι οὐδ' εἰ
 ἐνεργήσῃ, ἡ δ' οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται
 κίνησις αἰδίος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὄν μὴ
 20 εἶναι. δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην τῆς ἢ οὐσίας
 ἐνέργεια. ἔτι τοίνυν ταύτας δεῖ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι
 ἀνευ ὕλης· αἰδίους γὰρ δεῖ, εἴπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι
 αἰδίον. ἐνέργεια⁴ ἄρα. Καίτοι ἀπορία· δοκεῖ

¹ αἰδίον τινὰ] τινὰ αἰδίον A^b.² ἔσται A^b Alexander.³ ἔσται EA^b.⁴ ἐνέργεια EF.^a Cf. *Physics* VIII. 1-iii.^b The argument seems to be: If we assume that time was generated, it follows that before that there was no time; but the very term "before" implies time. The same applies to the destruction of time.^c Cf. XI. xii. 1 n.^d These statements are proved in *Physics* VIII. viii., ix.^e As there is not, according to Aristotle; cf. I. vii. 4.^f Aristotle is now thinking not only of the prime mover

METAPHYSICS, XII. vi. 1-5

and show that there must be some substance which is eternal and immutable. Substances are the primary reality, and if they are all perishable, everything is perishable. But motion cannot be either generated or destroyed, for it always existed ^a; nor can time, because there can be no priority or posteriority if there is no time.^b Hence as time ² is continuous, so too is motion: for time is either identical with motion or an affection of it.^c But there is no continuous motion except that which is spatial, and of spatial motion only that which is circular.^d

But even if we are to suppose that there is something which is kinetic and productive although it does not actually move or produce, there will not necessarily be motion; for that which has a potentiality may not actualize it. Thus it will not help ³ matters if we posit eternal substances, as do the exponents of the Forms, unless there is in them some principle which can cause change.^e And even this is not enough, nor is it enough if there is another substance besides the Forms; for unless it actually functions there will not be motion. And it will ⁴ still not be enough even if it does function, if its essence is potentiality; for there will not be eternal motion, since that which exists potentially may not exist. Therefore there must be a principle of this kind whose essence is actuality. Furthermore these substances^f must be immaterial; for they must be eternal if anything is. Therefore they are actuality.

There is a difficulty, however; for it seems that ⁵

(God or Mind) but also of the movers of the celestial spheres.
Cf. ch. viii. 14.

ARISTOTLE

1071 b

γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐνεργοῦν πᾶν δύνασθαι, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον
οὐ πᾶν ἐνεργεῖν, ὥστε πρότερον εἶναι τὴν δύναμιν.
25 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, οὐθὲν ἔσται τῶν ὄντων· ἐν-
δέχεται γὰρ δύνασθαι μὲν εἶναι μήπω δ' εἶναι.
καίτοι εἰ ὡς λέγουσιν οἱ θεολόγοι οἱ ἐκ νυκτός γεν-
νῶντες, ἢ ὡς οἱ φυσικοὶ " ἦν ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματά "
φασι, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον. πῶς γὰρ κινηθήσεται, εἰ
30 μὴ¹ ἔσται ἐνεργεία τι² αἷτιον; οὐ γὰρ ἡ γε ὕλη
κινήσει αὐτὴν ἑαυτήν, ἀλλὰ τεκτονική, οὐδὲ τὰ
ἐπιμήμια οὐδ' ἡ γῆ, ἀλλὰ τὰ σπέρματα καὶ ἡ γονή.
διὸ ἐνιοὶ ποιοῦσιν αἰεὶ ἐνέργειαν, οἷον Λευκιππος
καὶ Πλάτων· αἰεὶ γὰρ εἶναι φασὶ κίνησιν. ἀλλὰ
διὰ τί καὶ τίνα οὐ λέγουσιν, οὐδ', (εἰ) ὥδι ἢ ὥδι,³
35 τὴν αἰτίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχε κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ δεῖ
τι αἰεὶ ὑπάρχειν, ὥσπερ νῦν φύσει μὲν ὥδι, βία δὲ
ἢ ὑπὸ νοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ὥδι. εἴτα ποῖα πρώτη; διαφέρει
1072 a γὰρ ἀμήχανον ὅσον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί γε
οἷόν τε λέγειν ἦν οἶεται ἐνίοτε ἀρχὴν εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ
ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν· ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ
ἢ ψυχῇ, ὡς φησὶν. τὸ μὲν δὴ δύναμιν οἶεσθαι
ἐνεργείας πρότερον ἔστι μὲν ὡς καλῶς, ἔστι δ' ὡς
οὐ· εἴρηται δὲ πῶς. ὅτι δ' ἐνέργεια πρότερον,
μαρτυρεῖ Ἀναξαγόρας (ὁ γὰρ νοῦς ἐνέργεια⁴) καὶ

¹ μὴ] μὴθὲν A^b.² τι om. A^b.³ οὐδ', εἰ ὥδι ἢ ὥδι Diels, Alexander (?): οὐδὲ ὥδι οὐδέ.⁴ ἐνέργεια TF Alexander: ἐνεργεία EA^bJ.^a Cf. Hesiod, *Works and Days* 17, *Theogony* 116 sqq.^b Cf. ch. ii. 3.^c Cf. I. iv. 12, *De Caelo* 300 b 8, and see Burnet, *E.G.P.* § 178.^d Cf. *Timaeus* 30 a, and § 8 below.^e Aristotle refers to Plato's rather inconsistent account in *Timaeus* 30-34.

METAPHYSICS, XII. vi. 5-9

everything which actually functions has a potentiality, whereas not everything which has a potentiality actually functions; so that potentiality is prior. But if this is so, there need be no reality; for everything may be capable of existing, but not yet existent. Yet if we accept the statements of the 6 cosmologists who generate everything from Night,^a or the doctrine of the physicists that "all things were together,"^b we have the same impossibility; for how can there be motion if there is no actual cause? Wood will not move itself—carpentry must act upon it; nor will the menses or the earth move themselves—the seeds must act upon the earth, and the semen on the menses. Hence 7 some, *e.g.* Leucippus^c and Plato,^d posit an eternal actuality, for they say that there is always motion; but why there is, and what it is, they do not say; nor, if it moves in this or that particular way, what the cause is. For nothing is moved at haphazard, but in every case there must be some reason present; as in point of fact things are moved in one way by nature, and in another by force or mind or some other agent. And further, what kind of motion is primary? For this is an extremely important point. Again, 8 Plato at least cannot even explain what it is that he sometimes thinks to be the source of motion, *i.e.*, that which moves itself; for according to him the soul is posterior to motion and coeval with the sensible universe.^e Now to suppose that potentiality is prior to actuality is in one sense right and in another wrong; we have explained^f the distinction. But that actuality is prior is testified by Anaxagoras 9 (since mind is actuality), and by Empedocles with

It might seem that potentiality is prior to actuality; but on this view the

universe cannot be explained

^f The reference is probably to § 5 above, but *cf.* IX. viii.

1072 a

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φιλίαν καὶ νεῖκος, καὶ οἱ αἰεὶ λέγοντες
κίνησιν εἶναι, ὥσπερ Λεύκιππος. "Ωστ' οὐκ ἦν
ἄπειρον χρόνον χάος ἢ νύξ, ἀλλὰ ταυτὰ αἰεὶ ἢ
περιόδῳ ἢ ἄλλως, εἴπερ πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνά-
10 μως. εἰ δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ περιόδῳ, δεῖ τι αἰεὶ
μένειν ὡσαύτως ἐνεργοῦν. εἰ δὲ μέλλει γένεσις
καὶ φθορὰ εἶναι, ἄλλο δεῖ εἶναι αἰεὶ ἐνεργοῦν ἄλλως
καὶ ἄλλως. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ὥδι μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ ἐνερ-
γεῖν, ὥδι δὲ κατ' ἄλλο· ἥτοι ἄρα καθ' ἕτερον ἢ
κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον. ἀνάγκη δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο· πάλιν
15 γὰρ ἐκείνο αὐτῷ¹ τε αἷτιον καὶ κείνῳ. οὐκοῦν
βέλτιον τὸ πρῶτον· καὶ γὰρ αἷτιον ἦν ἐκείνο τοῦ
αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως, τοῦ δ' ἄλλως ἕτερον· τοῦ δ' αἰεὶ ἄλ-
λως ἄμφω δηλονότι. οὐκοῦν οὕτως καὶ ἔχουσιν
αἱ κυήσεις. τί οὖν ἄλλας δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀρχάς;

VII. Ἐπεὶ δ' οὕτω τ' ἐνδέχεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ οὕτως,
20 ἐκ νυκτὸς ἔσται καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος,
λύοιτ' ἂν ταῦτα, καὶ ἔστι τι αἰεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν
ἄπαυστον, αὕτη δ' ἢ κύκλῳ· καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ
μόνον ἀλλ' ἔργῳ δηλόν· ὥστε αἰδώς ἂν εἴη ὁ
πρῶτος οὐρανός. ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὁ κινεῖ. ἐπεὶ
δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν [καὶ]² μέσον, κινοῦν³

¹ αὐτῷ Γ Alexander: αὐτῷ codd.

² καὶ punctis notatum in A^b, om. Bessarion, Aldine.

³ κινεῖν ci. Ross: τοίνυν.

* The sphere of the fixed stars, viii. 9; cf. *De Gen. et Corr.* 396 a 23 sqq.

^b The sun, which has its own yearly orbit in the ecliptic, and a daily rotation round the earth, which is explained most economically with reference to the rotation of the sphere of the fixed stars. Cf. ch. v. 3 n., *De Gen. et Corr.* loc. cit.

^c Ch. vi. 6.

^d Ch. ii. 2, 3.

his theory of Love and Strife, and by those who hold that motion is eternal, e.g. Leucippus.

Therefore Chaos or Night did not endure for an unlimited time, but the same things have always existed, either passing through a cycle or in accordance with some other principle—that is, if actuality is prior to potentiality. Now if there is a regular cycle, there must be something^a which remains always active in the same way; but if there is to be generation and destruction, there must be something else^b which is always active in two different ways. Therefore this must be active in one way independently, and in the other in virtue of something else, i.e. either of some third active principle or of the first. It must, then, be in virtue of the 11 first; for this is in turn the cause both of the third and of the second. Therefore the first is preferable, since it was the cause of perpetual regular motion, and something else was the cause of variety; and obviously both together make up the cause of perpetual variety. Now this is just what actually characterizes motions; therefore why need we seek any further principles?

The theory of cyclic change fits all the facts

VII. Since (a) this is a possible explanation, and (b) if it is not true, we shall have to regard everything as coming from "Night"^c and "all things together" and "not-being,"^d these difficulties may be considered to be solved. There is something which is eternally moved with an unceasing motion, and that circular motion. This is evident not merely in theory, but in fact. Therefore the "ultimate heaven" must be eternal. Then there is also something which moves it. And since that which is 2 moved while it moves is intermediate, there is some-

The eternal motion of the outermost sphere presupposes an eternal prime mover.

ARISTOTLE

1072 a

25 ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, αἰδίου, καὶ οὐσία
καὶ ἐνέργεια οὐσα. Κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε· τὸ ὀρεκτὸν
καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα. τούτων τὰ
πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά. ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινό-
μενον καλόν, βουλευτὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὄν καλόν.
ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ διότι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότι
30 ὀρεγόμεθα· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις. νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ
νοητοῦ κινεῖται, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία καθ'
αὐτήν· καὶ ταύτης ἡ οὐσία πρώτη, καὶ ταύτης ἡ
ἀπλή καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν (ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ
ἀπλοῦν οὐ τὸ αὐτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν μέτρον σημαί-
νει, τὸ δὲ ἀπλοῦν πῶς ἔχον αὐτό). ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ
35 τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ
1072 b συστοιχίᾳ· καὶ ἔστιν ἄριστον αἰεὶ ἢ ἀνάλογον τὸ
πρῶτον.

"Ὅτι δ' ἔστι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις,
ἡ διαίρεσις δηλοῖ· ἔστι γὰρ τινὲς τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα (καὶ)
τινός,² ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔστι τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστι· κινεῖ δὲ ὡς
ἐρώμενον, κινούμενα³ δὲ τὰλλα κινεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν
5 τι κινεῖται, ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν· ὥστ' εἰ [ἡ]⁴

¹ γὰρ: δὲ A^b γρ. E.

² καὶ τινός Alexander apud Averroem, Christ: τινός A^b:
om. cet.

³ Ross: κινουμένων A^b E J: κινούμενον A^b et fort. Alexander.

⁴ Bonitz.

^a This shows that desire in general (of which appetite and will are the irrational and rational aspects) has as its object the good.

^b Aristotle himself recognizes two series, lists or columns of contraries, similar to those of the Pythagoreans (I. v. 6). One, the positive, contains being, unity, substance, etc.: the

φορὰ πρώτη ἢ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, ἥ κινεῖται ταύτη¹
 γ' ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν, κατὰ τόπον, καὶ εἰ μὴ
 κατ' οὐσίαν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τι κινεῖν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον
 ὄν, ἐνέργεια ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν
 οὐδαμῶς. φορὰ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν,
 10 ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλω· ταύτην δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν· καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, καλῶς, καὶ
 οὕτως ἀρχή. τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσαυταχῶς, τὸ
 μὲν βίβλ' ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ
 εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. Ἐκ
 τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἡρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύ-
 15 σις, διαγωγὴ δ' ἐστὶν οἷα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον
 ἡμῖν. οὕτω γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐκεῖνὸ ἐστὶν (ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ
 ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἢ ἐνέργεια τούτου (καὶ
 διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγοροις αἰσθησις νόησις ἡδιστον,
 ἐλπιδες δὲ καὶ μνήμαι διὰ ταῦτα). ἡ δὲ νόησις ἢ
 καθ' αὐτὴν τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα
 20 τοῦ μάλιστα. αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετά-
 ληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίνεταί θιγγάνων
 καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταυτόν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ

¹ ἢ ex Alexandro Ross: καὶ codd., incl. Bonitz.

² ταύτην A^b.

³ γ' ci. Bonitz: δὲ codd., secl. Bonitz.

⁴ ἡδονὴ ἢ γρ. E Alexander Themistius, Aldine: ἢ ἡδονῇ EA^bJ.

^a Proved in *Physics* VIII. vii.

^b *Ibid.* ch. ix.

^c The argument is: X (the prime mover), since it imparts the primary motion, cannot be liable to motion (or change) of any kind. Therefore it exists of necessity, and must be good (cf. V. v. 6); and it is *qua* good, i.e., the object of desire, that X is a first principle.

^d Cf. V. v.

^e For the relation of pleasure to actuality or activity see *Eth. Nic.* X. iv.

of "the heaven" is primary locomotion, then in so far as "the heaven" is moved, in this respect at least it is possible for it to be otherwise; i.e. in respect of place, even if not of substantiality. But since there is something—X—which moves while being itself unmoved, existing actually, X cannot be otherwise in any respect. For the primary kind of change is locomotion,^a and of locomotion circular locomotion^b; and this is the motion which X induces. Thus X is necessarily existent; and *qua* necessary it is good, and is in this sense a first principle.^c For the necessary has all these meanings: that which is by constraint because it is contrary to impulse; and that without which excellence is impossible; and that which cannot be otherwise, but is absolutely necessary.^d

Such, then, is the first principle upon which depend the sensible universe and the world of nature. And its life is like the best which we temporarily enjoy. It must be in that state always (which for us is impossible), since its actuality is also pleasure.^e (And for this reason waking, sensation and thinking are most pleasant, and hopes and memories are pleasant because of them.) Now thinking in itself is concerned with that which is in itself best, and thinking in the highest sense with that which is in the highest sense best.^f And thought thinks itself through participation in the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought by the act of apprehension and thinking, so that thought and the object of thought are the same, because that which is receptive of the object

The divine

life of the
prime
mover,
which is
pure self-
thinking
thought,
or God.

^f Since the prime mover is pure actuality, and has or rather is the highest form of life, Aristotle identifies it with the highest activity—pure thinking.

1072 b

δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς. ἐνεργεῖ
 δὲ ἔχων· ὥστε ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο¹ ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ
 νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἡδιστον καὶ
 20 ἄριστον. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, ὥς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ
 θεὸς αἰεὶ, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώ-
 τερον. ἔχει δὲ ᾧδε.² καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ
 γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωὴ, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια·
 ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ
 αἰδῖος. φαμέν δὴ³ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον αἰδῖον
 30 ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχῆς καὶ αἰδῖος
 ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός. "Ὅσοι δὲ
 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσι-
 ππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ
 εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς
 ἀρχὰς αἰτία μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον
 40 ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται. τὸ γὰρ
 σπέρμα ἐξ ἐτέρων ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ
 1072 a πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον· οἷον
 πρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἂν φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρ-
 ματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον
 ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν οὐσία τις
 αἰδῖος καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθη-
 5 τῶν, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. δέδεικται δὲ καὶ
 ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν
 οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' ἀμερῆς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν (κινεῖ

¹ ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο ex Alexandro Ross: ἐκείνο μᾶλλον τοῦτου codd.

² ᾧδε Bekker: ᾧδε ᾧδε Ab.

³ δὴ Themistius, ci. Bonitz: δὲ codd.

^a In actualization the subject and object of thought (like those of perception, *De Anima* III. II.) are identical.

of thought, *i.e.* essence, is thought. And it actually functions when it possesses this object.^a Hence it is actuality rather than potentiality that is held to be the divine possession of rational thought, and its active contemplation is that which is most pleasant and best. If, then, the happiness which God always enjoys is as great as that which we enjoy sometimes, it is marvellous; and if it is greater, this is still more marvellous. Nevertheless it is so. Moreover, life belongs to God. For the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and eternal. We hold, then, that God is a living being, eternal, most good; and therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to God; for that is what God is.

Those who suppose, as do the Pythagoreans and Speusippus,^b that perfect beauty and goodness do not exist in the beginning (on the ground that whereas the first beginnings of plants and animals are causes, it is in the products of these that beauty and perfection are found) are mistaken in their views. For seed comes from prior creatures which are perfect, and that which is first is not the seed but the perfect creature. *E.g.*, one might say that prior to the seed is the man—not he who is produced from the seed, but another man from whom the seed comes.^c

Thus it is evident from the foregoing account that there is some substance which is eternal and immovable and separate from sensible things; and it has also been shown that this substance can have no magnitude, but is impartible and indivisible (for it

^b The view is referred to again in ch. x. 6, XIV. iv. 2, 3, v. 1.

^c *Of.* IX. viii. 4, 5.

1078 a

γὰρ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, οὐδὲν δ' ἔχει δύναμιν
 ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον· ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν μέγεθος ἢ
 ἄπειρον ἢ πεπερασμένον, πεπερασμένον μὲν διὰ
 10 τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι μέγεθος, ἄπειρον δ' ὅτι ὅλως
 οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον μέγεθος). ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ
 ὅτι ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι
 κινήσεις ὕστεραι τῆς κατὰ τόπον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν
 δηλὰ διότι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.

VIII. Πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην
 15 οὐσίαν ἢ πλείους, καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν,
 ἀλλὰ μεμνησθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀποφάσεις, ὅτι
 περὶ πλήθους οὐθὲν εἰρήκασιν ὃ τι καὶ σαφὲς
 εἰπεῖν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὰς ιδέας ὑπόληψις οὐδε-
 μίαν ἔχει σκέψιν ἰδίαν· ἀριθμοὺς γὰρ λέγουσι τὰς
 ιδέας οἱ λέγοντες ιδέας, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν
 20 ὅτε μὲν ὡς περὶ ἀπείρων λέγουσιν, ὅτε δὲ ὡς
 μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος ὠρισμένων· δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν
 τοσοῦτον τὸ πλήθος τῶν ἀριθμῶν, οὐδὲν λέγεται
 μετὰ σπουδῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς. ἡμῖν δ' ἐκ τῶν ὑπο-
 κειμένων καὶ διωρισμένων λεκτέον. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ
 ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ'
 25 αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κινοῦν δὲ τὴν πρώτην
 αἰτίαν καὶ μίαν κίνησιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον
 ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ τινος κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν
 ἀκίνητον εἶναι καθ' αὐτό, καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν κίνησιν
 ὑπὸ αἰδίου κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν μίαν ὑφ' ενός, ὁρῶμεν
 δὲ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ παντός τὴν ἀπλὴν φορὰν, ἣν

^a Cf. *Physics* 266 a 24-b 6.

^b *Ibid.* III, v.

^c Cf. XIII. viii. 17, 20. This was a Pythagorean survival, cf. Vol. I. *Introd.* xvi.

^d i.e., the (apparent) diurnal revolution of the heavens.

causes motion for infinite time, and nothing finite has an infinite potentiality^a; and therefore since every magnitude is either finite or infinite, it cannot have finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite 13 magnitude because there is no such thing at all^b); and moreover that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other kinds of motion are posterior to spatial motion. Thus it is clear why this substance has these attributes.

VIII. We must not disregard the question whether we should hold that there is one substance of this kind or more than one, and if more than one, how many; we must review the pronouncements of other thinkers and show that with regard to the number of the substances they have said nothing that can be clearly stated. The theory of the Ideas contains 2 no peculiar treatment of the question; for the exponents of the theory call the Ideas numbers, and speak of the numbers now as though they were unlimited and now as though they were limited by the number 10^c; but as for why there should be just so many numbers, there is no explanation given with demonstrative accuracy. We, however, must discuss 3 the question on the basis of the assumptions and distinctions which we have already made.

The first principle and primary reality is immovable, both essentially and accidentally, but it excites the primary form of motion, which is one and eternal. Now since that which is moved must be moved by 4 something, and the prime mover must be essentially immovable, and eternal motion must be excited by something eternal, and one motion by some one thing; and since we can see that besides the simple spatial motion of the universe^d (which we hold to be

The number of unmoved moving principles.

The motions of the heavenly bodies are pre-

suppose a plurality of unmoved movers.

1078 a

80 κινεῖν φαμέν τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀκίνητον,
 ἄλλας φοράς οὐσας τὰς τῶν πλανήτων αἰδίους
 (αἰδίου γὰρ καὶ ἄστατον τὸ κύκλῳ σῶμα· δέδεικται
 δ' ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς περὶ τούτων), ἀνάγκη καὶ τού-
 των ἐκάστην τῶν φορῶν ὑπ' ἀκινήτου τε κινεῖσθαι
 καθ' αὐτήν· καὶ αἰδίου οὐσίας. ἢ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄ-
 85 στρων φύσις αἰδίου οὐσία τις οὔσα, καὶ τὸ κινεῖν
 αἰδίου καὶ πρότερον τοῦ κινουμένου, καὶ τὸ πρό-
 τερον οὐσίας οὐσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. φανερόν
 τοίνυν ὅτι τοσαύτας οὐσίας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν τε
 φύσιν αἰδίου καὶ ἀκινήτους καθ' αὐτὰς καὶ ἄνευ

1078 b

μεγέθους, διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν πρότερον. Ὅτι
 μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν οὐσίαι, καὶ τούτων τις² πρώτη καὶ
 δευτέρα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ταῖς φοράς τῶν
 ἄστρων, φανερόν. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἤδη τῶν φορῶν
 ἐκ τῆς οἰκειοτάτης φιλοσοφίας³ τῶν μαθηματικῶν
 9 ἐπιστημῶν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας· αὕτη
 γὰρ περὶ οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς μὲν αἰδίου δὲ ποιεῖται
 τὴν θεωρίαν, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι περὶ οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσίας,
 οἷον ἢ τε περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν.
 ὅτι μὲν οὖν πλείους τῶν φερομένων αἱ φοραί,
 φανερόν τοῖς καὶ μετρίως ἡμένοις· πλείους γὰρ
 10 ἕκαστον φέρεται μιᾶς τῶν πλανωμένων ἄστρων.
 πόσαι δ' αὐταὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι, νῦν μὲν ἡμεῖς
 ἃ λέγουσι τῶν μαθηματικῶν τινὲς ἐννοίας χάριν
 λέγομεν, ὅπως ἢ τι τῇ διανοίᾳ πλῆθος ὠρισμένον

¹ αὐτὴν E Alexander: αὐτὸ A²J γρ. Alexander, Simplicius.

² τις Alexander (?), Christ: τίς codd.

³ φιλοσοφία Alexander, Themistius, Bonitz: φιλοσοφίας codd.

* *Physics* VIII, viii., ix., *De Caelo* I. ii., II. iii.-viii.

^b Ch. vii. 19, 13.

excited by the primary immovable substance) there are other spatial motions—those of the planets—which are eternal (because a body which moves in a circle is eternal and is never at rest—this has been proved in our physical treatises ^a); then each of these spatial motions must also be excited by a substance which is essentially immovable and eternal.^c For the nature of the heavenly bodies is eternal, being a kind of substance; and that which moves is eternal and prior to the moved; and that which is prior to a substance must be a substance. It is therefore clear that there must be an equal number of substances, in nature eternal, essentially immovable, and without magnitude; for the reason already stated.^b

Thus it is clear that the movers are substances, and that one of them is first and another second and so on in the same order as the spatial motions of the heavenly bodies. As regards the number of these motions, we have now reached a question which must be investigated by the aid of that branch of mathematical science which is most akin to philosophy, *i.e.* astronomy; for this has as its object a substance which is sensible but eternal, whereas the other mathematical sciences, *e.g.* arithmetic and geometry, do not deal with any substance. That there are more spatial motions than there are bodies which move in space is obvious to those who have even a moderate grasp of the subject, since each of the non-fixed stars has more than one spatial motion. As to how many these spatial motions actually are we shall now, to give some idea of the subject, quote what some of the mathematicians say, in order that there may be some definite number for the mind to

The number of these motions, 7 and of the movers which excite them, must be decided by astronomy.

1078 b

ὑπολαβεῖν· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τὰ μὲν ζητοῦντας αὐτοὺς
 δεῖ, τὰ δὲ πυνθανομένους παρὰ τῶν ζητούντων,
 15 ἂν τι φαίνεται παρὰ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα τοῖς ταῦτα
 πραγματευομένοις, φιλεῖν μὲν ἀμφοτέρους, πείθε-
 σθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις. Εὐδοξος μὲν οὖν
 ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἑκατέρου τὴν φορὰν ἐν τρισὶν
 ἐτίθετ' εἶναι σφαίραις, ὧν τὴν μὲν πρώτην τὴν τῶν
 ἀπλανῶν ἀστρων εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν κατὰ τὸν
 20 διὰ μέσων τῶν ζωδίων, τὴν δὲ τρίτην κατὰ τὸν
 λελοξωμένον ἐν τῷ πλάτει τῶν ζωδίων· ἐν μείζονι
 δὲ πλάτει λελοξῶσθαι καθ' ὃν ἡ σελήνη φέρεται
 ἢ καθ' ὃν ὁ ἥλιος. τῶν δὲ πλανωμένων ἀστρων ἐν
 τέτταρσιν ἑκάστου σφαίραις, καὶ τούτων δὲ τὴν
 25 μὲν πρώτην καὶ δευτέραν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐκείναις
 (τὴν τε γὰρ τῶν ἀπλανῶν τὴν ἀπάσας φέρουσιν
 εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ ταύτῃ¹ τεταγμένην καὶ κατὰ τὸν
 διὰ μέσων τῶν ζωδίων τὴν φορὰν ἔχουσιν κοινὴν
 ἀπασῶν εἶναι), τῆς δὲ τρίτης ἀπάντων τοὺς πόλους
 ἐν τῷ διὰ μέσων τῶν ζωδίων εἶναι, τῆς δὲ τετάρ-
 30 τῆς τὴν φορὰν κατὰ τὸν λελοξωμένον πρὸς τὸν
 μέσον ταύτης· εἶναι δὲ τῆς τρίτης σφαίρας τοὺς
 πόλους τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἰδίου, τοὺς δὲ τῆς Ἀφρο-
 δίτης καὶ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ τοὺς αὐτοὺς. Κάλλιππος
 δὲ τὴν μὲν θέσιν τῶν σφαιρῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐτίθετο

¹ ταύτην recc.

* Of Cnidus (circa 408-355 B.C.). He was a pupil of Plato, and a distinguished mathematician.

* For a full discussion of the theories of Eudoxus and Callippus see Dreyer, *Planetary Systems* 87-114; Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos* 190-224.

* Not identical with that of the fixed stars, but having the same motion.

grasp ; but for the rest we must partly investigate for ourselves and partly learn from other investigators, and if those who apply themselves to these matters come to some conclusion which clashes with what we have just stated, we must appreciate both views, but follow the more accurate.

Eudoxus^a held that the motion of the sun and moon involves in either case three spheres,^b of which the outermost is that of the fixed stars,^c the second revolves in the circle which bisects the zodiac,^d and the third revolves in a circle which is inclined across the breadth of the zodiac^e ; but the circle in which the moon moves is inclined at a greater angle than that in which the sun moves. And he held that the motion of the planets involved in each case four spheres ; and that of these the first and second are the same^f as before (for the sphere of the fixed stars is that which carries round all the other spheres, and the sphere next in order, which has its motion in the circle which bisects the zodiac, is common to all the planets) ; the third sphere of all the planets has its poles in the circle which bisects the zodiac ; and the fourth sphere moves in the circle inclined to the equator of the third. In the case of the third sphere, while the other planets have their own peculiar poles, those of Venus and Mercury are the same.

The theory of homocentric spheres according to (a) Eudoxus,

Callippus^g assumed the same arrangement of the

^a *i.e.*, revolves with its equator in the ecliptic.

^b *i.e.*, has the plane of its equator inclined to the plane of the ecliptic. This sphere carries the sun (or moon) fixed to a point in its equator.

^c Not the same, but having the same motion.

^d Of Cyzicus (*fl.* 390 B.C.). Simplicius says (103. 5-8) that he corrected and elaborated Eudoxus's theory with Aristotle's help while on a visit to him at Athens.

1073 b

Εὐδόξῳ, τοῦτ' ἔστι τῶν ἀποστημάτων τὴν τάξιν, τὸ
 1073 δὲ πλῆθος τῷ μὲν τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τῷ τοῦ Κρόνου τὸ
 αὐτὸ ἐκείνῳ ἀπεδίδου, τῷ δ' ἡλίῳ καὶ τῇ σελήνῃ¹
 δύο ὤετο ἔτι προσθετέας εἶναι σφαίρας, τὰ φαινό-
 μενα εἰ μέλλει τις ἀποδώσειν, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς τῶν
 πλανητῶν ἐκάστω μίαν. Ἀναγκαῖον δέ, εἰ μέλ-

1074 λουσι συντεθεῖσαι πᾶσαι τὰ φαινόμενα ἀποδώσειν,
 καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πλανωμένων ἑτέρας σφαίρας μὴ
 ἐλάττονας εἶναι τὰς ἀνελιττούσας καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ
 ἀποκαθιστάσας τῇ θέσει τὴν πρώτην σφαῖραν αἰ
 5 τοῦ ὑποκάτω τεταγμένου ἄστρου· οὕτω γὰρ μόνως
 ἐνδέχεται τὴν τῶν πλανητῶν φορὰν ἅπαντα ποιῆ-
 σθαι. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐν αἷς μὲν αὐτὰ φέρεται σφαίραις αἱ
 μὲν ὀκτώ αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ εἰκοσὶν εἰσιν, τούτων δὲ
 μόνας οὐ δεῖ ἀνελιχθῆναι ἐν αἷς τὸ κατωτάτω
 τεταγμένον φέρεται, αἱ μὲν τὰς τῶν πρώτων δύο
 10 ἀνελίττους ἐξ ἔσονται, αἱ δὲ τὰς τῶν ὕστερον
 τεττάρων ἐκκαίδεκα, ὁ δὲ ἀπασῶν ἀριθμὸς τῶν τε
 φερουσῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνελιττούσων ταύτας πεντήκον-
 τὰ τε καὶ πέντε. εἰ δὲ τῇ σελήνῃ τε καὶ τῷ ἡλίῳ
 μὴ προστιθείη τις ἄς εἵπομεν κινήσεις, αἱ πᾶσαι
 σφαῖραι ἔσονται ἑπτὰ² τε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα. Τὸ
 15 μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν ἔστω τοσοῦτον, ὥστε
 καὶ τὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους [καὶ
 τὰς αἰσθητάς]³ τοσαύτας εὐλογον ὑπολαβεῖν· τὸ
 γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἀφείσθω τοῖς ἰσχυροτέροις λέγειν.

¹ ἡλίου καὶ τῷ σελήνης recc.

² ἐννέα ci. Sosigenes.

³ om. Alexander, secl. Goebel.

* Aristotle is trying to establish a mechanical relation between the spheres, which Eudoxus and Callippus did not attempt to do. ^b The moon. ^c In § 11.

^d Either Aristotle has made a slip in his calculations, or we should read ἐννέα (Sosigenes) for ἑπτὰ; this would give

spheres as did Eudoxus (that is, with respect to the order of their intervals), but as regards their number, whereas he assigned to Jupiter and Saturn the same number of spheres as Eudoxus, he considered that two further spheres should be added both for the sun and for the moon, if the phenomena are to be accounted for, and one for each of the other planets.

But if all the spheres in combination are to account for the phenomena, there must be for each of the other planets other spheres, one less in number than those already mentioned, which counteract these and restore to the same position the first sphere of the star which in each case is next in order below.^a In this way only can the combination of forces produce the motion of the planets. Therefore since the forces by which the planets themselves are moved are 8 for Jupiter and Saturn, and 25 for the others, and since of these the only ones which do not need to be counteracted are those by which the lowest planet^b is moved, the counteracting spheres for the first two planets will be 6, and those of the remaining four will be 16; and the total number of spheres, both those which move the planets and those which counteract these, will be 55. If we do not invest the moon and the sun with the additional motions which we have mentioned,^c there will be 47 (?)^d spheres in all.

This, then, may be taken to be the number of the spheres; and thus it is reasonable to suppose that there are as many immovable substances and principles,^e—the statement of logical necessity may be left to more competent thinkers.

49, which appears to be the correct total. For alternative explanations of an error in calculation see Ross *ad loc.*

^e i.e., the movers of the spheres.

Εἰ δὲ μηδεμίαν οἶόν τ' εἶναι φορὰν μὴ συντείνουσιν
 πρὸς ἄστρου φορὰν, ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν φύσιν καὶ πᾶσαν
 20 οὐσίαν ἀπαθῆ καὶ καθ' αὐτὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου τετυχη-
 κῦίαν τέλος¹ εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη παρὰ
 ταύτας ἑτέρα φύσις, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη τὸν
 ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν. εἴτε γὰρ εἰσὶν ἕτεραι,
 κινοῖεν ἂν ὡς τέλος οὔσαι φορᾶς. ἀλλ' εἶναι γε
 ἄλλας φορὰς ἀδύνατον παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας. τοῦτο
 25 δ' εὐλογον ἐκ τῶν φερομένων ὑπολαβεῖν. εἰ γὰρ
 πᾶν τὸ φέρον τοῦ φερομένου χάριν πέφυκε καὶ
 φορὰ πᾶσα φερομένου τινός ἐστιν, οὐδεμία φορὰ
 αὐτῆς ἂν ἔνεκα εἴη οὐδ' ἄλλης φορᾶς, ἀλλὰ τῶν
 ἄστρον ἔνεκα. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται φορὰ φορᾶς ἔνεκα,
 καὶ ἐκεῖνην ἑτέρου δεήσει χάριν εἶναι· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ
 30 οὐχ οἶόν τε εἰς ἄπειρον, τέλος ἔσται πάσης φορᾶς
 τῶν φερομένων τι θείων σωμάτων κατὰ τὸν οὐ-
 ρανόν.

"Οτι δὲ εἰς οὐρανός, φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ πλείους
 οὐρανοὶ ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι, ἔσται εἶδει μία ἢ περὶ
 ἑκαστον ἀρχή, ἀριθμῷ δέ γε πολλαί. ἀλλ' ὅσα
 ἀριθμῷ πολλά, ὕλην ἔχει (εἰς γὰρ λόγος καὶ ὁ
 35 αὐτός πολλῶν, οἶον ἀνθρώπου, Σωκράτης δὲ εἰς).
 τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἔχει ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον· ἐν-
 τελέχεια γάρ. ἐν ἄρα καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ τὸ
 πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον ὄν· καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἄρα

¹ τέλος Γ γρ. E Alexander (?) Bonitz: τελος codd.

^a See previous note.

^b This paragraph seems to belong to an earlier period of Aristotle's thought. At any rate the argument that plurality involves matter is inconsistent with the view that there are 55 immaterial movers.

^c The definition of form is one and universal; it is the combination of form with matter that constitutes an indi-

If there can be no spatial motion which is not 15
 conducive to the motion of a star, and if moreover every entity and every substance which is impassive and has in itself attained to the highest good should be regarded as an end, then there can be no other entity besides these,^a and the number of the substances must be as we have said. For if there are other substances, they must move something, since they are the end of spatial motion. But there can be 16
 no other spatial motions besides those already mentioned. This is a reasonable inference from a general consideration of spatial motion. For if everything which moves exists for the sake of that which is moved, and every motion for the sake of something which is moved, no motion can exist for the sake of itself or of some other motion, but all motions must exist for the sake of the stars. For if we are to 17
 suppose that one motion is for the sake of another, the latter too must be for the sake of something else ; and since the series cannot be infinite, the end of every motion must be one of the divine bodies which are moved through the heavens.

It is evident that there is only one heaven.^b For 18
 if there is to be a plurality of heavens (as there is of men), the principle of each must be one in kind but many in number. But all things which are many in number have matter (for one and the same definition applies to many individuals, *e.g.* that of " man " ; but Socrates is one ^c), but the primary essence has no matter, because it is complete reality. Therefore the prime mover, which is immovable, is one both in formula and in number ; and therefore so also is that
 individual. Thus a plurality of individuals is caused by the combination of the same form with different matter.

The unmoved mover (apart from the prime mover) must be equal in number to the spheres.

There is only one "heaven" or universe.

1074 a

ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς¹. εἰς ἅρα οὐρανὸς μόνος. Παρα-

1074 b

δέδοται δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παμπάλαιων ἐν
μύθου σχήματι καταλειμμένα τοῖς ὕστερον ὅτι
θεοὶ τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην
φύσιν. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσήκται πρὸς
τὴν πειθῶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς
νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρήσιν· ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τε
γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὁμοίους τισὶ
λέγουσι, καὶ τοῦτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ παραπλή-
σια τοῖς εἰρημένοις· ὧν εἴ τις χωρίσας αὐτὸ λάβοι
μόνον τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι θεοὺς ᾤοντο τὰς πρώτας
οὐσίας εἶναι, θείως ἂν εἰρησθαι νομίσειεν, καὶ κατὰ
τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὐρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐκάστης
καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων
καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ἐκείνων οἷον λείψανα περι-
σεσῶσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. ἡ μὲν οὖν πατριος δόξα
καὶ ἡ παρὰ τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν φανερά
μόνον.

16

IX. Τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας·
δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων θεϊότατον,
πῶς δ' ἔχων τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς δυσκολίας.
εἴτε γὰρ μηδὲν νοεῖ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν; ἀλλ' ἔχει
ὥσπερ ἂν εἴη ὁ καθεύδων· εἴτε νοεῖ, τούτου δ'
ἄλλο κύριον, οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο ὃ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἡ

¹ συνεχῶς ἐν μόνον E.J.

* This statement is not literally true. The planets do not seem to have been associated with the gods of popular mythology until the fourth century B.C. (see Burnet, *E.G.P.* p. 23 n.). But Aristotle's general meaning seems to be that

which is eternally and continuously in motion. Therefore there is only one heaven

A tradition has been handed down by the ancient 19
thinkers of very early times, and bequeathed to posterity in the form of a myth, to the effect that these heavenly bodies are gods,^a and that the Divine pervades the whole of nature. The rest of their 20
tradition has been added later in a mythological form to influence the vulgar and as a constitutional and utilitarian expedient^b; they say that these gods are human in shape or are like certain other animals,^c and make other statements consequent upon and similar to those which we have mentioned. Now if 21
we separate these statements and accept only the first, that they supposed the primary substances to be gods, we must regard it as an inspired saying; and reflect that whereas every art and philosophy has probably been repeatedly developed to the utmost and has perished again, these beliefs of theirs have been preserved as a relic of former knowledge. To this extent only, then, are the views of our forefathers and of the earliest thinkers intelligible to us.

IX. The subject of Mind involves certain difficulties. Mind is held to be of all phenomena the most supernatural; but the question of how we must regard it if it is to be of this nature involves certain difficulties. If Mind thinks nothing, where is its dignity? It is in just the same state as a man who is asleep. If it thinks, but something else determines its thinking, then since that which is its essence is not the gods were identified with the primary natural forces; and this is substantially true.

^a Cf. II. iii. 1.

^c *s.g.* the Egyptian deities. Zoomorphism in Greek religion is a doubtful quantity.

The divine element in nature has been recognized since the earliest times.

Further discussion of the Divine Intelligence. Its activity must be self-thinking.

1074 b

20 οὐσία νόησις ἀλλὰ δύναμις, οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία
 εἴη· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει.
 ἔτι δὲ εἴτε νοῦς ἢ οὐσία αὐτοῦ εἴτε νόησις ἐστι, τί
 νοεῖ; ἢ γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν τι. καὶ εἰ
 ἕτερόν τι, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ἢ ἄλλο. πότερον οὖν
 διαφέρει τι ἢ οὐδὲν τὸ νοεῖν τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ τυχόν;
 25 ἢ καὶ ἄτοπον τὸ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ἐνίων; δῆλον
 τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ θειότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον νοεῖ, καὶ
 οὐ μεταβάλλει· εἰς χεῖρον γὰρ ἢ μεταβολή, καὶ
 κίνησις τις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ
 μὴ νόησις ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ δύναμις, εὐλογον ἐπίπονον
 εἶναι τὸ συνεχές αὐτῷ τῆς νοήσεως· ἔπειτα δῆλον
 30 ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη τὸ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ νοού-
 μενον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις ὑπάρχει καὶ
 τὸ χείριστον νοοῦντι. ὥστ' εἰ φευκτὸν τοῦτο (καὶ
 γὰρ μὴ ὄρᾱν ἔνια κρεῖττον ἢ ὄρᾱν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ
 ἀριστον ἢ νόησις. αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ
 35 κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.

Φαίνεται δ' αἰεὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἰσθη-
 σις καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὐτῆς δ' ἐν παρέργῳ.
 ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖσθαι, κατὰ πότερον
 αὐτῷ τὸ εἶ ὑπάρχει; οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτό τὸ εἶναι
 1075 a νοήσει καὶ νοουμένῳ. ἢ ἐπ' ἐνίων ἢ ἐπιστήμη τὸ
 πρᾶγμα, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀνευ ὕλης ἢ

^a i.e., if its thinking is determined by something else, Mind is only a potentiality, and not (as described in ch. vii. 1-9) the highest actuality.

^b Cf. IX. viii. 18.

^c If Mind is a potentiality, since a potentiality is of contraries, Mind may think that which is worst.

thinking but potentiality,^a it cannot be the best reality ; because it derives its excellence from the act of thinking. Again, whether its essence is thought ² or thinking, what does it think ? It must think either itself or something else ; and if something else, then it must think either the same thing always, or different things at different times. Then does it make any difference, or not, whether it thinks that which is good or thinks at random ? Surely it would be ³ absurd for it to think about some subjects. Clearly, then, it thinks that which is most divine and estimable, and does not change ; for the change would be for the worse, and anything of this kind would immediately imply some sort of motion. Therefore if Mind is not thinking but a potentiality, (a) it is reasonable to suppose that the continuity of its thinking is laborious ^b ; (b) clearly there must be something else which is more excellent than Mind ; i.e. the object of thought ; for both thought and the act of thinking ⁴ will belong even to the thinker of the worst thoughts.^c Therefore if this is to be avoided (as it is, since it is better not to see some things than to see them), thinking cannot be the supreme good. Therefore Mind thinks itself, if it is that which is best ; and its thinking is a thinking of thinking.

Yet it seems that knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding are always of something else, and only incidentally of themselves. And ⁵ further, if to think is not the same as to be thought, in respect of which does goodness belong to thought ? for the act of thinking and the object of thought have not the same essence. The answer is that in some cases the knowledge is the object. In the productive sciences, if we disregard the matter, the sub-

Objections
to this view
answered.

1076 a

οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὁ λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ νόησις; οὐχ ἑτέρου οὖν οὗτος τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἡ νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ¹ μία.

Ἐπὶ δὲ λείπεται ἀπορία, εἰ σύνθετον τὸ νοούμενον· μεταβάλλοι γὰρ ἂν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου. ἢ ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην· ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, ἢ ὁ γε τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἐν τινι χρόνῳ (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ εὖ ἐν τῷδὶ ἢ ἐν τῷδί, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ τὸ ἀριστον, ὃν ἄλλο τι), οὕτως δ' ἔχει αὕτῃ αὐτῆς ἡ νόησις τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα.

Χ. Ἐπισκεπτόν δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν. ἢ ἀμφοτέρως, ὥσπερ στράτευμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος· οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ' ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν. πάντα δὲ συντέτακται πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτὰ· καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον μηδέν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἡ κίεστα ἔξεστιν ὁ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἡ

¹ τῷ νοουμένῳ Alexander, Bonitz: τοῦ νοουμένου.

^a i.e., beings composed of matter as well as form. Such beings are contrasted with the divine Mind, which is pure form.

^b The meaning of this sentence is shown by the definition of Happiness in *Eth. Nic.* 1098 a 16-20. It takes the human mind a lifetime of the highest intellectual activity of which it is capable to attain to happiness; but the divine Mind is always happy. Cf. ch. vii. 9.

stance, *i.e.* the essence, is the object; but in the speculative sciences the formula or the act of thinking is the object. Therefore since thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things which contain no matter, they will be the same, and the act of thinking will be one with the object of thought.

There still remains the question whether the object of thought is composite; for if so, thought would change in passing from one part of the whole to another. The answer is that everything which contains no matter is indivisible. Just as the human mind, or rather the mind of composite beings,^a is in a certain space of time^b (for it does not possess the good at this or at that moment, but in the course of a certain whole period it attains to the supreme good, which is other than itself), so is absolute self-thought throughout all eternity.

X. We must also consider in which sense the nature of the universe contains the good or the supreme good; whether as something separate and independent, or as the orderly arrangement of its parts. Probably in both senses, as an army does; for the efficiency of an army consists partly in the order and partly in the general; but chiefly in the latter, because he does not depend upon the order, but the order depends upon him. All things, both fishes and birds and plants, are ordered together in some way, but not in the same way; and the system is not such that there is no relation between one thing and another; there is a definite connexion. Every-³thing is ordered together to one end; but the arrangement is like that in a household, where the free persons have the least liberty to act at random,

The good exists both as a separate substance and as the order of the universe.

τὰ πλείστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς
 θηρίοις μικρόν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὃ
 τι ἔτυχεν· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἐκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ
 φύσις ἐστίν. λέγω δ' οἷον εἷς γε τὸ διακριθῆναι
 ἀνάγκη ἅπασιν ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα οὕτως ἔστιν ὧν
 25 κοινωνεῖ ἅπαντα εἰς τὸ ὅλον. "Ὅσα δὲ ἀδύνατα
 συμβαίνει ἢ ἄτοπα τοῖς ἄλλως λέγουσι, καὶ ποῖα
 οἱ χαριεστέρως λέγοντες, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίων ἐλάχισται
 ἀπορίαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἐναν-
 τίων ποιοῦσι πάντα. οὔτε δὲ τὸ πάντα οὔτε τὸ
 ἐξ ἐναντίων ὀρθῶς, οὔτ' ἐν ὅσοις τὰ ἐναντία
 30 ὑπάρχει, πῶς ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἔσται, οὐ λέγουσιν·
 ἀπαθῇ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ἡμῖν δὲ
 λύεται τοῦτο εὐλόγως τῷ τρίτον τι εἶναι. οἱ δὲ
 τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ὕλην ποιοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ
 τὸ ἄνισον τῷ ἴσῳ ἢ τῷ ἐνὶ τὰ πολλά. λύεται δὲ
 καὶ τοῦτο τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ἢ μία
 35 οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον. ἔτι ἅπαντα τοῦ φαύλου μεθέξει
 ἔξω τοῦ ἐνός· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν αὐτὸ θάτερον τῶν
 στοιχείων. οἱ δ' ἄλλοι οὐδ' ἀρχὰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ
 τὸ κακόν· καίτοι ἐν ἅπασι μάλιστα τὸ ἀγαθὸν
 ἀρχή. οἱ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς ὅτι ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ

^a The free persons correspond to the heavenly bodies, whose movements are fixed by necessity; the servile class to human beings. Each class acts in accordance with its nature, a principle which "produces obedience to duty in the higher creatures, caprice in the lower" (Ross).

^b Because there is an eternal substance, which is not derived from contraries (ch. vi. 1).

^c Things are derived from a substrate as well (ch. ii. 1).

and have all or most of their actions preordained for them, whereas the slaves and animals have little common responsibility and act for the most part at random; for the nature of each class is a principle such as we have described.^a I mean, for example, 4 that everything must at least come to dissolution; and similarly there are other respects in which everything contributes to the good of the whole.

We must not fail to observe how many impossi- Difficulties bilities and absurdities are involved by other theories, in other and what views the more enlightened thinkers hold, (a) Platonists and Pythagoreans, and what views entail the fewest difficulties. All 5 thinkers maintain that all things come from contraries; but they are wrong both in saying "all things" ^b and in saying that they come from contraries,^c nor do they explain how things in which the contraries really are present come from the contraries; for the contraries cannot act upon each other. For us, however, this problem is satisfactorily solved by the fact that there is a third factor. Other thinkers make one of the two contraries matter; e.g., this is done by those ^d who make the Unequal matter for the Equal, or the Many matter for the One. But this also is disposed of in 6 the same way; for the one matter of two contraries is contrary to nothing. Further, on their view everything except Unity itself will partake of evil; for "the Bad" ^e is itself one of the elements. The other school ^f does not even regard the Good and the Bad as principles; yet the Good is in the truest sense a principle in all things. The former school is

^a See on XIV. i. 4.

^c The "Bad" was identified with the unequal; cf. I. vi. 10.

^f See ch. vii. 10.

1076 b πῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὴ οὐ λέγουσιν, πότερον ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς κινήσαν ἢ ὡς εἶδος. Ἀτόπως δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν ποιεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὕτη δ' ἀρχὴ καὶ ὡς κινουσα (συνάγει γάρ) καὶ ὡς ὕλη (μόριον γὰρ τοῦ μέγματος)· εἰ δὴ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκε καὶ ὡς ὕλη¹ ἀρχῇ εἶναι καὶ ὡς κινούντι, ἀλλὰ τό γ' εἶναι οὐ ταυτό. κατὰ πότερον οὖν φιλία; ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀφθαρτον εἶναι τὸ νεῖκος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἢ τοῦ κακοῦ φύσις.

Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὡς κινούν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχήν· ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινεῖ ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε ἕτερον, 10 πλὴν ὡς ἡμεῖς λέγομεν· ἢ γὰρ ἱατρικὴ ἐστὶ πως ἢ ὑγίεια. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ ποιῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ νῷ. πάντες δ' οἱ τὰναντία λέγοντες οὐ χρῶνται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐὰν μὴ ῥυθμίση τις. καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δ' ἀφθαρτα, οὐδεὶς λέγει· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τῶν 15 αὐτῶν ἀρχῶν. ἔτι οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ποιοῦσι τὰ ὄντα· οἱ δ' ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκασθῶσιν, ἐν πάντα ποιοῦσιν. ἔτι διὰ τί αἰεὶ ἔσται γένεσις καὶ τί αἴτιον γενέσεως, οὐδεὶς λέγει. Καὶ τοῖς δύο ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν ἄλλην ἀνάγκη ἀρχὴν κυριωτέραν εἶναι, καὶ τοῖς τὰ εὔδη [ὅτι² ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα]³.

¹ καὶ ὡς ὅλη Bessarion Alexander Bonitz: ὡς ὅλη καί.

² ὅτι] ἐτι fort. Themistius, ci. Bonitz (uel ἔσται), Ross.

³ Christ.

^a Cf. I. iv. 3.

^b Fr. 17 (Diels), 18-20.

^c Cf. IX. ix. 3.

^d Motion presupposes a final cause, which was not what Anaxagoras meant by "Mind." Cf. I. vii. 5.

^e Aristotle identifies the efficient cause, in a sense, with the final cause. Cf. VII. ix. 3.

^f In I. vi. 10 Aristotle describes Anaxagoras as recognizing contrary principles of good and evil. Moreover, on Aristotle's own showing, evil cannot be a principle (IX. ix. 3).

right in holding that the Good is a principle, but they do not explain how it is a principle—whether as an end or as a moving cause or as form.

Empedocles' theory is also absurd, for he identifies 7 the Good with Love.^a This is a principle both as ^{(b) Empedocles,} causing motion (since it combines) and as matter (since it is part of the mixture).^b Now even if it so happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as causing motion, still the essence of the two principles is not the same. In which respect, then, is Love a principle? And it is also absurd that Strife should be imperishable; strife is the very essence of evil.^c

Anaxagoras makes the Good a principle as causing 8 motion; for Mind moves things, but moves them ^{(c) Anaxagoras} for some end, and therefore there must be some other Good ^d—unless it is as we say; for on our view the art of medicine is in a sense health.^d It is absurd also not to provide a contrary for the Good, i.e. for Mind.^e But all those who recognize the contraries fail to make use of the contraries, unless ^{(d) General} we systematize their theories. And none of them ^{(e) establishment of previous theories,} explains why some things are perishable and others imperishable; for they make all existing things come from the same first principles.^e Again, some ^f make existing things come from not-being, while others,^f to avoid this necessity, make all things one. Again, no one explains why there must always be generation, and what the cause of generation is.

Moreover, those who posit two principles must 10 admit another superior principle,^g and so must the exponents of the Forms; for what made or makes

^a Cf. III. iv. 11-20.

^b Cf. ch. ii. 2, 3.

^c The Eleatics. Cf. I. v. 10-13.

^d i.e., an efficient cause.

1075 b

20 διὰ τί γὰρ μετέσχευεν ἢ μετέχει; καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἀνάγκη τῇ σοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τιμιωτάτῃ ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναι τι ἐναντίον, ἡμῶν δ' οὔ. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐναντίον τῷ πρώτῳ οὐδέν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ὕλην ἔχει, καὶ δυνάμει ταῦτα¹ ἔστιν· ἡ δὲ ἐναντία ἄγνοια εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ πρώτῳ ἐναντίον οὐδέν.

25 Εἰ τε² μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις καὶ γένεσις καὶ τὰ οὐράνια, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀρχή, ὥσπερ τοῖς θεολόγοις καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πᾶσιν. εἰ δ' ἔσται τὰ εἶδη ἢ (οἱ)³ ἀριθμοί, οὐδενὸς αἷτια· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὔτι κινήσεώς γε. "Ἐτι πῶς ἔσται ἐξ ἀμεγεθῶν μέγεθος καὶ συνεχές; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς οὐ ποιήσκει

30 συνεχές, οὔτε ὡς κινουῖν οὔτε ὡς εἶδος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γ' ἔσται τῶν ἐναντίων ὅπερ καὶ ποιητικὸν καὶ κινητικόν· ἐνδέχουτο γὰρ ἂν μὴ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὕστερόν γε τὸ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως. οὐκ ἄρα αἰτία τὰ ὄντα. ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀναιρετέον ἄρα τούτων τι. τοῦτο δ' εἴρηται πῶς.⁴ "Ἐτι τίνι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ

35 ἐν ἣ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐδέν λέγει οὐδεὶς· οὐδ' ἐνδέχεται εἰπεῖν, εἰ μὴ ὡς ἡμεῖς εἴπη, ὡς τὸ κινουῖν ποιεῖ.

¹ ταῦτα JI¹: ταῦτά EA^b Themistius.

² εἰ τε Christ: εἴτε.

³ ex Alexandro Bonitz.

⁴ πῶς Bonitz: ὡς.

* If there is nothing but what is sensible or potential, there can be no prime mover (which is actuality) to excite motion in the universe, and no teleology in causation. For the cosmologists on causation see III. iii. 11-18.

^b By assuming an eternal actual mover (ch. vi. 4).

particulars participate in the Forms? And on all other views it follows necessarily that there must be something which is contrary to Wisdom or supreme knowledge, but on ours it does not. For there is no contrary to that which is primary, since all contraries¹¹ involve matter, and that which has matter exists potentially; and the ignorance which is contrary to Wisdom would tend towards the contrary of the object of Wisdom; but that which is primary has no contrary.

Further, if there is to be nothing else besides sensible things, there will be no first principle, no order, no generation, and no celestial motions, but every principle will be based upon another,^a as in the accounts of all the cosmologists and physicists. And if the Forms or numbers are to exist, they will¹² be causes of nothing; or if not of nothing, at least not of motion.

Further, how can extension, *i.e.* a continuum, be produced from that which is unextended? Number cannot, either as a moving or as a formal cause, produce a continuum. Moreover, no contrary can be essentially productive and kinetic, for then it would be possible for it not to exist; and further,¹³ the act of production would in any case be posterior to the potentiality. Therefore the world of reality is not eternal. But there are real objects which are eternal. Therefore one of these premisses must be rejected. We have described how this may be done.^b

Further, in virtue of what the numbers, or soul and body, or in general the form and the object, are one, no one attempts to explain; nor is it possible to do so except on our theory, that it is the moving

1076 b

οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθημα-
τικὸν καὶ οὕτως αἰεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ

1076 a

ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παν-
τός οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ
συμβάλλεται οὔσα ἢ μὴ οὔσα) καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλὰς·
τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς.

οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἰς κοίρανος ἔστω.

^a Cf. VIII. vi.

^b Speusippus and his followers; cf. VII. ii. 4, XIV. iii. 8.

^c Homer, *Iliad* ii. 204.

cause that makes them one.^a As for those ^b who main- 14
tain that mathematical number is the primary reality,
and so go on generating one substance after another
and finding different principles for each one, they
make the substance of the universe incoherent
(for one substance in no way affects another by its
existence or non-existence) and give us a great
many governing principles. But the world must not
be governed badly :

The rule of many is not good ; let one be the ruler.^c

1. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσίας εἴρη-
 ται τίς ἐστίν, ἐν μὲν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν
 10 περὶ τῆς ὕλης, ὕστερον δὲ περὶ τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν.
 ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ σκέψις ἐστὶ πότερόν ἐστι τις παρὰ τὰς
 αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας ἀκίνητος καὶ αἰδῖος ἢ οὐκ ἔστι,
 καὶ εἴ ἐστι τίς ἐστι, πρῶτον τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων
 λεγόμενα θεωρητέον, ὅπως εἴτε τι μὴ καλῶς
 λέγουσι, μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔνοχοι ὦμεν, καὶ εἴ τι
 16 δόγμα κοινὸν ἡμῖν κακείνοις, τοῦτ' ἰδίᾳ μὴ καθ'
 ἡμῶν δυσχεραίνωμεν· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ εἴ τις τὰ μὲν
 κάλλιον λέγοι, τὰ δὲ μὴ χεῖρον. Δύο δ' εἰσὶ δόξαι
 περὶ τούτων· τὰ τε γὰρ μαθηματικά φασιν οὐσίας
 εἶναι τινες, οἷον ἀριθμοὺς καὶ γραμμὰς καὶ τὰ
 συγγενῇ τούτοις, καὶ πάλιν τὰς ἰδέας. ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ
 20 μὲν δύο ταῦτα γένη ποιοῦσι, τὰς τε ἰδέας καὶ τοὺς
 μαθηματικούς ἀριθμούς, οἱ δὲ μίαν φύσιν ἀμφο-
 τέρων, ἕτεροι δὲ τινες τὰς μαθηματικὰς μόνον
 οὐσίας εἶναι φασί, σκεπτέον πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τῶν
 μαθηματικῶν, μηδεμίαν προστιθέντας φύσιν ἄλλην
 αὐτοῖς, οἷον πότερον ἰδέαι τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι ἢ οὐ,

^a The reference is presumably to *Physics* I.

^b In Books VII.-IX.

^c This was the orthodox Platonist view; cf. I. vi. 4.

^d Xenocrates and his followers.

BOOK XIII

I We have already explained what the substance of sensible things is, dealing in our treatise on physics ^a with the material substrate, and subsequently with substance as actuality.^b Now since 2 we are inquiring whether there is or is not some immutable and eternal substance besides sensible substances, and if there is, what it is, we must first examine the statements of other thinkers, so that if they have been mistaken in any respect, we may not be liable to the same mistakes; and if there is any view which is common to them and us, we may not feel any private self-irritation on this score. For we must be content if we state some points better than they have done, and others no worse.

There are two views on this subject. Some say 3 that mathematical objects, *i.e.* numbers and lines, etc., are substances; and others again that the Ideas are substances. Now since some ^c recognize 4 these as two classes—the Ideas and the mathematical numbers—and others ^d regard both as having one nature, and yet others ^e hold that only the mathematical substances are substances, we must first consider the mathematical objects, without imputing to them any other characteristic—*e.g.* by asking whether they are really Ideas or not, or whether

^a The Pythagoreans and Speusippus.

1076 a

25 καὶ πότερον ἀρχαὶ καὶ οὐσίαι τῶν ὄντων ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ'
ὥς περὶ μαθηματικῶν μόνον εἴτ' εἰσὶν εἴτε μὴ εἰσι,
καὶ εἴ εἰσι πῶς εἰσὶν· ἔπειτα μετὰ ταῦτα χωρὶς
περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν αὐτῶν ἀπλῶς καὶ ὅσον νόμου
χάριν· τεθρύληται γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξω-
τερικῶν λόγων. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς ἐκείνην δεῖ τὴν
30 σκέψιν ἀπαντᾶν τὸν πλείω λόγον, ὅταν ἐπι-
σκοπῶμεν εἰ αἱ οὐσίαι καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων
ἀριθμοὶ καὶ ἰδέαι εἰσὶν· μετὰ γὰρ τὰς ἰδέας αὕτη
λείπεται τρίτη σκέψις. Ἀνάγκη δ', εἴπερ ἔστι
τὰ μαθηματικά, ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς εἶναι αὐτά,
καθάπερ λέγουσί τινες, ἢ κεχωρισμένα τῶν αἰσθη-
35 τῶν (λέγουσι δὲ καὶ οὕτω τινές)· ἢ εἰ μηδετέρως,
ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον εἰσὶν. ὥσθ' ἢ ἀμφι-
σβήτησις ἡμῖν ἔσται οὐ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλὰ περὶ
τοῦ τρόπου.

II. Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔν γε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἀδύ-
νατον εἶναι καὶ ἅμα πλασματίας ὁ λόγος, εἴρηται
1076 b μὲν καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαφορήμασιν ὅτι δύο ἅμα στερεὰ
εἶναι ἀδύνατον, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου καὶ
τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις καὶ φύσεις ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς
εἶναι καὶ μηδεμίαν κεχωρισμένην—ταῦτα μὲν οὖν
εἴρηται πρότερον· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις φανερόν ὅτι
5 ἀδύνατον διαιρεθῆναι ὅτιοῦν σῶμα· κατ' ἐπίπεδον
γὰρ διαιρεθήσεται, καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ γραμμὴν, καὶ
αὕτη κατὰ στιγμὴν, ὥστ' εἰ τὴν στιγμὴν διελεῖν
ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὴν γραμμὴν, εἰ δὲ ταύτην, καὶ

* Cf. III. ii. 23-30.

they are principles and substances of existing things or not—and merely inquire whether as mathematical objects they exist or not, and if they do, in what sense: then after this we must separately consider the Ideas themselves, simply and in so far as the accepted procedure requires; for most of the arguments have been made familiar already by the criticisms of other thinkers. And further, the greater 5 part of our discussion must bear directly upon this second question—viz. when we are considering whether the substances and first principles of existing things are numbers and Ideas; for after we have dealt with the Ideas there remains this third question.

Now if the objects of mathematics exist, they 6 must be either in sensible things, as some hold; or separate from them (there are some also who hold this view); or if they are neither the one nor the other, either they do not exist at all, or they exist in some other way. Thus the point which we shall have to discuss is concerned not with their existence, but with the mode of their existence.

II. That the objects of mathematics cannot be in sensible things, and that moreover the theory that they are is a fabrication, has been observed already in our discussion of difficulties ^a—the reasons being (a) that two solids cannot occupy the same space, and (b) that on this same theory all other potentialities and characteristics would exist in sensible things, and none of them would exist separately. This, then, has been already stated; but in addition to this it is clearly impossible on this 2 theory for any body to be divided. For it must be divided in a plane, and the plane in a line, and the line at a point; and therefore if the point is indi-

The object of mathematics.

They are not in sensible things.

1078 b

τάλλα. τί οὖν διαφέρει ἢ ταύτας εἶναι τοιαύτας
 10 φύσεις, ἢ αὐτάς μὲν μή, εἶναι δ' ἐν αὐταῖς τοιαύτας
 φύσεις; τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ συμβήσεται· διαιρουμένων
 γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν διαιρεθήσονται, ἢ οὐδὲ αἰ
 αἰσθηταί.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κεχωρισμένας γ' εἶναι φύσεις
 τοιαύτας δυνατόν. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται στερεὰ παρὰ τὰ
 αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένα τούτων ἕτερα καὶ πρότερα
 τῶν αἰσθητῶν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τὰ ἐπίπεδα
 15 ἕτερα ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπίπεδα κεχωρισμένα, καὶ
 στιγμὰς καὶ γραμμὰς· τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ λόγον. εἰ
 δὲ ταῦτα, πάλιν παρὰ τὰ τοῦ στερεοῦ τοῦ μαθη-
 ματικοῦ ἐπίπεδα καὶ γραμμὰς καὶ στιγμὰς ἕτερα
 κεχωρισμένα· πρότερα γὰρ τῶν συγκεκριμένων ἐστὶ
 τὰ ἀσύνθετα· καὶ εἴπερ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρότερα
 20 σώματα μὴ αἰσθητά, τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῶν
 ἐπιπέδων τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις στερεοῖς τὰ αὐτὰ
 καθ' αὐτά. ὥστε ἕτερα ταῦτα ἐπίπεδα καὶ γραμ-
 μαὶ τῶν ἅμα τοῖς στερεοῖς τοῖς κεχωρισμένοις· τὰ
 μὲν γὰρ ἅμα τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς στερεοῖς, τὰ δὲ
 25 πρότερα τῶν μαθηματικῶν στερεῶν. πάλιν τοῖνυν
 τούτων τῶν ἐπιπέδων ἔσονται γραμμαί, ὧν πρό-
 τερον δεήσει ἐτέρας γραμμὰς καὶ στιγμὰς εἶναι διὰ
 τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον· καὶ τούτων (τῶν)¹ ἐν ταῖς
 προτέραις γραμμαῖς ἐτέρας προτέρας στιγμὰς, ὧν
 οὐκέτι πρότεραι ἕτεραι. ἄτοπός τε δὴ γίνεταί
 ἢ σώρευσις· συμβαίνει γὰρ στερεὰ μὲν μοναχὰ
 30 παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, ἐπίπεδα δὲ τριττὰ παρὰ τὰ
 αἰσθητά, τὰ τε παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς

¹ Christ.

visible, so is the line, and so on. For what difference 3
does it make whether entities of this kind are sensible
objects, or while not being the objects themselves,
are yet present in them? the consequence will be
the same, for either they must be divided when the
sensible objects are divided, or else not even the
sensible objects can be divided.

Nor again can entities of this kind exist separately.
For if besides sensible solids there are to be other 4
solids which are separate from them and prior to
sensible solids, clearly besides *sensible planes* there
must be other separate planes, and so too with
points and lines; for the same argument applies.
And if these exist, again besides the planes, lines
and points of the mathematical solid, there must be
others which are separate; for the incomposite is 5
prior to the composite, and if prior to sensible bodies
there are other non-sensible bodies, then by the
same argument the planes which exist independently
must be prior to those which are present in the im-
movable solids. Therefore there will be planes and
lines distinct from those which coexist with the
separately-existent solids; for the latter coexist
with the mathematical solids, but the former are
prior to the mathematical solids. Again, in these 6
planes there will be lines, and by the same argument
there must be other lines prior to these; and prior
to the points which are in the prior lines there must
be other points, although there will be no other
points prior to these. Now the accumulation be- 7
comes absurd; because whereas we get only one
class of solids besides sensible solids, we get three
classes of planes besides sensible planes—those
which exist separately from sensible planes, those

not can
they exist
separately.
First proof

- 1076 ^b μαθηματικοῖς στερεοῖς καὶ <τὰ>¹ παρὰ τὰ ἐν τοῦ-
τοις, γραμμαὶ δὲ τετραξαί, στιγμαὶ δὲ πενταξαί·
ὥστε περὶ ποῖα αἱ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐσονται αἱ μαθημα-
τικαὶ τούτων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ περὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ στερεῷ
10 τῷ ἀκινήτῳ ἐπίπεδα καὶ γραμμὰς καὶ στιγμας· αἰ
γὰρ περὶ τὰ πρότερα ἢ ἐπιστήμη. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς
λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν· παρ' ἐκάστας γὰρ τὰς
στιγμας ἕτεραι ἐσονται μονάδες, καὶ παρ' ἕκαστα
τὰ ὄντα, <τὰ>² αἰσθητά, εἴτα τὰ νοητά, ὥστ'
ἔσται γένη ἄπειρα τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἀριθμῶν.
- 1077 ^a "Ἐπὶ ἅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπορήμασιν ἐπήλθομεν πῶς
ἐνδέχεται λύειν; περὶ ἃ γὰρ ἡ ἀστρολογία ἐστίν,
ὁμοίως ἔσται³ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ
γεωμετρία· εἶναι δ' οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ
πῶς δυνατόν, ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν ἔχον κήνησιν; ὁμοίως
5 δὲ καὶ τὰ ὀπτικά καὶ τὰ ἀρμονικά· ἔσται γὰρ φωνή
τε καὶ ὄψις παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα·
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
αἰσθητά (τί γὰρ μᾶλλον τάδε ἢ τάδε;). εἰ δὲ ταῦτα,
καὶ ζῶα ἐσονται, εἴπερ καὶ αἰσθήσεις. "Ἐπὶ
10 γράφεται ἓν καὶ καθόλου ὑπὸ τῶν μαθηματικῶν παρὰ
ταύτας τὰς οὐσίας. ἔσται οὖν καὶ αὕτη τις ἄλλη
οὐσία μεταξὺ κεχωρισμένη τῶν τ' ἰδεῶν καὶ τῶν
μεταξὺ, ἣ οὔτε ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶν οὔτε στιγμαὶ οὔτε
μέγεθος οὔτε χρόνος. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, δῆλον

¹ Bessarion, Alexander.² Ross.³ ἔσται Alexander (P) Bonitz: ἐστὶ.^a III. ii. 23-27.

which exist in the mathematical solids, and those which exist separately from those in the mathematical solids—four classes of lines, and five of points ; with which of these, then, will the mathematical sciences deal? Not, surely, with the planes, lines and points in the immovable solid : for knowledge is always concerned with that which is prior. And the same argument applies to numbers : for there will be other units besides each class of points, and besides each class of existing things, first the sensible and then the intelligible : so that there will be an infinite number of kinds of mathematical numbers.

Again, there are the problems which we enumerated in our discussion of difficulties ^a : how can they be solved? For the objects of astronomy will similarly be distinct from sensible things, and so will those of geometry ; but how can a heaven and its parts (or anything else which has motion) exist apart from the sensible heaven? And similarly the objects of optics and of harmonics will be distinct, for there will be sound and sight apart from the sensible and particular objects. Hence clearly the other senses and objects of sense will exist separately ; for why should one class of objects do so rather than another? And if this is so, animals too will exist separately, inasmuch as the senses will.

Again, there are certain general mathematical theorems which are not restricted to these substances. Here, then, we shall have yet another kind of substance intermediate between and distinct from the Ideas and the intermediates, which is neither number nor points nor spatial magnitude nor time. And if this is impossible, clearly it is

1077^a

ὅτι κακεῖνα ἀδύνατον εἶναι κεχωρισμένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν.

- 15 "Ὅλως δὲ τοῦναντίον συμβαίνει καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ εἰωθότος ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι, εἴ τις θήσει οὕτως εἶναι τὰ μαθηματικὰ ὡς κεχωρισμένας τινὰς φύσεις. ἀνάγκη γὰρ διὰ τὸ μὲν οὕτως εἶναι αὐτὰς προτέρας εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεγεθῶν, κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς δὲ ὑστέρας· τὸ γὰρ ἀτελὲς μέγεθος γενέσει μὲν πρότερόν ἐστι, τῇ οὐσίᾳ δ' ὕστερον, ὅλον ἄψυχον ἐμφύχον. "Ἐτι τίτι καὶ ποτ'¹ ἔσται ἐν τὰ μαθηματικὰ μεγέθη; τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ψυχῇ ἢ μέρει ψυχῆς ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ εὐλόγως²· εἰ δὲ μή, πολλά, καὶ διαλύεται· ἐκείνοις δὲ διαιρετοῖς καὶ ποσοῖς οὐσι τί αἴτιον τοῦ ἐν εἶναι
- 20 καὶ συμμένειν; "Ἐτι αἱ γενέσεις δηλοῦσιν· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ μῆκος γίννεται, εἰτα ἐπὶ πλάτος, τελευταῖον δ' εἰς βάθος, καὶ τέλος ἔσχεν. εἰ οὖν τὸ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερον, τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἂν εἶη ἐπιπέδου καὶ μήκους, καὶ ταύτη καὶ τέλειον καὶ ὅλον μᾶλλον, ὅτι ἐμφύχον γίννεται.
- 30 γραμμῇ δὲ ἐμφύχος ἢ ἐπίπεδον πῶς ἂν εἶη; ὑπὲρ γὰρ τὰς αἰσθήσεις τὰς ἡμετέρας ἂν εἶη τὸ ἀξίωμα. "Ἐτι τὸ μὲν σῶμα οὐσία τις³· ἤδη γὰρ ἔχει πῶς τὸ τέλειον· αἱ δὲ γραμμαὶ πῶς οὐσίαι; οὔτε γὰρ ὡς

¹ καὶ ποτ' Bonitz: καὶ πότ'.

² εὐλόγως cl. Ross: εὐλογον Jaeger: εὐλόγω codd.

³ τις Γ Bessarion Alexander: τίς.

^a i.e., in the natural order of development. Thus "generation" (γένεσις) is used in two different senses in this argument, which therefore becomes invalid (Bonitz).

1077 a

εἶδος καὶ μορφή τις, οἷον εἰ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, οὔτε ὡς ἡ ὕλη, οἷον τὸ σῶμα· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐκ γραμμῶν οὐδ' ἐπιπέδων οὐδὲ στιγμῶν φαίνεται συν-

1077 b

ἂν ἐφαίνετο δυνάμενα πᾶσχειν. Τῷ μὲν οὖν λόγῳ ἔστω πρότερα· ἀλλ' οὐ πάντα ὅσα τῷ λόγῳ πρότερα καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα. τῇ μὲν γὰρ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα ὅσα χωριζόμενα τῷ εἶναι ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ ὅσων οἱ λόγοι ἐκ τῶν λόγων· ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ἅμα ὑπάρχει. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔστι τὰ πάθη παρὰ τὰς οὐσίας, οἷον κινούμενόν τι ἢ λευκόν, τοῦ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ λευκὸν πρότερον κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι κεχωρισμένον, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἅμα τῷ συνόλῳ ἐστίν· σύνολον δὲ λέγω τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν λευκόν. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως πρότερον οὔτε τὸ ἐκ προσθέσεως ὕστερον· ἐκ προσθέσεως γὰρ τῷ λευκῷ ὁ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος λέγεται. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε οὐσίαι μᾶλλον τῶν σωμάτων εἰσίν, οὔτε πρότερα τῷ εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ μόνον, οὔτε κεχωρισμένα που εἶναι δυνατόν, εἴρηται ἱκανῶς. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐνεδέχετο αὐτὰ εἶναι, φανερόν ὅτι ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ τρόπον τινὰ ἔστι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἔστιν· πολλαχῶς γὰρ τὸ εἶναι λέγομεν.

III. Ὡςπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς μαθή-

^a §§ 1-3 supra.

of form or shape, as perhaps the soul is, nor as being matter, like the body; for it does not appear that anything can be composed either of lines or of planes or of points, whereas if they were a kind of material substance it would be apparent that things can be so composed. 16

Let it be granted that they are prior in formula; yet not everything which is prior in formula is also prior in substantiality. Things are prior in substantiality which when separated have a superior power of existence; things are prior in formula from whose formulae the formulae of other things are compounded. And these characteristics are not indissociable. For if attributes, such as "moving" 17 or "white," do not exist apart from their substances, "white" will be prior in formula to "white man," but not in substantiality; for it cannot exist in separation, but always exists conjointly with the concrete whole—by which I mean "white man." Thus it is obvious that neither is the result 18 of abstraction prior, nor the result of adding a determinant posterior—for the expression "white man" is the result of adding a determinant to "white."

Thus we have sufficiently shown (a) that the objects of mathematics are not more substantial than corporeal objects; (b) that they are not prior in point of existence to sensible things, but only in formula; and (c) that they cannot in any way exist in separation. And since we have seen^a that they cannot 19 exist in sensible things, it is clear that either they do not exist at all, or they exist only in a certain way, and therefore not absolutely; for "exist" has several senses.

III. The general propositions in mathematics are

Mathematics

1077 b

μασιν οὐ περὶ κεχωρισμένων ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη
 καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τούτων μὲν, οὐχ ἥ
 10 δὲ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἔχειν μέγεθος ἢ εἶναι διαιρετά,
 δηλον ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεγεθῶν
 εἶναι καὶ λόγους καὶ ἀποδείξεις, μὴ ἥ δὲ αἰσθητά,
 ἀλλ' ἥ τοιαδί. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἥ κινούμενα μόνον
 πολλοὶ λόγοι εἰσὶ, χωρὶς τοῦ τί ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν
 20 τοιούτων καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα ἥ κεχωρισμένον τι εἶναι κινού-
 μενον τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ ἐν τούτοις τινὰ φύσιν εἶναι
 ἀφωρισμένην, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κινουμένων ἔσονται
 λόγοι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι, οὐχ ἥ κινούμενα δὲ ἀλλ' ἥ
 σώματα μόνον, καὶ πάλιν ἥ ἐπίπεδα μόνον καὶ ἥ
 30 μήκη μόνον, καὶ ἥ διαιρετά καὶ ἥ ἀδιαίρετα ἔχοντα
 δὲ θέσω, καὶ ἥ ἀδιαίρετα μόνον. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ ἀπλῶς
 λέγειν ἀληθὲς μὴ μόνον τὰ χωριστά εἶναι ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τὰ μὴ χωριστά, οἷον κινούμενα εἶναι, καὶ τὰ
 μαθηματικά ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπλῶς ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, καὶ
 τοιαῦτά γε οἷα λέγουσιν. καὶ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς
 80 ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας ἀπλῶς ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν τούτου
 εἶναι, οὐχὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, οἷον ὅτι λευκοῦ εἰ
 τὸ ὑγιεινὸν λευκόν, ἢ δ' ἔστιν ὑγιεινοῦ,² ἀλλ'
 1078 a ἐκείνου οὗ ἔστιν ἑκάστη, εἰ (ἥ)³ ὑγιεινὸν ὑγιεινοῦ,
 εἰ δ' ἥ ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου, οὕτω καὶ τὴν γεω-
 μετρίαν· οὐκ εἰ συμβέβηκεν αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ὧν ἐστὶ,

¹ ἢ Bonitz: ἥ.² ὑγιεινοῦ γρ. E, Alexander: ὑγιεινόν.³ Bonitz.

not concerned with objects which exist separately apart from magnitudes and numbers; they are concerned with magnitudes and numbers, but not with them as possessing magnitude or being divisible. It is clearly possible that in the same way propositions and logical proofs may apply to sensible magnitudes; not *qua* sensible, but *qua* having certain characteristics. For just as there can be many² propositions about things merely *qua* movable, without any reference to the essential nature of each one or to their attributes, and it does not necessarily follow from this either that there is something movable which exists in separation from sensible things or that there is a distinct movable nature in sensible things; so too there will be propositions and sciences which apply to movable things, not *qua* movable but *qua* corporeal only; and again *qua* planes only and *qua* lines only, and *qua* divisible, and *qua* indivisible but having position, and *qua* indivisible only. Therefore since it is true to say in a³ general sense not only that things which are separable but that things which are inseparable exist, *e.g.*, that movable things exist, it is also true to say in a general sense that mathematical objects exist, and in such a form as mathematicians describe them. And just as it is true to say generally of the⁴ other sciences that they deal with a particular subject—not with that which is accidental to it (*e.g.* not with "white" if "the healthy" is white, and the subject of the science is "the healthy"), but with that which is the subject of the particular science; with the healthy if it treats of things *qua* healthy, and with man if *qua* man—so this is also true of geometry. If the things of which it treats

studies
objects as
having
certain
character-
istics.

μη ἔστι δὲ ἡ αἰσθητά, οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔσονται
αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ παρὰ
5 ταῦτα ἄλλων κεχωρισμένων. Πολλὰ δὲ συμ-
βέβηκε καθ' αὐτὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἡ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχει
τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ θῆλυ τὸ ζῶον καὶ ἡ
ἄρρεν, ἴδια πάθη ἔστιν, καίτοι οὐκ ἔστι τι θῆλυ οὐδ'
ἄρρεν κεχωρισμένον τῶν ζώων· ὥστε καὶ ἡ μήκη
μόνον καὶ ἡ ἐπίπεδα. καὶ ὅσῳ δὴ ἂν περὶ
10 προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀπλουστέρων, τοσοῦτῳ
μᾶλλον ἔχει τὸ ἀκριβές (τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἔστιν).
ὥστε ἄνευ τε μεγέθους μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ μεγέθους,
καὶ μάλιστα ἄνευ κινήσεως· ἐὰν δὲ κίνησιν, μά-
λιστα τὴν πρώτην· ἀπλουστάτη γάρ, καὶ ταύτης ἡ
ὁμαλή. Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ἁρμονικῆς
16 καὶ ὀπτικῆς· οὐδετέρα γὰρ ἡ ὄψις ἢ ἡ φωνὴ θεωρεῖ,
ἀλλ' ἡ γραμμαὶ καὶ ἀριθμοί· οἰκεῖα μέντοι ταῦτα
πάθη ἐκείνων· καὶ ἡ μηχανικὴ δὲ ὡσαύτως. "Ωστ'
εἴ τις θέμενος κεχωρισμένα τῶν συμβεβηκότων
σκοπεῖ τι περὶ τούτων ἢ τοιαῦτα, οὐθέν διὰ τοῦτο
ψεύδος ψεύσεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὅταν ἐν τῇ γῇ γράφῃ
20 καὶ ποδιαίαν φῇ τὴν¹ μὴ ποδιαίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς
προτάσεσι τὸ ψεύδος. ἄριστα δ' ἂν οὕτω θεωρη-
θεῖν ἕκαστον, εἴ τις τὸ μὴ κεχωρισμένον θεῖν
χωρίσας, ὅπερ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ποιεῖ καὶ ὁ γεω-

¹ ποδιαίαν φῇ τὴν Bessarion Alexander Bonitz: τὴν ποδιαίαν φῇ.

^a XII. vii. 6.

^b Optics studies lines and harmonics numbers because these sciences are subordinate to geometry and arithmetic (*An. Post.* 75 b 15).

^c Cf. XIV. ii. 9, 10.

are accidentally sensible although it does not treat of them *qua* sensible, it does not follow that the mathematical sciences treat of sensible things—nor, on the other hand, that they treat of other things which exist independently apart from these.

Many attributes are essential properties of things 5 as possessing a particular characteristic; e.g., there are attributes peculiar to an animal *qua* female or *qua* male, although there is no such thing as female or male in separation from animals. Hence there are also attributes which are peculiar to things merely *qua* lines or planes. And in proportion as the 6 things which we are considering are prior in formula and simpler, they admit of greater exactness; for simplicity implies exactness. Hence we find greater exactness where there is no magnitude, and the greatest exactness where there is no motion; or if motion is involved, where it is primary, because this is the simplest kind; and the simplest kind of primary motion is uniform motion.^a

The same principle applies to both harmonics and 7 optics, for neither of these sciences studies objects *qua* sight or *qua* sound, but *qua* lines and numbers^b; yet the latter are affections peculiar to the former. The same is also true of mechanics.

Thus if we regard objects independently of their 8 attributes and investigate any aspect of them as so regarded, we shall not be guilty of any error on this account, any more than when we draw a diagram on the ground and say that a line is a foot long when it is not; because the error is not in the premises.^c The best way to conduct an investigation in every case is to take that which does not exist in separation and consider it separately; which is just what the

It is quite proper to regard as potentially separable that which is not actually separable.

1078^a μέτρης. ἐν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀδιαίρετον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ
 ἄνθρωπος· ὁ δ' ἔθετο ἐν ἀδιαίρετον, εἴτ' ἐθεώρησεν
 25 εἴ τι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν ἢ ἀδιαίρετος. ὁ δὲ
 γεωμέτρης οὐθ' ἢ ἄνθρωπος οὐθ' ἢ ἀδιαίρετος,
 ἀλλ' ἢ στερεόν. ἃ γὰρ καὶ εἰ μὴ που ἦν ἀδιαίρετος
 ὑπῆρχεν αὐτῷ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τούτων ἐν-
 δέχεται αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν [τὸ δυνατόν]¹. ὥστε διὰ
 τοῦτο ὀρθῶς οἱ γεωμέτραι λέγουσιν, καὶ περὶ ὄντων
 30 διαλέγονται, καὶ ὄντα ἐστίν· διττὸν γὰρ τὸ ὄν,
 τὸ μὲν ἐντελεχεῖα τὸ δ' ὑλικῶς. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἕτερον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐν
 πράξει, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις), οἱ
 φάσκοντες οὐδὲν λέγειν τὰς μαθηματικὰς ἐπι-
 στήμας περὶ καλοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ ψεύδονται· λέγουσι
 35 γὰρ καὶ δεικνύουσι μάλιστα· οὐ γὰρ εἰ μὴ ὀνομά-
 ζουσι, τὰ δ' ἔργα καὶ τοὺς λόγους δεικνύουσιν, οὐ
 λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν. τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδη
 1078^b τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὠρισμένον, ἃ μάλιστα
 δεικνύουσιν αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι. καὶ ἐπεὶ
 γε πολλῶν αἰτία φαίνεται ταῦτα (λέγω δ' οἶον ἢ
 τάξις καὶ τὸ ὠρισμένον), δῆλον ὅτι λέγοιεν ἂν καὶ
 4 τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν τὴν ὡς τὸ καλὸν αἴτιον τρόπον
 τινά. μᾶλλον δὲ γνωρίμους ἐν ἄλλοις περὶ αὐτῶν
 ἐροῦμεν.

IV. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μαθηματικῶν, ὅτι τε ὄντα

¹ om. Γ: habent codd.

^a i.e., potentially.

^b Cf. III. ii. 4.

^c There is no obvious fulfilment of this promise.

arithmetician or the geometrician does. For man, *qua* man, is one indivisible thing; and the arithmetician assumes man to be one indivisible thing, and then considers whether there is any attribute of man *qua* indivisible. And the geometrician considers man neither *qua* man nor *qua* indivisible, but *qua* something solid. For clearly the attributes which would have belonged to "man" even if man were somehow not indivisible can belong to man irrespectively of his humanity or indivisibility. Hence for this reason the geometricians are right ¹⁰ in what they maintain, and treat of what really exists; *i.e.*, the objects of geometry really exist. For things can exist in two ways, either in complete reality or as matter.^a

And since goodness is distinct from beauty (for it is always in actions that goodness is present, whereas beauty is also in immovable things), they ⁶ are in error who assert that the mathematical sciences tell us nothing about beauty or goodness: for they ¹¹ describe and manifest these qualities in the highest degree, since it does not follow, because they manifest the effects and principles of beauty and goodness without naming them, that they do not treat of these qualities. The main species of beauty are orderly arrangement, proportion, and definiteness; and these are especially manifested by the mathematical sciences. And inasmuch as it is evident that these ¹² (I mean, *e.g.*, orderly arrangement and definiteness) are causes of many things, obviously they must also to some extent treat of the cause in this sense, *i.e.* the cause in the sense of the Beautiful. But we shall deal with this subject more explicitly elsewhere.^b

Mathematicians does not ignore the principle of beauty.

IV. As regards the objects of mathematics, then, ^{The Ideal theory.}

ἐστὶ καὶ πῶς οὐτα, καὶ πῶς πρότερα καὶ πῶς οὐ
 πρότερα, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω. περὶ δὲ τῶν ιδεῶν
 10 πρῶτον αὐτὴν τὴν κατὰ τὴν ιδέαν δόξαν ἐπισκεπ-
 τέον, μηθὲν συνάπτοντας πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀριθμῶν
 φύσιν, ἀλλ' ὥς ὑπέλαβον ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἱ πρῶτοι τὰς
 ιδέας φήσαντες εἶναι. Συνέβη δ' ἡ περὶ τῶν
 εἰδῶν δόξα τοῖς εἰποῦσι διὰ τὸ πεισθῆναι περὶ τῆς
 ἀληθείας τοῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις λόγοις ὡς πάντων τῶν
 15 αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ρεόντων, ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς
 ἔσται καὶ φρόνησις, ἐτέρας δεῖν τινὰς φύσεις εἶναι
 παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς μενούσας· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τῶν
 ρεόντων ἐπιστήμην. Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ τὰς
 ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς πραγματευομένου καὶ περὶ τούτων
 ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου ζητοῦντος πρῶτον (τῶν μὲν γὰρ
 20 φυσικῶν ἐπὶ μικρὸν Δημόκριτος ἤψατο μόνον καὶ
 ὠρίσατό πως τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν· οἱ δὲ
 Πυθαγόρειοι πρότερον περὶ τινων ὀλέγων, ὧν τοὺς
 λόγους εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνῆπτον, οἶον τί ἐστι
 καιρὸς ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἢ γάμος), ἐκεῖνος δ'¹ εὐλόγως
 ἐζήτει τὸ τί ἐστι. συλλογίζεσθαι γὰρ ἐζήτει, ἀρχὴ
 25 δὲ τῶν συλλογισμῶν τὸ τί ἐστίν· διαλεκτικὴ γὰρ
 ἰσχυρὸς οὕτω τότε ἦν ὥστε δύνασθαι καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ
 τί ἐστι τὰναντία ἐπισκοπεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰ

¹ δ' om. rece.

* It seems quite obvious that Aristotle intends this vague phrase to refer to Plato. Cf. I. vi. 1-3, with which the following sections 2-5 should be compared. On the whole subject see Vol. I. Introd. pp. xx ff.

the foregoing account may be taken as sufficient to show that they exist, and in what sense they exist, and in what sense they are prior and in what they are not. But as regards the Ideas we must first consider the actual theory in relation to the Idea, without connecting it in any way with the nature of numbers, but approaching it in the form in which it was originally propounded by the first exponents^a of the Ideas.

¶ The theory of Forms occurred to those who enunciated it because they were convinced as to the true nature of reality by the doctrine of Heraclitus, that all sensible things are always in a state of flux; so that if there is to be any knowledge or thought about anything, there must be certain other entities, besides sensible ones, which persist. For there can be no knowledge of that which is in flux. Now Socrates² devoted his attention to the moral virtues, and was the first to seek a general definition of these (for of the Physicists Democritus gained only a superficial grasp of the subject^b and defined, after a fashion, "the hot" and "the cold"; while the Pythagoreans^c at an earlier date had arrived at definitions of some few things—whose formulae they connected with numbers—e.g., what "opportunity" is, or "justice" or "marriage"); and he naturally inquired into the essence of things; for he was trying⁴ to reason logically, and the starting-point of all logical reasoning is the essence. At that time there was as yet no such proficiency in Dialectic that men could study contraries independently of the essence, and consider whether both contraries come under the

^a Cf. *Physics* 194 a 20, *De Part. Anim.* 642 a 24.

^c Cf. I. v. 2, 16.

1078 b

ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη. δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἃ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη
 Σωκράτει δικαίως, τοὺς τ' ἐπακτικούς λόγους καὶ
 τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἄμφω περὶ
 80 ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης. Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ
 καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὁρισμούς·
 οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ιδέας
 προσηγόρευσαν. ὥστε συνέβαινεν αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν
 τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ πάντων ιδέας εἶναι τῶν καθόλου
 λεγομένων, καὶ παραπλήσιον ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις
 85 ἀριθμῆσαι βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οἶοιτο
 μὴ δύνασθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοίη· πλείω
 1079 a γάρ ἐστι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα αἰσθητῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ
 εἶδη, περὶ ὧν ζητοῦντες τὰς αἰτίας ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖ
 προῆλθον· καθ' ἕκαστόν τε γὰρ ὁμώνυμον ἔστι καὶ
 παρὰ τὰς οὐσίας, τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐν ἔστιν ἐπὶ πολ-
 λῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰδιόις. Ἔτι
 90 καθ' οὓς τρόπους δείκνυται ὅτι ἔστι τὰ εἶδη, κατ'
 οὐθέννα φαίνεται τούτων· ἐξ ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι συλλογισμόν, ἐξ ἐνίων δὲ καὶ οὐχ
 ὧν οἶονται τούτων εἶδη γίνεται. κατὰ τε γὰρ
 τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔσται εἶδη
 πάντων ὅσων ἐπιστῆμαι εἰσὶν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐν ἐπὶ
 10 πολλῶν καὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων, κατὰ δὲ τὸ νοεῖν τι

^a This is perhaps too strong a word. What Aristotle means is that Socrates was the first thinker who attached importance to general definitions and systematically used arguments from analogy in order to arrive at them. The Greeks as a whole were only too readily impressed by analogy; Socrates merely developed an already prevalent tendency. For an example of his method see the reference at V. xxix. 5.

^b Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxi.

^c With §§ 6-13 cf. I. ix. 1-8, which are almost verbatim the same. On the relation of Book XIII. to Book I. see Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxii.

same science. There are two innovations ^a which 5 may fairly be ascribed to Socrates : inductive reasoning and general definition. Both of these are associated with the starting-point of scientific knowledge.

But whereas Socrates regarded neither universals nor definitions as existing in separation, the Idealists gave them a separate existence, and to these universals and definitions of existing things they gave the name of Ideas.^b Hence on their view it followed 6

by virtually the same argument that there are Ideas of all terms which are predicated universally ^c ; and the result was very nearly the same as if a man who wishes to count a number of things were to suppose that he could not do so when they are few, and yet were to try to count them when he has added to them. For it is hardly an exaggeration to say that there are more Forms than there are particular sensible things (in seeking for whose causes these thinkers were led on from particulars to Ideas) ; because corresponding to each thing there is a synonymous entity, apart from the substances (and in the case of non-substantial things there is a One over the Many) both in our everyday world and in the realm of eternal entities.

Again, not one of the ways in which it is attempted 7 to prove that the Forms exist demonstrates their point ; from some of them no necessary conclusion follows, and from others it follows that there are Forms of things of which they hold that there are no Forms. For according to the arguments from the sciences 8 there will be Forms of all things of which there are sciences ; and according to the " One-over-Many " argument, of negations too ; and according to the argument that " we have some conception of what

Arguments against the Ideal Theory.

(a) The assumption

of the Ideas doubles the number of things to be explained.

(b) The arguments supposed to support the theory prove either

nothing, or too much, or else they imply consequences inconsistent

1079 a

φθαρέντος τῶν φθαρτῶν· φάντασμα γάρ τι τούτων
 ἔστιν. ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστατοι τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν
 τῶν πρὸς τι ποιουῶσιν ἰδέας, ὧν οὐ φασιν εἶναι καθ'
 αὐτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν.
 ὅλως τε ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν λόγοι ἂ
 15 μᾶλλον βούλονται εἶναι οἱ λέγοντες εἶδη τοῦ τὰς
 ἰδέας εἶναι· συμβαίνει γὰρ μὴ εἶναι πρῶτον τὴν
 δυνάδα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ τούτου τὸ πρὸς τι καὶ
 τοῦτο τοῦ καθ' αὐτό, καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα τινὲς ἀκολου-
 θήσαντες ταῖς περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν δόξαις ἠναντιώθη-
 σαν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς. Ἔτι κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὑπόληψιν

20 καθ' ἣν φασιν εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας οὐ μόνον τῶν οὐσιῶν
 ἔσονται εἶδη ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν (τὸ γὰρ νόημα
 ἐν οὐ μόνον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ μὴ
 οὐσιῶν ἐστὶ,¹ καὶ² ἐπιστῆμαι οὐ μόνον τῆς οὐσίας
 ἔσονται· συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα)·

[25 κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς δόξας τὰς περὶ
 αὐτῶν, εἰ ἔστι μεθεκτὰ τὰ εἶδη, τῶν οὐσιῶν
 ἀναγκαῖον ἰδέας εἶναι μόνον· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμ-
 βεβηκὸς μετέχονται, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ταύτῃ ἐκάστου μετ-
 ἔχειν ἢ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται. λέγω δ' οἶον
 εἴ τι αὐτοῦ διπλασίου μετέχει, τοῦτο καὶ αἰδίου
 30 μετέχει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· συμβέβηκε γὰρ
 τῷ διπλασίῳ αἰδίῳ εἶναι. ὥστε ἔσται οὐσία τὰ
 εἶδη. ταῦτα δ' ἐνταῦθα οὐσίαν σημαίνει κακεῖ·

¹ ἐστὶ] ἔσται Syrianus, fecit E, Bekker.

² καὶ J, A (E Alexander): καὶ αἱ EA^b Syrianus, A (A^b).

has perished" there will be Forms of perishable things, because we have a mental picture of these things. Further, of the most exact arguments some establish Ideas of relations, of which the Idealists deny that there is a separate genus, and others state the "Third Man." And in general the arguments 9 for the Forms do away with things which are more important to the exponents of the Forms than the existence of the Ideas; for they imply that it is not the Dyad that is primary, but Number; and that the relative is prior to number, and therefore to the absolute; and all the other conclusions in respect of which certain persons by following up the views held about the Forms have gone against the principles of the theory.

Again, according to the assumption by which they 10 hold that the Ideas exist, there will be Forms not only of substances but of many other things (since the concept is one not only in the case of substances but in the case of non-substantial things as well; and there can be sciences not only of substances but also of other things; and there are a thousand other similar consequences); but it follows necessarily from the views generally held about them that if the Forms are participated in, there can only be Ideas of substances, because they are not participated in accidentally; things can only participate in a Form in so far as it is not predicated of a subject. I mean, 12 *e.g.*, that if a thing participates in absolute doubleness, it participates also in something eternal, but only accidentally; because it is an accident of "doubleness" to be eternal. Thus the Ideas will be substance. But the same terms denote substance in the

with the principles of the theory

(c) It is a fundamental implication of the theory that there are Ideas of other things besides sub-

stances; but this is illogical and contrary to practice.

ARISTOTLE

- 1079^a ἢ τί ἔσται τὸ εἶναι φάναι τι παρὰ ταῦτα, τὸ ἐν
ἐπὶ πολλῶν; καὶ εἰ μὲν ταῦτὸ εἶδος τῶν ἰδεῶν καὶ
τῶν μετεχόντων, ἔσται τι κοινόν· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ
1079^b τῶν φθαρτῶν δυνάδων, καὶ τῶν δυνάδων τῶν πολλῶν
μὲν αἰδίων δέ, τὸ δυνάς ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν, ἢ ἐπὶ τ'¹ αὐτῆς
καὶ τῆς τινός; εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος, ὁμώνυμα
ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὁμοιον ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις καλοῖ ἄνθρωπον
τόν τε Καλλίαν καὶ τὸ ξύλον, μηδεμίαν κοινωνίαν
ἐπιβλέψας αὐτῶν. Εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοὺς
κοινοὺς λόγους ἐφαρμόττειν θήσομεν τοῖς εἰδεσιν,
5 οἷον ἐπ' αὐτόν τὸν κύκλον σχῆμα ἐπίπεδον καὶ τὰ
λοιπὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, τὸ δ' οὐδ' ἐστὶ προστεθήσεται,
σκοπεῖν δεῖ μὴ κενὸν ἢ τοῦτο παντελῶς. τίτι τε
γὰρ προστεθήσεται; τῷ μέσῳ ἢ τῷ ἐπιπέδῳ ἢ
πᾶσιν; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἰδέαι, οἷον τὸ
ζῶον καὶ τὸ δίπουν. ἔτι δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ
10 εἶναι τι, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπίπεδον φύσιν τινὰ ἢ πᾶσιν
ἐννπαρξεί τοῖς εἰδεσιν ὡς γένος.

V. Πάντων δὲ μάλιστα διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις τί
ποτε συμβάλλονται τὰ εἶδη ἢ τοῖς αἰδίοις τῶν
αἰσθητῶν ἢ τοῖς γιγνομένοις καὶ [τοῖς]² φθειρο-
15 μένοις· οὔτε γὰρ κινήσεώς ἐστιν οὔτε μεταβολῆς
οὐδεμιᾶς αἷτια αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε³ πρὸς τήν

¹ ἐπὶ τ' Bonitz : ἐπ'.

² om. Syrianus, A (A^b Alexander).

³ Bonitz : οὐδέ.

^a §§ 14, 15 have no counterpart in Book I.

^b The suggestion is that the definition of an Ideal circle is the same as that of a particular circle, except that it must have added to it the statement of what particular the Idea is an Idea.

^c sc. in the definition or essence of "Ideal man."

sensible as in the Ideal world ; otherwise what meaning will there be in saying that something exists besides the particulars, *i.e.* the unity comprising their multiplicity? If the form of the Ideas and of the 13 things which participate in them is the same, they will have something in common (for why should duality mean one and the same thing in the case of perishable 2's and the 2's which are many but eternal, and not in the case of absolute duality and a particular 2?). But if the form is not the same, they will simply be homonyms ; just as though one were to call both Callias and a piece of wood " man," without remarking any property common to them.

^a And if we profess that in all other respects the 14 common definitions apply to the Forms, *e.g.* that " plane figure " and the other parts of the definition apply to the Ideal circle, only that we must also state of what the Form is a Form, we must beware lest this is a quite meaningless statement.^b For to what 15 element of the definition must the addition be made? to " centre," or " plane " or all of them? For all the elements in the essence of an Idea are Ideas ; *e.g.* " animal " and " two-footed."^c Further, it is obvious that " being an Idea," just like " plane," must be a definite characteristic which belongs as genus to all its species.^d

V. ^eAbove all we might examine the question what on earth the Ideas contribute to sensible things, whether eternal or subject to generation and decay ; for they are not the cause of any motion or change in them. Moreover they are no help towards the 2

^a *i.e.*, " being an Idea " will be a characteristic common to all Ideas, and so must be itself an Idea.

^b This chapter corresponds almost verbally to I. ix. 9-15. Cf. note on ch. iv. 6.

(d) Difficulty of regarding Ideas and particulars

as related in definition.

(e) What do the Ideas contribute to sensible things? They are

1079 b

ἐπιστήμην οὐθέν βοηθεῖ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων (οὐδὲ¹ γὰρ οὐσία ἐκείνα τούτων· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἂν ᾔην), οὐτ' εἰς τὸ εἶναι, μὴ ἐνυπάρχοντά γε τοῖς μετέχουσιν· οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἴσως αἷτια δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι ὡς τὸ
 20 λευκὸν μεμιγμένον τῷ λευκῷ. ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος λίαν εὐκίνητος, ὃν Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν πρότερος Εὐδοξος δ' ὕστερος ἔλεγε διαπορῶν καὶ ἕτεροί τινες· ῥᾶδιον γὰρ πολλὰ συναγαγεῖν καὶ ἀδύνατα πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην δόξαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν εἰδῶν ἔστι τᾶλλα κατ' οὐθένα τρόπον τῶν εἰωθότων
 25 λέγεσθαι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν παραδείγματα εἶναι καὶ μετέχειν αὐτῶν τὰ ἄλλα κενολογεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικὰς. τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐργαζόμενον πρὸς τὰς ἰδέας ἀποβλέπον; ἐνδέχεται τε καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι ὁτιοῦν καὶ μὴ εἰκαζόμενον, ὥστε καὶ ὄντος Σωκράτους καὶ μὴ ὄντος γένοιτ' ἂν
 30 οἷος² Σωκράτης (ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἰ ᾔην ὁ Σωκράτης αἰδῖος). ἔσται τε πλείω παραδείγματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ εἶδη, οἷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῶον καὶ τὸ δέπουν, ἄμα δὲ καὶ αὐτοάνθρωπος. ἔτι οὐ μόνον τῶν αἰσθητῶν παραδείγματα τὰ εἶδη, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶν,³ οἷον τὸ γένος τῶν ὡς γένους
 35 εἰδῶν· ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται παράδειγμα καὶ εἰκῶν. ἔτι δόξειεν ἂν ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ
 1080 a οὐ ἡ οὐσία· ὥστε πῶς ἂν αἱ ἰδέαι οὐσῶν τῶν πραγμάτων οὐσαι χωρὶς εἶεν; Ἐν δὲ τῷ Φαίδωνι

¹ Bonitz: οὐτε.² οἷος A (A^b Alexander): οἷον codd.³ εἰ ᾔην Bessarion, A: εἴη codd.⁴ αὐτῶν] αὐτῶν Bekker.

knowledge of other things (for they are not the substance of particulars, otherwise they would be *in* particulars) or to their existence (since they are not present in the things which participate in them. If they were, they might perhaps seem to be causes, in the sense in which the admixture of white causes a thing to be white. But this theory, which was 3 stated first by Anaxagoras and later by Eudoxus in his discussion of difficulties, and by others also, is very readily refuted ; for it is easy to adduce plenty of impossibilities against such a view). Again, other things are not in any accepted sense derived from the Forms. To say that the Forms are patterns, 4 and that other things participate in them, is to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors ; for what is it that fashions things on the model of the Ideas ? Besides, anything may both be and come to be without being imitated from something else ; thus a man may become like Socrates whether Socrates exists or not, and even if Socrates were eternal, 5 clearly the case would be the same. Also there will be several " patterns " (and therefore Forms) of the same thing ; e.g., " animal " and " two-footed " will be patterns of " man," and so too will the Idea of man. Further, the Forms will be patterns not 6 only of sensible things but of Ideas ; e.g. the genus will be the pattern of its species ; hence the same thing will be pattern and copy. Further, it would seem impossible for the substance and that of which it is the substance to exist in separation ; then how can the Ideas, if they are the substances of things, exist in separation from them ?

not cause, they do not help our knowledge, they do not explain the existence of things

To say that the Ideas are " patterns " does not help the theory.

it only raises further difficulties.

In the *Phaedo* * this statement is made : that the

Plato describes the Ideas as

* Plato, *Phaedo* 100 D.

1080 a

τοῦτον λέγεται τὸν τρόπον, ὡς καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ γίνεσθαι αἷτια τὰ εἶδη ἐστίν. καίτοι τῶν εἰδῶν ὄντων ὁμῶς οὐ γίνεταί, ἂν μὴ ἢ τὸ κινήσον, καὶ
 5 πολλὰ γίνεταί ἕτερα, ὅλον οἰκία καὶ δακτύλιος, ὦν οὐ φασιν εἶναι εἶδη. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἐνδέχεται κάκεῖνα ὦν φασὶν ἰδέας εἶναι, καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας οἷας καὶ τὰ ῥηθέντα νῦν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ εἶδη. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἰδεῶν
 10 καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ διὰ λογικωτέρων καὶ ἀκριβεστέρων λόγων ἔστι πολλὰ συναγαγεῖν ὁμοία τοῖς τεθεωρημένοις.

VI. Ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται περὶ τούτων, καλῶς ἔχει πάλιν θεωρῆσαι τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς συμβαίνοντα τοῖς λέγουσιν οὐσίας αὐτοὺς εἶναι χωριστάς
 15 καὶ τῶν ὄντων αἰτίας πρώτας. ἀνάγκη δ', εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμὸς φύσις τις καὶ μὴ ἄλλη τίς ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐσία ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὥσπερ φασὶ τινες, ἥτοι εἶναι τὸ μὲν πρῶτόν τι αὐτοῦ τὸ δ' ἐχόμενον ἕτερον ὃν τῷ εἶδει ἕκαστον—καὶ τοῦτο ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν μονάδων εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει καὶ ἔστιν ἀσύμβλητος
 20 ὅποιαοῦν μονὰς ὅποιαοῦν μονάδι, ἢ εὐθὺς ἐφεξῆς πᾶσαι καὶ συμβληταὶ ὅποιαοῦν ὅποιαοῦν, ὅλον λέγουσιν εἶναι τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἀριθμόν (ἐν γὰρ τῷ μαθηματικῷ οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὐδεμία μονὰς ἑτέρα ἑτέρας)· ἢ τὰς μὲν συμβλητάς τὰς δὲ μὴ (ὅλον εἰ ἔστι μετὰ τὸ ἐν πρώτῃ ἢ δυνάς, ἔπειτα ἢ τριάς

* This statement seems to bear two meanings, which Aristotle confuses: (i) There must be more than one number-series, each series being different in kind from every other series; (ii) All numbers are different in kind, and inaddible. Confusion (or textual inaccuracy) is further suggested by the fact that Aristotle offers no alternative statement of the nature of number in general, such as we should expect from

Forms are causes both of being and of generation. Yet assuming that the Forms exist, still there is no generation unless there is something to impart motion; and many other things are generated (e.g. house and ring) of which the Idealists say that there are no Forms. Thus it is clearly possible that those things of which they say that there are Ideas may also exist and be generated through the same kind of causes as those of the things which we have just mentioned, and not because of the Forms. Indeed, as regards the Ideas, we can collect against them plenty of evidence similar to that which we have now considered; not only by the foregoing methods, but by means of more abstract and exact reasoning.

VI. Now that we have dealt with the problems concerning the Ideas, we had better re-investigate the problems connected with numbers that follow from the theory that numbers are separate substances and primary causes of existing things. Now if number is a kind of entity, and has nothing else as its substance, but only number itself, as some maintain; then either (a) there must be some one part of number which is primary, and some other part next in succession, and so on, each part being specifically different^a—and this applies directly to 2 units, and any given unit is inaddible to any other given unit; or (b) they^b are all directly successive, and any units can be added to any other units, as is held of mathematical number; for in mathematical number no one unit differs in any way from another. Or (c) some units must be addible and others not. 3
E.g., 2 is first after 1, and then 3, and so on with the

causing
existence
and genera-
tion, but
that cannot
be true.

Different
forms of the
theory that
numbers are
substances.

If there are
different
kinds of
number,

either (a) all
units are
inaddible,
or (b) all
units are
addible,

or (c) some

his language. In any case the classification is arbitrary and incomplete.

^a The units.

1080 a

25 καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὁ ἄλλος ἀριθμὸς, εἰσὶ δὲ συμβληταὶ αἱ
 ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἀριθμῷ μονάδες, ὅλον αἱ ἐν τῇ δυνάδι
 τῇ πρώτῃ αὐταῖς, καὶ ἐν τῇ τριάδι τῇ πρώτῃ
 αὐταῖς, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν· αἱ δ'
 ἐν τῇ δυνάδι αὐτῇ πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῇ τριάδι αὐτῇ
 ἀσύμβλητοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
 30 ἐφεξῆς ἀριθμῶν. διὸ καὶ ὁ μὲν μαθηματικὸς
 ἀριθμεῖται μετὰ τὸ ἐν δύο, πρὸς τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἐνὶ
 ἄλλο ἐν, καὶ τὰ τρία πρὸς τοῖς δυοὶ τούτοις ἄλλο
 ἐν, καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς δὲ ὡσαύτως· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ τὸ ἐν
 δύο ἕτερα ἄνευ τοῦ ἐνὸς τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ ἡ τριάς
 35 ἄνευ τῆς δυνάδος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ἀριθμὸς).
 ἢ τὸν μὲν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὅλον ὁ πρῶτος ἐλέχθη,
 τὸν δ' ὅλον οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λέγουσι, τρίτον δὲ τὸν
 ῥηθέντα τελευταῖον. Ἐτι τούτους ἢ χωριστοὺς εἶναι
 1080 b τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων, ἢ οὐ χωριστοὺς
 ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, οὐχ οὕτως δ' ὡς τὸ πρῶτον
 ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐνυπα-
 ρχόντων ὄντα τὰ αἰσθητά· ἢ τὸν μὲν αὐτῶν εἶναι
 b τὸν δὲ μή, ἢ πάντας εἶναι. οἱ μὲν οὖν τρόποι καθ'
 οὓς ἐνδέχεται αὐτοὺς εἶναι οὗτοί εἰσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 μόνοι. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ λέγοντες τὸ ἐν ἀρχὴν
 εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν καὶ στοιχεῖον πάντων, καὶ ἐκ
 τούτου καὶ ἄλλου τινὸς εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἕκαστος
 τούτων τινὰ τῶν τρόπων εἴρηκε, πλὴν τοῦ πάσας
 τὰς μονάδας εἶναι ἀσυμβλήτους. καὶ τοῦτο συμ-
 10 βέβηκεν εὐλόγως· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἔτι ἄλλον
 τρόπον εἶναι παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους. οἱ μὲν οὖν

a i.e., Ideal or natural.

b In ch. ii. 1-3.

c The Pythagorean number-atomist view; see Vol. I. Intro. p. xvii.

METAPHYSICS, XIII. vi. 3-7

other numbers ; and the units in each number are addible, e.g. the units in the first ^a 2 are addible to one another, and those in the first 3 to one another, and so on in the case of the other numbers ; but the units in the Ideal 2 are inaddible to those in the Ideal 3 ; and similarly in the case of the other successive numbers. Hence whereas mathematical number is counted thus : after 1, 2 (which consists of another 1 added to the former) and 3 (which consists of another 1 added to these two) and the other numbers in the same way, Ideal number is counted like this : after 1, a distinct 2 not including the original 1 ; and a 3 not including the 2, and the rest of the numbers similarly. Or (d) one kind of number must be such as we first described, and another such as the mathematicians maintain, and that which we have last described must be a third kind.

units are
addible
and some
inaddible,

or (d) all
three alter-
natives may
be held,
each of a
different
number-
series.
Numbers, as
substances,
must either
exist separ-

Again, these numbers must exist either in separation from things, or not in separation, but in sensible things (not, however, in the way which we first considered,^b but in the sense that sensible things are composed of numbers which are present in them^c)—either some of them and not others, or all of them.^d These are of necessity the only ways in which the numbers can exist. Now of those who say that unity is the beginning and substance and element of all things, and that number is derived from it and something else, almost everyone has described number in one of these ways (except that no one has maintained that all units are inaddible^e) ; and this is natural enough, because there can be no other way apart from those which we have mentioned. Some

ately or as
immanent in
things.

^a i.e., either all numbers are material elements of things, or some are and others are not.

^e Cf. § 2.

1080 b

ἀμφοτέρους φασὶν εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς, τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὰς ιδέας, τὸν δὲ μαθηματικὸν παρὰ τὰς ιδέας καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ χωριστοὺς ἀμφοτέρους τῶν αἰσθητῶν· οἱ δὲ τὸν
 10 μαθηματικὸν μόνον ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων κεχωρισμένον τῶν αἰσθητῶν. Καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι δ' ἓνα, τὸν μαθηματικόν, πλὴν οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτου τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας συνεστάναι φασίν· τὸν γὰρ ὅλον οὐρανὸν κατασκευάζουσιν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν, πλὴν οὐ μοναδικῶν, ἀλλὰ
 20 τὰς μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν μέγεθος· ὅπως δὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἐν συνέστη ἔχον μέγεθος, ἀπορεῖν εἰκόασιν. Ἄλλος δέ τις τὸν πρῶτον ἀριθμὸν τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν ἓνα εἶναι, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον εἶναι. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ μήκη καὶ περὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα καὶ περὶ τὰ στερεά.
 30 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ μαθηματικά καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ιδέας· τῶν δ' ἄλλως λεγόντων οἱ μὲν τὰ μαθηματικά καὶ μαθηματικῶς λέγουσιν, ὅσοι μὴ ποιούσι τὰς ιδέας ἀριθμοὺς μηδὲ εἶναί φασιν ιδέας, οἱ δὲ τὰ μαθηματικά, οὐ μαθηματικῶς δέ· οὐ γὰρ τέμνε-
 30 σθαι οὔτε μέγεθος πᾶν εἰς μεγέθη, οὔθ' ὅποιασοῦν μονάδας δυάδα εἶναι. μοναδικοὺς δὲ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς εἶναι πάντες τιθέασι, πλὴν τῶν Πυθαγορείων, ὅσοι

* Cf. I. vi. 4.

* Cf. XII. x. 14.

* Cf. ch. viii. 9, 10, XIV. iii. 15, v. 7, and see Vol. I. Introd. p. xvii.

* Cf. § 10 *ad fin.*, ch. i. 4.

* Plato.

* i.e., the (semi-)Ideal lines, planes, etc. Cf. I. ix. 30.

* Speusippus; cf. § 7 above.

hold that both kinds of number exist, that which involves priority and posteriority being identical with the Ideas, and mathematical number being distinct from Ideas and sensible things, and both kinds being separable from sensible things^a; others hold that mathematical number alone exists,^b being the primary reality and separate from sensible things.

The Pythagoreans also believe in one kind of number—the mathematical; only they maintain that it is not separate, but that sensible substances are composed of it. For they construct the whole universe of numbers, but not of numbers consisting of abstract units; they suppose the units to be extended—but as for how the first extended unit was formed they appear to be at a loss.^c

Another thinker holds that primary or Ideal number alone exists; and some^d identify this with mathematical number.

The same applies in the case of lines, planes and solids. Some^e distinguish mathematical objects from those which “come after the Ideas”^f; and of those who treat the subject in a different manner some^g speak of the mathematical objects and in a mathematical way—viz. those who do not regard the Ideas as numbers, nor indeed hold that the Ideas exist—and others^h speak of the mathematical objects, but not in a mathematical way; for they deny that every spatial magnitude is divisible into extended magnitudes, or that any two given units make 2. But all who hold that Unity is an element and principle of existing things regard numbers as

Views actually held by
(1) Plato.

(2) Spensippus

(3) Pythagoreans.

(4) Some Platonist.
(5) Xenocrates.

Similar views about geometrical objects.

^a Xenocrates. For his belief in indivisible lines see Ritter and Preller 363. Aristotle ascribes the doctrine to Plato in I. ix. 25.

1080 b

τὸ ἐν στοιχείῳ καὶ ἀρχὴν φασιν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων·
ἐκεῖνοι δ' ἔχοντα μέγεθος, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρό-
τερον.

Ὅσαχῶς μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται λεχθῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν,
35 καὶ ὅτι πάντες εἰσὶν εἰρημένοι οἱ τρόποι, φανερὸν
ἐκ τούτων· ἔστι δὲ πάντα μὲν ἀδύνατα, μᾶλλον
δ' ἴσως θάτερα τῶν ἐτέρων.

VII. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον εἰ συμβληταὶ
1081 a αἱ μονάδες ἢ ἀσύμβλητοι, καὶ εἰ ἀσύμβλητοι,
ποτέρως ὥσπερ διείλομεν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὅποιαν-
οὖν εἶναι ὁποιοῦν μονάδα ἀσύμβλητον, ἔστι δὲ
τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δυάδι πρὸς τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τριάδι,
καὶ οὕτως δὴ ἀσυμβλήτους εἶναι τὰς ἐν ἐκάστω τῷ
6 πρῶτῳ ἀριθμῷ πρὸς ἀλλήλας. Εἰ μὲν οὖν
πᾶσαι συμβληταὶ καὶ ἀδιάφοροι αἱ μονάδες, ὁ μαθη-
ματικὸς γίγνεται ἀριθμὸς καὶ εἰς μόνος, καὶ τὰς
ιδέας οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς. ποῖος γὰρ
ἔσται ἀριθμὸς αὐτὸ ἀνθρώπος ἢ ζῶον ἢ ἄλλο
ὅτιοῦν τῶν εἰδῶν; ιδέα μὲν γὰρ μία ἐκάστου, οἷον
10 αὐτοῦ ἀνθρώπου μία, καὶ αὐτοῦ ζῶου ἄλλη μία· οἱ
δ' ὅμοιοι καὶ ἀδιάφοροι ἄπειροι, ὥστ' οὐθὲν μᾶλλον
ἢδε ἢ τριάς αὐτοάνθρωπος ἢ ὁποιοῦν. εἰ δὲ μή
εἰσιν ἀριθμοὶ αἱ ιδέαι, οὐδ' ὅλως οἷόν τε αὐτὰς εἶναι.
ἐκ τίνων γὰρ ἔσονται ἀρχῶν αἱ ιδέαι; ὁ γὰρ
15 ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός καὶ τῆς δυάδος τῆς ἀ-
ορίστου, καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα λέγονται τοῦ
ἀριθμοῦ εἶναι, τάξαι τε οὕτε προτέρας ἐνδέχεται
210

consisting of abstract units, except the Pythagoreans; and they regard number as having spatial magnitude, as has been previously stated.^a

It is clear from the foregoing account (i.) in how many ways it is possible to speak of numbers, and (ii.) that all the ways have been described. They are all impossible, but doubtless some^b are more so than others.

VII. First, then, we must inquire whether the units are addible or maddible; and if inaddible, in which of the two ways which we have distinguished.^c For it is possible either (a) that any one unit is inaddible to any other, or (b) that the units in the Ideal 2 are inaddible to those in the Ideal 3, and thus that the units in each Ideal number are inaddible to those in the other Ideal numbers.

Now if all units are addible and do not differ in kind, we get one type of number only, the mathematical, and the Ideas cannot be the numbers thus produced; for how can we regard the Idea of Man or Animal, or any other Form, as a number? There is one Idea of each kind of thing: e.g. one of Humanity and another one of Animality; but the numbers which are similar and do not differ in kind are infinitely many, so that this 3 is no more the Idea of Man than any other 3 is. But if the Ideas are not numbers, they cannot exist at all; for from what principles can the Ideas be derived? Number is derived from Unity and the indeterminate dyad, and the principles and elements are said to be the principles and elements of number, and the Ideas

Plato's view
of number
criticized

2
If all units
are addible,
the Ideas

3
cannot
exist.

^a § 8.

^b *see* the view of Xenocrates (*cf.* ch. viii. 8).

^c Ch. vi. 2, 3.

τῶν ἀριθμῶν αὐτὰς οὐθ' ὑστέρας. Εἰ δ' ἀσύμ-
 βλητοι αἱ μονάδες, καὶ οὕτως ἀσύμβλητοι ὥστε
 ἡτισοῦν ἡτινιοῦν, οὔτε τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἐνδέχεται
 εἶναι τοῦτοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ μαθηματικὸς
 20 ἐξ ἀδιαφόρων, καὶ τὰ δεικνύμενα κατ' αὐτοῦ ὥς
 ἐπὶ τοιούτου ἀρμόττει) οὔτε τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν· οὐ γὰρ
 ἔσται ἡ δυὰς πρώτη ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου
 δυάδος, ἔπειτα οἱ ἐξῆς ἀριθμοί, ὥς λέγεται δυάς,
 τριάς, τετράς—ἅμα γὰρ αἱ ἐν τῇ δυάδι τῇ
 πρώτῃ μονάδες γεννῶνται, εἴτε ὥσπερ ὁ πρῶτος
 25 εἰπὼν ἐξ ἀνίσων (ἰσασθέντων γὰρ ἐγένοντο) εἴτε
 ἄλλως—, ἐπεὶ εἰ ἔσται ἡ ἑτέρα μονὰς τῆς ἑτέρας
 προτέρα, καὶ τῆς δυάδος τῆς ἐκ τούτων ἔσται
 προτέρα· ὅταν γὰρ ἦ τι τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δ'
 ὕστερον, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων τοῦ μὲν ἔσται πρότερον
 τοῦ δ' ὕστερον. Ἔτι ἐπειδὴ ἔστι πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ
 30 τὸ ἔν, ἔπειτα τῶν ἄλλων ἔστι τι πρῶτον ἔν, δεύ-

^a Ross: *ἔπειτα* codd.

^a Since the only principles which Plato recognizes are Unity and the Dyad, which are numerical (Aristotle insists on regarding them as a kind of 1 and 2), and therefore clearly principles of number; and the Ideas can only be derived from these principles if they (the Ideas) are (a) numbers (which has been proved impossible) or (b) prior or posterior to numbers (i.e., causes or effects of numbers, which they cannot be if they are composed of a different kind of units); then the Ideas are not derived from any principle at all, and therefore do not exist.

^b The Platonists.

^c This was the orthodox Platonic view of the generation of Ideal numbers; or at least Aristotle is intending to describe the orthodox view. Plato should not have regarded the Ideal numbers as composed of units at all, and there is no real reason to suppose that he did (see Vol. I. *Introd.* pp. xxi-xxiii). But Aristotle infers from the fact that the Ideal 2 is

cannot be placed either as prior or as posterior to numbers.^a

But if the units are inaddible in the sense that 5
any one unit is inaddible to any other, the number
so composed can be neither mathematical number
(since mathematical number consists of units which
do not differ, and the facts demonstrated of it fit
in with this character) nor Ideal number. For on
this view 2 will not be the first number generated
from Unity and the indeterminate dyad, and then
the other numbers in succession, as they ^b say 2,
3, 4—because the units in the primary 2 are generated
at the same time,^c whether, as the originator of the
theory held, from unequals ^d (coming into being when
these were equalized), or otherwise—since if we regard ^e
the one unit as prior to the other,^f it will be prior also
to the 2 which is composed of them; because whenever
one thing is prior and another posterior, their com-
pound will be prior to the latter and posterior to the
former.^g

Further, since the Ideal 1 is first, and then comes 7
a particular 1 which is first of the other 1's but second (2) The units

the first number generated (and then the other Ideal numbers
in the natural order) that the units of the Ideal 2 are
generated simultaneously, and then goes on to show that
this is incompatible with the theory of inaddible units.

^a i.e., the Great-and-Small, which Aristotle wrongly under-
stands as two unequal things. It is practically certain that
Plato used the term (as he did that of "Indeterminate
Dyad") to describe indeterminate quantity. See Vol. I.
Intro. p. xxii.

^b This is a necessary implication of the theory of inaddible
units (cf. ch. vi. 1, 2).

^c So the order of generation will be: (i) Unity (ungener-
ated); (ii) first unit in 2; (iii) second unit in 2; and the
Ideal 2 will come between (ii) and (iii).

1081 a

τερον δὲ μετ' ἐκεῖνο καὶ πάλιν τρίτον, τὸ δεύτερον
 μὲν μετὰ τὸ δεύτερον, τρίτον δὲ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον
 ἔν· ὥστε πρότεραι ἂν εἴεν αἱ μονάδες ἢ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ
 ἐξ ὧν λέγονται¹. οἷον ἐν τῇ δυάδι τρίτη μονὰς ἔσται
 85 πρὶν τὰ τρία εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῇ τριάδι τετάρτη καὶ
 [γ]² πέμπτη πρὶν τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τούτους. Οὐδεὶς

1081 b

μὲν οὖν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον εἴρηκεν αὐτῶν τὰς
 μονάδας ἀσυμβλήτους, ἔστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰς ἐκεί-
 νων ἀρχὰς εὐλογον καὶ οὕτως, κατὰ μέντοι τὴν
 ἀλήθειαν ἀδύνατον. τὰς τε γὰρ μονάδας προτέρας
 καὶ ὑστέρας εἶναι εὐλογον, εἴπερ καὶ πρώτη τις
 ἔστι μονὰς καὶ ἐν πρῶτον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυάδας,
 εἴπερ καὶ δυὰς πρώτη ἔστιν· μετὰ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον
 5 εὐλογον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον δεύτερόν τι εἶναι, καὶ εἰ
 δεύτερον, τρίτον, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα ἐφεξῆς· ἅμα
 δ' ἀμφοτέρω λέγειν, μονάδα τε μετὰ τὸ ἐν πρώτην
 εἶναι καὶ δευτέραν, καὶ δυάδα πρώτην, ἀδύνατον.
 οἱ δὲ ποιοῦσι μονάδα μὲν καὶ ἐν πρῶτον, δεύτερον
 10 δὲ καὶ τρίτον οὐκέτι, καὶ δυάδα πρώτην, δευτέραν
 δὲ καὶ τρίτην οὐκέτι. Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι
 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, εἰ ἀσύμβλητοι πᾶσαι αἱ μονάδες,
 δυάδα εἶναι αὐτὴν καὶ τριάδα καὶ οὕτω τοὺς
 ἄλλους ἀριθμούς. ἂν τε γὰρ ὥσιν ἀδιάφοροι αἱ
 μονάδες ἂν τε διαφέρουσαι ἐκάστη ἐκάστης, ἀνάγκη
 ἀριθμείσθαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, οἷον τὴν
 15 δυάδα πρὸς τῷ ἐνὶ ἄλλου ἐνὸς προστεθέντος, καὶ
 τὴν τριάδα ἄλλου ἐνὸς πρὸς τοῖς δυοῖ προστεθέντος,
 καὶ τὴν τετράδα ὡσαύτως. τούτων δὲ ὄντων ἀδύ-
 νατον τὴν γένεσιν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, ὥς γεννώσιν

¹ πλέκονται A^bJ³T Alexander.² Jaeger.

after the Ideal 1, and then a third 1 which is next after the second but third after the first 1, it follows that the units will be prior to the numbers after which they are called; e.g., there will be a third unit in 2 before 3 exists, and a fourth and fifth in 3 before these numbers exist.^a

will be prior to the numbers after which they are called.

It is true that nobody has represented the units 8 of numbers as inadmissible in this way; but according to the principles held by these thinkers even this view is quite reasonable, although in actual fact it is untenable. For assuming that there is a first unit 9 or first 1,^b it is reasonable that the units should be prior and posterior; and similarly in the case of 2's, if there is a first 2. For it is reasonable and indeed necessary that after the first there should be a second; and if a second, a third; and so on with the rest in sequence. But the two statements, that there is 10 after 1 a first and a second unit, and that there is a first 2, are incompatible. These thinkers, however, recognize a first unit and first 1, but not a second and third; and they recognize a first 2, but not a second and third.

It is also evident that if all units are inadmissible, there cannot be an Ideal 2 and 3, and similarly with the other numbers; for whether the units are 11 indistinguishable or each is different in kind from every other, numbers must be produced by addition; e.g. 2 by adding 1 to another 1, and 3 by adding another 1 to the 2, and 4 similarly.^c This being 12 so, numbers cannot be generated as these thinkers

(d) The numbers cannot be generated

as the Platonists hold, for they must

be generated

^a This is a corollary to the previous argument, and depends upon an identification of "ones" (including the Ideal One or Unity) with units.

^b i.e., the Ideal One.

^c This is of course not true of the natural numbers.

1081 b

ἐκ τῆς δυάδος καὶ τοῦ ενός· μόριον γὰρ γίγνεται ἡ
 20 δυὰς τῆς τριάδος καὶ αὕτη τῆς τετράδος· τὸν αὐτὸν
 δὲ τρόπον συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐχομένων. ἀλλ'
 ἐκ τῆς δυάδος τῆς πρώτης καὶ τῆς ἀόριστου δυάδος
 ἐγένετο ἡ τετράς, δύο δυάδες παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν
 δυάδα· εἰ δὲ μή, μόριον ἔσται αὐτῇ ἡ δυὰς, ἑτέρα
 δὲ προσέσται μία δυὰς, καὶ ἡ δυὰς ἔσται ἐκ τοῦ
 25 ενός αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλου ενός. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐχ οἷόν
 τ' εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον στοιχεῖον δυάδα ἀόριστον· μονάδα
 γὰρ μίαν γεννᾷ, ἀλλ' οὐ δυάδα ὠρισμένην.

Ἔτι παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν τριάδα καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν δυάδα
 πῶς ἔσονται ἄλλαι τριάδες καὶ δυάδες; καὶ τίνα
 τρόπον ἐκ προτέρων μονάδων καὶ ὑστέρων σύγκειν-
 30 ται; πάντα γὰρ ταῦτ' (ἄτοπά)* ἔστι καὶ πλασμα-
 τώδη, καὶ ἀδύνατον εἶναι πρώτην δυάδα, εἴτ' αὐτὴν
 τριάδα. ἀνάγκη δ', ἐπεὶ περ ἔσται τὸ ἐν καὶ ἡ
 ἀόριστος δυὰς στοιχεῖα. εἰ δ' ἀδύνατα τὰ συμ-
 βαίνοντα, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι ταύτας ἀδύνατον.

Εἰ μὲν οὖν διάφοροι αἱ μονάδες ὅποιασιν ὅποιασιν
 35 οὖν, ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα συμβαίνει ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
 εἰ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν ἄλλῃ διάφοροι, αἱ δ' ἐν τῷ
 αὐτῷ ἀριθμῷ ἀδιάφοροι ἀλλήλαις μόναι, καὶ οὕτως
 1082 a οὐθὲν ἐλάττω συμβαίνει τὰ δυσχερῆ. οἷον γὰρ ἐν
 τῇ δεκάδι αὐτῇ ἔνεισι δέκα μονάδες, σύγκειται δὲ
 καὶ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἐκ δύο πεντάδων ἡ δεκάς.

¹ αὐτῇ] αὐτῇ EJ.

² Jaeger.

try to generate them, from Unity and the dyad; by successive addition because 2 becomes a part of 3,^a and 3 of 4, and the same applies to the following numbers. But 13 according to them 4 was generated from the first three of 1, 2 and the indeterminate dyad, thus consisting of two 2's apart from the Ideal 2.^b Otherwise 4 will consist of the Ideal 2 and another 2 added to it, and the Ideal 2 will consist of the Ideal 1 and another 1; and if this is so the other element cannot be the indeterminate dyad, because it produces one unit and not a definite 2.^c

Again, how can there be other 3's and 2's besides 14 the Ideal numbers 3 and 2, and in what way can they be composed of prior and posterior units? All these theories are absurd and fictitious, and there can be no primary 2 and Ideal 3. Yet there must be, if we are to regard Unity and the indeterminate dyad as elements.^d But if the consequences are impossible, 15 the principles cannot be of this nature.

If, then, any one unit differs in kind from any other, these and other similar consequences necessarily follow. If, on the other hand, while the units in different numbers are different, those which are in the same number are alone indistinguishable from one another, even so the consequences which follow are no less difficult. For example, in the Ideal number 10 there are ten units, and 10 is composed both of these and of two 5's. Now since the Ideal

General criticism of the theory.

If the units in the same number are addible, but units in different

16 numbers are inaddible, the consequences

^a i.e., 3 is produced by adding 1 to 2. ^b Cf. § 18.

^c The general argument is: Numbers are produced by addition; but this is incompatible with the belief in the indeterminate Dyad as a generative principle, because, being duplicative, it cannot produce single units.

^d i.e., if numbers are not generated by addition, there must be Ideal (or natural) numbers.

ἐπεὶ δ' οὐχ ὁ τυχὼν ἀριθμὸς αὐτῇ¹ ἢ δεκάς οὐδὲ
 σύγκειται ἐκ τῶν τυχουσῶν πεντάδων, ὥσπερ
 5 οὐδὲ μονάδων, ἀνάγκη διαφέρειν τὰς μονάδας τὰς
 ἐν τῇ δεκάδι ταύτῃ. ἂν γὰρ μὴ διαφέρωσιν, οὐδ'
 αἱ πεντάδες διοίσουσιν ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶν ἡ δεκάς· ἐπεὶ δὲ
 διαφέρουσι, καὶ αἱ μονάδες διοίσουσιν. εἰ δὲ
 διαφέρουσι, πότερον οὐκ ἐνέσονται πεντάδες ἀλλὰ
 ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐταὶ αἱ δύο, ἣ ἔσονται; εἴτε δὲ μὴ
 10 ἐνέσονται, ἄτοπον· εἴτ' ἐνέσονται, ποία ἔσται δεκάς
 ἐξ ἐκείνων; οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἑτέρα δεκάς ἐν τῇ
 δεκάδι παρ' αὐτήν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀνάγκη γε μὴ
 ἐκ τῶν τυχουσῶν δυνάδων τὴν τετράδα συγκεῖσθαι·
 ἢ γὰρ ἀόριστος δυνάς, ὥς φασι, λαβοῦσα τὴν ὠρι-
 σμένην δυνάδα δύο δυνάδας ἐποίησεν· τοῦ γὰρ λη-
 15 φθέντος ἦν δυοποιός. Ἐπεὶ τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τὰς δύο
 μονάδας τὴν δυνάδα φύσιν τινά, καὶ τὴν τριάδα
 παρὰ τὰς τρεῖς μονάδας, πῶς ἐνδέχεται; ἢ γὰρ
 μεθέξει θατέρου θατέρου,² ὥσπερ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος
 παρὰ λευκὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον (μετέχει γὰρ τούτων),
 ἢ ὅταν ἡ θατέρου θάτερον διαφορά τις, ὥσπερ ὁ
 20 ἄνθρωπος παρὰ ζῶον καὶ δίπουν. Ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ἀφ᾽ ἧ
 ἐστὶν ἓν, τὰ δὲ μίξει, τὰ δὲ θέσει· ὧν οὐδὲν ἐν-
 δέχεται ὑπάρχειν ταῖς μονάσιν ἐξ ὧν ἡ δυνάς καὶ ἡ
 τριάς· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ δύο ἄνθρωποι οὐχ ἓν τι παρὰ
 ἀμφοτέρους, οὕτως ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς μονάδας. καὶ
 25 οὐχ ὅτι ἀδιαίρετοι, διοίσουσι διὰ τοῦτο· καὶ γὰρ αἱ

¹ αβηγ E.² θατέρου Christ: θάτερον.

* I think Ross's interpretation of this passage must be right. The Ideal 10 is a unique number, and the numbers contained in it must be ideal and unique; therefore the
 218

10 is not a chance number,^a and is not composed of chance 5's, any more than of chance units, the units in this number 10 must be different; for if they are not different, the 5's of which the 10 is composed will not be different; but since these are different, the units must be different too. Now if the units are different, will there or will there not be other 5's in this 10, and not only the two? If there are not, the thing is absurd^b; whereas if there are, what sort of 10 will be composed of them? for there is no other 10 in 10 besides the 10 itself.

Again, it must also be true that 4 is not composed of chance 2's. For according to them the indeterminate dyad, receiving the determinate dyad, made two dyads; for it was capable of duplicating that which it received.^c

Again, how is it possible that 2 can be a definite entity existing besides the two units, and 3 besides the three units? Either by participation of the one in the other, as "white man" exists besides "white" and "man," because it partakes of these concepts; or when the one is a differentia of the other, as "man" exists besides "animal" and "two-footed."

Again, some things are one by contact, others by mixture, and others by position; but none of these alternatives can possibly apply to the units of which 2 and 3 consist. Just as two men do not constitute any one thing distinct from both of them, so it must be with the units. The fact that the units are indivisible will make no difference; because points two 5's must be specifically different, and so must their units—which contradicts the view under discussion.

^b *i.e.*, it is only reasonable to suppose that other 5's might be made up out of different combinations of the units.

^c *Cf.* Vol. I. *Introd.* pp. xxii f.

1082 a

στιγμαὶ ἀδιαίρετοι, ἀλλ' ὅμως παρὰ τὰς δύο οὐθὲν
 ἕτερον ἢ δυὰς αὐτῶν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτο δεῖ
 λανθάνειν, ὅτι συμβαίνει προτέρας καὶ ὑστέρας
 εἶναι δυνάδας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀριθμούς.
 αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τετράδι δυνάδες ἔστωσαν ἀλλήλαις
 30 ἅμα· ἀλλ' αὐταὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀκτάδι πρότεραί εἰσι,
 καὶ ἐγέννησαν, ὥσπερ ἡ δυὰς ταύτας, αὐταὶ τὰς
 τετράδας τὰς ἐν τῇ ὀκτάδι αὐτῇ. ὥστε εἰ καὶ ἡ
 πρώτη δυὰς ἰδέα, καὶ αὐταὶ ἰδέαι τινὲς ἔσονται.
 ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μονάδων· αἱ γὰρ ἐν
 τῇ δυάδι τῇ πρώτῃ μονάδες γεννώσι τὰς τέτταρας
 40 τὰς ἐν τῇ τετράδι, ὥστε πᾶσαι αἱ μονάδες ἰδέαι
 γίνονται καὶ συγκείμεται ἰδέαι ἐξ ἰδεῶν· ὥστε
 δῆλον ὅτι κακεῖνα, ὧν ἰδέαι αὐταὶ τυγχάνουσιν
 1082 b οὔσαι, συγκείμενα ἔσται, ὅλον εἰ τὰ ζῶα φαίη τις
 συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ ζώων, εἰ τούτων ἰδέαι εἰσίν. Ὅλως
 δὲ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰς μονάδας διαφόρους ὅπως οὖν
 ἄτοπον καὶ πλασματώδες (λέγω δὲ πλασματώδες
 τὸ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν βεβιασμένον)· οὔτε γὰρ κατὰ τὸ
 5 ποσὸν οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ὀρώμεν διαφέρουσιν
 μονάδα μονάδος, ἀνάγκη τε ἡ ἴσον ἢ ἄνισον εἶναι
 ἀριθμόν, πάντα μὲν ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὸν μοναδικόν·
 ὥστε εἰ μήτε πλείων μήτ' ἐλάττων, ἴσος· τὰ δὲ ἴσα
 καὶ ὅλως ἀδιάφορα ταῦτά ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἐν τοῖς
 ἀριθμοῖς. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδ' αἱ ἐν αὐτῇ¹ τῇ δεκάδι
 10 δυνάδες ἀδιάφοροι ἔσονται ἴσαι οὔσαι· τίνα γὰρ
 αἰτίαν ἔξει λέγειν ὁ φάσκων ἀδιαφόρους εἶναι;
 Ἐτι εἰ ἅπαντα μονὰς καὶ μονὰς ἄλλη δύο, ἢ [δ']² ἐκ

¹ Alexander (?), Schwegler: ταύτην.² om. A^b Alexander (?).

are indivisible also, but nevertheless a pair of points is not anything distinct from the two single points.

Moreover we must not fail to realize this: that on this theory it follows that 2's are prior and posterior, and the other numbers similarly. Let it ²² be granted that the 2's in 4 are contemporaneous; yet they are prior to those in 8, and just as the (determinate) 2 produced the 2's in 4, so ^a they produced the 4's in 8. Hence if the original 2 is an Idea, these 2's will also be Ideas of a sort. And the same ²³ argument applies to the units, because the units in the original 2 produce the four units in 4; and so all the units become Ideas, and an Idea will be composed of Ideas. Hence clearly those things also of which these things are Ideas will be composite; *e.g.*, one might say that animals are composed of animals, if there are Ideas of animals.

In general, to regard units as different in any way ²⁴ whatsoever is absurd and fictitious (by "fictitious" I mean "dragged in to support a hypothesis"). For we can see that one unit differs from another neither in quantity nor in quality; and a number must be either equal or unequal—this applies to all numbers, but especially to numbers consisting of abstract units. Thus if a number is neither more nor less, it is equal; ²⁵ and things which are equal and entirely without difference we assume, in the sphere of number, to be identical. Otherwise even the 2's in the Ideal 10 will be different, although they are equal; for if anyone maintains that they are not different, what reason will he be able to allege?

Again, if every unit plus another unit makes 2, a ²⁶

^a In each case the other factor is the indeterminate dyad (*cf.* § 18).

1082 ^b

τῆς δυάδος αὐτῆς μονὰς καὶ ἡ ἐκ τῆς τριάδος αὐτῆς δυὰς ἔσται ἐκ διαφερουσῶν τε, καὶ πότερον προτέρα τῆς τριάδος ἢ ὑστέρα; μάλλον γὰρ ἔοικε
 15 προτέραν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἅμα τῇ τριάδι, ἡ δ' ἅμα τῇ δυάδι τῶν μονάδων. καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὅλως ἐν καὶ ἐν, καὶ ἐὰν ἡ ἴσα ἢ ἄνισα, δύο εἶναι, οἷον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἵππον· οἱ δ' οὕτως λέγοντες οὐδὲ τὰς μονάδας.

20 Εἴτε δὲ μὴ ἔστι πλείων ἀριθμὸς ὁ τῆς τριάδος αὐτῆς ἢ ὁ τῆς δυάδος, θαυμαστόν· εἴτε ἔστι πλείων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἴσος ἔνεστι τῇ δυάδι, ὥστε οὗτος ἀδιάφορος αὐτῇ τῇ δυάδι. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, εἰ πρῶτός τις ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς καὶ δεύτερος· οὐδὲ ἔσονται αἱ ἰδέαι ἀριθμοί. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ
 25 ὁρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ διαφόρους τὰς μονάδας ἀξιούν-
 τες εἶναι, εἴπερ ἰδέαι ἔσονται, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρό-
 τερον· ἐν γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, αἱ δὲ μονάδες εἰ ἀδιάφοροι, καὶ αἱ δυάδες καὶ αἱ τριάδες ἔσονται ἀδιάφοροι. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἀριθμεῖσθαι οὕτως, ἐν δύο, μὴ προσ-
 λαμβανομένου πρὸς τῷ ὑπάρχοντι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς
 30 λέγειν· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ γένεσις ἔσται ἐκ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος, οὔτ' ἰδέαν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι· ἐνυπάρξει γὰρ ἐτέρα ἰδέα ἐν ἐτέρᾳ, καὶ πάντα τὰ εἶδη ἐνὸς μέρη. διὸ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὁρθῶς λέγουσιν, ὅλως δ' οὐκ ὁρθῶς· πολλὰ γὰρ ἀναιροῦσιν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γ'
 35 αὐτὸ ἔχειν τινὰ φήσουσιν ἀπορίαν, πότερον, ὅταν ἀριθμῶμεν καὶ εἰπῶμεν ἐν δύο τρία, προσλαμβά-

^a Which conflicts with the view under discussion.

^b The implication seems to be, as Ross says, that the

1082 b

νοντες ἀριθμοῦμεν ἢ κατὰ μερίδας. ποιοῦμεν δὲ ἀμφοτέρως· διὸ γελοῖον ταύτην εἰς τηλικαύτην τῆς οὐσίας ἀνάγειν διαφοράν.

1082 a

VIII. Πάντων δὲ πρῶτον καλῶς ἔχει διορίσασθαι τίς ἀριθμοῦ διαφορά, καὶ μονάδος, εἰ ἔστιν. ἀνάγκη δὴ ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν διαφέρειν· τούτων δ' οὐδέτερον φαίνεται ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχον. ἀλλ' ἢ ἀριθμός, κατὰ τὸ ποσόν. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ αἱ μονάδες τῷ ποσῷ διέφερον, καὶ ἀριθμὸς ἀριθμοῦ διέφερεν ὁ ἴσος τῷ πλήθει τῶν μονάδων. ἔτι πότερον αἱ πρῶται μείζους ἢ ἐλάττους, καὶ αἱ ὕστερον ἐπιδιδόασιν ἢ τοῦναντίον; πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἄλογα. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν διαφέρειν ἐνδέχεται. οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐταῖς οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν πάθος· ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς φασὶν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ποιὸν τοῦ ποσοῦ. ἔτι οὗτ' ἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς τοῦτ' αὐταῖς γένοιτο οὗτ' ἂν ἀπὸ τῆς δυάδος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐ ποιόν, ἡ δὲ ποσοποιόν¹. τοῦ γὰρ πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα εἶναι αἰτία αὕτη² ἢ φύσις. εἰ δ' ἄρα ἔχει πῶς ἄλλως, λεκτέον ἐν ἀρχῇ μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ διοριστέον περὶ μονάδος διαφορᾶς, μάλιστα μὲν καὶ διότι ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν· εἰ δὲ μή, τίνι λέγουσιν.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ αἱ ἰδέαι, οὔτε συμβλητὰς τὰς μονάδας ἀπάσας ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, φανερόν, οὔτε ἀσυμβλήτους ἀλλήλαις οὐδέτερον τῶν

¹ ποσοποιόν E³ Syrianus: ποσὸν ποιόν.

² αὐτῆς E.J.

^a This is Apelt's interpretation of κατὰ μερίδας. For this sense of the word he quotes Plutarch, *Moralia* 644 c. The meaning then is: If you count by addition, you regard number as exhibited only in concrete instances; if you treat each number as a "distinct portion" (i.e., generated

by addition or by enumerating distinct portions." But we do both; and therefore it is ridiculous to refer this point to so great a difference in essence.

VIII. First of all it would be well to define the differentia of a number; and of a unit, if it has a differentia. Now units must differ either in quantity or in quality; and clearly neither of these alternatives can be true. "But units may differ, as number does, in quantity." But if units also differed in quantity, number would differ from number, although equal in number of units. Again, are the first units greater or smaller, and do the later units increase in size, or the opposite? All these suggestions are absurd. Nor can units differ in quality; for no modification can ever be applicable to them, because these thinkers hold that even in numbers quality is a later attribute than quantity.^b Further, the units cannot derive quality either from unity or from the dyad; because unity has no quality, and the dyad produces quantity, because *its nature causes things to be many*. If, then, the units differ in some other way, they should most certainly state this at the outset, and explain, if possible, with regard to the differentia of the unit, why it must exist; or failing this, what differentia they mean.

How can units differ?

They cannot differ in quantity,

or in quality.

Clearly, then, if the Ideas are numbers, the units cannot all be addible, nor can they all be inaddible

separately), you admit another kind of number besides the mathematical. Aristotle says that number can be regarded in both ways.

^b Numbers have quality as being prime or composite, "plane" or "solid" (i.e., products of two or three factors); but these qualities are clearly incidental to quantity. (Cf. V. xiv, 2.

1083 a

τρόπων. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὡς ἕτεροὶ τινες λέγουσι
περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν λέγεται καλῶς· εἰσὶ δ' οὗτοι
ὅσοι ἰδέας μὲν οὐκ οἶονται εἶναι οὔτε ἀπλῶς οὔτε
ὡς ἀριθμούς τινας οὔσας, τὰ δὲ μαθηματικὰ εἶναι
καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς πρώτους τῶν ὄντων, καὶ ἀρχὴν
²⁰ αὐτῶν εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν. ἀτοπον γὰρ τὸ ἓν μὲν
εἶναί τι πρῶτον τῶν ἐνῶν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνοί φασι,
δυσάδα δὲ τῶν δυσάδων μὴ, μηδὲ τριάδα τῶν
τριάδων· τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ λόγου πάντα ἐστίν. εἰ
μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχει τὰ περὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ θήσκει
τις εἶναι τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἓν
ἀρχή. ἀνάγκη γὰρ διαφέρειν τὸ ἓν τὸ τοιοῦτο τῶν
³⁰ ἄλλων μονάδων· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ δυσάδα τινὰ
πρώτην τῶν δυσάδων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
ἀριθμούς τοὺς ἐφεξῆς. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἓν ἀρχή,
ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ὥσπερ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν ἔχειν τὰ
περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, καὶ εἶναι δυσάδα¹ πρώτην καὶ
τριάδα, καὶ οὐ συμβλητοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς
⁴⁰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους. ἂν δ' αὖ πάλιν τις τιθῇ ταῦτα,
εἴρηται ὅτι ἀδύνατα πολλὰ συμβαίνει. ἀλλὰ μὴν
ἀνάγκη γε ἢ οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἔχειν, ὥστ' εἰ
1083 b μηδετέρως, οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν
χωριστόν.

Φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ ὅτι χεῖριστα
λέγεται ὁ τρίτος τρόπος, τὸ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν
ἀριθμὸν τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸν μαθηματικόν.
ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἰς μίαν δόξαν συμβαίνειν δύο ἀμαρ-
⁵ τίας· οὔτε γὰρ μαθηματικὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐνδέχεται
τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ἰδίας ὑποθέσεις
ὑποθέμενον ἀνάγκη μηκύνειν· ὅσα τε τοῖς ὡς εἶδη

¹ δυσάδα J τινὰ δυσάδα E: τὴν δυσάδα J.

^a Cf. ch. i. 4.

METAPHYSICS, XIII. VIII. 4-8

in either sense. Nor again is the theory sound which certain other thinkers^a hold concerning numbers. These are they who do not believe in Ideas, either absolutely or as being a kind of numbers, but believe that the objects of mathematics exist, and that the numbers are the first of existing things, and that their principle is Unity itself. For it is absurd that if, as they say, there is a 1 which is first of the 1's,^b there should not be a 2 first of the 2's, nor a 3 of the 3's; for the same principle applies to all cases. Now if this is the truth with regard to number, and we posit only mathematical number as existing, Unity is not a principle. For the Unity which is of this nature must differ from the other units; and if so, then there must be some 2 which is first of the 2's; and similarly with the other numbers in succession. But if Unity is a principle, then the truth about numbers must rather be as Plato used to maintain; there must be a first 2 and first 3, and the numbers cannot be addible to each other. But then again, if we assume this, many impossibilities result, as has been already stated.^c Moreover, the truth must lie one way or the other; so that if neither view is sound, number cannot have a separate abstract existence.

From these considerations it is also clear that the third alternative^d—that Ideal number and mathematical number are the same—is the worst; for two errors have to be combined to make one theory. (i.) Mathematical number cannot be of this nature, but the propounder of this view has to spin it out by making peculiar assumptions; (ii.) his theory must

^a i.e., Spensippus recognized unity or "the One" as a formal principle, but admitted no other ideal numbers. Aristotle argues that this is inconsistent.

^c Ch. vii. 1-viii. 3.

^d Cf. ch. vi. 7.

Criticism of
Spensippus's
view.

Xenocrates' view is the worst.

1083 b

τὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγουσι συμβαίνει, καὶ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν. Ὁ δὲ τῶν Πυθαγορείων τρόπος τῇ μὲν ἐλάττους ἔχει δυσχερείας τῶν πρότερον εἰρημένων, τῇ δὲ ἰδίας ἐτέρας. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ χωριστὸν ποιεῖν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀφαιρεῖται πολλὰ τῶν ἀδυνάτων· τὸ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐξ ἀριθμῶν εἶναι συγκείμενα, καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦτον εἶναι μαθηματικόν, ἀδυνάτον ἐστίν. οὔτε γὰρ ἄτομα μεγέθη λέγειν ἀληθές, εἰ θ' ὅτι μάλιστα τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐχ αἱ γε μονάδες μέγεθος ἔχουσιν· μέγεθος δ' ἐξ ἀδιαιρέτων συγκείσθαι πῶς δυνατόν; ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γ' ἀριθμητικὸς ἀριθμὸς μοναδικὸς ἐστίν. ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰ ὄντα λέγουσιν· τὰ γοῦν θεωρήματα προσάπτουσι τοῖς σώμασιν ὥς ἐξ ἐκείνων ὄντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν. Εἰ τοῦντο ἀνάγκη μὲν, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸς τῶν ὄντων τι καθ' αὐτό, τούτων εἶναι τινα τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων, οὐθένα δὲ τούτων ἐνδέχεται, φανερόν ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀριθμοῦ τις τοιαύτη φύσις οἷαν κατασκευάζουσιν οἱ χωριστὸν ποιοῦντες αὐτόν. Ἐτι πρότερον ἐκάστη μονὰς ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ ἰσασθέντων ἐστίν, ἢ ἡ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ μικροῦ ἢ δ' ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου; εἰ μὲν δὴ οὕτως, οὔτε ἐκ πάντων τῶν στοιχείων ἕκαστον, οὔτε ἀδιάφοροι αἱ μονάδες· ἐν τῇ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέγα ἐν τῇ δὲ τὸ μικρὸν ὑπάρχει, ἐναντίον τῇ φύσει ὄν. ἔτι αἱ ἐν τῇ τριάδι αὐτῇ πῶς; μία γὰρ περιττή. ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἴσως αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ποιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ περιττῷ μέσον. εἰ δ'

* See Vol. I. Introd. p. xvii.

† This is proved in *De Gen. et Corr.* 315 b 24-317 a 17.

‡ Cf. ch. vii. 5 n. Aristotle is obviously referring to the two units in the Ideal 2.

admit all the difficulties which confront those who speak of Ideal number.

The Pythagorean view in one way contains fewer ⁹ difficulties than the view described above, but in another way it contains further difficulties peculiar to itself. By not regarding number as separable, it disposes of many of the impossibilities; but that bodies should be composed of numbers, and that these numbers should be mathematical, is impossible.^a For (a) it is not true to speak of indivisible magnitudes ¹⁰ ^b; (b) assuming that this view is perfectly true, still units at any rate have no magnitude; and how can a magnitude be composed of indivisible parts? Moreover arithmetical number consists of abstract units. But the Pythagoreans identify number with existing things; at least they apply mathematical propositions to bodies as though they consisted of those numbers.^a

Thus if number, if it is a self-subsistent reality, ¹¹ must be regarded in one of the ways described above, and if it cannot be regarded in any of these ways, clearly number has no such nature as is invented for it by those who treat it as separable.

Again, does each unit come from the Great and ¹² the Small, when they are equalized^a; or does one come from the Small and another from the Great? If the latter, each thing is not composed of all the elements, nor are the units undifferentiated; for one contains the Great, and the other the Small, which is by nature contrary to the Great. Again, what of the ¹³ units in the Ideal 3? because there is one over. But no doubt it is for this reason that in an odd number they make the Ideal One the middle unit.^d If on

The
Pythagorean
view.

It follows
that number
cannot be
a self-
subsistent
reality.

General
objections.
(1) How
are such
numbers
generated?

^a Cf. Diels, *Vorsokratiker* 270. 18.

1083 b

ἐκατέρα τῶν μονάδων ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἐστὶν ἰσασιέν-
των, ἢ δυὰς πῶς ἔσται μία τις οὐσα φύσις ἐκ τοῦ
μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ; ἢ τί διοίσει τῆς μονάδος;
ἔτι προτέρα ἢ μονὰς τῆς δυάδος· ἀναιρουμένης
γὰρ ἀναιρεῖται ἡ δυάς. ἰδέαν οὖν ἰδέας ἀναγκαῖον
1. αὐτὴν εἶναι, προτέραν γ' οὐσαν ἰδέας, καὶ γεγονέναι
προτέραν. ἐκ τίνος οὖν¹; ἢ γὰρ ἀόριστος δυὰς
δυοποιὸς ἦν. "Ἐτι ἀνάγκη ᾗτοι ἄπειρον τὸν ἀρι-
θμὸν εἶναι ἢ πεπερασμένον· χωριστὸν γὰρ ποιούσι
1084 a τὸν ἀριθμὸν, ὥστε οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ οὐχὶ τούτων
θάτερον ὑπάρχειν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἄπειρον οὐκ
ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον· οὔτε γὰρ περιττός ὁ ἄπειρος
ἐστὶν οὔτε ἄρτιος, ἢ δὲ γένεσις τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἢ
περιττοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἢ ἀρτίου ἀεὶ ἐστὶν, ὥδι μὲν τοῦ
1. ἐνὸς εἰς τὸν ἄρτιον πίπτοντος περιττός, ὥδι δὲ
τῆς μὲν δυάδος ἐμπιπτούσης ὁ ἀφ' ἐνὸς διπλα-
σιαζόμενος, ὥδι δὲ τῶν περιττῶν ὁ ἄλλος ἄρτιος.
"Ἐτι εἰ πᾶσα ἰδέα τινός, οἱ δὲ ἀριθμοὶ ἰδέαι, καὶ ὁ
ἄπειρος ἔσται ἰδέα τινός, ἢ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ ἄλλου
τινός. καίτοι οὔτε κατὰ τὴν θέσιν ἐνδέχεται οὔτε
10 κατὰ λόγον, τάττουσί γ'² οὕτω τὰς ἰδέας. Εἰ
δὲ πεπερασμένος, μέχρι πόσου; τοῦτο γὰρ δεῖ
λέγεσθαι οὐ μόνον ὅτι, ἀλλὰ καὶ διότι. ἀλλὰ μὴν
εἰ μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος ὁ ἀριθμός, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασιν,

¹ τίνος οὖν A^b Alexander Syrianus: τινος οὖν (τινοσούν) EJ.

² γ' Schwegler: δ'.

^a Ch. vii. 18.

^b The point seems to be that if number is self-subsistent it must be *actually* finite or infinite. Aristotle himself holds that number is infinite only potentially; i.e., however high you count, you can always count higher.

^c i.e., as implying an actual infinite.

the other hand each of the units comes from both Great and Small, when they are equalized, how can the Ideal 2 be a single entity composed of the Great and Small? How will it differ from one of its units? Again, the unit is prior to the 2; because when the unit disappears the 2 disappears. Therefore the unit 14 must be the Idea of an Idea, since it is prior to an Idea, and must have been generated before it. From what, then? for the indeterminate dyad, as we have seen,^a causes duality.

Again, number must be either infinite or finite (for they make number separable, so that one of these alternatives must be true).^b Now it is obvious 15 that it cannot be infinite, because infinite number is neither odd nor even, and numbers are always generated either from odd or from even number. By one process, when 1 is added to an even number, we get an odd number; by another, when 1 is multiplied by 2, we get ascending powers of 2; and by another, when powers of 2 are multiplied by odd numbers, we get the remaining even numbers.

Again, if every Idea is an Idea of something, and 16 the numbers are Ideas, infinite number will also be an Idea of something, either sensible or otherwise. This, however, is impossible, both logically ^c and on their own assumption,^d since they regard the Ideas as they do.

If, on the other hand, number is finite, what is its limit? In reply to this we must not only assert the fact, but give the reason. Now if number only goes 17 up to 10, as some hold,^e in the first place the Forms

^a i.e., as inconsistent with the conception of an Idea as a determining principle.

^b Cf. XII. VIII. 2. The Platonists derived this view from the Pythagoreans; see Vol. I. Introd. p. xvi.

1084 a

πρῶτον μὲν ταχὺ ἐπιλείψει τὰ εἶδη· οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἡ τριάς αὐτοάνθρωπος, τίς ἔσται ἀριθμὸς αὐτοῦ-
 15 ἵππος; αὐτὸ γὰρ ἕκαστος ἀριθμὸς μέχρι δεκάδος· ἀνάγκη δὴ τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἀριθμῶν τινὰ¹ εἶναι—οὐσίαι γὰρ καὶ ιδέαι οὗτοι—ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐκλείψει· τὰ τοῦ ζώου γὰρ εἶδη ὑπερέξει· ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι εἰ οὕτως ἡ τριάς αὐτοάνθρωπος, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι
 21 τριάδες· ὅμοιαι γὰρ αἱ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, ὥστ' ἄπειροι ἔσονται ἄνθρωποι, εἰ μὲν ιδέα ἐκάστη τριάς, αὐτὸ ἕκαστος² ἄνθρωπος, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωποι γε. καὶ εἰ μέρος ὁ ἐλάττων τοῦ μείζονος, ὁ ἐκ τῶν συμβλητῶν μονάδων τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀριθμῷ, εἰ δὴ³ ἡ τετράς αὐτῇ⁴ ιδέα τινός ἐστιν, οἷον ἵππου ἢ λευκοῦ, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται μέρος
 25 ἵππου, εἰ δυάς ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς μὲν δεκάδος εἶναι ιδέαν, ἐνδεκάδος δὲ μή, μηδὲ τῶν ἐχομένων ἀριθμῶν. *Ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γίνεταί ἕνια καὶ ὧν εἶδη οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥστε διὰ τί οὐ κακέινων εἶδη ἔστιν; οὐκ ἄρα αἷτια τὰ εἶδη ἐστίν.

*Ἐπὶ ἄτοπον εἰ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ μέχρι τῆς δε-
 30 κάδος μᾶλλον τι ὄν καὶ εἶδος αὐτῆς τῆς δεκάδος, καίτοι τοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι γενεαίς ὡς ἐνός, τῆς δ' ἔστιν. πειρῶνται δ' ὡς τοῦ μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος τελείου ὄντος ἀριθμοῦ. γενῶσι γοῦν τὰ ἐπόμενα, οἷον τὸ κενόν, ἀναλογίαν, τὸ περιττόν, τὰ ἄλλα τὰ

¹ τινὰ Alexander, Bonitz: τινάς.² αὐτὸ ἕκαστος J Bessarion Alexander: αὐτοέκαστος.³ δὴ Bonitz: δ'.⁴ αὐτῇ T Bessarion Alexander: αὐτῇ.

* Robin is probably right in taking this to mean that the 3 which is in the ideal 4 is like the 3 which is in the 4 which
 232

will soon run short. For example, if 3 is the Idea of ^{causes} Man, what number will be the Idea of Horse? ^{quarries are} ^{absurd} Each number up to 10 is an Idea; the Idea of Horse, then, must be one of the numbers in this series, for they are substances or Ideas. But the fact remains 18 that they will run short, because the different types of animals will outnumber them. At the same time it is clear that if in this way the Ideal 3 is the Idea of Man, so will the other 3's be also (for the 3's in the same number "are similar), so that there will be an infinite number of men; and if each 3 is an Idea, each man will be an Idea of Man; or if not, they will still be men. And if the smaller number is 19 part of the greater, when it is composed of the addible units contained in the same number, then if the Ideal 4 is the Idea of something, e.g. "horse" or "white," then "man" will be part of "horse," if "man" is 2. It is absurd also that there should be an Idea of 10 and not of 11, nor of the following numbers.

Again, some things exist and come into being of 20 which there are no Forms^b; why, then, are there not Forms of these too? It follows that the Forms are not the causes of things.

Again, it is absurd that number up to 10 should be more really existent, and a Form, than 10 itself; although the former is not generated as a unity, whereas the latter is. However, they try to make out that the series up to 10 is a complete number; at least they generate the derivatives, e.g. the void, 21 proportion, the odd, etc., from within the decad.

is in a higher ideal number, and so on (*La Théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres d'après Aristote*, p. 352).

^b Cf. ch. iv. 7, 8; I. ix. 2, 3.

1084 b

ἄλλον, τὸ μὲν κατὰ λόγον τὸ δὲ κατὰ χρόνον.
 ποτέρως οὖν τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ; ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, καὶ
 ἡ ὀρθὴ τῆς ὀξείας καὶ αὕτη ἐκείνης δοκεῖ προτέρα
 εἶναι, καὶ ἑκατέρα μία. ἀμφοτέρως δὴ ποιοῦσι τὸ
 ἐν ἀρχῇ. ἔστι δὲ ἀδύνατον τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς εἶδος
 20 καὶ ἡ οὐσία, τὸ δ' ὡς μέρος καὶ ὡς ὕλη. ἔστι γάρ
 πως ἐν ἑκάτερον, τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ δυνάμει (εἴ γε ὁ
 ἀριθμὸς ἐν τι καὶ μὴ ὡς σωρός, ἀλλ' ἕτερος ἐξ
 ἑτέρων μονάδων, ὥσπερ φασίν), ἐντελεχεία δ' οὐκ
 ἔστι μονὰς ἑκατέρα. αἴτιον δὲ τῆς συμβαινούσης
 ἀμαρτίας ὅτι ἅμα ἐκ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐβλήθησαν
 25 καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων τῶν καθόλου, ὥστ' ἐξ ἐκείνων
 μὲν ὡς στιγμήν τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐβηκαν· ἡ
 γὰρ μονὰς στιγμή ἄθετός ἐστιν. καθάπερ οὖν
 καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἐκ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τὰ ὄντα συν-
 ἐτίθεσαν καὶ οὗτοι. ὥστε γίνεται ἡ μονὰς ὕλη τῶν
 ἀριθμῶν καὶ ἅμα προτέρα τῆς δυνάδος, πάλιν δὲ
 30 ὑστέρα ὡς ὅλου τινός καὶ ἐνός καὶ εἶδους τῆς
 δυνάδος οὔσης. διὰ δὲ τὸ καθόλου ζητεῖν τὸ κατ-
 ηγορούμενον ἐν καὶ οὕτως ὡς μέρος ἔλεγον· ταῦτα
 δὲ ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν
 αὐτὸ δεῖ ἴμόνον ἄθετον¹ εἶναι (οὐθενὶ γὰρ διαφέρει

¹ ἔτι *rec.*² *μόνον ἄθετον*] *μόνον ἀσύνθετον* Bywater, *μοναδιαὸν* Ross.

² Aristotle takes the number 2 as an example, but the principle is of course universal. In a sense both number and unit are one; but if the number exists as an actual unity, the unit can only exist potentially.

³ Perhaps the Atomists; but cf. I. viii. 3, 4.

⁴ If the text is sound (and no convincing emendation has been suggested), it seems best to understand *ἄθετον* in a rather wider sense than the semi-technical one put forward by Ross. "Without position" = not localized, *i.e.* abstract. Unity as a principle has no concrete instance.

Yes, but they are prior in a different sense ; the one in formula and the other in time. In which sense, then, is the One a first principle ? for, as we have just said, both the right angle seems to be prior to the acute angle, and the latter prior to the former ; and each of them is one. Accordingly the Platonists 26 make the One a first principle in both senses. But this is impossible ; for in one sense it is the One *qua* form or essence, and in the other the One *qua* part or matter, that is primary. There is a sense in which both number and unit are one ; they are so in truth potentially—that is, if a number is not an aggregate but a unity consisting of units distinct from those of other numbers, as the Platonists hold—but each of the two ^a units is not one in com- 27 plete reality. The cause of the error which befell the Platonists was that they were pursuing their inquiry from two points of view—that of mathematics and that of general definition—at the same time. Hence as a result of the former they conceived of the One or first principle as a point, for the unit is a point without position. (Thus they too, just like certain others, represented existing things as com- 28 posed of that which is smallest.)^b We get, then, that the unit is the material element of numbers, and at the same time is prior to the number 2 ; and again we get that it is posterior to 2 regarded as a whole or unity or form. On the other hand, through looking for the universal, they were led to speak of the unity predicated of a given number as a part in the formal sense also. But these two characteristics cannot belong simultaneously to the same thing.

And if Unity itself must only be without position ^c 29 (for it differs only in that it is a principle) and 2 is

1084 b

ἢ ὅτι ἀρχή), καὶ ἡ μὲν δυάς διαιρετὴ ἡ δὲ μονάς
 οὐ, ὁμοιοτέρα ἂν εἴη τῷ ἐνὶ αὐτῷ ἢ μονάς· εἰ
 δ' ἡ μονάς, κάκεινο τῇ μονάδι ἢ τῇ δυάδι· ὥστε
 προτέρα ἂν εἴη ἑκατέρα ἢ μονάς τῆς δυάδος. οὐ
 1085 a φασὶ δέ· γεννῶσι γοῦν τὴν δυάδα πρῶτον. "Ἐτι
 εἰ ἔστιν ἡ δυάς ἐν τι αὐτῇ καὶ ἡ τριάς αὐτῇ, ἄμφω
 δυάς. ἐκ τίνος οὖν αὕτη ἡ δυάς;

IX. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐπεὶ ἀφή μὲν οὐκ
 ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, τὸ δ' ἐφέξεῃς, ὅσων μὴ ἔστι
 .. μεταξὺ μονάδων, οἷον τῶν ἐν τῇ δυάδι ἢ τῇ τριάδι,
 πότερον ἐφέξεῃς τῷ ἐνὶ αὐτῷ ἢ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ἡ
 δυάς προτέρα τῶν ἐφέξεῃς ἢ τῶν μονάδων ὀποτερα-
 οῦν.¹

Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ὕστερον γενῶν
 τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ συμβαίνει τὰ δυσχερῆ, γραμμῆς τε
 καὶ ἐπιπέδου καὶ σώματος. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν
 10 εἰδῶν τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ ποιοῦσιν, οἷον ἐκ
 μακροῦ μὲν καὶ βραχέος τὰ μήκη, πλατέος δὲ καὶ
 στενοῦ τὰ ἐπίπεδα, ἐκ βαθέος δὲ καὶ ταπεινοῦ τοὺς
 ὄγκους· ταῦτα δὲ ἔστιν εἶδη τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ
 μικροῦ. τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχὴν ἄλλοι ἄλλως
 τιθέασιν τῶν τοιούτων. καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὲ μυρία
 15 φαίνεται τὰ τε ἀδύνατα καὶ τὰ πλασματώδη καὶ
 τὰ ὑπεναντία πᾶσι τοῖς εὐλόγοις. ἀπολελυμένα τε
 γὰρ ἀλλήλων συμβαίνει, εἰ μὴ συνακολουθοῦσι καὶ
 αἱ ἀρχαί, ὥστε εἶναι τὸ πλατὺ καὶ στενὸν καὶ
 μακρὸν καὶ βραχύ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται τὸ ἐπίπεδον
 γραμμῇ καὶ τὸ στερεὸν ἐπίπεδον. ἔτι δὲ γωνίαι
 20 καὶ σχήματα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἀποδοθήσεται;

¹ ὀποτεροῦν Bessarion, Aldine, Bekker.

divisible whereas the unit is not, the unit will be more nearly akin to Unity itself; and if this is so, Unity itself will also be more nearly akin to the unit than to 2. Hence each of the units in 2 will be prior to 2. But this they deny; at least they make out that 2 is generated first.^a

Further, if 2 itself and 3 itself are each one thing, both together make 2. From what, then, does this 2 come?

IX. Since there is no contact in numbers, but units which have nothing between them—*e.g.* those in 2 or 3—are successive, the question might be raised whether or not they are successive to Unity itself, and whether of the numbers which succeed it 2 or one of the units in 2 is prior.^b

We find similar difficulties in the case of the genera 2 posterior to number^c—the line, plane and solid. Some derive these from the species of the Great and Small; viz. lines from the Long and Short, planes from the Broad and Narrow, and solids from the Deep and Shallow. These are species of the Great and Small. As for the geometrical first principle 3 which corresponds to the arithmetical One, different Platonists propound different views.^d In these too we can see innumerable impossibilities, fictions and contradictions of all reasonable probability. For (a) we get that the geometrical forms are unconnected with each other, unless their principles also are so associated that the Broad and Narrow is also Long and Short; and if this is so, the plane will be a line and the solid a plane. Moreover, how can angles 4 and figures, etc., be explained? And (b) the same

difficulties about the generation of geometrical objects. Some Platonists

derive them from species of the Great and Small as their material principle; this is clearly illogical

^a Cf. ch. vii. 5. ^b Cf. *ibid.* 5-7. ^c Cf. ch. vi. 10.

^d Cf. III. iv. 34, XIV. iii. 9.

1085 a

ταυτό τε συμβαίνει τοῖς περὶ τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα γὰρ πάθη μεγέθους ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τούτων τὸ μέγεθος, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐξ εὐθείας καὶ καμπύλου τὸ μῆκος, οὐδ' ἐκ λείου καὶ τραχέος τὰ στερεά. Πάντων δὲ κοινὸν τούτων ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν ὡς
 25 γένους συμβαίνει διαπορεῖν, ὅταν τις θῇ τὰ καθόλου, πότερον τὸ ζῶον αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ ζῳῷ ἢ ἕτερον αὐτοῦ ζῳου. τούτου γὰρ μὴ χωριστοῦ μὲν ὄντος οὐδεμίαν ποιήσει ἀπορίαν· χωριστοῦ δ', ὥσπερ οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντές φασι, τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν οὐ ῥάδιον λύσαι, εἰ μὴ ῥάδιον δεῖ λέγειν τὸ ἀδύνατον.
 30 ὅταν γὰρ νοῇ τις ἐν τῇ δυνάδι τὸ ἐν καὶ ὅλως ἐν ἀριθμῷ, πότερον αὐτὸ νοεῖ τι ἢ ἕτερον; Οἱ μὲν οὖν τὰ μεγέθη γεννῶσιν ἐκ τοιαύτης ὕλης, ἕτεροι δὲ ἐκ τῆς στιγμῆς (ἡ δὲ στιγμή αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐχ ἐν ἀλλ' οἷον τὸ ἐν) καὶ ἄλλης ὕλης οἷας τὸ πλήθος, ἀλλ' οὐ πλήθους· περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν ἤττον συμβαίνει τὰ
 85 αὐτὰ ἀπορεῖν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μία ἡ ὕλη, ταὐτὸ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον καὶ στερεόν (ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ
 1085 b αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν ἔσται)· εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ὕλαι, καὶ ἑτέρα μὲν γραμμῆς ἑτέρα δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου καὶ ἄλλη τοῦ στερεοῦ, ἥτοι ἀκολουθοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις ἢ οὐ, ὥστε ταῦτα συμβήσεται καὶ οὕτως· ἡ γὰρ οὐχ ἔξει τὸ ἐπίπεδον γραμμὴν ἢ ἔσται γραμμή. Ἐτι
 9 πῶς μὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ πλήθους

* The reference is probably to Speusippus; Plato and Xenocrates did not believe in points (I. ix. 25, ch. v. 10 n.).

result follows as in the case of number ; for these concepts are modifications of magnitude, but magnitude is not generated from them, any more than a line is generated from the Straight and Crooked, or solids from the Smooth and Rough.

(Common to all these Platonic theories is the same 5 problem which presents itself in the case of species of a genus when we posit universals—viz. whether it is the Ideal animal that is present in the particular animal, or some other "animal" distinct from the Ideal animal. This question will cause no difficulty if the universal is not separable ; but if, as the Platonists say, Unity and the numbers exist separately, then it is not easy to solve (if we should apply the phrase "not easy" to what is impossible). For 6 when we think of the one in 2, or in number generally, are we thinking of an Idea or of something else ?)

These thinkers, then, generate geometrical magnitudes from this sort of material principle, but others^a generate them from the point (they regard the point not as a unity but as similar to Unity) and another material principle which is not plurality but is similar to it ; yet in the case of these principles none the less we get the same difficulties. For if 7 the matter is one, line, plane and solid will be the same ; because the product of the same elements must be one and the same. If on the other hand there is more than one kind of matter—one of the line, another of the plane, and another of the solid—either the kinds are associated with each other, or they are not. Thus the same result will follow in this case also ; for either the plane will not contain a line, or it will be a line.

(Digression.
The fundamen-
tals)
difficulty of
the Ideal
theory)

Others
generate
geometrical
objects from
principles
"similar"
to unity and
plurality.
The same
difficulties
apply to this
view.

Further, no attempt is made to explain how num- 8

τὸν ἀριθμὸν οὐθὲν ἐπιχειρεῖται· ὅπως δ' οὖν
λέγουσι ταῦτα συμβαίνει δυσχερῇ ἄπερ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ
τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ ἐκ τῆς δυάδος τῆς ἀορίστου. ὁ μὲν
γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθόλου γεννᾷ τὸν
ἀριθμὸν καὶ οὐ τινὸς πλήθους, ὁ δ' ἐκ τινος πλή-
10 θους, τοῦ πρώτου δέ (τὴν γὰρ δυάδα πρώτον τι
εἶναι πλήθος), ὥστε διαφέρει οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ'
αἱ ἀπορίαι αἱ αὐταί¹ ἀκολουθήσουσι, μίξις ἢ θέσις ἢ
κράσις ἢ γένεσις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. Μάλιστα
δ' ἂν τις ἐπιζητήσκειν, εἰ μία ἐκάστη μονάς, ἐκ
τίνος ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐτό γε τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη.
15 ἀνάγκη δὴ² ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ πλήθους,
ἢ μορίου τοῦ πλήθους. τὸ μὲν οὖν πλήθος τι εἶναι
φύσει τὴν μονάδα ἀδύνατον, ἀδιαίρετόν γ' οὖσαν·
τὸ δ' ἐκ μορίου ἄλλας ἔχει πολλὰς δυσχερείας·
ἀδιαίρετόν τε γὰρ ἕκαστον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῶν
μορίων, ἢ πλήθος εἶναι καὶ τὴν μονάδα διαιρετήν,
20 καὶ μὴ στοιχείον εἶναι τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ πλήθος· ἢ
γὰρ μονὰς ἐκάστη οὐκ ἐκ πλήθους καὶ ἐνός. ἔτι
οὐθὲν ἄλλο ποιεῖ ὁ τοῦτο λέγων ἄλλ' ἢ ἀριθμὸν
ἕτερον· τὸ γὰρ πλήθος ἀδιαιρέτων ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸς.
Ἐπεὶ ζητητέον καὶ παρὰ τοῦ οὕτω λέγοντος³
πότερον ἄπειρος ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἢ πεπερασμένος. ὑπῆρχε

¹ αἱ αὐταὶ Γ Syrianus, fort. Alexander: αὐταὶ (αἱ sup. lin. addito) J: αὐταὶ EA^b.

² δ' ἢ A^bΓ Syrianus.

³ τοῦ οὕτω λέγοντος scripsi: τοῖς οὕτω λέγοντας.

^a Aristotle again identifies the indeterminate dyad with the number 2.

^b sc. of the elements of number.

^c Which, being a principle, is *ἄσμερον* (viii. 29).

^d sc. but from an indivisible part of plurality—which is not a plurality but a unity.

ber can be generated from unity and plurality ; but howsoever they account for this, they have to meet the same difficulties as those who generate number from unity and the indeterminate dyad. The one school generates number not from a particular plurality but from that which is universally predicated ; the other from a particular plurality, but the first ; for they hold that the dyad is the first plurality.^a Thus there is practically no difference ⁹ between the two views ; the same difficulties will be involved with regard to mixture, position, blending, generation and the other similar modes of combination.^b

We might very well ask the further question : if each unit is one, of what it is composed ; for clearly each unit is not absolute unity.^c It must be generated from absolute unity and either plurality or a part of plurality. Now we cannot hold that the unit ¹⁰ is a plurality, because the unit is indivisible ; but the view that it is derived from a part of plurality involves many further difficulties, because (a) each part must be indivisible ; otherwise it will be a plurality and the unit will be divisible, and unity and plurality will not be its elements, because each unit will not be generated from plurality ^d and unity. (b) The ¹¹ exponent of this theory merely introduces another number ; because plurality is a number of indivisible parts.^e

Again, we must inquire from the exponent of this theory whether the number ^f is infinite or finite. ¹²

^a i.e., to say that number is derived from plurality is to say that number is derived from number - which explains nothing.

^f *sc.* which plurality has been shown to be.

1085 b

10 γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ πεπερασμένον πλῆθος, ἐξ οὗ αἱ
 πεπερασμέναι μονάδες καὶ τοῦ ἐνός· ἔστι τε ἕτερον
 αὐτὸ πλῆθος καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρον. ποῖον οὖν πλῆθος
 στοιχείον ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν; Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ
 στιγμῆς ἂν τις ζητήσῃ καὶ τοῦ στοιχείου ἐξ οὗ
 20 ποιοῦσι τὰ μεγέθη· οὐ γὰρ μία γε μόνον στιγμή
 ἐστὶν αὕτη. τῶν γοῦν ἄλλων στιγμῶν ἐκάστη ἐκ
 τίνος; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκ γε διαστήματός τινος καὶ
 αὐτῆς στιγμῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ μόρια ἀδιαίρετα
 ἐνδέχεται τοῦ διαστήματος εἶναι μόρια, ὥσπερ τοῦ
 πλῆθους ἐξ ὧν αἱ μονάδες· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμὸς ἐξ
 ἀδιαίρετων σύγκειται, τὰ δὲ μεγέθη οὐ. Πάντα
 30 δὴ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα φανερόν ποιεῖ ὅτι ἀ-
 δύνατον εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τὰ μεγέθη χωριστά.
 1088 a ἔτι δὲ τὸ διαφωνεῖν τοὺς πρώτους¹ περὶ τῶν ἀρι-
 θμῶν σημεῖον ὅτι τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ² οὐκ ὄντα
 ἀληθῆ παρέχει τὴν ταραχὴν αὐτοῖς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ
 μαθηματικὰ μόνον ποιοῦντες παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά,
 ὁρῶντες τὴν περὶ τὰ εἶδη δυσχέρειαν καὶ πλάσιν,
 4 ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ τὸν
 μαθηματικὸν ἐποίησαν· οἱ δὲ τὰ εἶδη βουλόμενοι
 ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμοὺς ποιεῖν, οὐχ ὁρῶντες δέ, εἰ τὰς
 ἀρχάς τις ταύτας θήσεται, πῶς ἔσται ὁ μαθη-
 ματικὸς ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὸν εἰδητικόν, τὸν αὐτὸν

¹ πρώτους A^b Alexander: τρόποις EJ γρ. Alexander.

² ταῦτα A^bJ Syrianus.

^a Alexander preferred the reading πρώτοις, interpreting it in this sense; and I do not see why he should not be followed. Ross objects that πρώτοις is used in the chronological sense in § 16 *init.*, but this is really no argument. For a much more serious (although different) inconsistency in the use of terms cf. XII. iii. 1.

^b Speusippus and his followers.

There was, it appears, a finite plurality from which, 12
in combination with unity, the finite units were ^{infinite?}
generated; and absolute plurality is different from
finite plurality. What sort of plurality is it, then,
that is, in combination with unity, an element of
number?

We might ask a similar question with regard to ^{How are}
the point, i.e. the element out of which they create ^{points}
spatial magnitudes. This is surely not the one and 13
only point. At least we may ask from what each ^{generated?}
of the other points comes; it is not, certainly, from
some interval and the Ideal point. Moreover, the
parts of the interval cannot be indivisible parts,
any more than the parts of the plurality of which
the units are composed; because although number
is composed of indivisible parts, spatial magnitudes
are not.

All these and other similar considerations make 14
it clear that number and spatial magnitudes cannot ^{Summary}
exist separately. Further, the fact that the leading ^{of the}
authorities^a disagree about numbers indicates that ^{criticisms}
it is the misrepresentation of the facts themselves ^{already}
that produces this confusion in their views. Those ^{stated.} 15
who recognize only the objects of mathematics as
existing besides sensible things, abandoned Ideal
number and posited mathematical number because
they perceived the difficulty and artificiality of the
Ideal theory. Others,^c wishing to maintain both
Forms and numbers, but not seeing how, if one posits
these^d as first principles, mathematical number can ex-
ist besides Ideal number, identified Ideal with mathe-

^a Xenocrates and his followers.

^d Unity and the indeterminate dyad; for the difficulty
see ch. vii. 3, 4.

εἰδητικὸν καὶ μαθηματικὸν ἐποίησαν ἀριθμὸν—
 11 τῷ λόγῳ, ἐπεὶ ἔργῳ γε ἀνήρηται ὁ μαθηματικός·
 ἰδίας γὰρ καὶ οὐ μαθηματικὰς ὑποθέσεις λέγουσιν·
 ὁ δὲ πρῶτος θέμενος τὰ εἶδη εἶναι καὶ ἀριθμοὺς
 τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ εἶναι εὐλόγως ἐχώρισεν·
 ὥστε πάντας συμβαίνει κατὰ μὲν τι λέγειν ὀρθῶς,
 ὅλως δ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς. καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ ὁμολογοῦσιν οὐ
 15 ταῦτά λέγοντες ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐναντία. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι αἱ
 ὑποθέσεις καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ψευδεῖς. χαλεπὸν δ' ἐκ μὴ
 καλῶς ἐχόντων λέγειν καλῶς, κατ' Ἐπίχαρμον·
 ἀρτίως τε γὰρ λέλεκται, καὶ εὐθέως φαίνεται οὐ
 καλῶς ἔχον. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἱκανὰ
 τὰ διηπορημένα καὶ διωρισμένα· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐκ
 20 πλειόνων ἂν ἔτι πεισθῇ τις πεπεισμένος, πρὸς δὲ
 τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ πεπεισμένος οὐθὲν μᾶλλον· περὶ δὲ
 τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν πρώτων αἰτιῶν καὶ
 στοιχείων ὅσα μὲν λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ μόνης τῆς
 αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας διορίζοντες, τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς περὶ
 φύσεως εἴρηται, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστι τῆς μεθόδου τῆς
 25 νῦν· ὅσα δὲ οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς
 ἑτέρας οὐσίας, ἐχόμενόν ἐστι θεωρῆσαι τῶν εἰρη-
 μένων.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν λέγουσιν ὅτι τοιαύτας εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας
 καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, καὶ τὰ τούτων στοιχεῖα τῶν
 ὄντων εἶναι στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχάς, σκεπτέον περὶ τού-
 των τί λέγουσι καὶ πῶς λέγουσιν. Οἱ μὲν οὖν
 30 ἀριθμοὺς ποιοῦντες μόνον καὶ τούτους μαθηματι-

¹ τὰ: τὰ τε rece. Syrianus.

^a Cf. ch. vi. 10.

^b Plato.

^c Fr. 14, Diels.

^d *Physics* I. iv.-vi.

^e The Pythagoreans and Speusippus.

matical number,—but only in theory, since actually
 mathematical number is done away with, because
 the hypotheses which they state are peculiar to them
 and not mathematical.^a And he ^b who first assumed 16
 that there are Ideas, and that the Ideas are numbers,
 and that the objects of mathematics exist, naturally
 separated them. Thus it happens that all are right
 in some respect, but not altogether right ; even they
 themselves admit as much by not agreeing but con-
 tradicting each other. The reason of this is that
 their assumptions and first principles are wrong ;
 and it is difficult to propound a correct theory from 17
 faulty premisses : as Epicharmus says, “ no sooner is
 it said than it is seen to be wrong.”^c

We have now examined and analyzed the questions
 concerning numbers to a sufficient extent ; for al-
 though one who is already convinced might be still
 more convinced by a fuller treatment, he who is
 not convinced would be brought no nearer to con-
 viction. As for the first principles and causes and 18
 elements, the views expressed by those who discuss
 only sensible substance either have been described
 in the *Physics*^d or have no place in our present
 inquiry ; but the views of those who assert that
 there are other substances besides sensible ones call
 for investigation next after those which we have just
 discussed.

Since, then, some thinkers hold that the Ideas and 19
 numbers are such substances, and that their elements
 are the elements and principles of reality, we must
 inquire what it is that they hold, and in what sense
 they hold it.

Those ^e who posit only numbers, and mathematical 20

1086 a

κοὺς ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέοι· τῶν δὲ τὰς ἰδέας λεγόντων ἅμα τὸν τε τρόπον θεάσαιτ' ἂν τις καὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἅμα γὰρ καθόλου τε ὡς οὐσίας¹ ποιοῦσι τὰς ἰδέας καὶ πάλιν ὡς χωριστὰς καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον. ταῦτα δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται

⁸⁷ διηπόρηται πρότερον. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ συνάψαι ταῦτα εἰς ταῦτόν τοις λέγουσι τὰς οὐσίας² καθόλου, ὅτι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὐ τὰς αὐτὰς [οὐσίας]³ ἐποιοῦν. τὰ

1086 b

μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ρεῖν ἐνόμιζον καὶ μένειν οὐθὲν αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ καθόλου παρὰ ταῦτα εἶναι τε καὶ ἕτερόν τι εἶναι. τοῦτο δ', ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἐκίνησε μὲν Σωκράτης διὰ τοὺς ὀρισμούς, οὐ μὴν ἐχώρισέ γε τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἐνόησεν οὐ χωρίσας. δηλοῖ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων· ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν, τὸ δὲ χωρίζειν αἴτιον τῶν συμβαινόντων δυσχερῶν περὶ τὰς ἰδέας ἐστίν. οἱ δ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἔσονται τινες οὐσίαι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς καὶ ρεούσας, χωριστὰς εἶναι, ¹⁰ ἄλλας μὲν οὐκ εἶχον, ταύτας δὲ τὰς καθόλου λεγομένας ἐξέθεσαν, ὥστε συμβαίνειν σχεδὸν τὰς αὐτὰς φύσεις εἶναι τὰς καθόλου καὶ τὰς καθ' ἕκαστον. αὕτη μὲν οὖν αὕτη καθ' αὐτὴν εἴη τις ἂν δυσχέρεια τῶν εἰρημένων.

X. Ὁ δὲ καὶ τοῖς λέγουσι τὰς ἰδέας ἔχει τινὰ ¹⁵ ἀπορίαν καὶ τοῖς μὴ λέγουσιν, καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν

¹ ὡς οὐσίας secl. Jaeger.

² οὐσίας Jaeger: ἰδέας.

³ Jaeger.

^a XIV. ii. 21, iii. 2-8, 15, 16.

^b III. vi. 7-9.

^c Ch. iv., and cf. I. vi.

^d The Platonists.

numbers at that, may be considered later ^a; but as Criticism of the Ideal theory for those who speak of the Ideas, we can observe at the same time their way of thinking and the difficulties which befall them. For they not only treat the Ideas as universal substances, but also as separable and particular. (That this is impossible has been ²¹ already shown ^b by a consideration of the difficulties involved.) The reason why those who hold substances to be universal combined these two views was that they did not identify substances with sensible things. They considered that the particulars in the sensible world are in a state of flux, and that none of them persists, but that the universal exists besides them and is something distinct from them. This theory, as we have said in an earlier passage, ²² was initiated by Socrates as a result of his definitions, but he did not separate universals from particulars; and he was right in not separating them. This is evident from the facts; for without the universal we cannot acquire knowledge, and the separation of the universal is the cause of the difficulties which we find in the Ideal theory. Others, ²³ regarding it as necessary, if there are to be any substances besides those which are sensible and transitory, that they should be separable, and having no other substances, assigned separate existence to those which are universally predicated; thus it followed that universals and particulars are practically the same kind of thing. This in itself would be one difficulty in the view which we have just described. ^c

X. Let us now mention a point which presents some difficulty both to those who hold the Ideal theory and to those who do not. It has been stated already, at How are substances to be regarded?

^a See Vol. I. Introd. pp. xvi f.

1088 b

τοῖς διαπορήμασιν ἐλέχθη πρότερον, λέγωμεν νῦν.
 εἰ μὲν γάρ τις μὴ θήσει τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι κε-
 χωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὡς λέγεται τὰ
 καθ' ἕκαστα τῶν ὄντων, ἀναιρήσει τὴν οὐσίαν ὡς
 βουλόμεθα λέγειν· ἂν δέ τις θῇ τὰς οὐσίας χωριστάς,
 πῶς θήσει τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν; εἰ
 μὲν γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ μὴ καθόλου, τοσαῦτα
 ἔσται τὰ ὄντα ὅσαπερ τὰ στοιχεῖα, καὶ οὐκ ἐπι-
 στητὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα. ἔστωσαν γὰρ αἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ
 φωνῇ συλλαβαὶ οὐσῖαι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα αὐτῶν
 στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν· ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ ΒΛ εἶναι
 καὶ ἐκάστην τῶν συλλαβῶν μίαν, εἴπερ μὴ καθόλου
 καὶ τῷ εἶδει αἱ αὐταί, ἀλλὰ μία ἐκάστη τῷ ἀριθμῷ
 καὶ τόδε τι καὶ μὴ ὁμώνυμον· ἔτι δ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν
 ἐν ἕκαστον τιθέασιν· εἰ δ' αἱ συλλαβαί, οὕτω καὶ
 ἐξ ὧν εἰσὶν· οὐκ ἔσται ἄρα πλείω ἄλφα ἑνός, οὐδὲ
 τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων οὐθὲν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον
 ὅνπερ οὐδὲ τῶν [ἄλλων]¹ συλλαβῶν ἢ αὐτὴ ἄλλη
 καὶ ἄλλη. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ
 στοιχεῖα ἕτερα ὄντα, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὰ στοιχεῖα.

Ἔτι δὲ οὐδ' ἐπιστητὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα· οὐ γὰρ
 καθόλου, ἢ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου. δῆλον δ'
 ἐκ* τῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ τῶν ὁρισμῶν· οὐ γὰρ γίγ-
 νεται συλλογισμὸς ὅτι τόδε τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαῖς,
 εἰ μὴ πᾶν τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί,² οὐδ' ὅτι ὁδὶ ὁ

¹ ἄλλων scilicet.² ἐκ τε Ε.³ ὀρθαῖς J.

the beginning of our treatise, among the problems.^a If we do not suppose substances to be separate, that is in the way in which particular things are said to be separate, we shall do away with substance in the sense in which we wish to maintain it ; but if we suppose substances to be separable, how are we to regard their elements and principles ? If they are particular 2 and not universal, there will be as many real things as there are elements, and the elements will not be knowable. For let us suppose that the syllables in speech are substances, and that their letters are the elements of substances. Then there must be only one BA, and only one of each of the other syllables ; that is, if they are not universal and identical in form, but each is numerically one and an individual, and not a member of a class bearing a common name. (Moreover, the Platonists assume that each Ideal 3 entity is unique.) Now if this is true of the syllables, it is also true of their letters. Hence there will not be more than one A, nor more than one of any of the other letters,^b on the same argument by which in the case of the syllable there cannot be more than one instance of the same syllable. But if this is so, there will be no other things besides the letters, but only the letters.

Nor again will the elements be knowable ; for they 4 will not be universal, and knowledge is of the universal. This can be seen by reference to proofs and definitions ; for there is no logical conclusion that a given triangle has its angles equal to two right angles unless every triangle has its angles equal to two right

if they are particular, existing things will be no more in number than their elements,

and these elements will be unknowable.

^a Cf. III. iv. 8-10, vi. 7-9.

^b This is, as a matter of fact, the assumption upon which the whole argument rests ; Aristotle is arguing in a circle.

1086 b

ἄνθρωπος ζῶον, εἰ μὴ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῶον. Ἄλλὰ
 1087 a μὴν εἶγε καθόλου αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἢ καὶ αἱ ἐκ τούτων
 οὐσίαι καθόλου (ἢ)² ἔσται μὴ οὐσία πρότερον
 οὐσίας· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου οὐκ οὐσία, τὸ δὲ
 στοιχείον καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ καθόλου· πρότερον δὲ τὸ
 στοιχείον καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ὧν ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχείον ἐστίν.
 ταῦτά τε δὴ πάντα συμβαίνει εὐλόγως, ὅταν ἐκ
 στοιχείων τε ποιῶσι τὰς ιδέας καὶ παρὰ τὰς τὸ
 αὐτὸ εἶδος ἐχούσας οὐσίας καὶ ιδέας ἐν τι ἄξιῳ
 εἶναι κεχωρισμένον. Εἰ δὲ μηθὲν κωλύει, ὥσπερ
 ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς φωνῆς στοιχείων πολλὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλφα
 καὶ τὰ βῆτα καὶ μηθὲν εἶναι παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ
 10 αὐτὸ ἄλφα καὶ αὐτὸ βῆτα, ἔσονται ἐνεκά γε τού-
 του ἄπειροι αἱ ὅμοιαι συλλαβαί. Τὸ δὲ τὴν ἐπι-
 στήμην εἶναι καθόλου πᾶσαν, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
 καὶ τὰς τῶν ὄντων ἀρχὰς καθόλου εἶναι καὶ μὴ
 οὐσίας κεχωρισμένας, ἔχει μὲν μάλιστα ἀπορίαν
 τῶν λεχθέντων, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἀληθές
 10 τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐκ ἀληθές. ἡ γὰρ
 ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, διττόν, ὧν
 τὸ μὲν δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις
 ὡς ὕλη [τοῦ]³ καθόλου οὐσα καὶ ἀόριστος τοῦ
 καθόλου καὶ ἀορίστου ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια ὠρι-
 σμένη καὶ ὠρισμένου τότε τι οὐσα τοῦδὲ τινος.
 ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡ ὄψις τὸ καθόλου χρῶμα
 20 ὁρᾷ, ὅτι τότε τὸ χρῶμα ὁ ὁρᾷ χρώμά ἐστιν, καὶ
 ὁ θεωρεῖ ὁ γραμματικός, τότε τὸ ἄλφα ἄλφα·
 ἐπεὶ εἰ ἀνάγκη τὰς ἀρχὰς καθόλου εἶναι, ἀνάγκη

² αἱ om. I²J Syrianus.³ ἢ Ross, Syrianus (?): habet ante καθόλου T.³ Bonitz.

angles, or that a given man is an animal unless every man is an animal.

On the other hand, if the first principles are universal, either the substances composed of them will be universal too, or there will be a non-substance prior to substance ; because the universal is not substance, and the element or first principle is universal ; and the element or first principle is prior to that of which it is an element or first principle. All this naturally follows when they compose the Ideas of elements and assert that besides the substances which have the same form there are also Ideas each of which is a separate entity.

If the first principles are universal, the consequences are equally difficult.

But if, as in the case of the phonetic elements, there is no reason why there should not be many A's and B's, and no "A itself" or "B itself" apart from these many, then on this basis there may be any number of similar syllables.

Solution of the problem.

The doctrine that all knowledge is of the universal, and hence that the principles of existing things must also be universal and not separate substances, presents the greatest difficulty of all that we have discussed ; there is, however, a sense in which this statement is true, although there is another in which it is not true. Knowledge, like the verb "to know," has two senses, of which one is potential and the other actual. The potentiality being, as matter, universal and indefinite, has a universal and indefinite object ; but the actuality is definite and has a definite object, because it is particular and deals with the particular. It is only accidentally that sight sees universal colour, because the particular colour which it sees is colour ; and the particular A which the grammarian studies is an A. For if the first principles must be universal,

1087 a

καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων καθόλου, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπο-
δείξεων· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται χωριστόν οὐθὲν
οὐδ' οὐσία. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὥς ἡ¹ ἐπι-
στήμη καθόλου, ἔστι δ' ὥς οὐ.

¹ "Because ἀπόδειξις " (logical or syllogistic proof)
" must be in the first figure (*En. Post.* I, xiv.), and in that

that which is derived from them must also be universal, as in the case of logical proofs^a; and if this is so, there will be nothing which has a separate existence; *i.e.* no substance. But it is clear that although in one sense knowledge is universal, in another it is not.

figure universal premises always give a universal conclusion." (Ross.)

N

1087 a

I. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς οὐσίας ταύτης εἰρήσθω
 80 τοσαῦτα, πάντες δὲ ποιούσι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐναντίως,
 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀκινήτους
 οὐσίας ὁμοίως. εἰ δὲ τῆς τῶν ἀπάντων ἀρχῆς μὴ
 ἐνδέχεται πρότερόν τι εἶναι, ἀδύνατον ἂν εἴη τὴν
 ἀρχὴν ἕτερόν τι οὖσαν εἶναι ἀρχήν, οἷον εἴ τις
 λέγοι τὸ λευκὸν ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐχ ἢ ἕτερον ἀλλ' ἢ
 3. λευκόν, εἶναι μέντοι καθ' ὑποκειμένου, καὶ ἕτερόν
 τι ὃν λευκὸν εἶναι· ἐκείνο γὰρ πρότερον ἔσται.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν γίγνεται πάντα ἐξ ἐναντίων ὥς ὑποκει-
 μένου τινός· ἀνάγκη ἄρα μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις
 1087 b τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν. ἀεὶ ἄρα πάντα τὰ ἐναντία καθ'
 ὑποκειμένου, καὶ οὐθὲν χωριστόν· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ
 φαίνεται οὐθὲν οὐσία ἐναντίον, καὶ ὁ λόγος μαρ-
 τυρεῖ. οὐθὲν ἄρα τῶν ἐναντίων κυρίως ἀρχὴ πάν-
 3 των ἀλλ' ἑτέρα. Οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων

* i.e., the Platonic Ideas or numbers, which they regarded as unchangeable substances. There is, however, no definite transition to a fresh subject at this point. The criticisms of the Ideas or numbers as substances, and of the Platonic first principles, have not been grouped systematically in Books 256

BOOK XIV

I. With regard to this kind of substance,^a then, let the foregoing account suffice. All thinkers make the first principles contraries ; as in the realm of natural objects, so too in respect of the unchangeable substances. Now if nothing can be prior to the first principle of all things, that first principle cannot be a first principle if it is an attribute of something else. This would be as absurd as to say that " white " is the first principle, not *qua* anything else but *qua* white, and yet that it is predicable of a subject, and is white because it is an attribute of something else ; because the latter will be prior to it. Moreover, all things are generated from contraries as from a substrate, and therefore contraries must most certainly have a substrate. Therefore all contraries are predicated of a subject, and none of them exists separately. But there is no contrary to substance ; not only is this apparent, but it is borne out by reasoned consideration.^b Thus none of the contraries is strictly a first principle ; the first principle is something different.

But the Platonists treat one of the contraries as 4

XIII. and XIV. Indeed there is so little distinction in subject matter between the two books that in some MSS. XIV. was made to begin at XIII. ix. 18 (Syrianus *ad loc.*). Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxii.

^b Cf. *Categories* 3 b 24-27.

BOOK XIV
FURTHER
CRITICISM
OF THE
THEORY OF
IDEAS AND
NUMBERS.
All thinkers
adopt con-
trary first
principles

But no con-
trary can
be a first
principle.

1087^b

ὕλην ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν τῷ ἐνὶ [τῷ ἴσῳ]¹ τὸ ἄνισον, ὡς τοῦτο τῇ τοῦ πλήθους οὕσαν φύσει, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ τῷ πλήθους· γεννῶνται γὰρ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνίσου δυάδος τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, τῷ δ' ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους, ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς δὲ οὐσίας
 10 ἀμφοῖν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ ἐν λέγων τὰ στοιχεῖα, τὸ δ' ἄνισον ἐκ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ δυάδα, ὡς ἐν ὄντα τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν λέγει, καὶ οὐ διορίζει ὅτι λόγῳ ἀριθμῷ δ' οὔ.

² Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἅς στοιχεῖα καλοῦσιν, οὐ καλῶς ἀποδιδόασιν, οἱ μὲν τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ
 15 μικρὸν λέγοντες μετὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς τρία ταῦτα στοιχεῖα τῶν ἀριθμῶν, τὰ μὲν δύο ὕλην, τὸ δ' ἐν τὴν μορφήν, οἱ δὲ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον, ὅτι τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν μεγέθους οἰκειότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ ὑπερέχον καὶ τὸ ὑπερεχόμενον. διαφέρει δὲ τούτων οὐθέν ὡς εἰπεῖν
 20 πρὸς ἓν τῶν συμβαινόντων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς μόνον δυσχερείας, ἃς φυλάττονται διὰ τὸ καὶ αὐτοὶ λογικὰς φέρειν τὰς ἀποδείξεις. πλὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ γε λόγου ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπερέχον καὶ³ ὑπερεχόμενον εἶναι ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν, καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρότερον τῆς δυάδος ἐκ

¹ Jaeger.² καὶ τὸ recte.³ Plato; cf. XIII. vii. 5.^b Probably Speusippus.

^c This shows clearly that by the Great-and-Small Plato meant a single principle, i.e., indeterminate quantity. Aristotle admits this here because he is contrasting the Great-and-Small with the One; but elsewhere he prefers to regard the

METAPHYSICS, XIV. I. 4-8

matter, some opposing "the unequal" to Unity (on the ground that the former is of the nature of plurality) and others plurality. For according to some,^a 5 numbers are generated from the unequal dyad of the Great and Small; and according to another,^b from plurality; but in both cases they are generated by the essence of unity. For he who speaks of "the unequal" and Unity as elements, and describes the unequal as a dyad composed of Great and Small, speaks of the unequal, i.e. the Great and Small, as being one; and does not draw the distinction that they are one in formula but not in number.^c

Again, they state the first principles, which they call elements, badly; some say that the Great and the Small, together with Unity (making 3^d in all), are the elements of numbers; the two former as matter, and Unity as form. Others speak of the Many and Few, because the Great and the Small are in their nature more suited to be the principles of magnitude; and others use the more general term which covers these—"the exceeding" and "the exceeded." But none of these variations 7 makes any appreciable difference with respect to some of the consequences of the theory; they only affect the abstract difficulties, which these thinkers escape because the proofs which they themselves employ are abstract. There is, however, this exception: if "the exceeding" and "the exceeded" are the first principles, and not the Great and the Small, on the same principle number should be derived from the elements before 2 is derived; for as "the exceeding and the exceeded" is more

Platonic material principle as a duality. Cf. Vol. I. *Introd.* pp. xxii f.

^a Cf. previous note.

1087 b

25 τῶν στοιχείων· καθόλου γὰρ ἀμφότερα μᾶλλον ἐστίν.
νῦν δὲ τὸ μὲν λέγουσι τὸ δ' οὐ λέγουσιν.

Οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ ἄλλο πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἀντι-
τιθέασιν, οἱ δὲ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἐν. εἰ δ' ἐστίν, ὥσπερ
βούλονται, τὰ ὄντα ἐξ ἐναντίων, τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ ἧ οὐθέν
ἐναντίον, ἧ εἴπερ ἄρα μέλλει, τὸ πλῆθος, τὸ δ'

30 αἴρισον τῷ ἴσῳ καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ταύτῳ καὶ τὸ
ἄλλο αὐτῷ,¹ μάλιστα μὲν οἱ τὸ ἐν τῷ πλήθει ἀντι-
τιθέντες ἔχονται τινος δόξης, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' οὗτοι
ικανῶς· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ ἐν ὀλίγον· πλῆθος μὲν γὰρ
ὀλιγότῳ, τὸ δὲ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ ἀντίκειται. Τὸ

δ' ἐν ὅτι μέτρον σημαίνει, φανερόν, καὶ ἐν παντί
85 ἐστὶ τι ἕτερον ὑποκείμενον, οἷον ἐν ἀρμονίᾳ διέσεις,
ἐν δὲ μεγέθει δάκτυλος ἢ πούς ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐν
δὲ ῥυθμοῖς βάσις ἢ συλλαβή· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν
βάρει σταθμός τις ὠρισμένος ἐστίν· καὶ κατὰ πάν-

1088 a των δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ποιοῖς ποιόν
τι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ποσοῖς ποσόν τι (καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τὸ
μέτρον, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν
αἴσθησιν), ὥς οὐκ ὄντος τινὸς τοῦ ἐνὸς καθ' αὐτὸ
οὐσίας. καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ λόγον· σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ
ἐν ὅτι μέτρον πλῆθους τινός, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅτι
πλῆθος μεμετρημένον καὶ πλῆθος μέτρων (διὸ καὶ
εὐλόγως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν ἀριθμός· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ
μέτρον μέτρα, ἀλλ' ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ ἐν).
δεῖ δὲ αἰεὶ τὸ αὐτό τι ὑπάρχειν πᾶσι τὸ μέτρον,
οἷον εἰ ἵπποι, τὸ μέτρον ἵππος, καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωποι,

¹ ταύτῳ Bekker.

* Cf. V. vi. 17, 18, X. i. 8, 21.

universal than the Great and Small, so number is more universal than 2. But in point of fact they assert the one and not the other.

Others oppose "the different" or "other" to Unity; and others contrast Plurality and Unity. Now if, as they maintain, existing things are derived 9 from contraries, and if there is either no contrary to unity, or if there is to be any contrary it is plurality; and if the unequal is contrary to the equal, and the different to the same, and the other to the thing itself, then those who oppose unity to plurality have the best claim to credibility—but even their theory is inadequate, because then unity will be few. For plurality is opposed to paucity, and many to few.

That "unity" denotes a measure ^a is obvious. And 10 in every case there is something else which underlies it; e.g., in the scale there is the quarter-tone; in spatial magnitude the inch or foot or some similar thing; and in rhythms the foot or syllable. Similarly in the case of gravity there is some definite weight. Unity is predicated of all things in the same way; of qualities as a quality, and of quantities as a quantity. (The measure is indivisible, in the former case in 11 kind, and in the latter to our senses.) This shows that unity is not any independent substance. And this is reasonable; because unity denotes a measure of some plurality, and number denotes a measured plurality and a plurality of measures. (Hence too it stands to reason that unity is not a number; for the measure is not measures, but the measure and unity are starting-points.) The measure must 12 always be something which applies to all alike; e.g., if the things are horses, the measure is a horse; if

Unity is "the One" is a measure which implies a substance. It has no substantive existence.

1088 a

10 ἄνθρωπος.¹ εἰ δ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος καὶ θεός,
ζῶον ἴσως, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς αὐτῶν ἔσται ζῷα. εἰ
δ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ λευκὸν καὶ βαδίζον, ἥκιστα μὲν
ἀριθμὸς τούτων διὰ τὸ ταυτῷ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ
ἐνὶ κατὰ² ἀριθμόν, ὅμως δὲ γενῶν ἔσται ὁ ἀρι-
θμὸς ὁ τούτων, ἢ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύτης προσ-
ηγορίας.

15 Οἱ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον ὡς ἔν τι, τὴν δυάδα δὲ
ἀόριστον ποιοῦντες μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, πόρρω
λίαν τῶν δοκούντων καὶ δυνατῶν λέγουσιν· πάθη
τε γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ συμβεβηκότα μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπο-
κείμενα τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν ἔστι, τὸ
πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν
20 μεγέθους, ὥσπερ ἄρτιον καὶ περιττόν, καὶ λείον
καὶ τραχύ, καὶ εὐθὺ καὶ καμπύλον. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς
ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ καὶ πρὸς τι ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ
μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· τὸ δὲ πρὸς
τι πάντων ἥκιστα φύσις τις ἢ οὐσία τῶν κατ-
ηγοριῶν ἐστί, καὶ ὑστέρα τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ·
25 καὶ πάθος τι τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ πρὸς τι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη,
ἀλλ' οὐχ ὕλη, εἰ τι ἕτερον καὶ τῷ ὅλως κοινῷ
πρὸς τι, καὶ τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ εἵδεσιν. οὐθέν
γάρ ἐστιν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν, οὔτε πολὺ οὔτε
ὀλίγον, οὔτε ὅλως πρὸς τι, ὃ οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὄν
πολὺ ἢ ὀλίγον ἢ μέγα ἢ μικρὸν ἢ πρὸς τι ἐστίν.
30 σημείον δ' ὅτι ἥκιστα οὐσία τις καὶ ὄν τι τὸ πρὸς

¹ ἵπποι . . . ἵππος . . . ἄνθρωποι, ἄνθρωπος Bonitz: ἵππος
. . . ἵππους . . . ἄνθρωπος, ἀνθρώπους codd.

² κατὰ τὸν recc.

^a Cf. § 5.

^b Cf. XI. xii. 1. There Aristotle refers to seven categories,

they are men, the measure is a man; and if they are man, horse and god, the measure will presumably be an animate being, and the number of them animate beings. If the things are "man," "white" and "walking," there will scarcely be a number of them, because they all belong to a subject which is one and the same in number; however, their number will be a number of "genera," or some other such appellation.

Those^a who regard the unequal as a unity, and the dyad as an indeterminate compound of great and small, hold theories which are very far from being probable or possible. For these terms represent affections and attributes, rather than substrates, of numbers and magnitudes—"many" and "few" applying to number, and "great" and "small" to magnitude—just as odd and even, smooth and rough, straight and crooked, are attributes. Further, in addition to this error, "great" and "small" and all other such terms must be relative. And the relative is of all the categories in the least degree a definite entity or substance; it is posterior to quality and quantity. The relative is an affection of quantity, as we have said, and not its matter; since there is something else distinct which is the matter both of the relative in general and of its parts and kinds. There is nothing great or small, many or few, or in general relative, which is many or few, great or small, or relative to something else without having a distinct nature of its own. That the relative is in the lowest degree a substance and a real thing is shown by the fact that of it alone^b there is neither

but here he omits "activity" and "passivity" as being virtually identical with motion.

Similarly, "the unequal" or "great and small" is an attribute, and not a substance

1088 a

τι τὸ μόνου¹ μὴ εἶναι γένεσιν αὐτοῦ μηδὲ φθορὰν
 μηδὲ κίνησιν, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν αὐξήσεις καὶ
 φθίσεις, κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἀλλοιώσεις, κατὰ τόπον
 φορά, κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἢ ἀπλῇ γένεσις καὶ φθορά·
 ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρὸς τι· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ κινήσθηναι
 35 ὅτε μὲν μεῖζον ὅτε δὲ ἔλαττον ἢ ἴσον ἔσται θατέρου
 1088 b κινήθέντος κατὰ τὸ ποσόν. ἀνάγκη τε ἐκάστου
 ὕλην εἶναι τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ οὐσίας·
 τὸ δὲ πρὸς τι οὔτε δυνάμει οὐσία οὔτε ἐνεργεία.
 "Ατοπον οὖν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον, τὸ οὐσίας μὴ
 οὐσίαν ποιεῖν στοιχεῖον καὶ πρότερον· ὕστερον γὰρ
 5 πᾶσαι αἱ κατηγορίαι. ἔτι δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα οὐ κατη-
 γορεῖται καθ' ὧν στοιχεῖα, τὸ δὲ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον
 καὶ χωρὶς καὶ ἅμα κατηγορεῖται ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ
 τὸ μακρὸν καὶ τὸ βραχὺ γραμμῆς, καὶ ἐπίπεδόν
 ἔστι καὶ πλατὺ καὶ στενόν. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἔστι τι
 πλῆθος οὐ τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ (τὸ)² ὀλίγον, οἶον ἢ δυάς
 10 (εἰ γὰρ πολὺ, τὸ ἐν ᾧ ὀλίγον εἶη), καὶ πολὺ
 ἀπλῶς εἶη, οἶον ἢ δεκάς πολὺ, [καὶ]³ εἰ ταύτης μὴ
 ἔστι πλείον, ἢ τὰ μύρια. πῶς οὖν ἔσται οὕτως
 ἐξ ὀλίγου καὶ πολλοῦ ὁ ἀριθμός; ἢ γὰρ ἄμφω
 ἔδει κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢ μηδέτερον· νῦν δὲ τὸ ἕτερον
 μόνον κατηγορεῖται.

II. Ἀπλῶς δὲ δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἄρα δυνατόν τὰ αἰδία
 15 ἐκ στοιχείων συγκεῖσθαι· ὕλην γὰρ ἔξει· σύνθετον
 γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἐκ στοιχείων. εἰ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη, ἐξ οὗ

¹ μόνου E Syriacus: μόνου J¹: μόνον J² A^b I¹.

² τὸ Alexander (?) Ross.

³ Bonitz.

^a Cf. X. vi. 1-3.

^b Cf. XIII. viii. 17.

generation nor destruction nor change in the sense that in respect of quantity there is increase and decrease, in respect of quality, alteration, in respect of place, locomotion, and in respect of substance, absolute generation and destruction. There is no 17 real change in respect of the relative; for without any change in itself, one term will be now greater, now smaller or equal, as the other term undergoes quantitative change. Moreover, the matter of every thing, and therefore of substance, must be that which is potentially of that nature; but the relative is neither potentially substance nor actually.

It is absurd, then, or rather impossible, to represent 18 non-substance as an element of substance and prior to it; for all the other categories are posterior to substance. And further, the elements are not predicated of those things of which they are elements; yet "many" and "few" are predicated, both separately and together, of number; and "long" and "short" are predicated of the line, and the plane is both broad and narrow. If, then, there is a 19 plurality of which one term, viz. "few," is always predicable, *e.g.* 2 (for if 2 is many, 1 will be few^a), then there will be an absolute "many"; *e.g.*, 10 will be many (if there is nothing more than 10^b), or 10,000. How, then, in this light, can number be derived from Few and Many? Either both ought to be predicated of it, or neither; but according to this view only one or the other is predicated.

II. But we must inquire in general whether eternal things can be composed of elements. If so, they will have matter; for everything which consists of elements is composite. Assuming, then, that that 2 which consists of anything, whether it has always

Eternal things cannot be composed of

1088 b

ἐστίν, εἰ καὶ ἂν ἐστι καὶ ἐν ἐγένετο, ἐκ τούτου
 γίνεσθαι, γίγνεται δὲ πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος
 τούτου ὃ γίγνεται (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο¹ ἐκ τοῦ ἀδυ-
 νάτου οὐδὲ ἦν), τὸ δὲ δυνατόν ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἐνε-
 ρ²⁰ γεῖν καὶ μὴ, εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα αἰεὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἀριθμὸς
 ἢ ὅτιοῦν ἄλλο ὕλην ἔχον, ἐνδέχεται² ἂν μὴ εἶναι,
 ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μίαν ἡμέραν ἔχον καὶ τὸ ὅποσαοῦν
 ἔτη· εἰ δ' οὕτω, καὶ τὸ τοσοῦτον χρόνον οὐ μὴ ἔστι
 πέρας. οὐκ ἂν τοίνυν εἴη αἰδία, εἴπερ μὴ αἰδίων τὸ
 ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις
²⁵ συνέβη πραγματευθῆναι. εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ λεγόμενον
 νῦν ἀληθὲς καθόλου, ὅτι οὐδεμία ἐστὶν αἰδίας οὐσία
 ἐὼν μὴ ἢ ἐνέργεια,³ τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ὕλη τῆς οὐ-
 σίας, οὐδεμιᾶς ἂν εἴη αἰδίου οὐσίας στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὧν
 ἐστὶν ἐνυπαρχόντων. Εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ δυνάδα
 μὲν ἀόριστον ποιοῦσι τὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς στοιχείου,
³⁰ τὸ δ' ἄνισον δυσχεραίνουσιν εὐλόγως διὰ τὰ συμ-
 βαίνοντα ἀδύνατα· οἷς τοσαῦτα μόνον ἀφήρηται τῶν
 δυσχερῶν, ὅσα διὰ τὸ ποιεῖν τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πρὸς τι
 στοιχεῖον ἀναγκαῖα συμβαίνει τοῖς λέγουσιν· ὅσα δὲ
 χωρὶς ταύτης τῆς δόξης, ταῦτα κακείνοις ὑπάρχειν
 ἀναγκαῖον, ἐάν τε τὸν εἰδητικὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐξ αὐτῶν
³⁵ ποιῶσιν, ἐάν τε τὸν μαθηματικόν. Πολλὰ μὲν
^{1089 a} οὖν τὰ αἰτία τῆς ἐπὶ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἐκτροπῆς,

¹ ἐγένετο E: ἐγίγνετο Bekker.² ἐνεργεία recc. I'.³ IX. viii. 15-17, De Caelo I. xii.⁴ Cf. ch. i. 14-17.

existed or it came into being, must come into being
 (if at all) out of that of which it consists; and that
 everything comes to be that which it comes to be
 out of that which is it potentially (for it could not
 have come to be out of that which was not potentially
 such, nor could it have consisted of it); and that the
 potential can either be actualized or not; then how-
 ever everlasting number or anything else which has
 matter may be, it would be possible for it not to exist,
 just as that which is any number of years old is as
 capable of not existing as that which is one day old.
 And if this is so, that which has existed for so long
 a time that there is no limit to it may also not exist.
 Therefore things which contain matter cannot be 3
 eternal, that is, if that which is capable of not existing
 is not eternal, as we have had occasion to say else-
 where ^a. Now if what we have just been saying—
 that no substance is eternal unless it is actuality—
 is true universally, and the elements are the matter
 of substance, an eternal substance can have no
 elements of which, as inherent in it, it consists.

There are some who, while making the element 4
 which acts conjointly with unity the indeterminate
 dyad, object to "the unequal," quite reasonably,
 on the score of the difficulties which it involves. But
 they are rid only of those difficulties ^b which neces-
 sarily attend the theory of those who make the
 unequal, *i.e.* the relative, an element; all the
 difficulties which are independent of this view must
 apply to their theories also, whether it is Ideal or
 mathematical number that they construct out of
 these elements.

However
 the material
 element is
 conceived,
 this objec-
 tion still
 applies.

There are many causes for their resorting to these 5
 explanations, the chief being that they visualized

1089 a

μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀπορῆσαι ἀρχαϊκῶς. ἔδοξε γάρ
αὐτοῖς πάντ' ἔσεσθαι ἐν τὰ ὄντα, αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν, εἰ μὴ
τις λύσει καὶ ὁμόσε βαδιεῖται τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ

οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆ,¹ εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα,

ἢ ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν δεῖξαι ὅτι ἔστιν·
οὕτω γάρ, ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἄλλου τινός, τὰ ὄντα
ἔσεσθαι, εἰ πολλά ἔστιν. Καίτοι πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ
τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ [ὅτι]² οὐσίαν σημαίνει,
τὸ δ' ὅτι ποιόν, τὸ δ' ὅτι ποσόν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δὴ
κατηγορίας), ποῖον οὖν τὰ ὄντα πάντα ἐν, εἰ μὴ τὸ
μὴ ὄν ἔσται; πότερον αἱ οὐσίαι, ἢ τὰ πάθη (καὶ
τὰ ἄλλα δὴ ὁμοίως), ἢ πάντα,³ καὶ ἔσται ἐν τὸ τόδε
καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε καὶ τὸ τοσόνδε καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα ὄν⁴
τι σημαίνει; ἀλλ' ἄτοπον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον,
τὸ μίαν φύσιν τινὰ γενομένην αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ
τοῦ ὄντος τὸ μὲν τόδε εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε, τὸ δὲ
τοσόνδε, τὸ δὲ πού. Ἐπειτα ἐκ ποίου μὴ ὄντος
καὶ ὄντος τὰ ὄντα; πολλαχῶς γὰρ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν,
ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ ὄν· καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀνθρωπον⁵ ση-
μαίνει τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοδί, τὸ δὲ μὴ εὐθύ τὸ μὴ εἶναι
τοιονδί, τὸ δὲ μὴ τρίπηχυν τὸ μὴ εἶναι τοσονδί. ἐκ
ποίου οὖν ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα;
βούλεται μὲν δὴ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ ταύτην τὴν φύσιν

¹ τοῦτο δαμῆ EJ Simplicius: τοῦτ' οὐδαμῆ Abl' Syrianus,
Plato: τοῦτο δαμῆ recce.

² Mater.

³ ἢ πάντα JI: ἅπαντα EA^b: πάντα Alexander, Syrianus.

⁴ ὄν Bonitz: ἐν.

⁵ ἀνθρωπον εἶναι Jaeger.

^a Fr. 7 (Diels).

^b Cf. Plato, *Sophist* 237 A, 241 D, 256 E.

the problem in an archaic form. They supposed that all existing things would be one, absolute Being, unless they encountered and refuted Parmenides' dictum :

The fundamental error of the Platonists: they thought that the principle must be "being" and "not-being."

"Twill ne'er be proved that things which are not, are,"

i.e., that they must show that that which is not, is; for only so—of that which is, and of something else—could existing things be composed, if they are more than one.^b

However, (i) in the first place, if "being" has 6 several meanings (for sometimes it means substance, sometimes quality, sometimes quantity, and so on with the other categories), what sort of unity will all the things that are constitute, if not-being is not to be? Will it be the substances that are one, or the affections (and similarly with the other categories), or all the categories together? in which case the "this" and the "such" and the "so great," and all the other categories which denote some sense of Being, will be one. But it is absurd, or rather im- 7 possible, that the introduction of one thing should account for the fact that "what is" sometimes means "so-and-so," sometimes "such-and-such," sometimes "of such-and-such a size," sometimes "in such-and-such a place."

But "being" and "not-being" have several meanings. What sort of unity did Plato expect to avoid?

(ii) Of what sort of not-being and Being do real 8 things consist? Not-being, too, has several senses, inasmuch as Being has; and "not-man" means "not so-and-so," whereas "not straight" means "not such-and-such," and "not five feet long" means "not of such-and-such a size." What sort of Being and not-being, then, make existing things a plurality? This thinker means by the not-being 9

1089 a λέγειν τὸ οὐκ ὄν, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος πολλὰ τὰ
 ὄντα· διὸ καὶ ἐλέγετο ὅτι δεῖ ψεῦδός τι ὑποθέσθαι,
 ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ γεωμέτραι τὸ ποδιαίαν εἶναι τὴν μὴ
 ποδιαίαν· ἀδύνατον δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν· οὔτε γὰρ
 25 οἱ γεωμέτραι ψεῦδος οὐθέν ὑποτίθεται (οὐ γὰρ ἐν
 τῷ συλλογισμῷ ἢ πρότασις), οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ οὕτω μὴ
 ὄντος τὰ ὄντα γίνεταί οὐδὲ φθείρεται. ἀλλ'
 ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὰς πτώσεις μὴ ὄν ἰσαχῶς
 ταῖς κατηγορίαις λέγεται, παρὰ τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ὡς
 ψεῦδος λέγεται τὸ μὴ ὄν καὶ τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν, ἐκ
 τούτου ἢ γένεσις ἐστίν, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀνθρώπου
 30 δυνάμει δὲ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ
 λευκοῦ δυνάμει δὲ λευκοῦ λευκόν, ὁμοίως ἂν τε ἐν
 τι γίνηται ἂν τε πολλά. Φαίνεται δὲ ἡ ζήτησις
 πῶς πολλὰ τὸ ὄν τὸ κατὰ τὰς οὐσίας λεγόμενον·
 ἀριθμοὶ γὰρ καὶ μήκη καὶ σώματα τὰ γεννώμενά
 ἐστίν. ἀτοπον δὲ τὸ ὅπως μὲν πολλὰ τὸ ὄν τὸ τί
 35 ἐστὶ ζητῆσαι, πῶς δὲ ἡ ποιά ἢ ποσά, μή. οὐ γὰρ
 δὴ ἡ δυνάς ἢ ἀόριστος αἰτία οὐδὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ
 1089 b μικρὸν τοῦ δύο λευκά ἢ πολλὰ εἶναι χρώματα ἢ
 χυμοὺς ἢ σχήματα· ἀριθμοὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ταῦτα
 ἦσαν καὶ μονάδες. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ γε ταῦτ' ἐπήλθον,
 εἶδον ἂν τὸ αἴτιον καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνοις· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ
 καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον αἴτιον. Αὕτη γὰρ ἡ παρέκβασις
 5 αἰτία καὶ τοῦ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ζητοῦντας τῷ ὄντι
 καὶ τῷ ἐνί, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τούτων τὸ ὄντα, τὸ πρὸς τι

^a *Sophist.* 237 A, 240; but Aristotle's statement assumes too much.

^b Presumably by some Platonist.

^c i.e., the validity of a geometrical proof does not depend upon the accuracy of the figure.

^d Matter, according to Aristotle; and there is matter, or something analogous to it, in every category. Cf. XII. v.

which together with Being makes existing things a plurality, falsity and everything of this nature^a; and for this reason also it was said^b that we must assume something which is false, just as geometers assume that a line is a foot long when it is not. But 10 this cannot be so; for (a) the geometers do not assume anything that is false (since the proposition is not part of the logical inference^c), and (b) existing things are not generated from or resolved into not-being in this sense. But not only has "not-being" in its various cases as many meanings as there are categories, but moreover the false and the potential are called "not-being"; and it is from the latter that generation takes place—man comes to be from that which is not man but is potentially man, and white from that which is not white but is potentially white; no matter whether one thing is generated or many.

Clearly the point at issue is how "being" in the 11 sense of the substances is many; for the things that are generated are numbers and lines and bodies. It is absurd to inquire how Being as substance is many, and not how qualities or quantities are many. Surely the indeterminate dyad or the Great and 12 Small is no reason why there should be two whites or many colours or flavours or shapes; for then these too would be numbers and units. But if the Platonists had pursued this inquiry, they would have perceived the cause of plurality in substances as well; for the cause^d is the same, or analogous.

This deviation of theirs was the reason why in 13 seeking the opposite of Being and unity, from which in combination with Being and unity existing things are derived, they posited the relative (i.e. the un-

By not-
"being"
Plato meant
is not.

The
Platonists
went wrong
because
they con-

sidered their
inquiry to
"being" in
the sense of
substance.

ARISTOTLE

1089 b καὶ τὸ ἄνισον ὑποθεῖναι, ὃ οὐτ' ἐναντίον οὐτ'
 ἀπόφασις ἐκείνων, μία τε φύσις τῶν ὄντων ὥσπερ
 καὶ τὸ τί καὶ τὸ ποιόν. καὶ ζητεῖν ἔδει καὶ τοῦτο,
 πῶς πολλὰ τὰ πρὸς τι ἄλλ' οὐχ ἓν. νῦν δὲ πῶς μὲν
 10 πολλαὶ μονάδες παρὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἐν ζητεῖται, πῶς
 δὲ πολλὰ ἄνισα παρὰ τὸ ἄνισον οὐκέτι. καίτοι
 χρώνται καὶ λέγουσι μέγα μικρόν, πολὺ ὀλίγον, ἐξ
 ὧν οἱ ἀριθμοί, μακρὸν βραχύ, ἐξ ὧν τὸ μήκος,
 πλατὺ στενόν, ἐξ ὧν τὸ ἐπίπεδον, βαθὺ ταπεινόν,
 ἐξ ὧν οἱ ὄγκοι· καὶ ἔτι δὴ πλείω εἶδη λέγουσι τοῦ
 15 πρὸς τι. τούτοις δὴ τί αἷτιον τοῦ πολλὰ εἶναι ;

Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ὑποθεῖναι τὸ
 δυνάμει ὃν ἐκάστω. τοῦτο δὲ προσαπεφήνυτο ὁ
 ταῦτα λέγων, τί τὸ δυνάμει τόδε καὶ οὐσία,¹ μὴ ὃν
 δὲ καθ' αὐτό, ὅτι τὸ πρὸς τι, ὥσπερ εἰ εἶπε τὸ
 ποιόν, ὃ οὐτε δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἢ τὸ ὄν, οὐτε
 20 ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἓν τι τῶν
 ὄντων· πολὺ τε μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, εἰ ἐζητεῖ²
 πῶς πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα, μὴ τὰ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ κατηγορίᾳ
 ζητεῖν, πῶς πολλαὶ οὐσίαι ἢ πολλὰ ποιά, ἀλλὰ πῶς
 πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐσίαι, τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ
 δὲ πρὸς τι. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν
 25 ἔχει τινα καὶ ἄλλην ἐπίστασιν πῶς πολλὰ· διὰ γὰρ

¹ οὐσίᾳ E² Bekker.² ἐζητεῖτο E Syrianus².² Cf. ch. i. 6, 18, I. ix. 23.^b Plato.^c § 11.

equal), which is neither the contrary nor the negation of Being and unity, but is a single characteristic of existing things, just like substance or quality. They should have investigated this question also: how it is that relations are many, and not one. As 14 it is, they inquire how it is that there are many units besides the primary unity, but not how there are many unequal things besides the Unequal. Yet they employ in their arguments and speak of Great and Small, Many and Few (of which numbers are composed), Long and Short (of which the line is composed), Broad and Narrow (of which the plane is composed), Deep and Shallow (of which solids are composed); and they mention still further kinds of relation.^a Now what is the cause of plurality in these relations?

We must, then, as I say, presuppose in the case 15 of each thing that which is it potentially. The author^b of this theory further explained what it is that is potentially a particular thing or substance, but is not *per se* existent—that it is the relative (he might as well have said “quality”); which is neither potentially unity or Being, nor a negation of unity or Being, but just a particular kind of Being. And it was still more necessary, as we have said,^c 16 that, if he was inquiring how it is that things are many, he should not confine his inquiry to things in the same category, and ask how it is that substances or qualities are many, but that he should ask how it is that things in general are many; for some things are substances, some affections, and some relations. Now in the case of the other 17 categories there is an additional difficulty in discovering how they are many. For it may be said

It is “not being” in the sense of the potential that is the material principle.

1089 b

τὸ μὴ χωριστὰ εἶναι τῷ τὸ ὑποκείμενοι· πολλὰ
 γίνεσθαι καὶ εἶναι ποιά τε πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ ποσά·
 καίτοι δεῖ γέ τινα εἶναι ὕλην ἐκάστω γενεῇ, πλήν
 χωριστὴν ἀδύνατον τῶν οὐσιῶν· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν τόδε
 30 τι ἔχει τινα λόγον, πῶς πολλὰ τὸ τόδε τι, εἰ μὴ τι
 ἔσται καὶ τόδε τι καὶ φύσις τις τοιαύτη. αὕτη δέ
 ἐστὶν ἐκείθεν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπορία, πῶς πολλαὶ ἐν-
 εργεῖαι οὐσίαι ἀλλ' οὐ μία. Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ μὴ
 ταυτὸν ἐστὶ τὸ τόδε καὶ τὸ ποσόν, οὐ λέγεται πῶς
 καὶ διὰ τί πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ πῶς ποσὰ πολλὰ.
 35 ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς ποσόν τι σημαίνει· καὶ ἡ μονάς,
 εἰ μὴ μέτρον, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν ἀδιαίρετον.
 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον τὸ ποσόν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστίν, οὐ
 1090 a λέγεται τὸ τί ἐστίν ἐκ τίνος οὐδὲ πῶς πολλὰ· εἰ δέ
 ταυτό, πολλὰς ὑπομένει ὁ λέγων ἐναντιώσεις.

Ἐπιστήσκει δ' ἂν τις τὴν σκέψιν καὶ περὶ τῶν
 ἀριθμῶν πόθεν δεῖ λαβεῖν τὴν πίστιν ὥς εἰσίν.
 τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἰδέας τιθεμένων παρέχονται τιν' αἰτίαν
 5 τοῖς οὖσιν, εἴπερ ἕκαστος τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέα τις,
 ἢ δ' ἰδέα τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι ὅν δὴ ποτε
 τρόπον· ἔστω γὰρ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς τοῦτο· τῷ
 δὲ τοῦτον μὲν τὸν τρόπον οὐκ οἰομένῳ διὰ τὸ τὰς
 ἐνούσας δυσχερείας ὄραν περὶ τὰς ἰδέας (ὥστε διὰ
 γε ταῦτα μὴ ποιεῖν ἀριθμούς), ποιοῦντι δὲ ἀριθμὸν
 10 τὸν μαθηματικόν, πόθεν τε χρὴ πιστεῦσαι ὥς ἐστι

¹ ὅτι] καὶ ex comm. Ross.

^a This, according to Aristotle, is how the Platonists regard the Ideas. See Vol. I. Introd. p. xxli.

^b Plato and his orthodox followers.

^c Speusippus.

that since they are not separable, it is because the substrate becomes or is many that qualities and quantities are many: yet there must be some matter for each class of entities, only it cannot be separable from substances. In the case of particular substances, however, it is explicable how the particular thing can be many, if we do not regard a thing both as a particular substance and as a certain characteristic.^a The real difficulty which arises from these considerations is how substances are actually many and not one.

Again, even if a particular thing and a quantity are not the same, it is not explained how and why existing things are many, but only how quantities are many; for all number denotes quantity, and the 19 unit, if it does not mean a measure, means that which is quantitatively indivisible. If, then, quantity and substance are different, it is not explained whence or how substance is many; but if they are the same, he who holds this has to face many logical contradictions.

One might fasten also upon the question with respect to numbers, whence we should derive the belief that they exist. For one ^b who posits Ideas, 20 numbers supply a kind of cause for existing things; that is if each of the numbers is a kind of Idea, and the Idea is, in some way or other, the cause of existence for other things; for let us grant them this assumption. But as for him ^c who does not hold 21 this belief, because he can see the difficulties inherent in the Ideal theory (and so has not this reason for positing numbers), and yet posits mathematical number, what grounds have we for believing his statement that there is a number of this kind, and

Criticism of
the theory
of numbers

Why should
numbers
have a
separate
existence?

τοιοῦτος ἀριθμός, καὶ τί τοῖς ἄλλοις χρήσιμος; οὐθενὸς γὰρ οὔτε φησὶν ὁ λέγων αὐτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὴν τινα λέγει καθ' αὐτὴν φύσιν οὔσαι, οὔτε φαίνεται ὦν αἴτιος· τὰ γὰρ θεωρήματα τῶν ἀριθμητικῶν πάντα καὶ κατὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑπάρξει, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη.

III. Οἱ μὲν οὖν τιθέμενοι τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι καὶ ἀριθμοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι, (τῷ)¹ κατὰ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ἐκάστου² παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ λαμβάνειν [τὸ]³ ἔν τι ἕκαστον πειρῶνται γέ λέγειν πως⁴ διὰ τί ἔστιν οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖα οὔτε δυνατὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν διὰ γε ταῦτα εἶναι λεκτέον· οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι διὰ τὸ ὄραν πολλὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν πάθη ὑπάρχοντα τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς σώμασιν, εἶναι μὲν ἀριθμοὺς ἐποίησαν τὰ ὄντα, οὐ χωριστοὺς δέ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀριθμῶν τὰ ὄντα. διὰ τί δέ; ὅτι τὰ πάθη τὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐν ἀρμονίᾳ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις. Τοῖς δὲ τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον λέγουσιν εἶναι ἀριθμὸν οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον ἐνδέχεται λέγειν κατὰ τὰς ὑποθέσεις, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται αὐτῶν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἐλέγετο. ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμέν εἶναι, καθάπερ εἶπομεν πρότερον. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ κεχώρισται τὰ μαθηματικά· οὐ γὰρ ἂν κεχωρισμένων τὰ πάθη ὑπῆρχεν ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν Πυθαγόρειοι κατὰ μὲν

¹ τῷ ex Bessarion Ross, Joachim.

² ἕκαστον Joachim.

³ Maier.

⁴ πως Alexander, Bullinger: πῶς EA^bJ: πῶς καὶ recte.

^a XIII. iii. 1.

^b I have followed Ross's text and interpretation of this sentence. For the meaning cf. ii. 20.

^c See Vol. I. Introd. p. xvii.

^d Cf. vi. 5.

^e Cf. ii. 21.

what good is this number to other things? He who maintains its existence does not claim that it is the cause of anything, but regards it as an independent entity; nor can we observe it to be the cause of anything; for the theorems of the arithmeticians will all apply equally well to sensible things, as we have said.^a

III. Those, then, who posit the Ideas and identify them with numbers, by their assumption (in accordance with their method of abstracting each general term from its several concrete examples) that every general term is a unity, make some attempt to explain why number exists.^b Since, however, their arguments are neither necessarily true nor indeed possible, there is no justification on this ground for maintaining the existence of number. The Pythagoreans, on the other hand, observing that many attributes of numbers apply to sensible bodies, assumed that real things are numbers; not that numbers exist separately, but that real things are composed of numbers.^c But why? Because the attributes of numbers are to be found in a musical scale, in the heavens, and in many other connexions.^d

As for those who hold that mathematical number 3 alone exists,^e they cannot allege anything of this kind^f consistently with their hypotheses; what they did say was that the sciences could not have sensible things as their objects. But we maintain that they can; as we have said before.^g And clearly the objects of mathematics do not exist in separation; for if they did their attributes would not be present in corporeal things. Thus in this respect the Pyth- 4

^f *i.e.*, that things are composed of numbers.

^g *Cf.* note on II. 21 *ad fin.*

1090 a

τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐθενὶ ἔνοχοί εἰσιν, κατὰ μέντοι τὸ ποιεῖν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα, ἐκ μὴ ἐχόντων βάρος μηδὲ κουφότητα ἔχοντα κουφότητα καὶ βάρος, εἰκόασι περὶ ἄλλου οὐρανοῦ λέγειν καὶ
 * σωμάτων ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· οἱ δὲ χωριστὸν ποιοῦντες, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐκ ἔσται τὰ ἀξιώματα, ἀληθῆ δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ σαίνει τὴν
 1090 b ψυχὴν, εἶναί τε ὑπολαμβάνουσι καὶ χωριστὰ εἶναι· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τὰ μαθηματικά.

Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἐναντιούμενος λόγος τὰναντία ἐρεῖ, καὶ ὁ ἄρτι ἠπορήθη λυτέον τοῖς οὕτω λέγουσι, διὰ τί οὐδαμῶς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπαρχόντων τὰ
 * πάθη ὑπάρχει αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ ἐκ τοῦ πέρατα εἶναι καὶ ἔσχατα τὴν στιγμήν μὲν γραμμῆς, ταύτην δ' ἐπιπέδον, τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ στερεοῦ, οἷονται εἶναι ἀνάγκην τοιαύτας φύσεις εἶναι. δεῖ δὴ καὶ τοῦτον ὁρᾶν τὸν λόγον, μὴ λίαν ἤ μαλακός. οὔτε γὰρ οὐσίαι εἰσὶ τὰ
 10 ἔσχατα ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πάντα ταῦτα πέρατα (ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς βαδίσσεως καὶ ὅλως κινήσεώς ἐστὶ τι πέρας· τοῦτ' οὖν ἔσται τόδε καὶ οὐσία τις· ἀλλ' ἄτοπον)· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ εἰ καὶ εἰσὶ, τῶνδε τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔσσονται πάντα· ἐπὶ τούτων γὰρ ὁ λόγος εἴρηκεν· διὰ τί οὖν χωριστὰ ἔσται; Ἔτι δὲ ἐπιζητήσεεν ἂν τις μὴ λίαν εὐχερῆς ὦν περὶ

* See Vol. I. Introd. p. xvii.

* The statements of mathematics appeal so strongly to our intelligence that they must be true; therefore if they are not true of sensible things, there must be some class of objects of which they are true.

* The Pythagorean theory, which maintains that numbers not only are present in sensible things but actually compose them, is in itself an argument against the Speusippean view,

agoreans are immune from criticism; but in so far as they construct natural bodies, which have lightness and weight, out of numbers which have no weight or lightness, they appear to be treating of another universe and other bodies, not of sensible ones.^a But those who treat number as separable assume that it exists and is separable because the axioms will not apply to sensible objects; whereas the statements of mathematics are true and appeal to the soul.^b The same applies to mathematical extended magnitudes.

It is clear, then, both that the contrary theory^c can make out a case for the contrary view, and that those who hold this theory must find a solution for the difficulty which was recently raised^d—why it is that while numbers are in no way present in sensible things, their attributes are present in sensible things.

There are some^e who think that, because the point is the limit and extreme of the line, and the line of the plane, and the plane of the solid, there must be entities of this kind. We must, then, examine this⁷ argument also, and see whether it is not exceptionally weak. For (i.) extremes are not substances; rather all such things are merely limits. Even walking, and motion in general, has some limit; so on the view which we are criticizing this will be an individual thing, and a kind of substance. But this is absurd. And moreover (ii.) even if they are substances, they will all be substances of particular sensible things, since it was to these that the argument applied. Why, then, should they be separable?

Again, we may, if we are not unduly acquiescent,⁸ which in separating numbers from sensible things has to face the question why sensible things exhibit numerical attributes.^a § 3.

^a Probably Pythagoreans. Cf. VII. ii. 2, III. v. 3.

1090 b

15 μὲν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ παντὸς καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν τὸ
 μηθὲν συμβάλλεσθαι ἀλλήλοις τὰ πρότερα τοῖς
 ὕστερον· μὴ ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐθὲν ἦττον
 τὰ μεγέθη ἔσται τοῖς τὰ μαθηματικά μόνον εἶναι
 φασμένοις, καὶ τούτων μὴ ὄντων ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ τὰ
 σώματα τὰ αἰσθητά· οὐκ ἔοικε δ' ἢ φύσις ἐπεισ-
 20 οδιώδης οὔσα ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων, ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ
 τραγωδία. τοῖς δὲ τὰς ιδέας τιθεμένοις τοῦτο μὲν
 ἐκφεύγει· ποιοῦσι γὰρ τὰ μεγέθη ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ
 ἀριθμοῦ, ἐκ μὲν τῆς δυάδος τὰ μήκη, ἐκ τριάδος δ'
 ἴσως τὰ ἐπίπεδα, ἐκ δὲ τῆς τετράδος τὰ στερεὰ ἢ
 καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐθέν. ἀλλὰ
 25 ταῦτά γε πότερον ιδέαι ἔσονται, ἢ τίς ὁ τρόπος
 αὐτῶν, καὶ τί συμβάλλονται τοῖς οὖσιν; οὐθὲν
 γάρ, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ μαθηματικά, οὐδὲ ταῦτα συμ-
 βάλλεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπάρχει γε κατ' αὐτῶν
 οὐθὲν θεώρημα, εἰ μὴ τις βούληται κινεῖν τὰ
 μαθηματικά καὶ ποιεῖν ἰδίας τινὰς δόξας. ἔστι δ'
 30 οὐ χαλεπὸν ὁποιασοῦν ὑποθέσεις λαμβάνοντας
 μακροποιεῖν καὶ συνείρειν. Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ
 προσγλιχόμενοι ταῖς ιδέαις τὰ μαθηματικά δια-
 μαρτάνουσιν· οἱ δὲ πρῶτοι δύο τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ποιή-
 σαντες, τὸν τε τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν
 ἄλλον, οὐδαμῶς οὗτ' εἰρήκασιν οὗτ' ἔχουσιν ἄν
 35 εἰπεῖν πῶς καὶ ἐκ τίνος ἔσται ὁ μαθηματικός.
 ποιοῦσι γὰρ αὐτὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ
 αἰσθητοῦ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ,

^a That the criticism is directed against Speusippus is clear from VII. ii. 4. Cf. XII. x. 14.

^b Xenocrates (that the reference is not to Plato is clear from § 11).

^c e.g. that of "indivisible lines."

further object with regard to all number and mathematical objects that they contribute nothing to each other, the prior to the posterior. For if number does not exist, none the less spatial magnitudes will exist for those who maintain that only the objects of mathematics exist; and if the latter do not exist, the soul and sensible bodies will exist.^a But it does not appear, to judge from the observed facts, that the natural system lacks cohesion, like a poorly constructed drama. Those^b who posit the Ideas escape this difficulty, because they construct spatial magnitudes out of matter and a number—2 in the case of lines, and 3, presumably, in that of planes, and 4 in that of solids; or out of other numbers, for it makes no difference. But are we to regard these magnitudes as Ideas, or what is their mode of existence? and what contribution do they make to reality? They contribute nothing; just as the objects of mathematics contribute nothing. Moreover, no mathematical theorem applies to them, unless one chooses to interfere with the principles of mathematics and invent peculiar theories^c of one's own. But it is not difficult to take any chance hypotheses and enlarge upon them and draw out a long string of conclusions.

These thinkers, then, are quite wrong in thus striving to connect the objects of mathematics with the Ideas. But those who first recognized two kinds of number, the Ideal and the mathematical as well, neither have explained nor can explain in any way how mathematical number will exist and of what it will be composed; for they make it intermediate between Ideal and sensible number. For if it is composed of the Great and Small, it will be the same

Speusippus' theory gives no coherent account of reality.

and that of Xenocrates offers no explanation of the sensible universe

Plato cannot account for the separate existence of mathematical number.

1090 b

ὁ αὐτὸς ἐκείνῳ ἔσται τῷ τῶν ἰδεῶν (ἐξ ἄλλου δὲ
 1091 a τίνος¹ μικροῦ καὶ μεγάλου; τὰ γὰρ μεγέθη ποιεῖ).
 εἰ δ' ἑτερόν τι ἔρεϊ, πλείω τὰ στοιχεῖα ἔρεϊ· καὶ
 εἰ ἓν τι ἑκατέρου ἢ ἀρχή, κοινόν τι ἐπὶ τούτων
 ἔσται τὸ ἓν, ζητητέον τίς πῶς καὶ ταῦτα πολλὰ τὸ
 6 ἓν, καὶ ἅμα τὸν ἀριθμὸν γενέσθαι ἄλλως ἢ ἐξ ἑνὸς
 καὶ δυάδος ἀορίστου ἀδύνατον κατ' ἐκείνον.

Πάντα δὴ ταῦτα ἄλογα, καὶ μάχεται καὶ αὐτὰ
 ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς εὐλόγοις, καὶ ἔοικεν ἐν αὐτοῖς
 εἶναι ὁ Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος· γίνεταί γάρ
 ὁ μακρὸς λόγος ὥσπερ ὁ τῶν δούλων ὅταν μὴθὲν
 10 ὕγιες λέγωσιν. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα
 τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν βοᾶν ὡς ἐλκόμενα· οὐ
 δύναται γὰρ οὐδαμῶς γεννηῆσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀλλ'
 ἢ τὸν ἀφ' ἑνὸς διπλασιαζόμενον. Ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ
 γένεσιν ποιεῖν αἰδίων ὄντων, μᾶλλον δ' ἓν τι τῶν
 ἀδυνάτων. οἱ μὲν οὖν Πυθαγόρειοι πότερον οὐ
 ποιοῦσιν ἢ ποιοῦσι γένεσιν οὐδὲν δεῖ διστάζειν·
 16 φανερώς γὰρ λέγουσιν ὡς τοῦ ἑνὸς συσταθέντος,
 εἴτ' ἐξ ἐπιπέδων εἴτ' ἐκ χροιάς εἴτ' ἐκ σπέρματος
 εἴτ' ἐξ ὧν ἀποροῦσιν εἰπεῖν, εὐθύς τὸ ἐγγιστα
 τοῦ ἀπείρου ὅτι εἴλκετο καὶ ἐπεραίνετο ὑπὸ τοῦ

¹ τίνος cf. Ross: τίνος.

* This interpretation (Ross's second alternative, reading τίνος for τίνος) seems to be the most satisfactory. For the objection cf. III. iv. 34.

² The argument may be summarized thus. If mathematical number cannot be derived from the Great-and-Small or a species of the Great-and-Small, either it has a different material principle (which is not economical) or its formal principle is in some sense distinct from that of the Ideal numbers. But this implies that unity is a kind of plurality,

as the former, *i.e.* Ideal, number. But of what other Great and Small can it be composed? for Plato makes spatial magnitudes out of a Great and Small.^a And if he speaks of some other component, he will be maintaining too many elements; while if some one thing is the first principle of each kind of number, unity will be something common to these several kinds. We must inquire how it is that unity is these 13 many things, when at the same time number, according to him, cannot be derived otherwise than from unity and an indeterminate dyad.^b

All these views are irrational; they conflict both with one another and with sound logic, and it seems that in them we have a case of Simonides' "long story"; for men have recourse to the "long story," such as slaves tell, when they have nothing satisfactory to say. The very elements too, the Great 14 and Small, seem to protest at being dragged in; for they cannot possibly generate numbers except rising powers of 2.^c

It is absurd also, or rather it is one of the impossibilities of this theory, to introduce generation of things which are eternal. There is no reason to 15 doubt whether the Pythagoreans do or do not introduce it; for they clearly state that when the One had been constituted—whether out of planes or superficies or seed or out of something that they cannot explain—immediately the nearest part of the Infinite began to be drawn in and limited by the

If numbers are eternal,

it is absurd that they should be generated.

and number or plurality can only be referred to the dyad or material principle.

^a The exact reference is uncertain, but Aristotle probably means Simonides of Ceos. Cf. fr. 189 (Bergk).

^b Assuming that the Great-and-Small, or indeterminate dyad, is duplicative (XIII. vii. 18).

1091 a

πέρατος. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ κοσμοποιοῦσι καὶ φυσικῶς
βούλονται λέγειν, δίκαιον αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζειν τι περὶ
20 φύσεως, ἐκ δὲ τῆς νῦν ἀφεῖναι μεθόδου· τὰς γὰρ
ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις ζητοῦμεν ἀρχάς, ὥστε καὶ τῶν
ἀριθμῶν τῶν τοιούτων ἐπισκεπτέον τὴν γένεσιν.

IV. Τοῦ μὲν οὖν περιττοῦ γένεσιν οὐ φασιν, ὡς
δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ ἀρτίου οὔσης γενέσεως· τὸν δ'
25 ἄρτιον πρῶτον ἐξ ἀνίσων τινὲς κατασκευάζουσι
τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ ἰσασθέντων. ἀνάγκη οὖν
πρότερον ὑπάρχειν τὴν ἀνισότητα αὐτοῖς τοῦ ἰσα-
σθῆναι· εἰ δ' αἰετῶς ἦσαν ἰσασμένα, οὐκ ἂν ἦσαν ἄνισα
πρότερον· τοῦ γὰρ αἰετῶς οὐκ ἔστι πρότερον οὐθέν·
ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι οὐ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι ἔνεκεν ποιοῦσι
30 τὴν γένεσιν τῶν ἀριθμῶν.

Ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ
εὐπορήσαντι ἐπιτίμησιν, πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν
καὶ τὸ καλὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀπορίαν
μὲν ταύτην, πότερόν ἐστί τι ἐκείνων ὅλον βου-
λόμεθα λέγειν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ἢ
οὐ, ἀλλ' ὑστερογενῇ. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν θεολόγων
35 ἔοικεν ὁμολογεῖσθαι τῶν νῦν τισίν, οἱ οὐ φασιν,
ἀλλὰ προελθούσης τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως καὶ τὸ
ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦ-
σιν εὐλαβούμενοι ἀληθινὴν δυσχέρειαν ἢ συμβαίνει
1091 b τοῖς λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι, τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ· ἔστι δ'

* Cf. *Physics* III. iv., IV. vi. *ad fin.*, and Burnet, *E.G.P.* § 53.

^b The Platonists.

* This statement was probably symbolical. "They described the odd numbers as ungenerated because they likened them to the One, the principle of pure form" (Ross *ad loc.*).

^d Cf. XIII. vii. 5.

* Aristotle speaks as a Platonist. See Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxxii.

^f The Pythagoreans and Speusippus; cf. XII. vii. 10.

Limit.^a However, since they are here explaining ¹⁶ the construction of the universe and meaning to speak in terms of physics, although we may somewhat criticize their physical theories, it is only fair to exempt them from the present inquiry ; for it is the first principles in unchangeable things that we are investigating, and therefore we have to consider the generation of this kind of numbers.

IV. They ^b say that there is no generation of odd numbers,^c which clearly implies that there is generation of even ones ; and some hold that the even is constructed first out of unequals—the Great and Small—when they are equalized.^d Therefore the inequality must apply to them before they are equalized. If they had always been equalized they would not have been unequal before ; for there is nothing prior to that which has always been. Hence ² evidently it is not for the sake of a logical theory that they introduce the generation of numbers.

[A difficulty, and a discredit to those who make light of the difficulty, arises out of the question how the elements and first principles are related to the Good and the Beautiful. The difficulty is this : whether any of the elements is such as we mean when we ^e speak of the Good or the Supreme Good, or whether on the contrary these are later in generation than the elements. It would seem that there is an ³ agreement between the mythologists and some present-day thinkers,^f who deny that there is such an element, and say that it was only after some evolution in the natural order of things that both the Good and the Beautiful appeared. They do this to avoid a real difficulty which confronts those who hold, as some do, that unity is a first principle. This ⁴

Relation of the first principles to the good.

Some hold that goodness only appeared in the course of evolution.

1091 b

ἡ δυσχέρεια οὐ διὰ τὸ τῇ ἀρχῇ τὸ εὖ ἀποδιδόναι
 ὡς ὑπάρχον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὸ ἐν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἀρχὴν
 ὡς στοιχεῖον καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός. οἱ δὲ
 ποιηταὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ταύτῃ ὁμοίως, ἢ βασιλεύειν
 5 καὶ ἄρχειν φύσιν οὐ τοὺς πρῶτους οἷον νύκτα καὶ
 οὐρανὸν ἢ χάος ἢ ὠκεανόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν Δία. οὐ
 μὴν ἀλλὰ τούτοις μὲν διὰ τὸ μεταβάλλειν τοὺς
 ἄρχοντας τῶν ὄντων συμβαίνει τοιαῦτα λέγειν, ἐπεὶ
 οἱ γε μεμιγμένοι αὐτῶν [καὶ]¹ τῷ μὴ μυθικῶς
 10 πάντα² λέγειν, οἷον Φερεκύδης καὶ ἕτεροί τινες, τὸ
 γεννῆσαν πρῶτον ἄριστον τιθέασιν, καὶ οἱ Μάγοι, καὶ
 τῶν ὑστέρων δὲ σοφῶν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε καὶ
 Ἀναξαγόρας, ὁ μὲν τὴν φιλίαν στοιχεῖον, ὁ δὲ
 τὸν νοῦν ἀρχὴν ποιήσας. τῶν δὲ τὰς ἀκινήτους
 οὐσίας εἶναι λεγόντων οἱ μὲν φασιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τὸ
 15 ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι· οὐσίαν μέντοι τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ ὥοντο
 εἶναι μάλιστα. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπορία αὕτη, ποτέρως
 δεῖ λέγειν. θαυμαστὸν δ' εἰ τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ αἰδίῳ
 καὶ αὐταρκεστάτῳ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ πρῶτον οὐχ ὡς
 ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχει τὸ αὐταρκες καὶ ἡ σωτηρία.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ δι' ἄλλο τι ἄφθαρτον ἢ διότι εὖ ἔχει,
 20 οὐδ' αὐταρκες, ὥστε τὸ μὲν φάναι τὴν ἀρχὴν
 τοιαύτην εἶναι εὐλογον ἀληθὲς εἶναι· τὸ μέντοι
 ταύτην εἶναι τὸ ἐν, ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο, στοιχεῖόν γε³
 καὶ στοιχεῖον ἀριθμῶν, ἀδύνατον· συμβαίνει γὰρ

¹ Bonitz.² ἅπαντα rec.³ γε J Syrianus: τε.

^a Of Syros (circa 600-525 B.C.). He made Zeus one of the three primary beings (Diels, *Vorpolitik* 301, 302).

^b The Zoroastrian priestly caste.

difficulty arises not from ascribing goodness to the first principle as an attribute, but from treating unity as a principle, and a principle in the sense of an element, and then deriving number from unity. The early poets agree with this view in so far as they assert that it was not the original forces—such as Night, Heaven, Chaos or Ocean—but Zeus who was king and ruler. It was, however, on the ground 5 of the changing of the rulers of the world that the poets were led to state these theories; because those of them who compromise by not describing everything in mythological language—e.g. Pherecydes^a and certain others—make the primary generator the Supreme Good; and so do the Magi,^b and some of the later philosophers such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras: the one making Love an element,^c and the other making Mind a first principle.^d And 6 of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some^e identify absolute unity with absolute goodness; but they considered that the essence of goodness was primarily unity.

This, then, is the problem: which of these two 7 views we should hold. Now it is remarkable if that which is primary and eternal and supremely self-sufficient does not possess this very quality, viz. self-sufficiency and immunity, in a primary degree and as something good. Moreover, it is imperishable and self-sufficient for no other reason than because it is good. Hence it is probably true to say that the first principle is of this nature. But to say that this 8 principle is unity, or if not that, that it is an element, and an element of numbers, is impossible; for this

others make good-ness a first principle.

The latter

are probably right.

But to identify goodness

^a Cf. III. i. 13.

^d Cf. I. iii. 16.

^e Plato; cf. I. vi. 10.

1081 b

πολλή δυσχέρεια, ἣν ἔνιοι φεύγοντες ἀπειρήκασιν,
οἱ τὸ ἓν μὲν ὁμολογοῦντες ἀρχὴν εἶναι πρώτην
25 καὶ στοιχείον, τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δὲ τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ.
ἅπασαι γὰρ αἱ μονάδες γίνονται ὅπερ ἀγαθόν τι,
καὶ πολλή τις εὐπορία ἀγαθῶν. ἔτι εἰ τὰ εἶδη
ἀριθμοί, τὰ εἶδη πάντα ὅπερ ἀγαθόν τι· ἀλλὰ μὴν
ὅτου βούλεται τιθέντω τις εἶναι ιδέας· εἰ μὲν γὰρ
τῶν ἀγαθῶν μόνον, οὐκ ἔσονται οὐσίαι αἱ ιδέαι,
30 εἰ δὲ καὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν, πάντα τὰ ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ
ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα. Ταῦτά τε δὴ συμβαίνει
ἄτοπα, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον στοιχείον, εἴτε πλήθος ὄν
εἴτε τὸ ἄνισον καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρόν, τὸ κακὸν
αὐτό· διόπερ ὁ μὲν ἔφευγε τὸ ἀγαθὸν προσάπτειν
τῷ ἐνὶ ὧς ἀναγκαῖον ὄν, ἐπειδὴ ἐξ ἐναντίων ἡ
36 γένεσις, τὸ κακὸν τὴν τοῦ πλήθους φύσιν εἶναι, οἱ
δὲ λέγουσι τὸ ἄνισον τοῦ κακοῦ φύσιν· συμβαίνει
δὴ πάντα τὰ ὄντα μετέχειν τοῦ κακοῦ ἕξω ἑνὸς
αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνός, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀκράτου μετέχειν τοὺς
1082 a ἀριθμοὺς ἢ τὰ μεγέθη, καὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
χώραν εἶναι, καὶ μετέχειν καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ
φθαρτικοῦ· φθαρτικόν γὰρ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναν-
τίον. καὶ εἰ ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἡ ὕλη ἐστὶ τὸ
δυνάμει ἑκαστον, οἷον πυρὸς τοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ
5 δυνάμει πῦρ, τὸ κακὸν ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ δυνάμει
ἀγαθόν.

^a Speusippus and his followers; cf. § 3.

^b If unity is goodness, and every unit is a kind of unity, every unit must be a kind of goodness—which is absurd.

^c Because they are Ideas not of substances but of qualities.

^d Because the Ideas are goods.

^e Speusippus.

^f Plato and Xenocrates.

involves a serious difficulty, to avoid which some thinkers ^a have abandoned the theory (viz. those who agree that unity is a first principle and element, but of *mathematical* number). For on this view all units become identical with some good, and we get a great abundance of goods.^b Further, if the Forms ⁹ are numbers, all Forms become identical with some good. Again, let us assume that there are Ideas of anything that we choose. If there are Ideas only of goods, the Ideas will not be substances^c; and if there are Ideas of substances also, all animals and plants, and all things that participate in the Ideas, will be goods.^d

Not only do these absurdities follow, but it also follows that the contrary element, whether it is plurality or the unequal, i.e. the Great and Small, is absolute badness. Hence one thinker^e avoided associating the Good with unity, on the ground that since generation proceeds from contraries, the nature of plurality would then necessarily be bad. Others^f hold that inequality is the nature of the bad. It follows, then, that all things partake of the Bad except one—absolute unity; and that numbers partake of it in a more unmitigated form than do spatial magnitudes^g; and that the Bad is the province for the activity of the Good, and partakes of and tends towards that which is destructive of the Good; for a contrary is destructive of its contrary. And if, as we said,^h the matter of each thing is that which is it potentially—e.g., the matter of actual fire is that which is potentially fire—then the Bad will be simply the potentially Good.

^g As being more directly derived from the first principles. Cf. I. ix. 23 n.

^a Ch. I. 17.

Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα συμβαίνει, τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἀρχὴν
 πᾶσαν στοιχείῳ ποιοῦσι, τὸ δ' ὅτι τᾶναντίῳ ἀρχάς,
 τὸ δ' ὅτι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ, τὸ δ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς
 τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας καὶ χωριστὰ¹ καὶ εἶδη.

V. Εἰ οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ τιθέναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς
 10 ἀρχαῖς καὶ τὸ τιθέναι οὕτως ἀδύνατον, δῆλον ὅτι
 αἱ ἀρχαὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀποδίδονται οὐδὲ αἱ πρώται
 οὐσίαι. οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνει οὐδ' εἴ τις
 παρειαίνει τὰς τοῦ ὅλου ἀρχάς τῇ τῶν ζώων καὶ
 φυτῶν, ὅτι ἐξ ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν τε² αἰεὶ τὰ τελειό-
 15 τερα, διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πριύτων οὕτως ἔχειν φησίν,
 20 ὥστε μηδὲ ὅν τι εἶναι τὸ ἐν αὐτό. εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ
 ἐνταῦθα τέλειαι αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα· ἄνθρωπος
 γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ σπέρμα
 πρῶτον. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τόπον ἅμα τοῖς στε-
 ρεοῖς τοῖς³ μαθηματικοῖς ποιῆσαι (ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος
 τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἴδιος, διὸ χωριστὰ τόπων, τὰ δὲ
 20 μαθηματικὰ οὐ πού), καὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν μὲν ὅτι πού
 ἔσται, τί δὲ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος μή. *Ἐδεῖ δὲ τοὺς λέ-
 γοντας ἐκ στοιχείων εἶναι τὰ ὄντα καὶ τῶν ὄντων
 τὰ πρῶτα τοὺς ἀριθμούς, διελομένους πῶς ἄλλο
 ἐξ ἄλλου ἐστίν, οὕτω λέγειν τίνα τρόπον ὁ ἀρι-
 θμός ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν. πότερον μίξει; ἀλλ'

¹ χωριστὰς A^b.

² Ravaisson: διέ.

³ καὶ τοῖς E.

* Evidently Speusippus; cf. ch. iv. 3.

^b Speusippus argued that since all things are originally imperfect, unity, which is the first principle, must be imperfect, and therefore distinct from the good. Aristotle objects that the imperfect does not really exist, and so Speusippus deprives his first principle of reality.

Thus all these objections follow because (i.) they make every principle an element; (ii.) they make contraries principles; (iii.) they make unity a principle; and (iv.) they make numbers the primary substances, and separable, and Forms.

The four fundamental errors in the Platonic system

V. If, then, it is impossible both not to include the Good among the first principles, and to include it in this way, it is clear that the first principles are not being rightly represented, nor are the primary substances. Nor is a certain thinker^a right in his assumption when he likens the principles of the universe to that of animals and plants, on the ground that the more perfect forms are always produced from those which are indeterminate and imperfect, and is led by this to assert that this is true also of the ultimate principles; so that not even unity itself is a real thing.^b He is wrong; for even in the natural world the principles from which these things are derived are perfect and complete—for it is man that begets man; the seed does not come first.^c It is absurd also to generate space simultaneously with the mathematical solids (for space is peculiar to particular things, which is why they are separable in space, whereas the objects of mathematics have no position) and to say that they must be somewhere, and yet not explain what their spatial position is.

Objectives to the hypotheses

Those who assert that reality is derived from elements, and that numbers are the primary realities, ought to have first distinguished the senses in which one thing is derived from another, and then explained in what way number is derived from the first principles. Is it by mixture? But (a) not

How is number derived from the first principles?

^a Cf. IX. viii. 5.

1082 a

20 οὔτε πᾶν μικτόν, τό τε γιγνόμενον ἕτερον, οὐκ ἔσται
 τε χωριστόν τὸ ἐν οὐδ' ἑτέρα φύσις· οἱ δὲ βούλον-
 ται. ἀλλὰ συνθέσει, ὥσπερ συλλαβήν¹; ἀλλὰ θέσω
 τε ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν, καὶ χωρὶς ὁ νοῶν νοήσει
 τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ πλήθος. τοῦτ' οὖν ἔσται ὁ ἀριθμός,
 μονὰς καὶ πλήθος, ἢ τὸ ἐν καὶ ἄνισον. Καὶ ἐπεὶ

30 τὸ ἐκ τινῶν εἶναι ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἐνυπαρχόντων
 ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ, ποτέρως ὁ ἀριθμός; οὕτως γὰρ
 ὡς ἐνυπαρχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλ' ἢ ὧν γένεσις
 ἔστιν. ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπὸ σπέρματος; ἀλλ' οὐχ οἶόν τε
 τοῦ ἀδιαϊρέτου τι ἀπελθεῖν. ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκ τοῦ ἐναν-
 τίου μὴ ὑπομένοντος; ἀλλ' ὅσα οὕτως ἔστι, καὶ
 85 ἐξ ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν ὑπομένοντος. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὸ

1082 b ἐν ὁ μὲν τῷ πλήθει ὡς ἐναντίον τίθησιν, ὁ δὲ τῷ
 ἀνίσω, ὡς ἴσω τῷ ἐνὶ χρώμενος, ὡς ἐξ ἐναντίων
 εἶη ἂν ὁ ἀριθμός· ἔστιν ἄρα τι ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ ὑπο-
 μένοντος καὶ θατέρου ἐστὶν ἢ γέγονεν. Ἐπεὶ τί
 δὴ ποτε τὰ μὲν ἄλλ' ὅσα ἐξ ἐναντίων ἢ οἷς ἔστιν
 5 ἐναντία φθείρεται, καὶ ἐκ παντός ἢ, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμός
 οὐ; περὶ τούτου γὰρ οὐθὲν λέγεται. καίτοι καὶ
 ἐνυπάρχον καὶ μὴ ἐνυπάρχον φθείρει τὸ ἐναντίον,

¹ συλλαβή E Alexander.

* e.g. to admit of mixture a thing must first have a separate existence, and the Great-and-Small, which is an affection or quality of number (ch. i. 14) cannot exist separately.

^b sc. when it has once been mixed. Cf. *De Gen. et Corr.* 327 b 21-26.

* And numbers are supposed to be eternal. Cf. ch. ii. 1-3.

* i.e., unity, being indivisible, cannot contribute the formal principle of generation in the way that the male parent contributes it.

* Speusippus: Plato. Cf. ch. i. 5.

† The objection is directed against the Platonist treatment of the principles as contraries (cf. iv. 12), and may be illus-

METAPHYSICS, XIV. v. 3-6

everything admits of mixture ^a; (b) the result of mixture is something different; and unity will not be separable,^b nor will it be a distinct entity, as they intend it to be. Is it by composition, as we hold of the syllable? But (a) this necessarily implies position; (b) in thinking of unity and plurality we shall think of them separately. This, then, is what number will be—a unit *plus* plurality, or unity *plus* the Unequal.

And since a thing is derived from elements either as inherent or as not inherent in it, in which way is number so derived? Derivation from inherent elements is only possible for things which admit of generation.^c Is it derived as from seed? But no-⁵ thing can be emitted from that which is indivisible.^d Is it derived from a contrary which does not persist? But all things which derive their being in this way derive it also from something else which does persist. Since, therefore, one thinker ^e regards unity as contrary to plurality, and another ^f (treating it as the Equal) as contrary to the Unequal, number must be derived as from contraries. Hence there is some-⁰ thing else which persists from which, together with one contrary, number is or has been derived.^f

Further, why on earth is it that whereas all other things which are derived from contraries or have contraries perish, even if the contrary is exhausted in producing them,^g number does not perish? Of this no explanation is given; yet whether it is inherent or not, a contrary is destructive; e.g., Strife

translated by XII. i. 5-ii. 2. Plurality, as the contrary of unity, is privation, not matter; the Platonists should have derived numbers from unity and some other principle which is truly material.

^g Because it may be regarded as still potentially present.

1092 b

οἷον τὸ νείκος τὸ μῖγμα· καίτοι γε¹ οὐκ ἔδει· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνω² γε ἐναντίον. Οὐθὲν δὲ διώρισται οὐδὲ ὁποτέρως οἱ ἀριθμοὶ αἷτιοι τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι, πότερον ὡς ὄροι (οἷον αἱ στιγμαὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν, καὶ ὡς Εὐρυτος ἔταττε τίς ἀριθμὸς τίνος, οἷον ὁδὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπου ὁδὶ δὲ ἵππου, ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἄγοντες εἰς τὰ σχήματα τρίγωνον καὶ τετράγωνον, οὕτως ἀφομοιωὶν ταῖς ψήφοις τὰς μορφὰς τῶν φυτῶν), ἢ ὅτι [ὁ]³ λόγος ἢ⁴ συμφωνία ἀριθμῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον; τὰ δὲ δὴ πάθη πῶς ἀριθμοί, τὸ λευκὸν καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ θερμόν; ὅτι δὲ οὐχ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ οὐσία⁵ οὐδὲ τῆς μορφῆς αἷτιοι, δηλόν· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἢ οὐσία, ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς ὕλη. οἷον σαρκὸς ἢ ὅσπου ἀριθμὸς ἢ οὐσία οὕτω, τρία πυρός, γῆς δὲ δύο· καὶ αἰεὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅς ἂν ᾖ τινῶν ἐστίν, ἢ πύρινος ἢ γῆινος ἢ μοναδικός, ἀλλ' ἢ οὐσία τὸ τοσόνδ' εἶναι πρὸς τοσόνδε κατὰ τὴν μίξιν· τοῦτο δ' οὐκέτι ἀριθμὸς ἀλλὰ λόγος μίξεως ἀριθμῶν σωματικῶν ἢ ὁποιωνοῦν. οὔτε οὖν τῷ ποιῆσαι αἷτιος ὁ ἀριθμὸς, οὔτε ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς οὔτε ὁ μοναδικός, οὔτε ὕλη οὔτε λόγος καὶ εἶδος τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὡς τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα.

¹ γε om. recce.² ἐκείνω E.³ Bonitz.⁴ ἢ E Alexander: ἢ.⁵ οὐσίαι recce.^{*} According to Empedocles, fr. 17 (Diels).^b The theories criticized from this point onwards to ch. vi. 11 are primarily Pythagorean. See Vol. I. Introđ. p. xvii.^c e.g. the line by 2 points, the triangle (the simplest plane figure) by 3, the tetrahedron (the simplest solid figure) by 4.^d Disciple of Philolaus; he "flourished" in the early fourth century B.C.

destroys the mixture.^a It should not, however, do this ; because the mixture is not its contrary.

Nor is it in any way defined in which sense numbers 7 are the causes of substances and of Being ; whether as bounds,^b e.g. as points are the bounds of spatial magnitudes,^c and as Eurytus^d determined which number belongs to which thing—e.g. this number to man, and this to horse—by using pebbles to copy the shape of natural objects, like those who arrange numbers in the form of geometrical figures, the triangle and the square.^e Or is it because harmony 8 is a ratio of numbers, and so too is man and everything else ? But in what sense are attributes --white, and sweet, and hot—numbers ?^f And clearly numbers are not the essence of things, nor are they causes of the form ; for the ratio^g is the essence, and number^h is matter. E.g. the essence of flesh 9 or bone is number only in the sense that it is three parts of fire and two of earth.ⁱ And the number, whatever it is, is always a number of something ; of particles of fire or earth, or of units. But the essence is the proportion of one quantity to another in the mixture ; i.e. no longer a number, but a ratio of the mixture of numbers, either of corporeal particles or of any other kind. Thus number is not an efficient cause—neither number in general, nor that which consists of abstract units—nor is it the matter, nor the formula or form of things. Nor again is it a final cause.

^a Cf. Burnet, *B.G.P.* § 47.

^b This is an objection to the view that numbers are causes as bounds.

^c Or "formula."

^d In the sense of a number of material particles.

^e Cf. Empedocles fr. 96 (Diels).

1092 b

VI. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις καὶ τί τὸ εὖ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῷ¹ ἐν ἀριθμῷ εἶναι τὴν μῖξιν, ἢ ἐν εὐλογίστῳ ἢ ἐν περιττῷ. νυνὶ γὰρ οὐθὲν ὑγιεινότερον τρεῖς τρία ἂν ἢ τὸ μελίκρατον κεκρα-
 10 μένον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὠφελήσειεν ἂν ἐν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ ὃν ὕδαρες δὲ ἢ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ἄκρατον ὄν. ἔτι οἱ λόγοι ἐν προσθέσει ἀριθμῶν εἰσὶν οἱ τῶν μίξεων, οὐκ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς, οἷον τρία πρὸς δύο, ἀλλ' οὐ τρεῖς δύο. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ δεῖ γένος εἶναι ἐν ταῖς πολλα-
 15 πλασιώσεσιν, ὥστε δεῖ μετρεῖσθαι τῷ τε Α τὸ στοιχείον ἐφ' οὗ ΑΒΓ καὶ τῷ Δ τὸν ΔΕΖ· ὥστε τῷ αὐτῷ πάντα. οὐκ οὖν² ἔσται πυρὸς ΒΕΓΖ,
 1093 a καὶ ὕδατος ἀριθμὸς δις τρία. Εἰ δ' ἀνάγκη πάντα ἀριθμοῦ κοινωνεῖν, ἀνάγκη πολλὰ συμ-
 βαίνειν τὰ αὐτά, καὶ ἀριθμὸν τὸν αὐτὸν τῷδε καὶ ἄλλῳ. ἅρ' οὖν τοῦτ' αἴτιον καὶ διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἢ ἄδηλον; οἷον ἔστι τις τῶν τοῦ ἡλίου
 6 φορῶν ἀριθμὸς, καὶ πάλιν τῶν τῆς σελήνης, καὶ τῶν ζώων γε ἐκάστου τοῦ βίου καὶ ἡλικίας· τί οὖν κωλύει ἐνίοις μὲν τούτων τετραγώνους εἶναι ἐνίοις δὲ κύβους, καὶ ἴσους, τοὺς δὲ διπλασίους; οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐν τούτοις στρέφε-

¹ τῷ Alexander: τὸ ΕΛ^b.² οὐκ οὖν Bonitz: οὐκοῦν.^a i.e., a simple ratio.^b It is hard to see exactly what this means. If the terms of a ratio are rational, one of them must be odd. Alexander says a ratio like 1:3 is meant. Oddness was associated with goodness (cf. I. v. 6).^c Apparently the Pythagoreans meant by this "three parts of water to three of honey." Aristotle goes on to criticize this way of expressing ratios.^d Cf. previous note.

VI. The question might also be raised as to what the good is which things derive from numbers because their mixture can be expressed by a number, either one which is easily calculable,^a or an odd number.^b For in point of fact honey-water is no more wholesome if it is mixed in the proportion "three times three"^c; it would be more beneficial mixed in no particular proportion, provided that it be diluted, than mixed in an arithmetical proportion, but strong. Again, 2 the ratios of mixtures are expressed by the relation of numbers, and not simply by numbers; e.g., it is 3 : 2, not 3×2 ^d; for in products of multiplication the units must belong to the same genus. Thus the product of $1 \times 2 \times 3$ must be measurable by 1, and the product of $4 \times 5 \times 7$ by 4. Therefore all products which contain the same factor must be measurable by that factor. Hence the number of fire cannot be $2 \times 5 \times 3 \times 7$ if the number of water is 2×3 .^e

If all things must share in number, it must follow 8 that many things are the same; i.e., that the same number belongs both to this thing and to something else. Is number, then, a cause; i.e., is it because of number that the object exists? Or is this not conclusive? E.g., there is a certain number of the sun's motions, and again of the moon's,^f and indeed of the life and maturity of every animate thing. What reason, then, is there why some of these numbers should not be squares and others cubes, some equal and others double? There is no reason; 4 all things must fall within this range of numbers if,

^a so, because if so, a particle of fire would simply equal 35 particles of water.

^f 5 in each case, according to Aristotle; cf. XII. vii. 9, 11.

σθαι, εἰ ἀριθμοῦ πάντα ἐκωνώνει, ἐνεδέχεται τε
 10 τὰ διαφέροντα ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν πίπτειν·
 ὥστ' εἰ τις ὁ αὐτὸς ἀριθμὸς συνεβεβήκει, ταῦτα
 ἂν ᾤν ἀλλήλοις ἐκείνα τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἀριθμοῦ
 ἔχοντα, ὅσον ἡλῖος καὶ σελήνη τὰ αὐτά. ἀλλὰ διὰ
 τί αἷτια ταῦτα; ἐπτὰ μὲν φωνήεντα, ἐπτὰ δὲ
 χορδαὶ ἢ ἁρμονία,¹ ἐπτὰ δὲ αἱ πλειάδες, ἐν ἐπτὰ
 15 δὲ ὀδόντας βάλλει (ἐνία γε, ἐνια δ' οὐ), ἐπτὰ δὲ οἱ
 ἐπὶ Θήβας. ἄρ' οὖν ὅτι τοιοσδὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς πέφυκεν,
 διὰ τοῦτο ἢ ἐκεῖνοι ἐγένοντο ἐπτὰ ἢ ἡ πλειὰς
 ἐπτὰ ἀστέρων ἐστίν; ἢ οἱ μὲν διὰ τὰς πύλας ἢ
 ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν, τὴν δὲ ἡμεῖς οὕτως ἀριθμοῦμεν,
 20 τὴν δὲ ἄρκτον γε δώδεκα, οἱ δὲ πλείους· ἐπεὶ καὶ
 τὸ Ξ Ψ Ζ συμφωνίας φασὶν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι ἐκεῖναι
 τρεῖς, καὶ ταῦτα τρία· ὅτι δὲ μυρία ἂν εἶη τοιαῦτα,
 οὐθὲν μέλει (τῷ² γὰρ Γ καὶ Ρ εἶη ἂν ἐν σημείον).
 εἰ δ' ὅτι διπλάσιον τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ἄλλο δ'
 οὐ, αἷτιον δ' ὅτι τριῶν ὄντων τόπων ἐν ἐφ' ἐκά-
 25 στου ἐπιφέρεται τῷ σίγμα, διὰ τοῦτο τρία μόνον
 ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι αἱ συμφωνίαι τρεῖς, ἐπεὶ
 πλείους γε αἱ συμφωνίαι, ἐνταῦθα δ' οὐκέτι
 δύναται.

Ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ὀμηρικοῖς,
 οἱ μικρὰς ὁμοιότητας ὁρῶσι μεγάλας δὲ παρ-
 ὁρῶσιν.

¹ ἢ ἁρμονία E. Alexandri lemma: ἢ ἁρμονίαι.

² τὸ Alexander, Syrianus.

* Cf. previous note.

^b In the Greek alphabet.

* In the old heptachord: cf. note on V. xi. 4.

^d Cf. *Hist. An.* 576 a 6.

^e According to Alexander ζ was connected with the fourth, ξ with the fifth, and ψ with the octave.

^f θ, φ, and χ are aspirated, not double, consonants.

^g Palate, lips, and teeth.

as was assumed, all things share in number, and different things may fall under the same number. Hence if certain things happened to have the same number, on the Pythagorean view they would be the same as one another, because they would have the same form of number; e.g., sun and moon would be the same.^a But why are these numbers causes? ⁵ There are seven vowels,^b seven strings to the scale,^c seven Pleiads; most animals (though not all^d) lose their teeth in the seventh year; and there were seven heroes who attacked Thebes. Is it, then, because the number 7 is such as it is that there were seven heroes, or that the Pleiads consist of seven stars? Surely there were seven heroes because of the seven gates, or for some other reason, and the Pleiads are seven because we count them so; just as we count the Bear as 12, whereas others count more stars in both. Indeed, they assert also ⁶ that Ξ, Ψ, and Ζ are concords,^e and that because there are three concords, there are three double consonants. They ignore the fact that there might be thousands of double consonants—because there might be one symbol for 1P. But if they say that each of these letters is double any of the others, whereas no other is,^f and that the reason is that there are three regions ^g of the mouth, and that one consonant is combined with σ in each region, it is for this reason that there are only three double consonants, and not because there are three concords—because there are really more than three; but there cannot be more than three double consonants.

Thus these thinkers are like the ancient Homeric ⁷ scholars, who see minor similarities but overlook important ones.

1093 a

- Λέγουσι δέ τινες ὅτι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον αἱ
 90 τε μέσαι ἢ μὲν ἐννέα ἢ δὲ ὀκτώ, καὶ τὸ ἔπος
 1093 b δεκαεπτὰ, ἰσάριθμον τούτοις, βαίνεται δ' ἐν μὲν
 τῷ δεξιῷ ἐννέα συλλαβαῖς ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀριστερῷ
 ὀκτώ, καὶ ὅτι ἴσον τὸ διάστημα ἐν τε τοῖς γράμ-
 μασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ Α πρὸς τὸ Ω καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ βόμβυκος
 ἐπὶ τὴν ὀξυτάτην [νεάτην]¹ ἐν αὐλοῖς, ἧς ὁ ἀριθμὸς
 5 ἴσος τῇ οὐλομελείᾳ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. ὁρᾶν δὲ δεῖ μὴ
 τοιαῦτα οὐθεὶς ἂν ἀπορήσειεν οὔτε λέγειν οὔθ'
 εὐρίσκειν ἐν τοῖς αἰδίοις, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φθαρτοῖς.
 Ἄλλ' αἱ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς φύσεις αἱ ἐπαινούμεναι
 καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία καὶ ὅλως τὰ ἐν τοῖς μαθή-
 10 μασιν, ὡς μὲν λέγουσί τινες καὶ αἷτια ποιοῦσι τῆς
 φύσεως, ἔοικεν οὕτωςί γε σκοποῦμένοις διαφεύ-
 γειν· κατ' οὐθένα γὰρ τρόπον τῶν διωρισμένων
 περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς οὐθέν αὐτῶν αἷτιον. ἔστιν ὡς²
 μέντοι ποιοῦσι φανερόν ὅτι τὸ εὖ ὑπάρχει καὶ τῆς
 συστοιχίας ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ περιττόν, τὸ
 εὐθύ, τὸ ἰσάκεις ἴσον,³ αἱ δυνάμεις ἐνίων ἀριθμῶν.
 15 ἅμα γὰρ ὦραι καὶ ἀριθμὸς τοιοσδί· καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ
 ὅσα συνάγουσιν ἐκ τῶν μαθηματικῶν θεωρημάτων

¹ Diels.² ὡς A^b Alexander: ἐκείνο JI¹ Syrianus: om. E.³ ἰσάκεις ἴσον: ἰσάριθμον E: ἴσον A^b.

^a i.e., the μέση (fourth) and παραμέση (fifth), whose ratios can be expressed as 8 : 6, 9 : 6.

^b i.e., a dactylic hexameter whose sixth foot is always a spondee or trochee has nine syllables in the first three feet and eight in the last three. For τὸ δεξιόν meaning "the first part" of a metrical system see Bassett, *Journal of Classical Philology* xi. 458-460.

^c Alexander suggests that the number 24 may have been made up of the 12 signs of the zodiac, the 8 spheres (fixed stars, five planets, sun and moon) and 4 elements.

Some say that there are many correspondences of this kind; *e.g.*, the middle notes ^a of the octave are respectively 8 and 9, and the epic hexameter has seventeen syllables, which equals the sum of these two; and the line scans in the first half with nine syllables, and in the second with eight.^b And they ⁸ point out that the interval from *α* to *ω* in the alphabet is equal to that from the lowest note of a flute to the highest, whose number is equal to that of the whole system of the universe.^c We must realize that no one would find any difficulty either in discovering or in stating such correspondences as these in the realm of eternal things, since they occur even among perishable things.

As for the celebrated characteristics of number, ⁹ and their contraries, and in general the mathematical properties, in the sense that some describe them and make them out to be causes of the natural world, it would seem that if we examine them along these lines, they disappear; for not one of them is a cause in any of the senses which we distinguished with respect to the first principles.^d There is a sense, ¹⁰ however, in which these thinkers make it clear that goodness is predicable of numbers, and that the odd, the straight, the equal-by-equal,^e and the powers ^f of certain numbers, belong to the series of the Beautiful.^g For the seasons are connected with a certain kind of number ^h; and the other examples which they adduce from mathematical theorems all have

There is a certain analogy between numbers and things; but the relation is not causal.

^a Cf. I. iii. 1, V. i., ii.

^b *i.e.*, square.

^c Probably their "power" of being represented as regular figures; *e.g.* the triangularity of 3 \therefore or 6 \therefore .

^d Cf. I. v. 6.

^e *i.e.*, 4.

1098 b

πάντα ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν. διὸ καὶ ἔοικε
 συμπτώμασιν· ἔστι γὰρ συμβεβηκότα μέν, ἀλλ'
 οἰκεῖα ἀλλήλοις πάντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ¹ ἀνάλογον· ἐν
 ἐκάστη γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος κατηγορία ἐστὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον,
 20 ὡς εὐθὺ ἐν μήκει οὕτως ἐν πλάτει τὸ ὁμαλόν, ἴσως
 ἐν ἀριθμῷ τὸ περιττόν, ἐν δὲ χροίᾳ² τὸ λευκόν.

Ἔτι οὐχ οἱ ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσιν ἀριθμοὶ αἷτιοι τῶν ἀρ-
 μονικῶν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων (διαφέρουσι γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι
 ἀλλήλων οἱ ἴσοι εἶδει· καὶ γὰρ αἱ μονάδες)· ὥστε
 διὰ γε ταῦτα εἶδη οὐ ποιητέον. Τὰ μὲν οὖν
 25 συμβαίνοντα ταῦτά τε κἄν ἔτι πλείω συναχθεῖη.
 ἔοικε δὲ τεκμήριον εἶναι τὸ πολλὰ κακοπαθεῖν
 περὶ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν καὶ μηδένα τρόπον δύ-
 νασθαι συνεῖραι τοῦ μὴ χωριστὰ εἶναι τὰ μαθημα-
 τικὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ὡς ἐνιοὶ λέγουσι, μηδὲ ταύτας
 εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς.

¹ τῷ] τὸ A^b.² χροῖα E.

* Aristotle has argued (XIII. vi.-viii.) that if the Ideal numbers differ in kind, their units must differ in kind. Hence even equal numbers, being composed of different

the same force. Hence they would seem to be mere 11
 coincidences, for they are accidental; but all the
 examples are appropriate to each other, and they
 are one by analogy. For there is analogy between
 all the categories of Being—as “straight” is in
 length, so is “level” in breadth, perhaps “odd”
 in number, and “white” in colour.

Again, it is not the Ideal numbers that are the 12
 causes of harmonic relations, etc. (for Ideal numbers,
 even when they are equal, differ in kind, since their
 units also differ in kind)^a; so on this ground at least
 we need not posit *Forms*. Ideal numbers cannot even express relations.

Such, then, are the consequences of the theory, 13
 and even more might be adduced. But the mere
 fact that the Platonists find so much trouble with
 regard to the generation of Ideal numbers, and can
 in no way build up a system, would seem to be a
 proof that the objects of mathematics are not separ-
 able from sensible things, as some maintain, and that
 the first principles are not those which these thinkers
 assume. Hence the Platonists are clearly mistaken with respect to the first principles.

units, must be different in kind. In point of fact, since each
 Ideal number is unique, no two of them could be equal.

INDEX TO
ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS
Books I-XIV

INDEX TO THE METAPHYSICS

Accident, accidental (*συμβεβηκός*), defined, v. xxx., implies predication, iv. iv. 48; accidental Being, v. vi. 1, vii. 1, vi. ii. 1, xi. viii.; causes, v. ii. 11, vi. iii., identity, v. ix. 1; predication, vii. vi. 2; quantity, v. xiii. 2; relations, v. xv. 11, unity, v. vi. 1. See Attribute

Activity, relative, v. xv. 6; and actuality, ix. viii. 11; of heavenly bodies, 16 18

Actuality (*ἐνέργεια*), = form or formula, viii. ii. 1, xii. v. 2, cf. vii. xiii. 1; X concrete substance, viii. iii.; and complete reality and motion, ix. iii. 9; X potentiality, ix. vi. 1; X motion, ix. vi. 7; prior to potentiality, ix. viii., xii. vi. 5, cf. xii. vii. 11; resides in subject or object of action, ix. viii. 13; imperishable things actual, 16 17, cf. xii. vi. 4; good actuality better than good potentiality, ix. ix.; as a common cause, xii. v. 1; and pleasure, xii. vii. 7

Affection (*πάθος*), defined, v. xxi

Alcmaeon, i. v. 7

All, defined, v. xxv. 3

Alteration, = change of affection or quality, xii. ii. 1, xiv. i. 16, impossible on Empedocles' view, i. viii. 9

Always X usually, vi. ii. 6, 11

Analytics, quoted, vii. xii. 1

Anaxagoras, theory of particles, i. iii. 9, vii. 2, x. vi. 6; of Mind, i. iii. 17, iv. 5, vi. 10, viii. 10, xii. vi. 9, x. 8, xiv. iv. 5; of Mixture, i. viii. 11, ix. 11, iv. iv. 28, v. 5, xi. vi. 17, xii. ii. 3,

xiii. v. 3; of subjective reality, iv. v. 13, vii. 8

Anaximander, xii. ii. 3, cf. x. i. 7, ii. 1

Anaximenes, i. iii. 8, cf. iii. i. 13, x. ii. 1

Anticithon or counter-earth, i. v. 3

Antisthenes, v. xix. 4, viii. iii. 7

Appearances, theory of truth in, iv. v. vi. See Impression

Appetite, xii. v. 1, vii. 2

Archytas, viii. ii. 9

Aristippus, iii. ii. 4

Arithmetic, i. ii. 5; cf. iv. iii. 3, xiv. ii. 21

Art, and science and experience, i. i. 8 ff.; = form, vii. iv. 3, xii. iii. 9; arts called "beginnings," v. i. 2; all arts potencies, ix. ii. 1, cf. v. 1

Astronomy, i. viii. 17, iii. ii. 23, 26, vi. i. 11, x. i. 15, xii. viii. 7, xiii. ii. 9

Atoms, v. xxiii. 3

Attributes (*συμβεβηκέντα*), whether studied by the science of substance, iii. i. 8, ii. 13, iv. i. 1, xi. iii. 8, per se or peculiar, vii. v. 2, xiii. iii. 5; how are they numbers? xiv. v. 8

Axioma, iii. ii. 11, iv. iii. 1, 12, xi. iv.

Bad, and Great-and-Small, unequal, plurality, xiv. iv. 10. See Good, Evil

Bats, ii. i. 3

Beautiful, and Good, v. i. 8, xii. vii. 10, xiv. iv. 2, vi. 10; X Good, xiii. iii. 10

Bees, i. i. 8

Beginning, defined, v. i.; a kind of

ARISTOTLE

limit, v. xvii. 2. See Principle.
Starting-Point
Being, defined, v. vii; various senses, iv. ii. 8, v. 6, v. x, 4, xi. 7, xi. ii. 1, vii. i. 1, iv. 4, viii. ii. 8, ix. i. 2, x. 1, xi. ii. 1, xii. ii. 10, xiv. ii. 6; **Being** *qua* **Being** the subject of metaphysics, iv. i., ii. 6, vi. i. 1, xi. ii. 1, modifications of, iv. ii. 18; and unity, iii. iii. 4, 6, iv. 24, iv. 6, 21, vii. xvi. 3, viii. vi. 6, x. ii. 4; as substance, iii. i. 18, iv. 21, vii. i., xi. ii. 8; all senses refer to substance, iv. ii. 1, ix. i. 1; not substance, iii. iv. 20, vii. xvi. 3; most universal term, iii. iv. 27, x. ii. 2, xi. i. 10; not a universal, iv. ii. 24; as genus, iii. iii. 4; not a genus, iii. iii. 7, xi. i. 11; not an element, xii. iv. 3, not a dual cause, i. vii. 6; potential & actual, v. vii. 9, ix. i. 2; accidental, v. vii. 1, vi. ii. 1, iii. xi. vii.; as truth, v. vii. 5, vi. iv., ix. xi., xi. vii. 9; Eleatic, i. v. 13; Eleatic and Platonic, xii. ii. 5
Body, and soul and mind, xii. v. 1; (geometrical) defined, v. vi. 19, xi. ii. 6; derivation (Platonic), i. iv. 28, as substance, iii. v., vii. ii. 2. See Solid
Callias (name used without personal reference), i. i. 6, v. xviii. 3, vii. v. 2, etc.
Callippus, xii. vii. 11
Capable, ix. ix. 1. See Potency
Capacity, ix. i. 8. See Potency
Categories, enumerated, v. vii. 4; meanings vary in different, v. x. 4, xxviii. 4, vi. ii. 1, vii. i. 1, nature of unity the same in all, x. ii. 13; motion or change in, xi. ix. 1, xi. i. 1; plurality in, xiv. ii. 10; substrate for each, vii. iv. 6; elements of different, xii. iv. 1; no category except substance can exist separately, vii. i. 6; form not generated in any, vii. ix. 6
Cause, defined, v. ii; = that in virtue of which, v. xviii. 2;

Wisdom the knowledge of primary causes, i. i. 17, cf. ii. i. 6, iii. i. 6, ii., vi. i. 1, viii. i. 1, four causes, i. ii. 1, x. 1, viii. iv. 4, cf. xii. iv., no infinite series or number of causes, ii. ii., is there any cause besides matter? iii. i. 11; not all present in all things, iii. ii. 2, no definite cause of the accidental, v. xxx. 3, xi. vii. 6; accidental causes, v. ii. 10, vi. iii., xi. viii. 10; potential and actual causes, v. ii. 12; proximate causes, xii. iv. 7, v. 4, only two causes in Platonism, i. vi. ii. 27. See End, Essence, Final Cause, Formal Cause, Matter, Moving Cause, Principle
Chance, xi. viii. 10
Change, modes of, iv. v. 20, viii. i. 7, vi. ix. 1, x. xi. ii. 1; reciprocal, viii. v. 4, between contraries or intermediates, iv. vii. 2, xi. v. 9, xii. i. 6, mechanism of, xii. iii. 1, cf. i. iii. 11; problems connected with, iv. v. 17; source of (i.e. efficient cause), v. ii. 2, 8; not explained by Ideal Theory, i. ix. 26. See Motion
Chaos, a cosmological principle, i. iv. 1, xii. vi. 8, xiv. iv. 4
Choice, v. xiv. 6, ix. v. 3
Cleon (name used without personal reference), vii. xv. 10, x. v. 1
Cognition, vii. vii. 7
Completeness, iv. ii. 24, x. iv. 2. See Perfect
Concrete object or whole (σύνολον), iii. i. 11, iv. 2, 6, vii. iii. 2, x. 13, xi. 15, xi. ii. 18, xiii. i. 17, cf. v. xxiv. 2, vii. iv. 6, v. 4, xii. iii. 8, ix. 6
Contact (ἀπρεσβας, ἀφής), v. iv. 1, vi. 7, xi. xii. 11, xiii. vii. 20, ix. i. 1. = immediate apprehension, ix. v. 5, xii. vii. 8
Contiguity (ἐχέσθαι), xi. xii. 18
Continuity (συνεχές), defined, xi. xii. 13, and unity, v. vi. 6, xxvi. 2, vii. xvi. 2; and quantity, xi. iii. 7
Continuum, xii. x. 12. See Body
Contradiction, a kind of opposition, v. x. 1, x. iv. 8; Law of, iv.

INDEX TO THE METAPHYSICS

in, vi. 1, xi. v. 1, no intermediate in, iv. vii. x. iv. 8, xi. xii. 13, and truth and falsity, vi. iv. 1
Contrary, defined, v. x. 2, (in place) xi. xii. 11, and difference, opposition, privation, iv. ii. 14, 21, v. x. 1, ix. ii. 5, x. iii. 1, 10, iv. 7, v. 1, vi. iii. 6, iv. 9, cf. xii. vii. 8, attribute of substance, iii. i. 9, one thing has one, iv. ii. 16, x. iv. 4; contraries fall under one science, iii. ii. 1, xi. iii. 6, xiii. iv. 1; reducible to Being and unity and their privations, iv. ii. 9, 21, xi. iii. 4; and subject, substance, matter, i. viii. 9, xiii. v. 2, ix. ix. 1, xi. vi. 18, xii. i. 5, x. ii. 1, xiv. i. 8, v. 5, cf. vi. iii. 3; contraries have the same form, vii. vii. 5, cf. v. ii. 5; mutually destructive, xiv. iv. 11, cf. vi. iii. 8, generation of, iv. v. 4, viii. v. 1; change between, xi. x. 9, xi. 3, xii. i. 6, intermediates composed of, x. vii; as principles, iv. ii. 21, vii. ii. 5, x. 5, xiv. i. 1, Pythagorean, i. v. 6
Coriscus (name used without personal reference), v. vi. 1, vi. ii. 4, vii. vi. 12
Critylus, i. vi. 2, iv. v. 18
Definition, relation of parts to whole, vii. x.; parts must be familiar, i. ix. 88, unity of, vii. xi. 14, xii. viii. vi. 1, cf. v. vi. 18, refers to universal, vii. xi.; belongs primarily to substance, vii. iv. 16, v. 5; of matter, form and their compound, viii. ii. 8; no definition of coupled terms, vii. v. 1, or of individual sensible substances, vii. xv. 2, cf. vi. i. 7, viii. iii. 7, has more than one sense, vii. iv. 12, and essence, i. x. 2, vii. iv. 9, v. 7, viii. i. 4; genera first principles of, iii. iii. 3, starting-point for demonstration, iv. vii. 7, cf. iv. 5; false of everything but its proper subject, v. xix. 3, how not per se true of its subject, vii. iv. 7, by division, ib. xii. 4; and number, viii. iii. 9, vi. 1, and ideal theory,

xiii. iv. 14, cf. vii. xv. 5; Platonism, Pythagorean, Socratic, i. v. 10, vi. 2, xiii. iv. 8. See **Formula**
Democritus, i. iv. 9, iv. v. 5, 9, vii. xiii. 9, viii. ii. 1, xii. ii. 8, xiii. iv. 3
Desire, a principle, i. iv. 1; as exerting activity, ix. v. 3, xii. vi. 2
Destruction. See **Generation**
Dialectic, i. vi. 7, iv. ii. 19, xi. iii. 8, xiii. iv. 4
Dialecticians, ix. viii. 20
Differences, different, defined, v. ix. 4, primary, xi. iii. 9. (Contrary, opposite, other, iv. ii. 12, x. iii. 7, iv. 1, vii. 3, ix.; as constitutive form, viii. ii. 3, **atomie**, i. iv. 10, viii. ii. 1
Differentiation, of substance, i. iv. 28; of genus and species, iii. iii. 7, iv. ii. 11, v. vi. 11, vii. xii. 3, x. vii. 6, viii. i. 1, ix. 2, x. 2, x. iii. 8, of essence, v. xiv. 1, of motions, ib. 4; of numbers and units, xii. viii. 9, cf. vi. vii
Diogenes, i. iii. 8
Dionysia, v. xlv. 5
Disposition, defined, v. xix. See **State**
Dissimilarity, iv. ii. 14
Dyad, indeterminate, i. ix. 1, xiii. iv. 9, vii. 14, ix. 8, xiv. i. 4, ii. 4, 12, iii. 18; cf. i. vi. 6, 7, 10. See **Great-and-Small**, **One**, **Unity**
Ecliptic, as cause, xii. v. 3
Effects, classified like causes, v. ii. 18
Egypt, i. 16
Element (*στοιχείον*), defined, v. iii., cf. vii. xvii. 12, x. i. 6; = material principle, i. iii. 3; (principle, xii. iv. 6; problems connected with elements, i. ix. iii. iii. vi. 5, xiii. x., only elements of substances, i. ix. iii.; elements of compound individuals determined by form, vii. xvii. 8, cf. viii. iii. 3; elements of different categories, xii. iv. 2, v. 5, no elements of eternal things, xiv. ii. 1; and infinity, xi. x. 6;

ARISTOTLE

monistic view of, i. viii. 1, = letter of the alphabet, iii. iii. 1, iv. 10, vi. 2, v. iii. 1, cf. vii. xviii. 8, in geometry, iii. iii. 1, v. iii. 8

Empedocles, his four elements, i. iii. 8, iv. 8, vii. 2, vii. 7, x. 8, iii. iii. 2; on Love, Strife, Mixture, i. iv. 8, iii. i. 13, iv. 15, 26, xii. ii. 8, vi. 9, x. 7, xiv. iv. 5; on ratios, i. x. 2, cf. xiv. v. 11, on thought and physical alteration, iv. v. 10, on "nature," v. iv. 5

End, = final cause, i. vii. 5, ii. ii. 9, v. ii. 2, 8, xvi. 4, xvii. 2, ix. viii. 9, xi. i. 4, xii. viii. 17, and limit, ii. ii. 10, v. xvii. 2; and death, perfection, shape, v. xvi. 4, xxiv. 2; and actuality, ix. viii. 9

Epicharmus, iv. v. 17, xiii. b. 17

Equal, defined, v. xv. 5, relative, ib. 11, χ unequal, x. iv. 10; χ greater and smaller, x. v., Platonic principle, xii. x. 5, xiv. v. 5

Essence (*ti ês êsai, ti êsti*, sometimes *ousia*), discussed, vii. iv. vi; studied by Metaphysics, vii. i. 6; = substance, v. viii. 4, vii. ii. 1, iv. 3, xvii. 7, viii. i. 3, xi. vii. 2; = that in virtue of which, v. xviii. 1; = formal cause, definition, formula, ratio, i. iii. 1, viii. 2, x. 2, iii. ii. 7, v. ii. 7, viii. 4, xiii. iv. 3, xiv. v. 8, cf. vii. vi. 17; = efficient or final cause, i. vi. 9, iii. 4, vii. xvii. 5; called "nature," v. iv. 7, primary essence = Mind or God, xii. viii. 18; Platonic and Pythagorean views of, i. v. 16, vi. 5

Eternal, χ sensible things, i. vi. 4, v. v. 6, vii. ii. 8, ix. viii. 15, ix. 8, xii. i. 3, ii. 4; eternal substance = Prime Mover, xii. vi. 1, eternal things incomposite and ungenerated, xiv. ii. 1, iii. 14

Eudoxus, i. ix. 11, xii. viii. 9, xiii. v. 3

Eurytus, xiv. v. 7

Even, Pythagorean, i. v. 5, iv. ii. 22; cf. xi. x. 6

Evenus, v. v. 2

Evil, only in perishable things, ix.

ix. 3; and Strife, i. iv. 3; Platonic principle, xii. x. 5, cf. xiv. iv. 10. See Bad, Good

Excess and defect, i. ix. 28, iv. ii. 18, viii. ii. 2, 4, x. i. 11, vi. 10, xiv. i. 6

Experience, i. i. 8-18, 17

Extremes, and opposition, v. x. 1

Falsity, defined, iv. vii. 1, v. xxi. 1, and not-being, vi. ii. 1, iv. i. 1, ix. x; χ impossibility, ix. iv. 2; Platonic, xiv. ii. 9

Few, χ many, x. vi.

Figures (*εἰρηματα*), are the substances? iii. i. 15. See Plane

Final cause (*od êsai*), no infinite chain of f.c.'s, ii. ii. 2; = beginning, end, function, good, iii. ii. 6, v. i. 3, ii. 2, 8, viii. iv. 4, xi. i. 4, xii. vii. 4; and Formal, Efficient causes, viii. iv. 5, xi. i. 4, number not a final cause, xiv. v. 9

Flux, Heraclitus, i. vi. 2, xiii. iv. 2; cf. xi. vi. 10, xiii. ix. 21

Form, and definition or formula, iii. ii. 6, v. vi. 13, vii. x. 4 ff., xi. 1, viii. ii. 8, xii. ii. 5, xiii. viii. 24, cf. iv. v. 21, viii. i. 6; and essence, vii. vii. 4, viii. x. 16; and nature, v. iv. 6; and whole, v. vi. 16; = actuality, ix. viii. 14; = art, viii. ix. 8, xii. iii. 3, cf. vii. vii. 4, = that in virtue of which, v. xviii. 1, cf. vii. xvii. 7, as substance, v. viii. 4, vii. iii. 7, vii. 4, x. 4, xvii. 7, ix. viii. 8, 14, xii. vii. 24; as substrate, vii. iii. 2; χ matter and concrete object, iii. iv. 6, vi. i. 6, vii. viii. x. 4-xi. ix. viii. 10, xi. ii. 18, xii. iii. 1, xiii. vii. 24; χ privation, viii. v. 2, xii. iv. 5; not generated, vii. vii. 1, ix. 6, viii. iii. 6, v. 1, xii. iii. 1, 4, cf. viii. i. 6, perishable, xi. ii. 4. See Species

Formal cause, xii. v. 8; = essence or formula, v. ii. 1, viii. iv. 5, cf. i. iii. 1; and final cause, viii. iv. 5; no infinite chain of final causes, ii. ii. 3, 10, final causes coexist with their effects, xii. iii. 5

INDEX TO THE METAPHYSICS

Forma (Platonic), theory of described, i. vi; criticized, i. iv, vii, xi 6, xiv, x. v 6, xiii, iv, v; as causes, i. vii. 4, viii. viii. 7, xii. vi. 8, x. 10, xiii. viii. 20; as substances, iii. i. 7, ii. 20, vii. ii 8, xvi. 6, viii. i. 2, xii. i. 4, as *per se* beings, vii. v 8, of natural objects, xii. iii. 4, and intermediates or mathematical objects, iii. i. 7, ii. 20, vii. 3, viii. i. 2, x. i. 6, xii. i. 4; and numbers, xiii. vii. 20, xiv. iv. 9, vi. 12. See *Ideas*

Formula (*lógos*), or Account, and definition, iii. iii. 5, iv. iv. 8, vii. i. 8, viii. ii. 9, iii. 7, (definition, vii. iv. 11, parts of, vii. x., xi. = actuality, essence, form, vii. xv. 1, viii. ii. 7, = formal cause, viii. iv. 7, xii. iii. 5, and matter, vii. vii. 9; (matter, concrete object, vii. xv. 1, viii. i. 6, x. ix. 4, xi. vii. 6, xii. viii. 18; and potency, ix. ii. 2, priority in, v. i. 6, vii. xii. 5, ix. viii. 2, x. iii. 2, xiii. ii. 10, iii. 8, viii. 24, cf. vii. i. 6; applies to universals, x. i. 9, analysis of, xi. vi. 10. See *Definition*

Fortuitous, vi. ii. 11, iii. 4, xi. viii. 4

Full (*átomatos*), i. iv. 9. See *Plenum*

Generation or Becoming (*généseis, vyeσeσai*), conditions of, iii. iv. 4, iv. v. 20, vii. vii. 1, 9, viii. 1, viii. v. 1, ix. viii. 8, 9, by something of the same form or name, vii. iv. 8, ix. viii. 6, xii. iii. 2; not of matter or form but of the concrete thing, vii. viii. ix. 6, xv. 1, viii. i. 6, v. 1; xii. iii. 1, 4, from not being, the potential, ii. ii. 6, ix. viii. 6, xi. vi. 4, xii. ii. 2, xiv. ii. 2, from matter, privation, substrate, vii. vii. 2, 9, x. iv. 10; from contraries, x. iv. 10, xiv. iv. 10, absolute and qualified, viii. i. 8, xi. xi. 4, xii. ii. 1, xiv. i. 16, cf. i. iii. 8; natural, artificial, spontaneous, vii. vii., ix., xii. iii. 2, (production, vii. vii. 8; a mode of change, xi. xi. 4, and motion,

xi. xii., of points, lines and planes, iii. v. 8; no generation of the accidental, vi. ii. 5, cf. iii. 1

Genus, defined, v. xviii., viii. i. 2, x. iii. 9; studied by metaphysics, iv. ii. 26; highest, lowest, primary, proximate, ultimate, iii. i. 10, iii. 5, iv. 2, v. xxiv. 1, vii. viii. 8, xii. 5, xi. i. 9, cf. v. iii. 6, as element or principle, iii. i. 10, iii. v. iii. 6, xi. i. 9; as substance, vii. iii. 1, xii. viii. 1, 3, v. ii. 3; and definition, difference, individual, intermediate, species, iii. iii. v. iii. 6, vi. 11, 21, xii. i. 1, xii. 2, vii. xii. 3, xiv. 1, x. iii. 8, vii. viii. 1, 3, 13. unity and being as genera, iii. iii. i. 7, cf. viii. vi. 7; connexion with universal and *Ideas*, viii. i. 8

Geometry, i. ii. 16, iv. 25, iii. ii. 25, 27, iv. ii. 24, iii. 3, vi. i. 11, ix. ix. 4, xi. iii. 7, xiii. iii. 9, xiv. ii. 9

God, not jealous, i. ii. 12; a principle, ib. 11, cf. i. v. 12, x. viii. 8, life and activity of, xii. vii. 9, 12; gods in human form, iii. ii. 22, xii. viii. 20; heavenly bodies as gods, xii. viii. 20. See *Mund, Mover*

Good, goodness, a kind of perfection, v. xvi. 3, cf. xii. vii. 10, x. 6, = end, final cause, i. ii. 7, iii. 1, iv. 3, vii. 5, iii. ii. 2, v. ii. 8, cf. xii. vii. 4; in mathematics, numbers, iii. i. 8, xiii. iii. 10, xiv. vi. 10; how contained in the universe, xii. x; relation to elements, xiv. iv. 2; as a quality, v. xiv. 3; and beauty, v. i. 8, xiv. iv. 2; (beauty, xiii. iii. 10, causation of (Platonic), i. vi. 10, cf. xiii. viii. 21

Great-and-Small, Plato's material principle, i. vi. 8, 10, vii. 2, ix. 28, xiv. i. 6, ii. 12, iii. 12; a duality, pair of unequals, i. vi. 6, 10, xiii. viii. 12, xiv. i. 6, iv. 10, relative, xiv. i. 16, ii. 14; as a genus, iii. iii. 4; species of, i. ix. 23, xiii. ix. 2, cf. xiv. ii. 14. See *Dual, Plurality, Unequal*

ARISTOTLE

Habit, having (*ἔχει*), defined, v. ix.
See State

Harmonies, III. ii. 24, XIII. ii. 9,
iii. 7, XIV. vi. 12

Have or possess, defined, v. xviii.

Hearing, necessary for learning, I.
1, 3

Heaven, motion of, XII. vii. 1, 5,
only one, *ib.* vii. 17, a cosmo-
logical principle, iv. i. 4

Hector, iv. v. 14

Hellen, v. xviii. 1

Heraclitus, I. ii. 8, vi. 2, iv. iii. 10,
i. 18, vii. 8, vii. 2, xi. v. 8, vi. 17,
x. 9, XIII. iv. 2

Hermes, "in the stone" or "wood,"
III. v. 6, v. vii. 8, ix. vi. 2. See
Phaon

Hermotimus, I. iii. 17

Hesiod, I. iv. 1, viii. 6, iii. ii. 12

Hipparchus, I. iii. 8

Hippolytus Minor quoted, v. xvix. 6

Hippolytus, I. iii. 7

Homer, iv. i. 14

Homocomerous, I. iii. 9, vii. 2

Ideas (Platonic), theory described,
I. vi. 3 ff., XIII. iv.; as per se
terms, vii. vi. 4; as substances,
vii. vi. 8, viii. 1, 5, XIII. ix. 10, as
causes, XIII. v., *cf.* XII. iii. 6, as
potentialities, ix. vii. 20, and
definition, vii. xv. 6, viii. vi. 2,
and genus and universal, viii. i.
8, XIII. ix. 5, and numbers, xii.
viii. 2, XIII. i. 3, ii. 11, vi. viii.,
xiv. ii. 20, iii. 9, iv. 9. See
Forms

Identity, iv. ii. 14, 24, v. iii. 2.
See Same

Ignorance, *X* falsity, ix. x. 5, 7

Illel, a unity by connexion, vii.
iv. 17, viii. vi. 2, *cf.* vii. iv. 10

Imitation (Pythagorean), I. vi. 3,
cf. v. 2

Imperishable. See Perishable

Impossible, defined, v. xii. 9; *X*
false, ix. iv. 2

Impotence, defined, v. xii. 8

Impressions, of sense-perception
vary, iv. v. 9; *X* perception,
ib. 28

Indeterminate, exists only poten-
tially, iv. iv. 28, v. 10, Anaxi-

mander's (?) principle, x. i. 7,
ii. 1. See Infinite

Individual (*καθ' ἑαυτόν*, *ἄτομον*,
ῥῆς τῆς), and unity, III. iv. 9, v.
i. 4; and genus, III. i. 10, iii.
9 ff.; and substances, vii. i. 1,
and causes, vii. iv. 9; and
matter, xii. iii. 3, does anything
exist apart from the individual?
III. iv.; are first principles
individual? III. iv. 8, *cf.* XII.
v. 4. See Particular

Indivisible (*ἄτομος*), lines, mag-
nitudes, I. ix. 25, XIII. viii. 10,
22; form, species, vii. viii. 9, x.
viii. 4; in genus, v. x. 5; (*ἀσεί-
κετος*, insulating-qualifiable), and
unity, III. iii. 9, v. vi. 10, XIII.
viii. 25; in form, kind, iii. iii.
9, v. iii. 1, vi. 10

Induction, I. iv. 33, ix. vi. 3,
Socratic, XIII. i. 6

Inequality, a species of plurality,
iv. ii. 12; Platonic principle,
III. iv. 84, XIV. iv. 11. See Un-
equal

Infinite, defined and discussed, xi.
x., ii. ii. 9 ff., III. iv. 1, in what
sense it exists potentially, ix.
vi. 5, *cf.* x. x. 8; infinite series
impossible, ii. ii., iii. iv. 22,
iv. iv. 2, vii. 5, vii. 6, v. x. 1,
vii. v. 5, vi. 12, viii. 3, xvii. 10,
xi. ii. 7, vii. iii. 1, viii. 17; no
infinite magnitude or number,
xii. vii. 13, XIII. viii. 11; Anax-
agoras's infinity of homocomerous,
I. iii. 9, vii. 2. See Indeter-
minate, Unlimited

Intelligible, learning proceeds from
the less to the more intelligible,
vii. iv. 2, intelligible circles,
vii. x. 17; matter, *ib.* 18,
viii. vi. 6; numbers, I. viii. 24;
objects, III. iv. 8, substances,
viii. iii. 5, "intelligibles," i. e.
Being, Unity, etc., xi. iv. 8,
cf. vii. 3. See Sensible

Intermediate terms of a series not
causes, ii. ii. 3; intermediates
between contraries, iv. vii. 2, x.
iv. 8, v. 6, vii., *cf.* xi. xi. 7; not
between contradictories, iv. vii.
2, x. iv. 8, xi. xii. 18; Platonic

INDEX TO THE METAPHYSICS

I. vi. 4, 6, ix. 20, 30, iii. ii. 30 ff., vi. 1, xi. 1, &c. See Mathematics
 Ion, v. xxviii 1
 Isthmian games, ii. ii. 5
 Ithians, i. e. Pythagoreans, i. v. 15, vi. 1, vii. 2

Judgements, all men form some unqualified, iv. iv. 42

Knowledge, universally desired, i. i. 1, characteristics of, i. i. 1, ii. ii. 7, theoretical and practical, ii. i. 5; concerned with what is primary, iv. ii. 5; consists in knowing the essence, vii. vi. 6, of causes, i. ii. 6, iii. 1, ii. i. 6, ii. 12, iii. ii. 7; of elements, i. ix. 31 ff., of individuals, ii. ii. 11, of universals, i. ii. 1, iii. iv. 8, xiii. ix. 22, x. 7, X guess-work, opinion, sense-perception, iii. iv. 3, iv. iv. 48, vii. xv. 3; priority in, v. xi. 5, vii. i. 5; a kind of measure, x. i. 9, cf. vi. 9, has two senses, xiii. v. 8; of like by like (Empedocles), iii. iv. 17. See Science

Learning, how acquired, i. ix. 38, vii. ix. 2

Lectures, their effect upon the listener, ii. iii

Leucippus, i. ii. 9, vii. vi. 7, 9

Like X unlike, attribute of substance, iii. i. 9, defined, v. ix. 5, xv. 6, knowledge of like by like, iii. iv. 17 See Similar

Limit, defined, v. xvii; Pythagorean, i. v. 6, 15, vii. 20, xiv. ii. 15; Platonic (?), iv. ii. 22. See Unlimited

Line, defined, v. vi. 19, not composed of points, iii. iv. 38, are lines substances? iii. i. 15, ii. 18, vii. ii. 3, xi. ii. 11, xiii. ii. 1, xiv. ii. 6, generation and destruction of, iii. v. 8, essential to plane, v. viii. 8, indivisible lines, i. ix. 25, ideal lines, how derived, i. ix. 25, 30, xiii. ix. 2, secondary to ideas and numbers, vii. ii. 4. See Point, Plane, Solid

Love, a first principle, i. iv. 1, vii. 3, 5; (Empedocles) i. iv. 2, 6, iii. i. 13, iv. 18, 26, iv. ii. 22, x. ii. 1, xii. vi. 9, x. 7, xiv. iv. 6, Pausanias on an object of love, xii. vii. 1
 Lycophoon, viii. vi. 8

Magn, xiv. iv. 5

Magnitude, defined, v. xiii 1; how composed of indivisible parts? iii. iv. 30, no infinite or indivisible magnitudes, xii. vii. 13, xiii. viii. 10, how are mathematical magnitudes one? xiii. ii. 14

Many X one, v. vi. 28, x. iii. 1, vi. X few, much, little, v. vi. 1, xiv. i. 6, 18, ii. 14, Platonic principle, vii. x. 5, xiv. i. 6. See Plurality

Material cause. See Matter

Mathematics, originated in Egypt, i. i. 16; developed by Pythagoreans, i. v. 1; over-stressed in Platonism, i. ix. 27; relation to the Good, iii. ii. 8, xiii. iii. 10, a speculative science, vi. i. 8, xi. vii. 7, procedure of, vi. i. 11, vi. iv. 1, cf. xiii. iii.; mathematical accuracy impossible in the sensible world, ii. iii. 5; mathematical objects, i. viii. 17, 21, vii. x. 17, vi. 10, (Platonic), i. vi. 4, 9, iii. i. 7, vii. ii. 3, x. 18, viii. i. 2, 5, xi. i. 5, xii. i. 4, xiii. i. iii., vi. 10, xiv. iii. 8 ff., vi. 18. See Intermediate, Line, Plane, Point, etc.

Matter, defined, vii. ii. 6; discussed, viii. iv., v., as substance, vii. iii, viii. i. 7, ix. vii. 7, xii. iii. 8, xiii. ii. 16; = substance, i. iii. 1, vi. 10, ix. 18, 28, v. xviii. 1, xviii. 8, viii. i. 6, xii. iii. 3; X actuality, definition, form, formula, vi. i. 6, vii. ii. 3, x. xi., xiii. 1, xvii. 7, 11, viii. ii. 6, vi. 4, ix. vii. 10, x. ix. 2, 4, xii. iii. 1, v. 3, vi. 4, vii. 18, xiii. i. 1, iii. 10, viii. 24, and potentiality, vii. xv. 2, viii. i. 6, ii. 1, ix. vii. 4, viii. 10, xi. ii. 4, xii. ii. 2, iv. 4, v. 2,

ARISTOTLE

XIV. i. 17, iv. 12, and contraries, VIII. v. 2, XII. i. 5, x. 11, infinite, VII. xi. 10, ix. vi. 7, necessary for generation and change, VII. vii. 2, 9, VIII. i. 7, v., XII. i. 6; and motion, vi. i. 7; = female element, v. xxviii. 2, cf. VIII. iv. 5, primary, proximate, ultimate, v. ii. 8, 7, xi. 28, VII. x. 15, VIII. iv. 1, vi. 10, ix. vii. 5, cf. XII. iii. 3, sensible X intelligible, VII. x. 18, xi. 11, VIII. vi. 6, cf. xi. i. 7; generable, mobile, VIII. i. 7, iv. 6, XII. ii. 1, genus as matter, v. xxviii. 8, VII. xii. 7, matter cause of the accidental, vi. ii. 11, cf. VII. vii. 2, of plurality, XII. viii. 18, is there any first principle apart from matter? III. i. 11; material cause, i. iii. 1, v. ii. 1, i. 7, ix. i. 7; early views of, i. iii. 8, v. 5, 14, vi. 2, Platonic, i. vi. 5, 10, vii. 2, ix. 28, no infinite chain of material causes, ii. ii. 1, 6 ff.

Measure, x. i., XIV. i. 10 ff.; unity a measure, x. i. 8, vi. 7, XII. vii. 8, XIV. i. 10, knowledge a measure, x. i. 10, vi. 9, man the measure of all things, x. i. 20, xi. vi. 1 ff.

Megarian school, ix. iii. 1

Melissus, i. v. 12, 18

Memory, i. i. 2

Mind, in nature (Anaxagoras), i. iii. 16, iv. 5, vii. 3, 5, viii. 13, xii. ii. 5; as cause, vi. i. 5, xi. viii. 12, relation to body, soul, XII. v. 1, cf. iii. 6; = actuality, XII. vi. 9, = God, XII. ix., XIV. iv. 5. See Thought

Modifications, not substance, iii. v. 1. See Affection, Attribute, Quality

Monists, criticized, i. vii. 1 ff.

Motion, defined, xi. ix. 2; other views of, 6 8; and activity, actuality, complete reality, function, v. xiv. 5, xvii. 2, xx. 1, xxiii. 3, ix. iii. 9, viii. 7, xi. ix. 2, XII. vi. 6; X action, ix. vi. 7, X actualization, ib. 8; relation to matter, sensible objects, i.

vii. 17, vi. i. 7, vii. xi. 9, cf. ix. iii. 10, xi. ix. 1, to time, v. xiii. 5, xi. x. 15, to change, xi. xi., xii.; continuous, eternal, simple, v. i. 13, xii. vi. 1, 7, 11, viii. 4, motions of heavenly bodies, x. i. 15, xii. vi. 10, vii. 1, viii. 1; primary motion or change locomotion, x. i. 3, xii. vii. 5, 13, xiii. iii. 6, locomotion defined, xii. ii. 4, 4; primary locomotion circular, xii. vi. 2, vii. 6, simple locomotion, xii. viii. 4

Motion, source of, i.e., moving or efficient cause, i. iii. 1, iii. ii. 6, 9, v. ii. 2 ff., vii. xvii. 5, viii. iv. 8, xi. i. 1, in natural objects called "nature," v. iv. 1, 8, cf. vii. ix. 1, 6; early views of, i. iii. 11, v. 13, vii. 8; ignored by monists, i. viii. 1; treatment by Empedocles, ib. 8, Platonic, i. ix. 29, xii. vi. 8. See Moving Cause

Mover(s), eternal, xii. viii.; First or Prime, iv. viii. 8, xi. i. 4, xii. iv. 8, v. 6, vii. viii. 4, 18

Moving cause, xii. iii. 5; proximate, xii. iv. 7, v. 6, no infinite chain of moving causes, ii. ii. See Motion, Source of

Mutilated, defined, v. xxvii.

Nature, defined, v. iv.; a genus of Being, iv. iii. 4, a cause, xi. viii. 12, = matter, v. iv. 8, xxvi. 4, = form, actuality, vii. vii. 3, viii. iii. 11, xii. iii. 8, as substance, viii. iii. 6, contains its own motive principle, v. iv. 1, vi. i. 4, ix. viii. 1, xii. iii. 2, X art, vii. vii. 1, xii. iii. 2, X force, v. v. 5, x. i. 2, xii. vi. 7; prior in, i. viii. 7, natural generation, vii. vii. 1, natural philosophy, science, ii. iii. 4, iv. iii. 4, xi. vi. 8, vii. See Physics

Necessary, necessity, iv. iv. 15, v. 28, v. v., vi. ii. 6, iii., xi. v. 6, viii. 4, xii. vii. 6, necessarily X usually, v. xxx. 1, vi. ii. 6, necessary truths, vii. xv. 8

Negation, and privation, iv. ii. 11, x. v. 5, 8; and contrariety, iv. vii.

INDEX TO THE METAPHYSICS

5, superfluous in the answer to a simple question, iv. 17, Ideas of, i. iv. 2, xiii. iv. 8
 Night, a cosmological principle, xtr. vi. 6, 9, xiv. iv. 4
 Not-being, its three senses, xii. ii. 4, as falsity, vi. iv. 1, xiv. ii. 9; as potentiality, xiv. ii. 10, a principle in Platonism, ii. 5. See Being
 Number, defined, v. xli. 2, v. vi. 8; arithmetical, mathematical, i. iv. 20, xiii. i. 4, vi. 2 ff., viii. 8 ff., ii. 15, xiv. ii. 21, iii. 11, iv. 8, modifications of, iv. ii. 18; how qualitative, v. xli. 2, in relations, v. xv. 2, 6, succession of, xiii. iv. 1, and unity, iii. iv. 28, vii. xii. 10, xiii. vi. 8, 11, vii. 24, viii. 10, and unity, v. vi. 17, v. i. 9, vi. 8; and definition, viii. iii. 9, vi. 1, intelligible, sensible, i. vii. 24, xiv. iii. 11, addible, in-addible, xiii. vi. viii. as substances, iii. i. 15, iv. 80, v. v. viii. 8, viii. ii. 9, xi. ii. 10, xii. v. 12, xiii. ii. 8, vi. ix. 19, xiv. ii. 10; as causes, principles, i. v. 5, vi. 6, viii. 22, xii. x. 12, xiii. i. 5, xiv. v. 7, vi. i. Pythagorean view of, i. v. 7, vi. 22, vii. xi. 5, xiv. iii. v. 7-vi.; in Platonism, i. vi. 6, viii. 24, ix. 4, 8, xiii. vi. iv., xiv. ii. 10-v., vi. 12; relation to Ideas, i. ix. 16, viii. ii. 4, xii. x. 12, xiii. i. 4, vi. 7, vii. 2, viii. 8, ix. 16, xiv. ii. 19, generation of, i. vi. 7, iii. iv. 34, xiii. vi. 4, viii. ix. 6, xiv. iv. v.
 Oceanus, i. iii. 6, xiv. iv. 4
 Odd, Pythagorean principle, i. v. 5, viii. 20, iv. ii. 22; cf. xiv. iv. 1; = unity (Platonism), xiii. viii. 22
 Odeum, iv. v. 26
 Olympic games, ii. ii. 6
 One, defined, v. vi. x. i. 1; various senses, iv. ii. 13, 28, vii. iv. 17; starting-point of number, v. xv. 6, x. i. 10; a measure, x. i. 8, xii. vii. 8, xiv. i. 10; X number, x. vi. 8, X many, x. ii. 1, vi.; = Mind (Anaxagoras), i. viii. 14, xii. ii. 3, cf. xi. x. 9, Pythagorean, xiv.

iii. 16; Platonic, i. vi. 5, vii. 4, ix. 22, xi. ii. 10, xii. x. 6, xiii. viii. 24 ff., Spensopagus, vii. ii. 4. See Unity
 One-over-many, i. ix. 1, vii. xvi. 5, xiii. iv. 6, cf. x. ii. 2
 Opposition, defined, v. v., by pos of, x. iii. 1, iv. 8, vi. 4, xii. xii. 4, species of plurality, iv. ii. 12, problems connected with, x. v., vi. vii. 4; opposites studied by one science, iv. ii. 11; all change between opposites, iv. xii. 8, v. vii. 3, xi. xii. 4, xii. i. 5, potentiality for opposites, ix. viii. 16, 19
 Otherness, defined, v. ix. 4, meanings, x. iii. 6; species of plurality, iv. ii. 12, 24, X difference, x. iii. 7; in species, v. x. 4, x. viii. ix., x. 6; in form, kind, x. x.; of genus, x. viii. 3
 Parmenides, i. iii. 18, iv. 1, v. 12, 13, iii. iv. 80, iv. v. 12, xiv. ii. 5
 Part, defined, v. xiv. i. meanings, vii. x. 3; studied by metaphysics, iv. ii. 26, relation to whole, v. vi. 8, in definitions, vii. v., viii. i. 4; of form, concrete object, vii. v., and mutilation, v. xxvii. 3
 Participation, vii. iv. 11, xii. 8; Platonic, i. vi. 3, 5, ix. 5 ff., vii. vi. 8, xv. 8, viii. vi. 8, 8, xiii. iv. 11, v. 2
 Particular (καθ' ἑαυτοῦ), object of experience, action, i. i. 8; prior in perception, v. xi. 5, cause, principle, iii. iv. 7, v. ii. 14, xii. v. 4; is there anything besides particulars? xi. ii.; are substances particular? xiii. x. See Individual, Universal
 Passivity, v. xv. 6. See Activity
 Pausan, ix. viii. 11
 Perception X impression, iv. v. 23
 Perfect, defined, v. xvi.
 Perishable X imperishable things, iii. iv. 11, x. v.; principle, substance of perishable things, iii. iv. 11, viii. iii. 6; perishable substance, xii. i. 8; perishables X Forms or intermediates, i. iv. 30
 Phaedo quoted, i. ix. 14, xiii. v. 6

ARISTOTLE

Metecydes, XIV. IV. 5
Philosophy, origin and development, I. II. 9; mathematical legend, id. IX. 27; knowledge of truth, II. I. 5; divisions of, IV. II. 9, VI. I. 10; X dialectic, sophistry, IV. II. 19, XI. III. 8; subject matter of, IV. I. III. XI. III. IV. cf. III. I. 5, II.; Primary philosophy, VI. I. 11, cf. XI. III. 8, IV. I. See Wisdom
Physicists (i.e., pre-Socratics), I. V. 11, VII. 17, IX. 28, III. IV. 20, IV. III. 3, IV. I. IX. VII. 18, X. II. I, XI. V. 9, XII. VI. 6, X. 11, XIII. IV. 3
Physics, subject matter of, VI. I. 7 B, VII. XI. 12, XI. I. 8, III. 8, IV. 8, VII. XII. I. 4. See Natural Science
Physics quoted, I. II. 2, IV. 4, V. 13, VII. I. X. I, VIII. I. 8, XI. I. 4, VI. 6, XII. VIII. 4, XIII. I. I, IX. 18
Place, kinds of, XI. V. 14; change of, VIII. I. 7, XII. II. 1. See Motion, contrary in, together in, XI. VII. 11. See Space
Plane, I. IX. 28, 80, III. II. 18, V. V. VI. 19, VIII. 7, VII. II. 4, XIII. II. 1, 2, XIV. II. 6. See Surface
Planets, motions of, XII. VII. 4
Plato, I. VI. 3, VII. 2, VIII. 24, IX. 3, 26, III. I. 18, IV. 23, IV. V. 25, V. XI. 7, VI. II. 3, VII. II. 8, X. II. I, XI. VII. 3, XII. II. 4, VI. 7, 8, XIII. VII. 7, cf. IX. II. 9
Platonists, referred to, III. I. 7, II. 21, 28, III. 4, IV. 25, V. 4, VI. I, VII. II. 8, VI. 4, VIII. 7, XI. 8, XV. 10, VIII. VI. 2, IX. VIII. 20, X. V. 4, X. 6, XI. I. 6, II. 10, XII. I. 2, 4, VI. 8, VIII. 2, X. 6, 10, 13, XIII. and XIV. *passim*
Platide, XIV. VI. 6
Plurality, defined, V. VIII. I; X unity, IV. II. 11, X. II. I, VI.; Pythagorean, I. V. 6; Platonic, XIII. IX. 8, XIV. I. 4, IV. 10. See Many
Point, defined, V. VI. 10; X unit, unity, XI. XII. 15, XIII. IX. 6, as substances, III. I. 16, V. VII. II. 2, XI. II. 12, XIII. II., XIV. III. 6; generation of, III. V. 8 B. Platonic, I. IX. 26, XIII. IX. 12, cf. id. 6

Prins, I. I. 5
Polyctus, V. II. 11
Position, an atomic "difference," I. IV. 11, VIII. II. I, of points, unity, V. VI. 19, XIII. III. 2, VIII. 27, 29, and disposition, V. XIV
Possible, its meanings, V. XII. 10, IX. I. 4, the possible may happen, IX. IV.
Posteriority. See Priority
Potency, defined, V. XII. IX. I. 4, the superior in potency prior, V. XI. 8, rational X irrational potencies, IX. II. I, V. 2; Megaric view of, id. III. I; how acquired and actualized, id. V. See Capacity, Potentiality
Potent, V. XII. 5
Potentiality, V. XII., prior, posterior to actuality, III. VI. 6, IX. VIII. IX. 6, not always actualized, III. VI. 6, XII. VI. 2, X actuality, VII. XII. 8, VIII. II. 8, VI. 6, IX. I. 2, IX. 6, XI. IX. I, XII. II. 3, V. 2, 4, potential and actual in a sense one, VIII. VI. 10, potentiality and matter, VIII. I. 6, II. I, 8, IX. VIII. 10, XI. II. 4, XII. II. 2, IV. 4, V. 2, XIV. I. 17, II. 16, IV. 12, cf. VII. XV. 2; for opposite results, IX. II. 2, V. 2, VIII. 19, XII. V. 2; how one thing is potentially another, IX. VII. cf. XII. II. do elements exist potentially? III. I. 14, VI. 6, the indeterminate exists potentially, IV. IV. 28, nothing eternal potential, IX. VII. 15; no motion potential, *ibid.*; potential causes, being, priority, relations, V. II. 12, VII. 6, XI. 7, XV. 6, most so-called substances potentialities, VII. XVI. I. See Capacity, Potency
Power (geometrical), V. XII. 11, IX. I. 4
Predication, figures of, V. VII. 4. See Categories
Principle (ἀρχή), defined, V. I.; most knowable, I. II. 6, most true, II. I. 7; necessary, II. II.; material, I. III. 3 ff., V. 6, 11, IX. I. 7; efficient, IX. I. 5, II. 3, VIII. I, XII. III. 2, IV. 6; final, IX. VII. 9, formal, XII. I. 2, XIII. I. 4; God

INDEX TO THE METAPHYSICS

a principle, I. ii. 14, cf. iii. iv. 12; principles conceived as contraries, I. v. 6, 8, iv. ii. 22, xii. v. 5, xiv. i. 1, of Being, substance, iii. i. vi. 1, xi. i. 1; of demonstration, iii. i. 5, ii. 10, iv. iii. 6 ff., xi. v. 1; are genera principles? iii. i. 10, iii. xi. i. 9, cf. viii. i. 2, 4; one in kind or in number? iii. i. 12, iv. 8, xi. ii. 13, cf. xii. iv. v., xiii. x.; of perishable and imperishable things, iii. i. 12, iv. 11, xi. ii. 6; potential or actual? iii. i. 14, vi. 5, universal or individual? iii. i. 14, vi. 5, xi. ii. 12, xii. i. 2, v. 3, xiii. x., (element, vii. xvi. 12, xii. iv. 6, most certain principle the Law of Contradiction, iv. iii. 9, xi. v. 1; unity as a principle, xiii. viii. 24; relation to Good, xiv. iv. 3, v. 1, cf. viii. ii. 4; views of Anaxagoras, Pythagoreans, I. iii. 9, v. 6. See Beginning, Cause, Starting-point

Priority, defined, v. xi.; attribute of substance, iii. i. 9; studied by metaphysicians, iv. ii. 25; in formula, generation, nature, substantiality, time, i. viii. 7, vii. xii. 5, ix. viii., x. ii. 2, xiv. ii. 16, iii. 6; in causation, v. ii. 10, of parts or whole in definitions, vii. x. 2, xiii. viii. 23; actuality prior to potentiality, ix. viii.; accidental not prior to per se, xi. viii. 12, cf. vii. xiii. 5; no priority of individuals, iii. iii. 11; of species, numbers, iii. iii. 10, xiii. vi. 7, viii. 22

Privation, defined, v. xvi., ix. i. 9; and contrariety, iv. ii. 21, vi. 11, ix. ii. 3, x. iv. 10, 13, xi. iii. 6, vi. 16, and contradiction, x. iv. 8; and negation, iv. ii. 11, x. v. 5; a form of opposition, v. x. 1, x. iv. 8; a kind of state, v. xii. 6; (positive state, viii. v. 2, x. iv. 7, cf. xii. iv. 4; a definite incompleteness, x. x. 1, generation proceeds from, vii. vii. 10, x. iv. 10

Production, a kind of generation, vii. vii. 8; natural production, ib. viii. 8. See Generation

Proof, not always possible, iv. iv. 2, cf. xi. v. 1; by refutation, iv. iv. 8, xi. v. 2. See Demonstration

Prologues, iii. ii. 27, iv. iv. 27, v. 1, ix. iii. 4, x. i. 20, xi. vi. 1

Purpose, = Good or final cause (q.v.), I. iii. 1

Pyrrho, v. xxviii. 2

Pythagoras, I. v. 7

Pythagoreans, I. v., vi. 3, viii. 17, iii. i. 13, iv. 26, vii. xi. 7, x. ii. 1, xii. vii. 10, xiii. vi. 8, 11, viii. 9, xiv. iii. 2, 4, 15, vi. 4. See Italians

Quality, defined, v. xiv., xi. viii. 9, (substance, viii. i. 2, (quantity, xi. vi. 11, xiii. viii. 1; change of, xii. ii. 1

Quantity, defined, v. xli., known by a measure, x. i. 9; (quality, xi. vi. 11, xiii. viii. 1, change of, xii. ii. 1, cf. xi. vii. 9

Quarter-time, a unit, v. vi. 18, x. i. 15, ii. 6, xiv. i. 10

Rarity, atomic, I. iv. 10, ix. 28

Ratio (λόγος), = definition or essence, I. x. 2, xiv. v. 8, not substance, iii. v. 1, cf. xi. iii. 7; how expressed, xiv. vi. 2; Empedoclean, I. x. 2, Pythagoreans, I. v. 2, ix. 17, cf. xiv. vi. 1

Reality, complete (ἐντελέχεια), ix. iii. 9, viii. 11, xi. iv. 2, xii. v. 6, viii. 18, xiii. iii. 10. See Actuality

Reasoning, I. i. 3. See Mind

Relation, relative, defined, v. xv., x. vi. 7, xiv. i. 16; and opposition, v. x. 1, x. iv. 8, vi. 7 ff.; no motion of, xi. vii. 1, xiv. i. 16; Ideas of, I. ix. 3, xiii. iv. 8; Great-and-Small relative, xiv. i. 16, ii. 14 ff., cf. i. iv. 4

Same, defined, v. ix., xv. 5, cf. x. iii. 2; (other, iii. i. 9, iv. ii. 8 in species, v. x. 5, x. viii. 5, cf. ix. viii. 3, 5; accidentally, vii. xi. 18. See Identity

Science, scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), (experience, art, I. ii. 4-17, speculative, productive, practical, I. i. 17, ii. i. 5,

ARISTOTLE

vi. i. 4, ix. ii. 1; superior, subsidiary, i. ii. 8, 7, iii. ii. 7; exact, independent, divine, i. ii. 6, 11, 14; contraries studied by one science, iii. ii. 1, xi. iii. 6, xiii. iv. 4, one science of one genus, ii. ii. 4, x. iv. 6, knowledge of species, iii. iii. 4, of essence, vii. vi. 6; of universals, xi. i. 9, ii. 12, sciences of other things than substances, i. ix. 5; every intellectual science treats of causes, vi. i. 1; particular sciences do not study the essence, xi. vii. 1, no science of the accidental or sensible, i. vi. 2, vi. ii. 2, 12, xi. vii. 1, 5, xiii. iii. 4; natural or physical science, vi. i. 4, xi. vii. 5. See *Physics*

Sense-perception, natural to animals, i. i. 2, only concerned with facts, ib. 1d, X *Wisdom*, i. ii. 2; X knowledge, iii. iv. 8; produces various impressions, iv. v. 9, xi. vi. 13, and thought, physical alteration, iv. v. 10; objects proper or foreign to a given sense, ib. 26; perception presupposes an object, ib. 29

Sensible, X ideal, intelligible, mathematical, i. vii. 17, 21, 24, iii. ii. 21 ff., iv. 8, vii. x. 17, viii. vi. 6, xiv. iii. 11; no knowledge of the sensible, i. vi. 3 ff., iii. iv. 3, xiii. iv. 2, cf. iv. v. 16 ff., vii. xv. 2 ff., *sensibilia*, non sensible substance, iii. i. 7, ii. 29, vi. i. ff., vii. iii. 8, viii. i. 5, xi. i. 5, xii. i. 3; change, motion of sensible things, i. vi. 2, vii. 17, vii. xi. 9, xiii. iv. 2; sensible contraries, xi. iii. 7

Sight, i. i. 1

Similar, v. xv. 11, x. iii. 4. See *Like*

Simonas, i. ii. 12, xiv. iii. 18

Snub, vi. i. 6, vii. x. 4, xi. 16, xi. vii. 6. See *Concrete object*

Socrates, i. vi. 2, xiii. iv. 3, 5, ix. 23; the younger, vii. xi. 9; name used without personal reference, i. i. 6, iii. 8, ix. 12, etc.

Solid, whether substance, iii. ii. 18, xiii. ii., xiv. iii. 6, contains all

shapes, iii. v. 6; ideal solids, i. iv. 21 ff., xiii. ix. 2. See *Body*

Sophistry, sophists, iv. ii. 10, vi. ii. 4, vii. vi. 13, ix. vii. 7, xi. iii. 8, vii. 3

Sophocles quoted, v. v. 3

Soul, studied by physics, vi. i. 7, substance of living creature, vii. x. 18, xi. 12, viii. iii. 1, cf. xii. v. 1, = essence of soul, vii. x. 16, viii. iii. 3; rational, intelligent part of, ix. ii. 1, xii. iii. 6, survival of, *idol*; a unifying principle, xiii. ii. 13; and motion (Plato), xii. vi. 8. See *Mind*

Space, xiv. v. 2. See *Place*

Species, scientific knowledge of, iii. iii. 4; relation to genus, *idol*, v. xxv. 2 ff., vii. xii. 7, xiv. i. x. vii. 6, viii. ix.; same in other iii. v. x. 4, 5, x. vii. ix., cf. iii. 8. See *Form*, *Genus*

Spongiopus, vii. ii. 4, xii. vii. 10; cf. xiii. vi. 7, viii. 5, ix. 15, xiv. ii. 21, iii. 3, v. 1

Spheres, theory of homocentre, xii. vii. 9

Spontaneity, i. ii. 15. See *Generation*, *Motion*

Square, a Pythagorean principle, i. v. 6, diagonal of square incommensurable, i. ii. 15, iv. viii. 1, v. vii. 6, xix. 1, ix. iv. 1, x. 4, x. i. 16

Starting-point (*ἀρχή*), of the fortuitous, vi. iii. 4; one the starting-point of number, v. vi. 17, x. i. 10. See *Beginning*, *Principle*

State (*ἔξις*), opposite, v. x. 1; privation a kind of state, v. xii. 6; X privation, x. iv. 7 ff.; positive state and privation as primary contrariety, x. iv. 7; = form, viii. v. 2, cf. xii. iii. 8; and potentiality, ix. i. 6. See *Habit*, *Have*

Strife, Empedocles' principle, i. iv. 2 ff., ii. ii. 1, iii. iv. 16, xii. x. 7, xiv. v. 6. See *Love*

Styx, i. iii. 6

Substance, its meanings, v. viii., vii. iii., xii. i., iii. 3, cf. vi. i., = body, matter, subject, sub-

INDEX TO THE METAPHYSICS

science, i. iv. 10, ix. 28, iii. v. 2, v. vii. 1, xi. 7, vii. ii. 1, iii. 8, x. 4, xii. 3, viii. i. 2, 3, 6 ff., ii. 1, iv. 1, ix. vii. 7, xii. iv. 4, xiii. ii. 10, = actuality, essence, form, i. vi. 5, iv. iv. 19, v. viii. 4, vii. iii. 1, 7, iv. vi. 4, vi. 4, x. 18, xi. 16, xii. 3, xvi. vii. ii. iii. ix. vii. 14, xi. ix. 1, xii. iv. 4, vii. 2, and genus, universal, iii. vi. 7, vii. iii. 1, x. 18, xii. xvi. 8, x. ii. 4, xi. ii. 12, xii. i. 2, xiii. x. 6, sensible, non-sensible, iii. i. 7, ii. 20, vi. 1, vii. iii. 8, viii. i. 6, xi. i. 5, ii. 2, xii. i. 3, individual, separable, iii. vi. 7, vii. i. 5, iii. 7, iv. 12; χ accident, affection, iv. iv. 22, vii. xiii. 5, xii. v. 1, and concrete thing, vii. x. 4, 14, xi. 10, viii. ii. 8, iii. cf. xii. iv. 1; primary, *prior*, v. xi. 7, vii. i. 5; one in a primary sense, v. vi. 15, = primary being, vii. i. 1, xii. i. 1; a principle or cause, vii. xvii. 1, 12, viii. ii. 5, *et cetera* forms, mathematical objects, numbers substances? iii. i. 16, iv. 30, v. v. vii. 8, viii. i. 2, iii. 9, xi. 15, 10, xii. i. 4, x. 18, xiii. i. iii. vi. ix. 19, xiv. ii. 19, are Being and Unity substances? iii. i. 18, iv. 21 ff., vii. xvi. 8, x. ii. natural substances, vi. i. 12, viii. i. 2, iv. 6, xii. iii. 2, in-composite, vii. xii. 11; most so called substances potentialities, vii. xvi. 1, eternal, vii. xvi. 7, xii. i. 3, vi. vii; not all things substances, xi. ii. 10; no motion of substance, xi. xii. 1; cause of plurality in substances, xiv. ii. See *Being*
Substance, subject (*ὑποκείμενον*), its meanings, vii. iii. 1, xiii. i. ix. vii. 6; = matter, i. iii. 1, ix. 28, v. vi. 7, xviii. 1, vii. iii. 2, viii. i. 6, cf. xii. iii. 8; χ matter, viii. iv. 7; as substance, vii. iii. 1, viii. i. 3, 6, see *Substance*; substance not predicated of a subject, v. viii. 1, substrate prior, v. xi. 7; immediate, predi-

cated, ultimate, v. vi. 10, viii. i. xxi. 4
Successive, xi. xii. 12
Surface, vii. ii. 2, xi. ii. 11, x. 6
 See *Plane*
Syllable, composition denical, i. ix. 25, principles of syllables determinate in number, iii. vi. 2, syllable not merely the sum of its letters, vii. xvii. 8 See *Letter*, *Element*
Teleology, xi. viii. 10
Tethys, i. iii. 6
Thales, i. iii. 5, 7
Thargelia, v. xxi. 5
Theology, vi. i. 10, xi. vii. 9 See *Philosophy*, *Wisdom*
"Third Man", i. ix. 3, vii. xii. 7, vii. iv. 8
Thought (*νόημα*, *νόος*), truth and falsity in thought, not in things, v. iv. 2, cf. xi. vii. 9, has the same sphere of action as chance, xi. vii. 11, of the Divine Mind, xii. vii. ix. See *Cognition*, *Mind*
Time, relation to motion, v. xii. 5, xi. x. 15; ungenerated, xii. vi. 1
Timotheus, ii. i. 4
Unequal, the (Platonic principle), x. v. 4, xiv. i. i, ii. 1, 18, iv. 10, cf. iii. iv. 84. See *Great-and-Small*
Unit, defined, v. vi. 19, xiv. ii. 19, and one, unity, iii. iv. 28, xii. iii. 29, indivisible, v. vi. 18, x. i. 12; indivisible in different senses, ib. 17; a measure and starting-point, ib. 12, differs in different classes, v. vi. 17, χ point, xi. xii. 15, cf. xiii. viii. 27; whether substance, vii. i. 2, number is unity, iii. iv. 28, vii. xii. 19, relation of units in ideal numbers, i. ix. 19, xii. vi. 1; addible, inaddible units, xii. vi. vii., how can units differ? ib. vii.; how are they composed? ib. ix. 9; units as goods, xiv. i. 8. See *Number*
Unity, its senses, vii. xvii. 8, x.

ARISTOTLE

- is ; not a final cause, I. vii. 6 ; whether substance, III. i. 13, IV. 24, VII. XVI. 3, X. II., XI. II. 10, whether a genus or universal, III. III. 4, 7, IV. II. 24, X. II. 3, indivisible, III. IV. 81, X. i. 17, association with Being, IV. II. 6, VII. XVI. 3, XI. III. 6, species of unity, IV. II. 3, X. III. 2 ; unity of definition, number, substance, VIII. III. 10, VI. ; the same in all categories, X. II. 3 ; (plural, X. III. 1 ; a measure, X. i. 21, XIV. i. 10, not an element, XII. I. 3, and unity, XIII. VIII. 20, and Good, XIV. IV. 6, Pythagorean, I. V. 5 ; Eleatic, I. V. 11 ; Platonic, XII. X. 6, XIII. VII. 4, VIII. 22, XIV. i. 4, IV. 3, V. 5. See One
- Universal, defined, V. XXVI. 2, VII. VII. 2, hard to grasp, I. II. 4, (class, genus, I. IX. 30, VII. III. 1 ; are first principles universal ? III. I. 14, III. 6, VI. 7, XI. I. 9, II. 12, XII. i. 2, XIII. X. ; Being and Unity most universal terms, III. IV. 127 ; prior in formula, V. VI. 6 ; relation to particulars, V. XXVI. 2 ; whether substance, VII. III. 1, X. 16, VIII. I. 3, XI. II. 12, XII. I. 2, XIII. X. 6, not self-subsistent, VII. XVI. 6, X. II. 2, XIII. IX. 20 ; connexion with genus and Ideas, VIII. i. 3 ; a unity, X. I. 6 ; all definition and knowledge of universals, III. VI. 9, VII. XI. 1, XI. i. 9, II. 12, XIII. X. 4, 7, cf. I. I. 8 ; universal predication, V. IX. 2
- Unlike, X. III. 6. See Like
- Unlimited (Pythagorean), I. V. 6, 15, VI. 6, VII. 2, IV. II. 22 See Infinite
- Usual(ly), (always, VI. II. 6, XI. VII. 4
- Virtue of itself, III, V. XVIII. 3, cf. XXX. 4
- Virtue of which, that in, V. XVIII
- Void, IX. VI. 5, (in Atomism) I. IV. II, IV. V. 5
- Whole, defined, V. XXVI., studied by Metaphysics, IV. II. 25 ; some things only one if whole, V. VI. 10, cf. X. I. 2 ; relation to part, V. XI. 8
- Will, V. XI. 3, XII. VII. 2
- Wisdom, i.e. Metaphysics, its characteristics, scope, I. I., II., XI. I.-III. ; knowledge of causes, I. i. 17, II. 2, IX. 20, III. II. 6, XI. I. 1, Divine Wisdom has no contrary, XII. X. 10. See Philosophy, Science, Theology
- Xenocrates referred to, XIII. VI. 9, VII. 8, IX. 15, XIV. III. 9
- Xenophanes, I. V. 12, IV. V. 17
- Zeno, III. IV. III
- Zens, XIV. IV. i
- Zodiac, XII. VII. 9

THE OECONOMICA

INTRODUCTION ^a

Two Books entitled "*Oeconomica*"—"Housecraft" or "The Ordering of Households"—are current in Greek under Aristotle's name; a third exists in two Latin versions.

The first Book is largely derived from the *Οἰκονομικός* of Xenophon and the *Πολιτικά* of Aristotle.^b A treatise of the Epicurean Philodemus (a contemporary of Cicero) discovered at Herculaneum attributes it to Theophrastus, who succeeded Aristotle as head of the Peripatetic school in 322 B.C. According to Susemihl, although it differs in certain points from the teaching of Aristotle, it is unmistakably the work of an early Peripatetic, uncoloured as yet by any tincture of Stoicism.

The second Book, in the main a collection of anecdotes telling of the means, fair or foul, by which various rulers and governments filled their treasuries, was shown by Niebuhr in 1813^c to be an independent work. It is certainly unworthy of the great moralist; and the *οἰκονομική* which it illustrates is something very different from that so carefully defined and distinguished from *πολιτική* in Book I. The intro-

^a For this I am chiefly indebted to the edition of Franz Susemihl (Teubner, Leipzig, 1887).

^b Susemihl (pp. v and vi) gives a list of parallel passages.

^c His essay was reprinted in a collection of his shorter works published at Bonn in 1828.

ARISTOTLE

ductory chapter applies the term *οικονομία*, as we apply its Anglicized form Economy, to the ordering of states as well as to that of private households ; and in the succeeding anecdotes, the latter is ignored. Of the rulers whose deeds are herein recorded, Cleomenes and Philoxenus survived Aristotle (*d.* 322), while Ophellias was living in 308. Susemihl would assign the book to the latter half of the third century B.C.

The chief interest of these "footnotes to history" is the opportunity they afford for comparing ancient and modern treatment of such matters as currency, taxation, and insurance. August Boeckh makes considerable use of this Book in his treatise on the Public Economy of Athens (*Staatshaushaltung der Athener*), which may with advantage be consulted. It is available in an English translation.

The Greek text followed is in the main that of Susemihl (Leipzig 1887), which is reprinted by kind permission of Messrs. Teubner. Where I have diverged from it, I have given the reading preferred in a footnote. The pages, columns, and lines of Bekker's Greek Text of Books A and B are given in the margin for convenience of reference.

The third Book, of which no Greek exemplar is known, appears in a Latin translation made by Guillaume Durand^a (who also translated the first Book) in 1295. One of the mss. of this translation adds in the margin portions of a different version ; whether this was ever more than fragmentary, we do not know. Another Latin translation is also extant containing Book II. as well as Books I. and III.

^a Bishop of Mende in Languedoc, a distinguished statesman and jurist ; died at Rome in 1296.

OECONOMICA

Its age and authorship are uncertain. Susemihl thinks the first Book of this latter version is translated from a Greek original differing from that used by Durand ; and suspects the third Book to be a compound of Durand's version and the now fragmentary one mentioned above.

These three Latin versions I have distinguished by the letters *a* (Durand), *b* (fragmentary) and *c*. In Book III. the version of Durand, as edited by Susemihl, is printed (by kind permission of Messrs. Teubner) on the left-hand pages ; and where the English translation noticeably diverges from it, the reading followed is added in a note. The pages of Rose's edition (*Aristotelian Fragments*, No. 184) are given in the margin.

In substance this so-called third Book is a graceful homily on married life, worthy of Aristotle himself. Indeed the chaste and tender spirit which it breathes is almost Christian. As a favourable example of enlightened Greek thought about marriage and the family, it is well worth presenting in an English dress. It should be compared with the discourse of Ischomachus in the *Οἰκονομικός* of Xenophon—a work probably well-known to its author.

In a list of works attributed to Aristotle which is preserved by Hesychius of Miletus (VIth Century) a treatise is mentioned under the title *νόμοι ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς*—"Rules for married life." It is conjectured by Rose that this is the work translated by Durand, and now only known in his and the other Latin versions.

In the translation, words inserted to complete the sense are placed between angular brackets < >.

[ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ] ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΩΝ

A

1848 a I. Ἡ οἰκονομικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ διαφέρει οὐ μόνον τοσοῦτον ὅσον οἰκία καὶ πόλις (ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ αὐταῖς ἐστὶ τὰ ὑποκείμενα), ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ ἐκ πολλῶν ἀρχόντων ἐστίν, ἡ οἰκονομικὴ δὲ μοναρχία.

5 Ἔναι μὲν οὖν τῶν τεχνῶν διήρηνται, καὶ οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ ποιῆσαι καὶ χρήσασθαι τῷ ποιηθέντι, ὥσπερ λύρα καὶ αὐλοῖς· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἐστὶ καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς συστήσασθαι καὶ ὑπαρχούσῃ χρήσασθαι καλῶς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἂν εἴη καὶ κτήσασθαι οἶκον καὶ χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ.

10 Πόλις μὲν οὖν οἰκιῶν πληθὸς ἐστὶ καὶ χώρας καὶ 2 κτημάτων αὐταρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. φανερόν δέ· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ δυνατοὶ ᾧσι τούτου τυγχάνειν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ κοινωνία. ἔτι δὲ ἕνεκα τούτου συν-
326

[ARISTOTLE'S]
THE OECONOMICA
BOOK I

I. Between Housecraft (the art of governing a Household or Home) and Statecraft (the art of governing a Nation) there are differences corresponding to those between the two kinds of community over which they severally preside. There is, however, this further difference: that whereas the government of a nation is in many hands, a household has but a single ruler.

Now some arts are divided into two separate branches, one concerned with the making of an object—for example a lyre or a flute—and the other with its use when made. Statecraft on the other hand shows us how to build up a nation from its beginning, as well as how to order rightly a nation that already exists; from which we infer that Housecraft also tells us first how to acquire a household and then how to conduct its affairs.

By a Nation we mean an assemblage of houses, ² lands, and property sufficient to enable the inhabitants to lead a civilized life. This is proved by the fact that when such a life is no longer possible for them, the tie itself which unites them is dissolved. Moreover,

έρχονται· οὐ δὲ ἕνεκα ἕκαστον ἔστι καὶ γέγονε, καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει αὕτη οὐσα.

15 "Ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι πρότερον γενέσκει ἢ οἰκονομικὴ πολιτικῆς ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον. μόριον γὰρ οἰκία πόλεώς ἐστιν.

Σκεπτέον οὖν περὶ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς, καὶ τί τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς.

II. Μέρη δὲ οἰκίας ἀνθρωπός τε καὶ κτήσις ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις ἡ φύσις
20 ἐκάστου θεωρεῖται, καὶ περὶ οἰκίας ἂν ὁμοίως ἔχοι· ὥστε καθ' Ἡσίοδον δέοι ἂν ὑπάρχειν

οἶκον μὲν πρῶτιστα γυναικά τε [βοῦν τ' ἀρο-
τῆρα].¹

τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς τροφῆς πρῶτον, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐλευ-
θέρων. ὥστε δέοι ἂν τὰ περὶ τὴν τῆς γυναικὸς
ὁμιλίαν οἰκονομήσασθαι καλῶς· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ
25 ποίαν² τινὰ δεῖ ταύτην εἶναι παρασκευάσαι.

Κτήσεως δὲ πρῶτη ἐπιμέλεια ἡ κατὰ φύσιν· 2
κατὰ φύσιν δὲ γεωργικὴ προτέρα, καὶ δευτέραι
οἶσαι ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, οἷον μεταλλευτικὴ καὶ εἴ τις
ἄλλη τοιαύτη. ἡ δὲ γεωργικὴ μάλιστα ὅτι δικαία·
οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων, οὐθ' ἐκόντων, ὥσπερ
30 καπηλεία καὶ αἱ μισθαρνικαί, οὐτ' ἀκόντων, ὥσπερ
αἱ πολεμικαί. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· φύσει

¹ βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα: apparently these words were not in the copy read by Philodemus (see Introduction).

² Reading *ὁποῖαν* (Schoemann) for ms. τὸ ποίαν.

it is with such a life in view that the association is originally formed ; and the object for which a thing exists and has come into being is in fact the very essence of that particular thing.

From this definition of a Nation, it is evident that the art of Housecraft is older than that of Statecraft, since the Household, which it creates, is older ; being a component part of the Nation created by Statecraft.

Accordingly we must consider the nature of Housecraft, and what the Household, which it creates, actually is.

II. The component parts of a household are (1) human beings, and (2) goods and chattels. And as households are no exception to the rule that the nature of a thing is first studied in its barest and simplest form, we will follow Hesiod and begin by postulating

Homestead first, and a woman ; a plough-ox hardy to furrow.

For the steading takes precedence among our physical necessities, and the woman among our free associates. It is, therefore, one of the tasks of Homecraft to set in order the relation between man and woman ; in other words, to see that it is what it ought to be.

Of occupations attendant on our goods and chattels, 2 those come first which are natural. Among these precedence is given to the one which cultivates the land ; those like mining, which extract wealth from it, take the second place. Agriculture is the most honest of all such occupations ; seeing that the wealth it brings is not derived from other men. Herein it is distinguished from trade and the wage-earning employments, which acquire wealth from others by their consent ; and from war, which wrings it from them perforce. It is also a natural occupa-

1348 b

γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἢ τροφῇ πᾶσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε
καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς.

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ πρὸς ἀνδρίαν συμβάλλεται ³
μεγάλα· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ αἱ βάνανσοι τὰ σώματα
ἀχρεῖα ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμενα θυραυλεῖν καὶ
⁶ πονεῖν, ἔτι δὲ δυνάμενα κινδυνεύειν πρὸς τοὺς
πολεμίους· μόνων γὰρ τούτων τὰ κτήματα ἔξω
τῶν ἐρυμάτων ἐστίν.

III. Τῶν δὲ περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ περὶ γυναῖκα
πρώτη ἐπιμέλεια· κοινωνία γὰρ φύσει τῷ θήλει καὶ
τῷ ἄρρενι μάλιστα ἐστίν. ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐν
¹⁰ ἄλλοις ὅτι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ἢ φύσις ἐφίεται ἀπερ-
γάζεσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ζώων ἕκαστον· ἀδύνατον
δὲ τὸ θῆλυ ἄνευ τοῦ ἄρρενος ἢ τὸ ἄρρεν ἄνευ τοῦ
θήλεος ἀποτελεῖν τοῦτο, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτῶν
ἡ κοινωνία συνέστηκεν.

Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ἀλόγως τοῦτο ²
ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον μετέχουσι τῆς φύσεως, ἐπὶ
¹⁵ τοσοῦτον, καὶ τεκνοποιίας μόνον χάριν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς
ἡμέροις καὶ φρονιμωτέροις διήρθρωται μᾶλλον
(φαίνονται γὰρ μᾶλλον βοήθειαι γινόμεναι καὶ
εὐνοιαὶ καὶ συνεργαίαι ἀλλήλοις), ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ³
μάλιστα, ὅτι οὐ μόνον τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ
²⁰ εἶναι συνεργὰ ἀλλήλοις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ἐστί.
καὶ ἡ τῶν τέκνων κτήσις οὐ λειτουργίας ἔνεκεν

tion; since by Nature's appointment all creatures receive sustenance from their mother, and mankind like the rest from their common mother the earth.

And besides all this, agriculture contributes notably 3 to the making of a manly character; because, unlike the mechanical arts, it does not cripple and weaken the bodies of those engaged in it, but inures them to exposure and toil and invigorates them to face the perils of war. For the farmer's possessions, unlike those of other men, lie outside the city's defences.

III. When we turn our attention to the human part of the household, it is the woman who makes the first claim upon it; (for the natural comes first, as we have said,) and nothing is more natural than the tie between female and male. For we have elsewhere laid down the premiss^a that Nature is intent on multiplying severally her types; and this is true of every animal in particular. Neither the female, however, can effect this without the male, nor the male without the female; whence the union of the sexes has of necessity arisen.

Now among the lower animals, this union is irra- 2 tional in character; it exists merely for the purpose of procreation, and lasts only so long as the parents are occupied in producing their brood. In tame animals, on the other hand, and those which possess a greater share of intelligence, it has assumed a more complex form; for in their case we see more examples of mutual help, goodwill, and co-operation. It is, 3 however, in the human species that this complexity is most marked; since the co-operation between woman and man aims not merely at existence, but at a happy existence. Nor do mankind beget children merely to pay the service they owe to Nature,

1348^b

τῇ φύσει μόνον οὔσα τυγχάνει ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελείας·
 ἃ γὰρ ἂν δυνάμενοι εἰς ἀδυνάτους ποιήσωσι, πάλιν
 κομίζονται παρὰ δυναμένων ἀδυνατούντες ἐν τῷ
 γήρᾳ.

Ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἀναπληροῖ ταύτῃ τῇ περιόδῳ⁴
 25 τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι, ἐπεὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν οὐ δύναται, ἀλλὰ
 κατὰ τὸ εἶδος. οὕτω προφικονόμηται ὑπὸ τοῦ
 θεοῦ ἐκατέρου ἡ φύσις, τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς
 γυναικός, πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν. διεῖληπται γὰρ τῷ
 μὴ ἐπὶ ταῦτα πάντα χρήσιμον ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν,
 ἀλλ' ἕνια μὲν ἐπὶ τὰναντία, εἰς ταὐτὸν δὲ συντεί-
 30 νοντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἰσχυρότερον τὸ δ' ἀσθενέστερον
 1344^a ἐποίησεν, ἵνα τὸ μὲν φυλακτικώτερον ἢ διὰ τὸν
 φόβον, τὸ δ' ἀμυντικώτερον διὰ τὴν ἀνδρίαν, καὶ
 τὸ μὲν πορίζῃ τὰ ἐξωθεν, τὸ δὲ σῶζῃ τὰ ἐνδον· καὶ
 πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν τὸ μὲν δυνάμενον ἑδραῖον εἶναι,
 5 πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐξωθεν θυμαυλίας ἀσθενές, τὸ δὲ πρὸς
 μὲν τὰς ἡσυχίας χεῖρον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς κινήσεις ὑγιει-
 νόν· καὶ περὶ τέκνων τὴν μὲν γένεσιν κοινήν, τὴν
 δὲ ὠφέλειαν ἴδιον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ θρέψαι, τῶν δὲ
 τὸ παιδεῦσαί ἐστιν.

IV. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν νόμοι πρὸς γυναῖκα, καὶ
 τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἀδικοῖτο·
 10 τοῦθ' ὑφηγεῖται δὲ [ὁ] καὶ ὁ κοινὸς νόμος, καθάπερ
 οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ἰκέτω καὶ ἀφ'

¹ Other mss. read τὴν μὲν γένεσιν ἴδιον, τὴν δὲ ὠφέλειαν κοινήν, "to the production of children each makes a different contribution, but in their upbringing both share alike." (The concluding sentence, distinguishing between the parts of the parents in upbringing, points clearly to the first reading.)

but also that they may themselves receive a benefit ; for the toil they undergo while they are strong and their offspring is still weak is repaid by that offspring when it in turn is grown strong and the parents by reason of age are weak.

At the same time Nature, by this cycle of changes, 4 fulfils her purpose of perpetuating existence ; preserving the type when she is unable to preserve the individual^a And so with this purpose in view Divine Providence has fashioned the nature of man and of woman for their partnership. For they are distinguished from each other by the possession of faculties not adapted in every case to the same tasks, but in some cases for opposite ones, though contributing to the same end. For Providence made man stronger and woman weaker, so that he in virtue of his manly prowess may be more ready to defend the home, and she, by reason of her timid nature, more ready to keep watch over it ; and while he brings in fresh supplies from without, she may keep safe what lies within. In handicrafts again, woman was given a sedentary patience, though denied stamina for endurance of exposure ; while man, though inferior to her in quiet employments, is endowed with vigour for every active occupation. In the production of children both share alike ; but each makes a different contribution to their upbringing. It is the mother who nurtures, and the father who educates.

IV. We begin then with the rules that should govern a man's treatment of his wife. And the first of these forbids him to do her wrong ; for if he observes this, he is not likely himself to suffer wrong at her hands. As the Pythagoreans declare, even the common rule or custom of mankind thus ordains,

1344 a

ἐστίας ἡγμένην ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖν [δοκεῖν] ἀδικεῖν.
ἀδικία δὲ ἀνδρὸς αἰ θύραζε συνουσίαι γιγνόμεναι.

Περὶ δὲ ὁμιλίας μῆθ' ὥστε δεῖσθαι (μηθὲν) ²
μῆθ' ὡς ἀπόντων ἀδυνατεῖν ἡσυχάζειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως
¹⁶ ἐθίζειν ὥστε ἱκανῶς ἔχειν παρόντος καὶ μὴ παρόν-
τος. εὖ δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἑσιόδου

Παρθενικὴν δὲ γαμεῖν, ἵνα ἡθεα κεδνὰ διδάξης.

αἱ γὰρ ἀνομοιότητες τῶν ἡθῶν ἥκιστα φιλικόν.

Περὶ δὲ κοσμήσεως, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ἡθῆ δεῖ ³
²⁰ ἀλαζονευομένους ἀλλήλοις πλησιάζειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ
τὰ σώματα· ἡ δὲ διὰ τῆς κοσμήσεως οὐδὲν δια-
φέρουσά ἐστι τῆς τῶν τραγωδῶν ἐν τῇ σκευῇ πρὸς
ἀλλήλους ὁμιλία.

V. Τῶν δὲ κτημάτων πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἀναγ-
καϊότατον τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ οἰκονομικώτατον·
²⁶ τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ἄνθρωπος. διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον δούλους
παρασκευάζεσθαι σπουδαίους. δούλων δὲ εἶδη δύο,
ἐπίτροπος καὶ ἐργάτης. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁρῶμεν ὅτι αἱ
παιδεῖαι ποιοῦς τινὰς ποιοῦσι τοὺς νέους, ἀναγ-
καῖον καὶ παρασκευασάμενον τρέφειν οἷς τὰ ἐλευ-
θέρια τῶν ἔργων προστακτέον.

Ὅμιλία δὲ πρὸς δούλους ὡς μήτε ὑβρίζειν ἐὰν ²
³⁰ μήτε ἀνιάν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐλευθεριωτέροις τιμῆς

forbidding all wrong to a wife as stringently as though she were a suppliant whom one has raised from the hearthstone. And a man does wrong to his wife when he associates with other women.

As regards the intercourse of marriage, wives 2 should neither importune their husbands, nor be restless in their absence; but a man should accustom his wife to be content whether he is at home or away. Good also is the advice of Hesiod:

Take thee a maiden to wife, and teach her ways of discretion.

For differences of ways and habits are little conducive to affection.

As regards adornment: it is not well that souls 3 should approach one another in borrowed plumes, nor is it well in the case of bodies. Intercourse which depends (for its charm) upon outward adornment differs in no respect from that of figures on the stage in their conventional attire.

V. Of property, the first and most indispensable kind is that which is also best and most amenable to Housecraft; and this is the human chattel. Our first step therefore must be to procure good slaves. Of slaves there are two kinds; those in positions of trust, and the labourers. And since it is matter of experience that the character of the young can be moulded by training, when we require to charge slaves with tasks befitting the free, we have not only to procure the slaves, but to bring them up (for the trust).

In our intercourse with slaves we must neither 2 suffer them to be insolent nor treat them with cruelty. A share of honour should be given to those who are

ARISTOTLE

1344 a

μεταδιδόναι, τοῖς δ' ἐργάταις τροφῆς πλῆθος.
καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις καὶ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους
ὑβριστὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ ἔθνη ἀπέχεται καὶ τῶν
ἐλευθέρων, οἷον Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς, φανερόν
ὅτι τούτου ἢ μηδὲν ἢ ὀλιγάκις μεταδοτέον.

35 Ὅντων δὲ τριῶν, ἔργου καὶ κολάσεως καὶ τροφῆς, 3

τὸ μὲν μήτε κολάζεσθαι, μήτ' ἐργάζεσθαι, τροφήν

1344 b

δ' ἔχειν, ὑβριν ἐμποιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ἔργα μὲν ἔχειν καὶ
κολάσεις, τροφήν δὲ μή, βίαιον, καὶ ἀδυναμίαν
ποιεῖ. λείπεται δὴ ἔργα παρέχειν καὶ τροφήν
ικανήν· ἀμίσθων γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄρχειν, δούλῳ δὲ
μισθὸς τροφή.

5 Ὡσπερ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅταν μὴ γίγνηται
τοῖς βελτίοσι βέλτιον μηδὲ ἄθλα ἢ ἀρετῆς καὶ
κακίας, γίνονται χείρους, οὕτω καὶ περὶ οἰκέτας.
διόπερ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι σκέψιν, καὶ διανέμειν τε 1
καὶ ἀνιέναι κατ' ἀξίαν ἕκαστα, καὶ τροφήν καὶ
ἐσθῆτα καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ κολάσεις, λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ
10 μιμουμένους τὴν τῶν ἱατρῶν δύναμιν ἐν φαρμάκον
λόγῳ, προσθεωροῦντας ὅτι ἡ τροφή οὐ φάρμακον
διὰ τὸ συνεχές.

Γένη δὲ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὰ ἔργα βέλτιστα μήτε δειλὰ 5
μήτε ἀνδρεία ἄγαν. ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἀδικοῦσιν· καὶ
γὰρ οἱ ἄγαν δειλοὶ οὐχ ὑπομένουσι καὶ οἱ θυμοειδεῖς
οὐκ εὐαρχοι.

1344 b

15 Χρὴ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὠρίσθαι πᾶσιν· δίκαιον γὰρ θ
καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κείσθαι ἄθλον· βού-
λονται γὰρ πονεῖν, ὅταν ἢ ἄθλον καὶ ὁ χρόνος
ὠρισμένος. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐξομηρεῦναι ταῖς τεκνο-
ποιαῖς· καὶ μὴ κτᾶσθαι ὁμοεθνεῖς πολλούς, ὥσπερ
καὶ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· καὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἀπο-
20 λαύσεις μᾶλλον τῶν δούλων ἔνεκα ποιεῖσθαι ἢ
τῶν ἐλευθέρων. πλείονα γὰρ ἔχουσιν οὗτοι οὐπερ
ἔνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνομίσθη.

VI. Εἶδη δὲ τοῦ οἰκονόμου τέτταρα, ἃ δεῖ ἔχειν
περὶ τὰ χρήματα. καὶ γὰρ τὸ κτᾶσθαι δυνατόν
χρὴ εἶναι καὶ φυλάττειν· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδὲν ὄφελος
25 τοῦ κτᾶσθαι· τῷ γὰρ ἡθμῷ ἀντλεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστίν, καὶ
ὁ λεγόμενος τετρημένος πίθος. ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἶναι
κοσμητικὸν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων καὶ χρηστικόν· τού-
των γὰρ ἔνεκα κακείνων δεόμεθα.

Διηρῆσθαι δὲ δεῖ τῶν κτημάτων ἕκαστον, καὶ 2
πλείω τὰ κάρπιμα εἶναι τῶν ἀκάρπων, καὶ τὰς
30 ἐργασίας οὕτω νενεμηθῆσθαι, ὅπως μὴ ἅμα κινδυ-
νεύσωσιν ἅπασιν. πρὸς δὲ φυλακὴν τοῖς τε Περ-
σικοῖς συμφέρει χρῆσθαι καὶ τοῖς Λακωνικοῖς.
καὶ ἡ Ἀττικὴ δὲ οἰκονομία χρήσιμος· ἀποδιδό-
μενοι γὰρ ὠνοῦνται, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ταμείου θέσις οὐκ
ἔστιν ἐν ταῖς μικροτέραις οἰκονομίαις.

36 Περσικὰ δὲ ἦν τὸ πάντα τετάχθαι, καὶ πάντ' 3

Every slave should have before his eyes a definite goal or term of his labour. To set the prize of freedom before him is both just and expedient ; since having a prize to work for, and a time defined for its attainment, he will put his heart into his labours. We should, moreover, take hostages (for our slaves' fidelity) by allowing them to beget children; and avoid the practice of purchasing many slaves of the same nationality, as men avoid doing in towns. We should also keep festivals and give treats, more on the slaves' account than on that of the freemen ; since the free have a fuller share in those enjoyments for the sake of which these institutions exist.

VI. There are four qualities which the head of a household must possess in dealing with his property. Firstly, he must have the faculty of acquiring, and secondly that of preserving what he has acquired ; otherwise there is no more benefit in acquiring than in baling with a colander, or in the proverbial wine-jar with a hole in the bottom. Thirdly and fourthly, he must know how to improve his property, and how to make use of it ; since these are the ends for which the powers of acquisition and of preservation are sought.

Everything we possess should be duly classified ; 2 and the amount of our productive property exceed that of the unproductive. Produce should be so employed that we do not risk all our possessions at once. For the safe keeping of our property, we shall do well to adopt the Persian and Laconian systems. Athenian housecraft has, however, some advantages. The Athenian buys immediately with the produce of his sales, and the smaller households keep no idle deposits in store.

Under the Persian system, the master himself 3

ARISTOTLE

1344 b

ἐφορᾷ αὐτόν, καὶ ὃ ἔλεγε Δίων περὶ Διονυσίου·
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐπιμελεῖται ὁμοίως τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ
1345 a τῶν οἰκείων, ὥστε ὅσα ἐνδέχεται, δι' ἑαυτοῦ
ποιεῖσθαι χρή τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Πέρσου
καὶ τὸ τοῦ Λίβυος ἀπόφθεγμα εὖ ἂν ἔχοι. ὁ μὲν
γὰρ ἐρωτηθεὶς τί μάλιστα ἵππον πιαίνει, "ὁ τοῦ
δεσπότου ὀφθαλμὸς" ἔφη· ὁ δὲ Λίβυς ἐρωτηθεὶς
ποία κόπρος ἀρίστη, "τὰ τοῦ δεσπότου ἵχνη"
ἔφη.

Ἐπισκεπτέον οὖν τὰ μὲν αὐτόν τὰ δὲ τὴν 4
γυναῖκα, ὥς ἑκατέροις διαιρεῖται τὰ ἔργα τῆς
οἰκονομίας. καὶ τοῦτο ποιητέον ἐν μικραῖς οἰκονο-
μίαις ὀλιγάκις, ἐν δ' ἐπιτροπευομέναις πολλάκις.
οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε μὴ καλῶς ὑποδεικνύντος καλῶς
10 μιμεῖσθαι, οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτ' ἐν ἐπιτροπείᾳ·
ὥς ἀδύνατον μὴ ἐπιμελῶν δεσποτῶν ἐπιμελεῖς
εἶναι τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ καλὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ 5
ὠφέλιμα πρὸς οἰκονομίαν, ἐγείρεσθαι χρή πρότερον
δεσπότης οἰκετῶν καὶ καθεύδειν ὕστερον, καὶ
16 μηδέποτε ἀφύλακτον οἰκίαν εἶναι, ὥσπερ πόλιν, ὅσα
τε δεῖ ποιεῖν μήτε νυκτὸς μήτε ἡμέρας παριέναι.
τό τε διανίστασθαι νύκτωρ· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ πρὸς
ὑγίειαν καὶ οἰκονομίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν χρήσιμον.

Ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς μικραῖς κτήσεσιν ὁ Ἀττικὸς 6
τρόπος τῆς διαθέσεως τῶν ἐπικαρπιῶν χρήσιμος·
20 ἐν δὲ ταῖς μεγάλαις διαμερισθέντων καὶ τῶν πρὸς

* Cf. Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 12 (end).

undertook the entire disposition and supervision of the household, following the practice which Dion used to remark in Dionysius. No one, indeed, takes the same care of another's property as of his own ; so that, as far as is possible, each man ought to attend to his affairs in person. We may commend also a pair of sayings, one attributed to a Persian and the other to a Libyan. The former on being asked what best conditions a horse, replied " His master's eye." ^a The Libyan, when asked what kind of manure is best, answered " The master's footprints."

The master and mistress should, therefore, give personal supervision, each to his or her special department of the household work. In small households, an occasional inspection will suffice ; in estates managed through stewards, inspections must be frequent. For in stewardship as in other matters there can be no good copy without a good example ; and if the master and mistress do not attend diligently to their estate, their deputies will certainly not do so.

Moreover, as such habits are both commendable ⁵ for moral reasons and also conducive to good management, the master and mistress will do well to rise earlier than their servants and to retire later ; to treat their home as a city, and never leave it unguarded ; nor ever, by night or by day, to postpone a task which ought to be done. Rising before daylight is also to be commended ; it is a healthy habit, and gives more time for the management of the household as well as for liberal studies.

We have remarked that on small holdings the ⁶ Athenian method of disposing of the produce is advantageous. On large estates, after the amount for the year's or the month's outlay has been set

1345 a

ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ τῶν κατὰ μῆνα δαπανωμένων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ σκευῶν χρήσεως τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν καὶ τῶν ὀλιγάκις, ταῦτα παραδοτέον τοῖς ἐφεστῶσιν. ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν αὐτῶν διὰ τινος χρόνου ποιητέον, ἵνα μὴ λανθάνῃ τὸ σφριζόμενον καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον.

25 Οἰκίαν δὲ πρὸς τε τὰ κτήματα ἀποβλέποντα 7
κατασκευαστέον καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς εὐ-
ημερίαν αὐτῶν· λέγω δὲ κτήματα μὲν, οἶον καρποῖς
καὶ ἐσθῆτι ποία συμφέρει, καὶ τῶν καρπῶν ποία
ξηροῖς καὶ ποία ὑγροῖς, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων
ποία ἐμψύχοις καὶ ποία ἀψύχοις καὶ δούλοις καὶ
80 ἐλευθέροις καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ ἀνδράσι καὶ ξένοις καὶ
ἄστοις. καὶ πρὸς εὐημερίαν δὲ καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν
δεῖ εἶναι,¹ εὐπνουν μὲν τοῦ θέρους, εὐήλιον δὲ τοῦ
χειμῶνος.

Εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ τοιαύτη κατάβορρος οὕσα καὶ μὴ 8
ἰσοπλατῆς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις οἰκο-
90 νομίαις χρήσιμος εἶναι θυρωρός, ὅς ἂν ᾗ ἄχρηστος
τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων, πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν τῶν εἰς-
1345 b φερομένων καὶ ἐκφερομένων. πρὸς εὐχρηστίαν δὲ
σκευῶν τὸ Λακωνικόν· χρὴ γὰρ ἐν ἑκάστων ἐν τῇ
αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ κεῖσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἔτοιμον ὄν οὐ
ζητοῖτο.

¹ I omit the comma in translating.

apart, it should be handed to the overseers ; and so also with implements, whether for daily or for occasional use. In addition, an inspection of implements and stores should be made periodically, so that remainders and deficiencies may alike be noted.

In constructing a homestead, we have to provide 7 for the stock which it is to shelter, and for its health and well-being. Providing for the stock involves questions such as these : What type of building is best for the storage of crops and of clothing ? How are we to store the dry crops, and how the moist ones ? Of the other stock, how is the living to be housed, and how the dead ? and what accommodation are we to make for slaves and free, for women and men, for foreigners and fellow-citizens ? For well-being and health, again, the homestead should be airy in summer, and sunny in winter.

A homestead possessing these qualities would be 8 longer than it is deep ; and its main front would face the south. On large estates, moreover, it seems worth while to instal as porter a man incapable of other work, to keep his eye on what passes in and out. That implements may be ready for use, the Laconian practice should be followed. Each should be kept in its own place ; thus it will always be to hand, and not require seeking.

B

1345 b

I. Τὸν οἰκονομεῖν μέλλοντά τι κατὰ τρόπον τῶν τε τόπων, περὶ οὓς ἂν πραγματεύηται, μὴ ἀπείρως ἔχειν, καὶ τῇ φύσει εὐφυνῇ εἶναι καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει
 10 φιλόπονόν τε καὶ δίκαιον· ὃ τι γὰρ ἂν ἀπῇ τούτων τῶν μερῶν, πολλὰ διαμαρτήσεται περὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἣν μεταχειρίζεται.

Οἰκονομίαι δέ εἰσι τέσσαρες, ὥς ἐν τύπῳ διελέσθαι (τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας εἰς τοῦτο ἐμπίπτουσας εὐρήσομεν), βασιλική, σατραπική, πολιτική, ἰδιωτική.

15 Τούτων δέ μεγίστη μὲν καὶ ἀπλουστάτη ἡ βασιλική, . . . ,¹ ποικιλωτάτη δὲ καὶ ῥάστη ἡ πολιτική, ἐλαχίστη δὲ καὶ ποικιλωτάτη ἡ ἰδιωτική. ἐπικοινωνεῖν μὲν τὰ πολλὰ ἀλλήλαις ἀναγκαῖον ἐστίν· ὅσα δὲ μάλιστα δι' αὐτῶν ἐκάστη συμβαίνει, ταῦτα ἐπισκεπτέον ἡμῖν ἐστίν.

Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τὴν βασιλικὴν ἴδωμεν. ἔστι
 20 δὲ αὕτη δυναμένη μὲν τὸ καθόλου, εἶδη δὲ ἔχουσα τέσσαρα, περὶ νόμισμα, περὶ τὰ ἐξαγώγιμα, περὶ τὰ εἰσαγώγιμα, περὶ τὰ ἀναλώματα.

Τούτων δὲ ἕκαστον [μὲν] περὶ . . . τὸ νόμισμα 3

¹ Reading, after βασιλική, <μεγίστη δὲ καὶ ποικιλωτάτη ἡ σατραπική> (Susemihl, following Goettling).

* Or, "the localities wherein we work."

BOOK II

I. Right administration of a household demands in the first place familiarity with the sphere of one's action ^a; in the second place, good natural endowments; and in the third, an upright and industrious way of life. For the lack of any one of these qualifications will involve many a failure in the task one takes in hand.

Of such administrations there are four main types, under which all others may be classified. We have the administration of a king; of the governors under him; of a free state; and of a private citizen.

Of these, that of a king is the most extensive, yet ² at the same time the simplest. A governor's office is also very extensive, but divided into a great variety of departments. The administration of a free state is again very varied, but it is the easiest to conduct; while that of a private individual presents the like variety, but within limits which are narrowest of all. For the most part, all four will of necessity cover the same ground; we will, however, take them in turn, and see what is especially characteristic of each.

Taking first the royal administration, we see that while theoretically its power is unlimited, it is in practice concerned with four departments, namely currency, exports, imports, and expenditure.

Taking these severally, I assign to that of currency ³

λέγω¹ ποῖον καὶ πότε τίμιον ἢ εὖωνον ποιητέον, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἐξαγώγιμα καὶ εἰσαγώγιμα πότε καὶ
 25 τίνα παρὰ τῶν σατραπῶν ἐν τῇ ταγῇ ἐκλαβόντι αὐτῷ λυσιτελήσει διατίθεσθαι, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀναλώματα τίνα περαιορέτεον καὶ πότε, καὶ πότερον δοτέον νόμισμα εἰς τὰς δαπάνας, ἢ ἂ τῷ νομίσματι ὦνια.

Δεύτερον δὲ τὴν σατραπικὴν. ἔστι δὲ ταύτης 4
 εἶδη ἐξ τῶν προσόδων, ἀπὸ γῆς, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ
 80 χώρα ἰδίων γινομένων, ἀπὸ ἐμπορίων,² ἀπὸ τελῶν, ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων, ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων.

Αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πρώτη μὲν καὶ κρατίστη ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς (αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἣν οἱ μὲν ἐκφόριον οἱ δὲ δεκάτην προσαγορεύουσιν), δευτέρα ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων γινομένη, οὗ μὲν χρυσίον, οὗ δὲ ἀργύριον,
 85 οὗ δὲ χαλκός, οὗ δὲ ὅποσα δύναται γίνεσθαι, τρίτη
 1345 a δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμπορίων,³ τετάρτη δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ γῆν τε καὶ ἀγοραίων τελῶν γινομένη, πέμπτη δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν βοσκημάτων, ἐπικαρπία τε καὶ δεκάτη καλουμένη, ἕκτη δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων,
 5 ἐπικεφάλαιόν τε καὶ χειρωνάξιον προσαγορευομένη.

Τρίτον δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν. ταύτης δὲ κρατίστη 8
 μὲν πρόσοδος ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γινομένων, εἴτα ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμπορίων³ καὶ διαγωγῶν,⁴
 εἴτα ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐγκυκλίων,

¹ Reading τούτων δὲ ἕκαστον, περὶ μὲν τὸ νόμισμα λέγω (Susemihl, after Bekker).

² Or (after Schneider and Bonitz) ἐμποριῶν, "merchandise" (mss. ἐμπόρων, "traders").

³ Or ἐμπορίων, "merchandise" (several mss.).

⁴ διαγωγῶν is Boeckh's conjecture for ms. δὲ ἀγώνων. (Boeckh however takes the word to signify "tolls" or "wayleaves"; as in Polybius iv. 52 διαγῶγιον.

the seasonable regulation of prices ; to imports and exports, the profitable disposition, at any given time, of the dues received from provincial governors ; and to expenditure, the reduction of outgoings as occasion may serve, and the question of meeting expenses by currency or by commodities.

The second kind of administration, that of the 4 governor, is concerned with six different classes of revenue ; those, namely, arising from agriculture, from the special products of the country, from markets, from taxes, from cattle, and from other sources.

Taking these in turn, the first and most important of them is revenue from agriculture, which some call tithe and some produce-tax.^a The second is that from special products ; in one place gold, in another silver, in another copper, and so on. Third in importance is revenue from markets, and fourth that which arises from taxes on land and on sales. In the fifth place we have revenue from cattle, called tithe or first-fruits ; and in the sixth, revenue from other sources, which we term poll-tax, or tax on industry.

Of our third kind of administration, that of a free 5 state, the most important revenue is that arising from the special products of the country. Next follows revenue from markets and occupations ; and finally that from every-day transactions.^b

^a Boeckh translates ἐκφόρεον "Grundsteuer." But how then does it differ from τῶν ἀσπὶ γῆν τελῶν below ?

^b Or (understanding λειτουργιῶν) "regular public services."

Τέταρτον δὲ καὶ τελευταῖον τὴν ἰδιωτικὴν. αὐ- 6
 τη δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνώμαλος μὲν διὰ τὸ δεῖν μὴ πρὸς ἓνα
 10 σκοπὸν οἰκονομεῖν, ἐλαχίστη δὲ διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰς
 προσόδους καὶ τὰ ἀναλώματα βραχέα γίνεσθαι.
 αὐτῆς δὲ ταύτης κρατίστη μὲν πρόσσδος ἡ ἀπὸ
 γῆς γινομένη, δευτέρα δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐγκλη-
 μάτων,¹ τρίτη δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ ἀργυρίου. χωρὶς δὲ τού-
 των ὃ πάσαις μὲν ἐπικοινωνεῖται ταῖς οἰκονομίαις,
 15 καὶ προσήκει σκοπεῖν αὐτὸ μὴ παρέργως, μάλιστα
 δὲ ταύτη, τὸ τὰναλώματα μὴ μείζω τῶν προσόδων
 γίνεσθαι.

Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὰς διαιρέσεις εἰρήκαμεν, μετὰ 7
 τοῦτο πάλιν νοητέον ἡμῖν, ἡ σατραπεία, περὶ ἣν
 ἂν πραγματευώμεθα, ἡ πόλις, πότερον ἂ πάντα
 20 ἄρτι διειλόμεθα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα τούτων εἰ δυνατὴ
 φέρειν ἐστί, . . .² τούτοις χρηστέον μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο
 ποῖαι τῶν προσόδων ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ εἰσὶ, δυ-
 ναταὶ δ' εἰσὶ γενέσθαι, ἢ μικραὶ νῦν οὔσαι μείζους
 οἶαί τινες κατασκευασθῆναι, ἢ τῶν ἀναλωμάτων
 τῶν νῦν ἀναλουμένων, τίνα τε καὶ πόσα περι-
 αιρεθέντα (τὰ)³ ὅλα μὴθὲν βλάβῃ.

25 Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς οἰκονομίας τε καὶ τὰ μέρη 8
 τὰ τούτων εἰρήκαμεν· ὅσα δὲ τινες τῶν πρότερον
 πεπράγασις εἰς πόρον χρημάτων ἢ τεχνικῶς τι
 διώκησαν, ἃ ὑπελαμβάνομεν ἀξιόλογα αὐτῶν εἶναι,
 συναγρόχαμεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταύτην τὴν ἱστορίαν ἀ-

¹ Reading ἐγκυκλημάτων (3rd Basic edition) for ms. ἐγκλημάτων, ἐγκλημάτων, ἐγ . . . μάτων.

² If τούτοις χρηστέον be read, some addition must be made to complete the sense. The words are, however, omitted by several mss. If they are left untranslated the sentence ends at "them." Sussemihl suggests a lacuna before τούτοις.

³ (τὰ) inserted by Keil.

Fourthly and lastly, we must consider the adminis- 6
tration of a private citizen. It is difficult to reduce
this to rules owing to the necessary variety of its
aims ; yet it is the most limited of the four, because
both revenues and expenses are (comparatively) small.
Taking its revenues in turn, the chief are those from
agriculture ; next in importance, those from other
every-day occupations ; while third comes interest on
money. Apart from all these, there is a matter
common to all kinds of administration which is best
considered at this particular point, and deserves more
than cursory attention. This is the importance of
keeping expenditure within the limits of revenue.

Having thus enumerated the divisions of our sub- 7
ject, we must next consider whether the province or
the free state with which we are concerned is able to
produce all the forms of revenue we have just detailed
or at least the chief of them ; (and this being known)
must make the best use of what we have. Next we
must inquire what kinds of revenue, at present wholly
lacking, are yet potentially existent ; what kinds,
though now small, may with care be increased ; and
how far certain items of present expenditure may
without prejudice to the commonwealth be diminished.

Having spoken thus of administrations and their 8
various departments, we have further proceeded to
collect such instances as we deemed noteworthy of
the means adopted by certain statesmen in times past
for the replenishment of the treasury, and also of
their skill in administration. These anecdotes (which

1346 a

χρεῖον ὑπελαμβάνομεν εἶναι. ἔστι γὰρ ὅτε τούτων ἐφαρμόσει τοῖς οἷα ἂν αὐτὸς πραγματεύηται.¹

1346 b

Π. Κύψελος ὁ Κορίνθιος εὐξάμενος τῷ Διί, ἐὰν κύριος γένηται τῆς πόλεως, τὰ ὄντα Κορινθίοις πάντα ἀναθήσειν, ἐκέλευσεν αὐτοὺς ἀπογράψασθαι, ἀπογραψαμένων δὲ τούτων τὸ δέκατον μέρος παρ' ἐκάστου ἔλαβε, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἐκέλευσεν ἐργάζεσθαι. περιελθόντος δὲ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν, ὥστε συνέβαινεν ἐν δέκα ἔτεσι
 5 κείνόν τε ἅπαντα ἔχειν, ἅπερ ἀνιέρωσεν, τοὺς τε Κορινθίους ἕτερα κεκτῆσθαι.

Λύγδαμης Νάξιος ἐκβαλὼν φυγάδας, ἐπειδὴ τὰ 2 κτήματα αὐτῶν οὐθεὶς ἠθέλησεν ἄλλ' ἢ βραχείος ἀγοράζειν, αὐτοῖς τοῖς φυγάσιν ἀπέδοτο. τὰ τε
 10 ἀναθήματα, ὅσα ἦν αὐτῶν ἐν τισιν ἐργαστηρίοις ἡμίεργα ἀνακείμενα, ἐπώλει τοῖς τε φυγάσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὥστ' ἐπιγραφῆναι τὸ τοῦ πριαμένου ὄνομα.

Βυζάντιοι δὲ δεηθέντες χρημάτων τὰ τεμένη τὰ 3 δημόσια ἀπέδοντο, τὰ μὲν κάρπιμα χρόνον τινά,
 15 τὰ δὲ ἄκαρπα ἀενάως, τὰ τε θιασωτικὰ καὶ τὰ πατριωτικὰ ὡσαύτως, καὶ ὅσα ἐν χωρίοις ἰδιωτικοῖς ἦν· ὠνοῦντο γὰρ πολλοῦ ὧν ἦν καὶ τὸ ἄλλο κτήμα. τοῖς δὲ θιασώταις ἕτερα χωρία² τὰ δημόσια, ὅσα ἦν περὶ τὸ γυμνάσιον ἢ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἢ

¹ Reading *τι* after *τούτων* and *τις οἷς* for *τοῖς οἷα* (see Susemihl's note).

² A verb is omitted in the Greek.

³ See the seventh Speech of the Athenian orator Lysias.

follow), seemed to us by no means lacking in utility ; being capable from time to time of application by others to the business they themselves have in hand.

II. Cypselus of Corinth had made a vow that if he became master of the city, he would offer to Zeus the entire property of the Corinthians. Accordingly he commanded them to make a return of their possessions ; which done, he took from each a tenth part, and told them to employ the remainder in trading. A year later, he repeated the process. And so in ten years' time it came to pass that Cypselus received the entire amount which he had dedicated ; while the Corinthians on their part had replaced all that they had paid him.

Lygdamis of Naxos, after driving into exile a party ² of the inhabitants, found that no one would give him a fair price for their property. He therefore sold it to the exiled owners. The exiles had left behind them a number of works of art destined for temple offerings, which lay in certain workshops in an unfinished condition. These Lygdamis proceeded to sell to the exiles and whoso else would buy them ; allowing each purchaser to have his name engraved on the offering.

The people of Byzantium, being in need of funds, ³ sold such dedicated lands as belonged to the State ; those under crops, for a term of years, and those uncultivated, in perpetuity. In like manner they sold lands appropriated to religious celebrations or ancestral cults, not excepting those that were on private estates ^a ; for the owners of the surrounding land were ready to give a high price for them. To the dispossessed celebrants (they assigned) such other public lands surrounding the gymnasium, the

1346 b

20 τὸν λιμένα,¹ τοὺς τε τόπους τοὺς ἀγοραίους, ἐν οἷς ἐπώλει τίς τι· καὶ τῆς θαλάττης τὴν ἀλιείαν, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀλῶν ἀλ[ατ]οπωλίαν, τῶν τ' ἐργαζομένων θαυματοποιῶν καὶ μάντεων καὶ φαρμακοπωλῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιοντοτρόπων . . .² τὸ τρίτον δὲ μέρος τοῦ ἐργαζομένου ἀποτελεῖν ἔταξαν. τῶν τε νομισμάτων τὴν καταλλαγὴν ἀπέδοντο μιᾷ
26 τραπέζῃ· ἑτέρῳ δὲ οὐκ ἦν οὐθενὶ οὔτε ἀποδόσθαι ἑτέρῳ οὔτε πρίασθαι παρ' ἑτέρου· εἰ δὲ μή, στέρησις ἦν.

"Οντος δὲ νόμου αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶναι πολίτην ὅς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀστῶν ἀμφοτέρων ᾖ, χρημάτων δεηθέντες ἐψηφίσαντο τὸν ἐξ ἐνὸς ὄντα ἀστοῦ³ καταβαλόντα μινὰς τριάκοντα εἶναι πολίτην.

80 Ἐν σιτοδείᾳ δὲ γενόμενοι καὶ ἀποροῦντες χρημάτων κατήγαγον τὰ πλοῖα τὰ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου· χρόνου δὲ γενομένου, τῶν ἐμπόρων ἀγανακτούντων ἐτέλουν αὐτοῖς τόκους ἐπιδεκάτους· τοῖς δ' ὠνούμενοις τι ἔταξαν χωρὶς τῆς τιμῆς διδόναι τὸ ἐπιδέκατον.

1347 a Μετοίκων δὲ τινων ἐπιδεδανεικότων ἐπὶ κτήμασιν, οὐκ οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἐγκτήσεως⁴ ἐψηφίσαντο τὸ τρίτον μέρος εἰσφέροντα τοῦ δανείου τὸν βουλόμενον κυρίως ἔχειν τὸ κτῆμα.

Ἰππίας [ὁ] Ἀθηναῖος τὰ ὑπερέχοντα τῶν ὑπε- 4

¹ I transpose this comma and the colon in the next line.

² Reading τὴν ἐργασίαν ἐδήμεισαν, (P) after τοιοντοτρόπων.

³ ἀστοῦ (for αὐτοῦ mss.) is restored by Sylburg from the Latin version σ.

⁴ ἐγκτήσεως is Schneider's correction of ms. ἐκτίσεως, ἐκτῆσεως, or ἐκκτῆσεως.

agora, or the harbour, as belonged to the State. Moreover they claimed as public property all open spaces where anything was sold, together with the sea-fisheries, the traffic in salt, and the trade of professional conjurors, soothsayers, charm-sellers, and the like; exacting from all these one-third of their gains. The right of changing money they sold to a single bank, whose proprietor was given a monopoly of the sale and purchase of coin, protected under penalty of confiscation.

And whereas previously the rights of citizenship were by law confined to those whose parents were both citizens, lack of funds induced them to offer citizenship to him who had one citizen parent on payment of the sum of thirty *minae*.^a

On another occasion, when food and funds were both scarce, they called home all vessels that were trading in the Pontus. On the merchants protesting, they were at length allowed to trade on payment of a tithe of their profits. This tax of 10 per cent was also extended to purchases of every kind.

It happened that certain aliens residing in the city had lent money on the security of citizens' property. As these aliens did not possess the right of holding such property, the people offered to recognize the title of anyone who chose to pay into the treasury one third of the amount secured.

Hippias of Athens offered for sale upper stories that 4

* A *mina* of silver (1lb. 5 oz. avoirdupois) was coined into 100 *drachmae*, each being an artisan's ordinary daily wage.

1247^a

ῥῶων εἰς τὰς δημοσίας ὁδοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀναβαθμοὺς καὶ τὰ προφράγματα καὶ τὰς θύρας τὰς ἀνοιγομένας ἔξω ἐπώλησεν· ὠνοῦντο οὖν ὧν ἦν τὰ κτήματα, καὶ συνελέγη χρήματα οὕτω συχνά.

Τό τε νόμισμα τὸ ὃν Ἀθηναίοις ἀδόκιμον ἐποίησε, τάξας δὲ τιμὴν ἐκέλευσε πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνακομίζειν·
 10 συνελθόντων δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ κόψαι ἕτερον χαρακτήρα, ἐξέδωκε τὸ αὐτὸ ἀργύριον.

Ὅσοι τε τριηραρχεῖν ἢ φυλαρχεῖν ἢ χορηγεῖν ἢ τινα εἰς ἑτέραν λειτουργίαν τοιαύτην ἤμελλον δαπανᾶν, τίμημα τάξας μέτριον ἐκέλευσε τὸν βουλόμενον ἀποτίσαντα τοῦτο ἐγγράφεισθαι εἰς τοὺς λελειουργηκότας.

15 Τῇ τε ἱερείᾳ τῇ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τῆς ἐν ἀκροπόλει ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀποθανόντος φέρειν χοῖνικα κριθῶν καὶ πυρῶν ἑτέραν καὶ ὀβολόν, καὶ ὅτῳ ἂν παιδάριον γένηται, τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο.

Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ οἱ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ οἰκοῦντες δεόμενοι ὅς
 χρημάτων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀπογράψασθαι ἅπασιν
 20 συνέταξαν τὰς οὐσίας, μὴ ἀθρόας εἰς τὸν αὐτοῦ δῆμον ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ κτῆμα ἐν ᾧ τόπῳ ἕκαστον εἴη, ἵνα οἱ πένητες δύνωνται ὑποτιμᾶσθαι· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἦν κτῆμα μηθέν, τὸ σῶμα διμναῖον τιμῆσθαι. ἀπὸ τούτων οὖν εἰσέφερον τὸ ἐπιγραφέν ἕκαστος σῶρον τῇ πόλει.

* Cf. Goethe, *Wahrheit und Dichtung*, Book I. "In Frankfurt, as in several ancient cities, those who had erected wooden buildings had sought to obtain more room by allowing the first and higher floors to overhang the street. . . . At last a law was carried that in all entirely new houses the first floor alone should project; above that, the wall should be perpendicular."

The poet's father, wishing to rebuild his house without

projected over the public streets,^a together with flights of steps, railings, and doors that opened outwards. The owners of the buildings bought them, and in this way a large sum of money was collected.

He also called in ^b the existing currency, promising to pay the holders at a fixed rate. But when they came to receive the new mintage, he reissued the old coins.

Those who were expecting to equip a war-vessel or preside over a tribe or train a chorus or undertake the expense of some other public service of the kind, he allowed, if they chose, to commute the service for a moderate sum, and to be enrolled on the list of those who had performed it.

Moreover, whenever a citizen died, the priestess of the temple of Athena on the Acropolis ^c was to receive one quart measure of barley, one of wheat, and a silver *obolus*.^d And when a child was born, the father paid the same dues.

The Athenian colonists at Potidaea, being in need ⁵ of funds for the war, agreed that all should make a return of their property for assessment of tax. But instead of each returning the entire amount to his own parish, properties were to be assessed separately, each in its own locality, so that the poor might propose a reduced assessment; while those without any (landed) property were assessed at two *minae* a head. On these assessments each man paid the State the full amount of the war-tax.

sacrifice of floor-space, underpinned the upper stories and renewed the building piecemeal from below. Cf. also § 14.

^b Lit. "rendered invalid."

^c This was the public treasury, like the Temple of Saturnus at Rome.

^d $\frac{1}{4}$ of the *drachma*. See § 3 above.

1347 a

25 (Σωσίπολις)¹ Ἀντισσαῖος [δέ], δεηθείσης τῆς 8
 πόλεως χρημάτων, εἰθισμένων [δέ] αὐτῶν λαμπρῶς
 ἄγειν Διονύσια, ἐν οἷς ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἀνήλiskon ἐξ
 ἐνιαυτοῦ παρασκευάζοντες, καὶ ἱερεῖα πολυτελῆ,
 ὑπογούου δὲ οὔσης ταύτης τῆς ἐορτῆς, ἔπεισεν
 αὐτοὺς τῷ μὲν Διονύσω εὖξασθαι ἐς νέωτα ἀποδώ-
 80 σειν διπλάσια, ταῦτα δὲ συναγαγόντας ἀποδόσθαι.
 συνελέγη οὖν αὐτοῖς χρήματα οὐκ ὀλίγα πρὸς τὴν
 χρεῖαν.

Λαμψακηνοὶ δὲ προσδοκίμων οὐσῶν τριήρων 7
 πολλῶν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὄντος μεδίμνου τῶν ἀλφίτων
 τετραδράχμου, προσέταξαν τοῖς ἀγοραίοις πωλεῖν
 85 ἐξάδραχμον, καὶ τοῦ ἐλαίου τὸν χοᾶ ὄντα δραχμῶν
 (τριῶν),² τεττάρων καὶ τριωβόλου, τοῦ τε οἴνου
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀρχαίαν
 1347 b τιμὴν ἐλάμβανεν ὁ ἰδιώτης, τὸ δὲ πλεόν ἢ πόλις,
 καὶ εὐπόρησε χρημάτων.

Ἡρακλεῶται πέμποντες ναῦς τεσσαράκοντα ἐπὶ 8
 τοὺς ἐν Βοσπόρῳ τυράννους, οὐκ εὐπορούμενοι
 9 χρημάτων παρὰ τῶν ἐμπόρων συνηγόρασαν τὸν τε
 σῆτον πάντα καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον καὶ τὸν οἶνον καὶ τὴν
 ἄλλην ἀγορὰν χρόνου δισταμένου ἐν ᾧ ἔμελλον
 ἀποδώσειν τὴν τιμὴν. τοῖς τε δὴ ἐμπόροις καλῶς
 εἶχε μὴ κοτυλίζειν, ἀλλ' ἀθρόα τὰ φορτία πεπρα-
 σθαι, ἐκεῖνοί τε διδόντες δι' ἄλλην οὐ³ μισθὸν παρ-
 10 ἦγον [ἀλλὰ] τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐν ὁλκάσι, (καὶ) ἀνδρα
 ταμίαν ἐπέστησαν ἐφ' ἐκάστη τῶν νεῶν. ἀφ-

¹ The name, omitted in the Greek mss., is supplied from the Latin version c.

² <τριῶν> is inserted by Boeckh.

³ Reading διμήνου (Kirchhoff) for ms. δι' ἄλλην οὐ.

^a Or "All through the year."

The city of Antissa had been accustomed to celebrate the festival of Dionysus with great magnificence. Year by year ^a great provision was made for the occasion, and costly sacrifices were prepared. Now one year the city found itself in need of funds; and shortly before the festival, on the proposal of a citizen named Sosipolis, the people after vowing that they would next year offer to Dionysus a double amount, collected all that had been provided and sold it. In this way they realized a large sum of money to meet their necessity.

On one occasion the people of Lampascus were ⁷ expecting to be attacked by a large fleet of triremes.^b The price of barley meal being then four drachmae for a bushel and a half, they instructed the retailers to sell it at six drachmae. Oil, which was at three drachmae for six pints, was to be sold at four drachmae and a half, and wine and other commodities at a proportionate increase. In this way the retailer got the original price, while the State took the addition and filled its treasury.

The people of Heraclea, being about to dispatch a ⁸ fleet of forty ships against the lords of Bosphorus, were at a loss for the necessary funds. They therefore bought up all the merchants' stock of corn and oil and wine and other marketable commodities, agreeing to pay at a future date. The merchants were well satisfied that they had disposed of their cargoes without breaking bulk; and the people, advancing two months' pay to their armament, sent along with it a fleet of merchant-vessels laden with the commodities, every ship being in charge of a public official. When

^b War-ships, each propelled by some 174 rowers ranked in three tiers.

1847 b

ικομένων δ' εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν αὐτῶν ἡγόραζον οἱ
στρατιῶται παρὰ τούτων ἅπαντα. πρότερον (οὖν)
συνελέγη ἀργύριον ἢ¹ ἐδίδουσιν οἱ στρατηγοὶ πάλιν
τὸν μισθόν, ὥστε συνέβαινε ταὐτὸ [τὸ]² ἀργύριον
16 δίδοσθαι ἕως εἰς οἶκον ἀπῆλθον.

Λακεδαιμόνιοι Σαμίων δεηθέντων χρήματα αὐτοῖς 9
εἰς τὴν κάθοδον δοῦναι, ἐψηφίσαντο μίαν ἡμέραν
καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας καὶ τὰ ὑποζύγια
νηστεῦσαι, ὅσον δὲ ἐδαπάναι ἕκαστος, τοσοῦτον
δοῦναι τοῖς Σαμίοις.

20 Χαλκηδόνιοι δέ, ξένων ἐν τῇ πόλει συχνῶν παρ' 10
αὐτοῖς γινομένων, ὀφείλοντες αὐτοῖς μισθὸν οὐκ
ἡδύναντο διαλύσαι. ἀντήγγειλαν οὖν, εἴ τις τῶν
πολιτῶν ἢ μετοίκων σῦλον ἔχει κατὰ πόλεως ἢ
ιδιῶτου καὶ βούλεται λαβεῖν, ἀπογράψασθαι. ἀπο-
26 γραφάμενων δὲ συχνῶν, τὰ πλοῖα τὰ πλείοντα εἰς
τὸν Πόντον ἐσύλων μετὰ προφάσεως εὐλόγου.
ἔταξαν δὲ χρόνον ἐν ᾧ λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔφασαν
ποιήσασθαι. συλλεγόντων δὲ χρημάτων συχνῶν
τοὺς μὲν στρατιώτας ἀπῆλλαξαν, ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν
σύλων διεδικάσαντο. τοῖς δὲ μὴ δικαίως συλη-
30 θείωσιν ἢ πόλιν ἀπὸ τῶν προσόδων ἀπεδίδου.

Κυζικηνοὶ δὲ στασιάσαντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους, 11
ἐπικρατήσαντος τοῦ δήμου, τῶν δὲ πλουσιῶν
συνειλημμένων, ὀφείλοντες χρήματα στρατιώταις

¹ Reading πρότερον οὖν συνελέγη τὰργύριον ἢ (Schneider's correction of πρότερον συνελέγη ἢ ἀργύριον, the reading of most mss.).

² τὸ bracketed by Schneider.

the expedition reached its goal, the men purchased from these officials all they needed. In this way, the money was collected before the leaders again paid their men ; so that the same payment sufficed until the expedition returned home.

When the Samians entreated the Lacedaemonians ⁹ for money to enable them to return to their country, the Lacedaemonians passed a resolution that they and their servants and their beasts of burden should go without food for one day ; and that the expense each one thus saved should be given to the Samians.

The people of Chalcedon had a large number of ¹⁰ mercenary troops in their city, to whom they could not pay the wages they owed. Accordingly they made proclamation that anyone, either citizen or alien, who had right of reprisal against any city or individual, and wished to exercise it, should have his name entered on a list. A large number of names was enrolled, and the people thus obtained a specious pretext for exercising reprisal upon ships that were passing on their way to the Pontus. They accordingly arrested the ships and fixed a period within which they would consider any claims that might be made in respect of them. Having now a large fund in hand, they paid off the mercenaries, and set up a tribunal to decide the claims ; and those whose goods had been unjustly seized were compensated out of the revenues of the state.

At Cyzicus, civil strife broke out between the ¹¹ democratic and oligarchic parties. The former proved victorious, and the rich citizens were placed under arrest. But as the city owed money to its troops, a

ARISTOTLE

1347 b

ἔφηφίσαντο μὴ θανατῶσαι τοὺς συνειλημμένους, ἀλλὰ χρήματα πραξαμένους φυγαδεῦσαι.

35 Χῖοι δέ, νόμου ὄντος αὐτοῖς ἀπογράφεσθαι τὰ 12

1348 a σαντο τοὺς ὀφείλοντας μὲν ἀποδοῦναι τῇ πόλει τὰ δάνεια, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐκ τῶν προσόδων τοὺς τόκους τοῖς δεδανεικόσι καταφέρειν, ἕως ἂν κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εὐπορήσωσιν.

Μαύσωλος ὁ Καρίας τύραννος, πέμποντος βασι- 13

8 λέως πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῷ τοὺς φόρους δοῦναι, συναγαγὼν τοὺς εὐπορωτάτους ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁ βασιλεὺς αἰτεῖ τοὺς φόρους, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ εὐπορεῖται. κατασκευαστοὶ δ' ἄνδρες αὐτῷ εὐθέως ἐπηγγέλλοντο, ὅσον εἰσοίσει ἕκαστος. τούτων δὲ τοῦτο πραξάντων, οἱ εὐπορώτεροι τὰ μὲν αἰσχυρό- 10 μνοι τὰ δὲ φοβούμενοι πολλῷ τούτων (πλείῳ)² ἐπηγγέλλοντο καὶ εἰσέφερον.

Πάλιν δεηθεὶς χρημάτων ἐξεκκλησιάσας τοῖς Μυλασσεῦσιν ἔλεγεν ὅτι μητρόπολις οὐσα ἡ πόλις αὐτοῦ αὕτη ἀτειχιστός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἐπ' αὐτὸν στρατεύει. ἐκέλευσεν οὖν τοὺς Μυλασσεῖς 15 φέρειν ἕκαστον ὅτι πλείστα χρήματα, φάσκων αὐτοὺς τοῖς νῦν εἰσενεχθεῖσι καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ σώζειν. εἰσενεχθέντων δὲ πολλῶν τὰ μὲν χρήματα εἶχε, τὸ δὲ τεῖχος οὐκ ἔφη τὸν θεὸν (εἶαν)³ ἐν τῷ παρόντι οἰκοδομεῖν.

Κόνδαλος Μαυσώλου ὑπαρχος, ὅποτε διαπορευο- 14 μένω αὐτῷ διὰ τῆς χώρας προσενέγκοι τις πρόβατον

¹ Or, reading καὶ (Camerarius) for κατὰ, "until it was able to repay the principal as well."

² <πλείῳ> added by the Aldine edition.

³ <εἶαν> inserted by Scaliger.

resolution was passed that the lives of those under arrest should be spared, and that they should be allowed to depart into exile on paying a sum of money to the state.

At Chios there was a law that all debts should be¹² entered on a public register. Being in need of funds, the people resolved that debtors should pay their debts into the treasury, and that the state should meet the creditors' interest out of its revenues until its former prosperity returned.

Mausolus lord of Caria received from the King of¹³ Persia^a a demand for tribute. Therefore he summoned the wealthiest men in his dominion, and told them that the King was asking for the tribute, and he had not the means of paying it. Men whom he had previously suborned at once came forward and declared what each was ready to contribute. With this example before them, they who were wealthier than these, partly in shame and partly in alarm, promised and paid much larger sums than the others.

Being again in lack of funds, Mausolus summoned a public meeting of the people of Mylassa and told them that the King of Persia was preparing to attack him; and that Mylassa his capital city was unfortified. He therefore bade the citizens contribute each as liberally as he could, saying that what they now paid in would afford security to the rest of their possessions. By these means he obtained large contributions. But though he kept the money, he declared that heaven, for the present, forbade the building of the walls.

Condalus, who was a lieutenant-governor under¹⁴ Mausolus, whenever on his progress through the country he was presented with a sheep, a pig, or a

^a Probably Artaxerxes II. who reigned 405-359 B.C.

ARISTOTLE

1348^a 20 ἢ ὅν ἢ μόσχον, ἀπογραφάμενος τὸν δόντα καὶ τὸν
 χρόνον, ἀπαγαγόντα εἰς οἶκον ἐκέλευε τρέφειν ἕως
 ἂν ἐπανέλθοι· ὅποτε δὲ δοκοίη χρόνος ἱκανὸς εἶναι,
 αὐτό τε τὸ τραφέν καὶ τὴν ἐπικαρπίαν λογισάμενος
 ἀπῆτει. τῶν τε δένδρων τὰ ὑπερέχοντα ἢ πίπτοντα
 25 εἰς τὰς ὁδοὺς τὰς βασιλικὰς ἐπώλει ὡς ἐπικαρπίας.¹

Τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν εἴ τις τελευτήσῃ, διαπύλιον
 ἐπώλει δραχμὴν τοῦ σώματος· ἅμα τε οὖν ἐντεῦθεν
 καὶ ἀργύριον ἐλάμβανεν, ἅμα τε οἱ ἡγεμόνες οὐ παρ-
 κρούοντο αὐτόν, πότε τετελεύτηκεν ὁ στρατιώτης.

Τοὺς τε Λυκίους ὁρῶν ἀγαπῶντας τὸ τρίχωμα
 30 φορεῖν, ἔφησε γράμματα ἤκειν παρὰ βασιλέως,
 κόμας ἀποστεῖλαι εἰς προκόμια, προστετάχθαι οὖν
 αὐτῷ ὑπὸ Μανσώλου ἀποκεῖραι αὐτοῦς. ἔφησεν
 οὖν, εἰ βούλονται ἐπικεφάλαιον τακτὸν αὐτῷ δοῦ-
 ναι, μεταπέμψασθαι ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος κόμην, οἱ δὲ
 ἀσμένως ἔδοσαν ὃ ἦτει, καὶ συνελέγη χρήματα
 πολλὰ ἀπὸ ὄχλου πολλοῦ.

35 Ἀριστοτέλης Ῥόδιος ἄρχων Φωκαίας, ἀπορῶν 15
 χρημάτων, ὁρῶν στάσεις οὖσας δύο τῶν Φωκαίων
 1348^b λόγους ἐποίησατο πρὸς τὴν ἐτέραν στάσιν ἐν ἀπορ-
 ρήτοις, φάσκων αὐτῷ διδόναι χρήματα τοὺς ἐτέρους
 ἐφ' ᾧ αὐτοῖς τὰ πράγματα ἐγκλῶναι, αὐτὸς δὲ
 μᾶλλον βούλεσθαι παρὰ τούτων λαβεῖν καὶ τὰ περὶ
 6 τὴν πόλιν τούτοις διοικεῖν παραδοῦναι. ἀκούσαντες
 δὲ ταῦτα εὐθέως τὰ χρήματα οἱ παρόντες πορί-
 σαντες ὅσα ἐκέλευσεν ἔδωκαν. ὁ δὲ τοῖς ἐτέροις
 πάλιν ἔδειξεν ἃ εἰληφῶς εἶη παρὰ τῶν ἐτέρων· οἱ

¹ ὡς ἐπικαρπίας is Goettling's emendation for τὰς ἐ. (MSB.).

* Mentioned by Proclus in his commentary on the *Timaeus* of Plato. A coin of Phocaea is extant bearing the name.

calf, had a record made of the donor's name and of the date. He then bade the man take the beast home and keep it until he should again pass that way. After what he considered a sufficient interval, he would demand the beast together with such profits as he reckoned it had produced. All trees, too, which projected over the king's highway, or fell thereon, he sold as profits accruing to the State.

When one of his soldiers died, he charged a drachma for the right of passing the body through the gates. This was not only a source of revenue, but a check on the commanders, who were thus prevented from falsifying the date of the man's death.

Noticing that the Lycians were fond of wearing their hair long, Condalus proclaimed that a dispatch had arrived from the King ordering him to send hair to make forelocks for his horses; and that Mausolus had therefore instructed him to shave their heads. However, if they would pay him a fixed sum per head, he would send to Greece for hair. They were glad to comply with his demand, and a large sum was collected, the number of those taxed being great.

Aristoteles of Rhodes,^a when governor of Phocaea, 15 found himself in need of funds. Noticing that there were at Phocaea two opposing parties, he held a secret conference with one of them, at which he declared that the other party was offering him money if he would favour their pretensions; that he, however, preferred to receive from those now before him, and to entrust to them the administration of the city. On hearing this, they immediately contributed the money he asked, and gave it him. Thereupon he told the other party what he had received from them;

1318 b

δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔφασαν οὐκ ἐλάττω δώσειν. λαβὼν δὲ παρ' ἀμφοτέρων κατήλλαξεν αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

- 10 Τοῖς τε πολίταις κατιδὼν οὔσας δίκας πολλὰς, καὶ μεγάλας ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου ἀδικίας τούτοις διὰ πολέμου, δικαστήριον καθίσας προεῖπεν, ὅσοι ἂν μὴ δικάσωνται χρόνῳ ὃν¹ ἔθηκε, μηκέτι εἶναι ὑπὲρ τῶν προτέρων ἐγκλημάτων κρίσεις. τότε δὴ παραβόλιον² πολλῶν δικῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκκλητήους³ μετ'
15 ἐπιτιμιῶν ἐφ' αὐτὸν ποιούμενος καὶ παρ' ἑκατέρων ἀργύριον δι' ἐτέρων⁴ λαμβάνων, συνήγαγεν οὐκ ὀλίγα χρήματα.

- Κλαζομένοι δ' ἐν σιτοδείᾳ ὄντες χρημάτων τε 18 ἀποροῦντες ἐψηφίσαντο, παρ' οἷς ἔλαιόν ἐστι τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, δανεῖσαι τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ τόκῳ· γίνεται δὲ
20 πολὺς οὗτος ὁ καρπὸς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ αὐτῶν. δανεισάντων δὲ μισθωσάμενοι πλοῖα ἀπέστειλαν εἰς τὰ ἐμπόρια, ὅθεν αὐτοῖς ἦκε σίτος, ὑποθήκης γενομένης τῆς τοῦ ἐλαίου τιμῆς.

- Ὁφειλοντες στρατιώταις μισθὸν εἴκοσι τάλαντα καὶ οὐ (δοῦναι)⁵ δυνάμενοι τόκον ἔφερον τοῖς ἡγεμόσι τέτταρα τάλαντα τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ· ἐπεὶ δὲ
25 τοῦ μὲν ἀρχαίου ἀπέκοπτον οὐθέν, αἰεὶ δὲ μάτην ἔδαπάνων, νόμισμα ἔκοψαν σιδηροῦν εἰς ἀργυρίου λόγον εἴκοσι ταλάντων, εἰτα διδόντες τοῖς εὐπορω-

¹ χρόνῳ ὃν is Susemihl's emendation. The mss. have χρόνον, καὶ χρόνον, or καὶ χρόνων.

² παραβόλιον is Susemihl's emendation. The mss. have παραβολόν, παραβόλου, παραβολήν, or παραβολή. Perhaps παρακαταβολήν should be restored.

³ ἐκκλητήους is Schneider's emendation for ms. ἐγκλητήους. Perhaps <τὰς> should be inserted before μετ' ἐπιτιμιῶν.

⁴ Perhaps αἰ' ἐτέρων should be omitted. Walford renders:

and they in turn promised him at least an equal amount. Having thus taken the money of both factions, he effected a reconciliation between them.

He also observed that there were many law-suits pending between the citizens, and that they had grave and long-standing complaints against one another which had arisen in course of war. He therefore appointed a tribunal, and made proclamation that all who failed to appear before it within a stated period should lose the right to a legal decision of their outstanding claims. Then, by taking into his own hands the court-fees for a number of suits, and also those appeal-cases which involved penalties, and receiving [through others] money from both sides, he obtained altogether a very considerable sum.

The people of Clazomenae, suffering from dearth ¹⁶ of grain and scarcity of funds, passed a resolution that any private citizens who had stores of oil should lend it to the State at interest; this being a produce which their land bears in abundance. The loan arranged, they hired vessels and sent them to the depots whence they obtained their grain, (and bought a consignment) on security of the value of the oil.

The same people, owing their mercenaries twenty talents of pay and being unable to find it, were giving the leaders of the troop four talents of interest each year. But failing to reduce the capital debt, and committed to this fruitless drain on their revenue, they struck an iron coinage of twenty talents, bearing the face-value of the silver. This they distributed

"and by taking bribes from each party through the instrumentality of the other."

¹⁶ <δοῦναι> is added by Spengel and Susemihl. Schneider suggests <διαλῦσαι> or <δοῖναι> after *δυστάμενοι*.

1348 b

τάτοις ἐν τῇ πόλει κατὰ λόγον ἐκάστω ἀργύριον
 παρ' ἐκείνων ἔλαβον ἴσον. οἳ τε οὖν ἰδιῶται εἶχον
 εἰς τὰς καθ' ἡμέραν χρείας ἀναλίσκειν, καὶ ἡ πόλις
 80 τοῦ χρέους ἀπηλλάγη. δεύτερον δὲ ἐκ τῶν προσό-
 δων ἐκείνοις τὸν τε τόκον κατέφερον (καὶ) αἰεὶ
 διαιροῦντες ἐκάστω πρὸς μέρος διεδίδουσιν, τοὺς
 δὲ σιδηροὺς ἐκομίζοντο.

Σηλυβριανοὶ δὲ δεηθέντες χρημάτων, νόμου ὄντος 17
 αὐτοῖς σίτον μὴ ἐξάγειν . . .¹ ἐν λιμῷ γενομένοις,
 85 ἐκείνοις δὲ ὑπάρχοντος σίτου παλαιοῦ, ἐψηφίσαντο
 τῇ πόλει παραδοῦναι τοὺς ἰδιώτας τὸν σίτον τῆς
 1349 α τεταγμένης τιμῆς, ὑπολειπόμενον ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτοῦ
 τροφήν· εἴτα ἐξαγωγήν ἔδωκαν τῷ βουλομένῳ,
 τάξαντες τιμὴν ἣν ἐδόκει καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτοῖς.

Ἀβυθηνοὶ δέ, διὰ στασιασμόν τῆς χώρας ἀργοῦ 18
 γενομένης, καὶ τῶν μετοίκων οὐ προεϊμένων αὐτοῖς
 9 οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ καὶ ἔτι ὀφείλειν, ἐψηφίσαντο τὸν
 βουλόμενον τοῖς γεωργοῖς δανεῖζειν, ὡς ἐργάσων-
 ται, ὡς πρώτοις αὐτοῖς ἐσομένης τῆς κομιδῆς ἐκ
 τοῦ καρποῦ, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἐκ τῶν λειπομένων.

Ἐφέσιοι δεηθέντες χρημάτων νόμον ἔθεντο μὴ 19
 10 φορεῖν χρυσὸν τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅσον δὲ νῦν ἔχουσι,
 δανεῖσαι τῇ πόλει.

¹ Keil and Susemihl suspect a lacuna before ἐν λιμῷ. The former suggests <τοῖς ἄλλοις>, ". . . a law which forbade the export of grain <to other peoples> suffering from famine." The latter conjectures τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐν λιμῷ γενομένων, ". . . a law which forbade the export of grain. On one occasion, however, they were in need of funds; and as <others were suffering from famine while> they possessed . . ."

proportionately among the wealthiest citizens, and received from them silver to the same amount. Through this expedient, the private citizens possessed a currency which was good for their daily needs, and the state was relieved of its debt. Next, they proceeded to pay interest out of revenue to those who had advanced the silver; and little by little distributed repayment among them, recalling at the same time the currency of iron.^a

The people of Selybria had a law, passed in time 17 of famine, which forbade the export of grain. On one occasion, however, they were in need of funds; and as they possessed large stores of grain, they passed a resolution that citizens should deliver up their corn to the state at the regular fixed price, each retaining for himself a year's supply. They then granted right of export to any who desired it, fixing what they deemed a suitable price.

At Abydos civil strife had caused the land to re- 18 main uncultivated; while the resident aliens, to whom the city was already indebted, refused to make any further advances. A resolution was accordingly passed that anyone who would might lend money to enable the farmers to cultivate their land, on the understanding that the lender had the first claim on its produce; others taking from what was then left. The people of Ephesus, being in need of funds, 19 passed a law forbidding their women to wear gold, and ordering them to lend the State what gold they had in their possession.

^a Plutarch (*Life of Lycurgus*) speaks of an iron currency at Sparta, and Seneca (*De beneficiis*) of a leathern one. These, not being exchangeable abroad, threw the nation upon its own resources and prevented the import of luxuries.

Τῶν τε κιόνων (τισὶ)¹ τῶν ἐν τῷ νεῷ τάξαντες ἀργύριον ὃ δεῖ καταβαλεῖν εἷων ἐπιγράφεσθαι τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ δόντος τὸ ἀργύριον ὡς ἀνατεθεικότος.

Διονύσιος Συρακούσιος βουλόμενος χρήματα 20 συναγαγεῖν, ἐκκλησίαν ποιήσας ἔφησεν ἑωρακέναι τὴν Δήμητραν, καὶ κελεύειν τὸν τῶν γυναικῶν κόσμον εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν ἀποκομίζειν. αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ γυναικῶν τὸν κόσμον τοῦτο πεποιη-
κέναι· ἡξίου δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, μή τι μῆνιμα παρὰ
τῆς θεοῦ γένηται· τὸν δὲ μὴ τοῦτο ποιήσαντα
20 ἔνοχον ἔφησεν ἱεροσυλίας ἔσεσθαι. ἀνενεγκάντων
δὲ πάντων ἃ εἶχον διὰ τε τὴν θεὸν καὶ δι' ἐκείνον,
θύσας τῇ θεῷ τὸν κόσμον ἀπηνέγκατο ὡς παρὰ τῆς
θεοῦ δεδανεισμένος. προελθόντος δὲ χρόνου καὶ
τῶν γυναικῶν πάλιν φορουσῶν, ἐκέλευσε τὴν βου-
λομένην χρυσοφορεῖν τάγμα τι ἀνατιθέναι ἐν τῷ
ἱερῷ.

25 Τριήρεις τε ναυπηγεῖσθαι μέλλον ἦδει ὅτι δεή-
σοιτο χρημάτων. ἐκκλησίαν οὖν συναγαγὼν ἔφη
πόλιν αὐτῷ τινα προδίδοσθαι, εἰς ἣν δεῖσθαι χρη-
μάτων, ἡξίου τε αὐτῷ τοὺς πολίτας εἰσενέγκαι δύο
στατήρας ἕκαστον· οἱ δ' εἰσήνεγκαν. διαλιπὼν δὲ
δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἡμέρας, ὡς διημαρτηκῶς τῆς πράξεως,
30 ἐπαινέσας αὐτοὺς ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ ὃ εἰσήνεγκαν.

¹ <τισι> inserted by Keil; otherwise, "They also assessed each pillar in their temple at a certain price, and offered to any citizen who was willing to pay it, the right of having his name inscribed thereon as the donor."

* This temple, dedicated to Artemis, was restored with great magnificence after its destruction by fire in 356 B.C.
368

They also offered to any citizen who was willing to pay a fixed sum the right of having his name inscribed on a certain pillar of their temple^a as the donor thereof.

Dionysius of Syracuse, being desirous of collecting 20 funds, called a public assembly, and declared that Demeter had appeared to him, and bade him convey all the women's ornaments into her temple. That he himself had done so with the ornaments of his own household; and the others must now follow his example, and thereby avoid any visitation of the goddess's anger. Anyone who failed to comply would, he declared, be guilty of sacrilege. Through fear of the goddess as well as of the despot, all the citizens brought in whatever they had. Then Dionysius, after sacrificing to the goddess, removed the ornaments to his own treasury as a loan which he had borrowed from her. As time went on, the women again appeared with precious ornaments. Dionysius thereupon issued a decree that any woman who desired to wear gold should make an offering of a fixed amount in the temple.

Intending to build a fleet of triremes, Dionysius knew that he should require funds for the purpose. He therefore called an assembly and declared that a certain city was offered to him by traitors, and he needed money to pay them. The citizens therefore must contribute two staters apiece.^b The money was paid; but after two or three days, Dionysius, pretending that the plot had failed, thanked the citizens and returned to each his contribution. In

For its fame see Acts xix. Portions of the sculptured pillars are to be seen in the British Museum.

^b The *stater* was a Persian gold coin worth 20 *drachmas*. (See § 3.)

1349 a ποιήσας δὲ τοῦτο ἀνεκτῆσατο τοὺς πολίτας. εἴτα
 πάλιν . . . ὁ δὲ λαβὼν εἶχεν εἰς τὴν ναυπηγίαν.

Οὐκ εὐπορῶν δὲ ἀργυρίου νόμισμα ἔκοψε κατ-
 τιτέρου, καὶ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν πολλὰ τοῦ
 35 κεκομμένου νομίσματος ὑπερεῖπεν, οἱ δὲ ἐψηφίσαντο
 καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι ἕκαστος ὃ ἂν εἴλετο ἔχειν ὡς
 ἀργυροῦν ἀλλὰ μὴ καττιτέρουν.

1349 b Πάλιν τε δεηθεὶς χρημάτων ἡξίου τοὺς πολίτας
 εἰσενεγκεῖν αὐτῷ· οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔφασαν ἔχειν. ἐξ-
 ενέγκας οὖν τὰ σκεύη τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐπώλει, ὡς δὴ
 δι' ἀπορίαν τοῦτο ποιῶν· ἀγοραζόντων δὲ Συρα-
 κουσίων ἀπεγράφετο τί ἕκαστος ἀγοράσειεν· ἐπεὶ
 5 δὲ τὴν τιμὴν κατέβαλον, ἐκέλευσε τὸ σκεῦος ἀνα-
 φέρειν ἕκαστον ὃ ἡγόρασεν.

Τῶν δὲ πολιτῶν διὰ τὰς εἰσφορὰς οὐ τρεφόντων
 βοσκήματα εἶπεν ὅτι ἱκανὰ ἦν αὐτῷ πρὸς τοσοῦτον·
 τοὺς οὖν νῦν τι κτησαμένους ἀτελεῖς ἔσεσθαι.
 πολλῶν δὲ ταχὺ κτησαμένων πολλὰ βοσκήματα,
 10 ὡς ἀτελῇ ἐξόντων, ἐπεὶ καιρὸν ᾤετο εἶναι, τιμή-
 σασθαι κελεύσας ἐπέβαλε τέλος. οἱ οὖν πολῖται
 ἀγανακτήσαντες ἐπὶ τῷ ἐξηπατηθῆναι, σφάζοντες
 ἐπώλουν. ὡς δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔταξε σφάζεσθαι ὅσα
 δεῖ τῆς ἡμέρας, οἱ δὲ πάλιν ἱερόθυτα ἐποιοῦν· ὁ δὲ
 ἀπέειπε θῆλν μὴ θύειν.

16 Πάλιν τε δεηθεὶς χρημάτων ἐκέλευσεν ἀπο-

¹ Understanding or inserting <ἀξιοῦντος> (Susemihl) or the like.

this way he won the confidence of the citizens ; so that when he again asked for money, they contributed in the expectation that they would receive it back. But this time he kept it for building the fleet.

On another occasion being in straits for silver he minted a coinage of tin, and summoning a public assembly, spoke at length in its favour. The citizens perforce voted that everyone should regard as silver, and not as tin, whatever he received.

Again being in need of funds, he requested the citizens to contribute. On their declaring that they had not the wherewithal, he brought out the furnishings of his palace and offered them for sale, pretending to be compelled through lack of money. At the sale, he had a list made of the articles and their purchasers ; and when they had all paid, he commanded every one to bring back the article he had bought.

Finding that because of his imposts the citizens were ceasing to rear sheep and cattle, he made proclamation that he needed no more money until a certain (date) ; so that those who now became possessed of any stock would not be liable to taxation. A large number of citizens lost no time in acquiring a quantity of sheep and cattle, on the understanding that they would be free of impost. But Dionysius, when he thought the fitting time was come, had them all valued and imposed a tax. The citizens were angry at being thus deceived, and proceeded to kill and sell their beasts. On Dionysius's making a decree that only such beasts should be slain as were needed each day, the owners retorted by offering their animals as sacrifices ; whereupon the despot forbade the sacrifice of female beasts.

Once more funds were lacking, and Dionysius

1340 b

γράφασθαι [χρήματα]¹ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅσοι οἰκοί εἰσιν ὀρφανικοί· ἀπογραφεμένων δὲ ἄλλων² τὰ τούτων χρήματα ἀπεχρᾶτο, ἕως ἕκαστος εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι.

Ῥηγίων τε καταλαβὼν, ἐκκλησίαν συναγαγὼν εἶπε διότι δικαίως μὲν ἂν ἑξανδραποδισθεῖεν ὑφ' αὐτοῦ, νῦν μέντοι τὰ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀνηλωμένα χρήματα κομισάμενος καὶ ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου σώματος τρεῖς μνᾶς ἀφήσειν αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ Ῥηγῖνοι ὅσα ποτ' ἦν αὐτοῖς ἀποκεκρυμμένα ἐμφανῇ ἐποίουν, καὶ οἱ ἄποροι παρὰ τῶν εὐπορωτέρων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ξένων δανειζόμενοι ἐπόρισαν ἃ ἐκέλευσε χρήματα. λαβὼν δὲ ταῦτα παρ' αὐτῶν τὰ τε σώματα πάντα οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀπέδοτο, τὰ τε σκεύη, ἃ τότε ἦν ἀποκεκρυμμένα, ἐμφανῇ ἅπαντα ἔλαβε.

Δανεισάμενός τε παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν χρήματα ἐπ' ἀποδόσει, ὡς ἀπῆτουν αὐτόν, ἐκέλευσεν ἀναφέρειν ὅσον ἔχει τις ἀργύριον πρὸς αὐτόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, θάνατον ἔταξε τὸ ἐπιτίμιον· ἀνενεχθέντος δὲ τοῦ ἀργυρίου, ἐπικόψας χαρακτηῖρα ἐξέδωκε τὴν δραχμὴν δύο δυναμένην δραχμᾶς, καὶ τό τε ὀφειλόμενον πρότερον . . .³ ἀνήνεγκαν πρὸς αὐτόν.

Εἰς Τυρρηνίαν τε πλεύσας ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν ἔλαβεν ἐκ τοῦ τῆς Λευκοθέας ἱεροῦ χρυσίον τε καὶ ἀργύριον πολὺ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον κόσμον οὐκ ὀλίγον. εἰδὼς δὲ ὅτι καὶ οἱ ναῦται πολλὰ ἔχουσι, κήρυγμα ἐποίησατο, τὰ ἡμίσεα ὧν ἔχει ἕκαστος ἀναφέρειν πρὸς αὐτόν, τὰ δ' ἡμίσεα ἔχειν τὸν λαβόντα· τῷ δὲ μὴ ἀνεγγκαντι θάνατον ἔταξε τὸ ἐπιτίμιον. ὑπολαβόντες δὲ

¹ Or, if χρήματα be kept, "a return of property to be made him by all houses whose heirs were orphan."

² Reading πάντων (Sylburg) for ms. ἄλλων.

³ Reading τὸ τε ὀφειλόμενον (ἀπέδωκε καὶ ὁ νῦν) ἀνήνεγκαν (after Susemihl).

ordered a list to be made for him of all houses whose heirs were orphan. Having obtained a complete list, he made use of the orphans' property until each should come of age.

After the capture of Rhegium, he summoned a meeting of the citizens, and told them why he had a good right to sell them as slaves. If, however, they would pay him the expenses of the war and three minae ^a a head besides, he would release them. The people of Rhegium brought forth all their hoards; the poor borrowed from the wealthier and from the foreigners resident in the city; and so the amount demanded was paid. But though he received this money from them, none the less he sold them all for slaves, having succeeded (by his trick) in bringing to light the hoarded goods which they had previously concealed.

On another occasion he had borrowed money from the citizens, promising to repay it. On their demanding its return, he bade each bring him, under pain of death, whatever silver he possessed. This silver when brought he coined into drachmae each bearing the face value of two: with these he repaid the (previous) debt and also what had just been brought in.

He also made a raid on Tyrrhenia with a hundred ships, and rifled the temple of Leucothea of a large amount of gold and silver, besides a quantity of works of art. But being aware that his sailors too had taken much plunder, he made proclamation that each should bring him, under pain of death, one-half of what he had; the remainder of their takings they might keep. On the understanding that if they

^a See § 3.

οἱ ναῦται ἀνενεγκόντες τὰ ἡμίσεα τὰ κατάλοιπα
 5 ἔχειν ἀδεῶς, ἀνήνεγκαν· ὁ δ' ἐπέειπερ ἐκεῖνα ἔλαβεν,
 ἐκέλευσε πάλιν τὰ ἡμίσεα ἀναφέρειν.

Μενδαῖοι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ λιμένων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 21
 τελῶν αὐτοῖς προσπορευόμενα ἐχρῶντο εἰς διοίκη-
 σιν τῆς πόλεως, τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ οἰκιῶν τέλη
 οὐκ ἔπραττον, ἀλλ' ἀνέγραφον τοὺς ἔχοντας· ὅποταν
 10 δὲ δεηθεῖεν χρημάτων, ἀπεδίδουσιν (οἱ) ὀφείλοντες.
 ἐκέρδαινον οὖν τὸν παρεληλυθότα χρόνον ἀπόκοις
 τοῖς χρήμασι ἀποκεχρημένοι.

Πολεμοῦντές (τε) πρὸς Ὀλυνθίους καὶ δεόμενοι
 χρημάτων, ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἀνδραπόδων, ἐψηφίσαντο
 καταλειπομένων ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ θήλεος καὶ ἄρρενος
 τὰ ἄλλα ἀποδόσθαι τῇ πόλει, ὥς ἐκδανείσαι τοὺς
 15 ἰδιώτας χρήματα.

Καλλίστρατος ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πωλουμένον τοῦ 22
 ἑλλιμενίου ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ εἴκοσι ταλάντων ἐποίη-
 σεν εὐρεῖν τὸ διπλάσιον· κατιδὼν γὰρ ὠνούμενους
 τοὺς εὐπορωτέρους αἰεὶ διὰ τὸ δεῖν ταλαντιαίους
 20 καθεστάναι τοὺς ἐγγύους τῶν εἴκοσι ταλάντων,
 προεκήρυξεν ὠνεῖσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον, καὶ τοὺς
 ἐγγύους καθεστάναι τοῦ τρίτου μέρους καὶ καθ'
 ὅποσον ἐκάστους δύνηται πείθειν.

Τιμόθεος Ἀθηναῖος πολεμῶν πρὸς Ὀλυνθίους 23
 καὶ ἀπορούμενος ἀργυρίου, κόψας χαλκὸν διεδίδου
 25 τοῖς στρατιώταις. ἀγανακτοῦντων δὲ τῶν στρα-
 τιωτῶν ἔφη αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἐμπόρους τε καὶ ἀγοραίους
 ἅπαντας ὡσαύτως πωλήσειν. τοῖς δ' ἐμπόροις
 προεῖπεν, ὃν ἂν τις λάβῃ χαλκόν, τούτου πάλιν

* Or: "that citizens should sell to the state what slaves they possessed . . . as the equivalent of a loan from private persons to the city <of the slaves' value>."

1250 a

ἀγοράζειν τά τ' ἐκ τῆς χώρας ὧνια καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν
 λειῶν ἀγόμενα· ὃς δ' ἂν περιλειφθῇ αὐτοῖς χαλκός,
 80 πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναφέροντας ἀργύριον λαμβάνειν.

Περὶ Κέρκυραν δὲ πολεμῶν καὶ ἀπόρως διακεί-
 μενος καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν αἰτούντων τοὺς μισθοὺς
 καὶ ἀπειθούντων αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὑπεναντίους
 φασκόντων ἀποπορεύεσθαι, ἐκκλησίαν συναγαγὼν
 85 εἶπεν οὐ δύνασθαι διὰ τοὺς χειμῶνας παραγενέ-
 σθαι αὐτῷ ἀργύριον, ἐπεὶ τοσαύτην εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸν
 εὐπορίαν, ὥστε τὴν προδεδομένην τριμήνου σιταρ-
 1250 b χίαν δωρεὰν αὐτοῖς διδόναι· οἱ δὲ ὑπολαβόντες οὐκ

ἂν ποτε προέσθαι τοσαῦτα χρήματα τὸν Τιμόθεον
 αὐτοῖς, εἰ μὴ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ προσδόκιμα ᾦν τὰ χρήματα
 πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἥσυχίαν εἶχον ὑπὲρ τῶν μισθῶν, ἕως
 ἐκεῖνος διωκῆσατο ἃ ἐβούλετο.

5 Σάμον δὲ πολιορκῶν τοὺς καρποὺς καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ
 τῶν ἀγρῶν ἀπεδίδοτο αὐτοῖς τοῖς Σαμίοις, ὥστε
 εὐπόρησε χρημάτων εἰς μισθοὺς τοῖς στρατιώταις.
 τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων ἐπεὶ σπάνις ᾦν ἐν τῷ στρα-
 10 τοπέδῳ διὰ τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους, ἀπηγόρευσε μὴ
 πωλεῖν σῖτον ἀληλεσμένον, μηδὲ μέτρον ἔλασσον ἢ

15 μέδιμνον, μηδὲ τῶν ὑγρῶν μηθὲν ἔλαττον ἢ μετρη-
 τήν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ταξίαρχοί τε καὶ λοχαγοὶ ἀγορά-
 ζοντες ἀθρόα διεδίδονσαν τοῖς στρατιώταις, οἱ δὲ
 εἰσαφικνούμενοι ᾗγον αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, ὅποτε δὲ
 ἀπαλλάττοντο, εἰ τι περίλοιπον εἶη αὐτοῖς, ἐπώ-
 λουν. ὥστε συνέβαιεν εὐπορεῖσθαι τοὺς στρατιώ-
 16 τας τῶν ἐπιτηδείων.

Διδάλης Πέρσης ἔχων στρατιώτας τὰ μὲν καθ' 24
 ἡμέραν πορίζειν ἐδύνατο ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας αὐτοῖς,
 νόμισμα δὲ οὐκ ἔχων διδόναι, ἀπαιτούμενος δέ,

ceived such produce of the land as was for sale, as well as any booty brought to them ; such copper as remained on their hands he would exchange for silver.

During the campaign of Corcyra^a this same Timotheus was reduced to sore straits. His men demanded their pay ; refused to obey his orders ; and declared they would desert to the enemy. Accordingly he summoned a meeting and told them that the stormy weather was delaying the arrival of the silver he expected ; meanwhile, as he had on hand such abundance of provisions, he would charge them nothing for the three months' ration of grain already advanced. The men, unable to believe that Timotheus would have sacrificed so large a sum to them unless he was in truth expecting the money, made no further claim for pay until he had completed his dispositions.

At the siege of Samos,^b Timotheus sold the crops and other country property to the besieged Samians themselves, and thus obtained plenty of money to pay his men. But finding the camp was short of provisions owing to the arrival of reinforcements, he forbade the sale of milled corn, or of any measure less than $1\frac{1}{2}$ bushels of corn or $8\frac{1}{2}$ gallons of wine or oil. Accordingly the officers bought supplies wholesale and issued them to their men ; the reinforcements thenceforth brought their own provisions, and sold any surplus on their departure. In this way the needs of the soldiers were satisfactorily met.

Didales the Persian was able to provide for the 24 daily needs of his mercenaries from the enemy's country ; but had no coined money to give them.

^a Apparently in 375 B.C. See the end of Xenophon's fifth Book of *Hellenica*.

^b In 366 B.C.

1350 b

χρόνου γενομένου οὐ ὥφειλε, τεχνάζει τοιόνδε.
 20 ἐκκλησίαν συναγαγὼν ἔφη οὐκ ἀπορεῖσθαι χρη-
 μάτων, ἀλλ' εἶναι αὐτῷ ἐν χωρίῳ τινί, λέγων ἐν
 ᾧ εἶη. καὶ ἀναζεύξας ἐβάδιζεν ἐπ' αὐτό· εἶτα ὡς
 ἐγγὺς τοῦ χωρίου ἐγένετο, προελθὼν εἰς αὐτὸ
 ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῶν ἐνόντων ἱερῶν ὅσος ἐνὴν κοῖλος
 ἄργυρος· εἶτ' ἐπισκευάσας τὰς ἡμιόνας ὡς ἀγούσας
 25 ἄργύριον παραφαινούσας τε ταῦτα ἐβάδιζεν. ἰδόντες
 δὲ οἱ στρατιῶται καὶ νομίσαντες ἅπαντα εἶναι
 ἄργυρον τὰ ἀγόμενα, ἐθάρρησαν ὡς κομιούμενοι
 τὸν μισθόν. ὁ δὲ ἔφη δεῖν εἰς Ἀμισὸν ἐλθόντα
 ἐπισημῆνασθαι· ἦν δ' εἰς τὴν Ἀμισὸν ὁδὸς πολλῶν
 τε ἡμερῶν καὶ χειμέριος· τὸν δὴ χρόνον τοῦτον
 30 ἀπεχρᾶτο τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια μόνον
 διδούς.

Τοὺς (τε) τεχνίτας τοὺς ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ
 αὐτὸς εἶχε καὶ τοὺς καπήλους τοὺς μεταβαλλο-
 μένους τι· ἄλλω δὲ οὐκ ἦν οὐθενὶ οὐθέν τούτων
 ποιεῖν.

Χαβρίας Ἀθηναῖος Ταῦ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων βασιλεῖ 25
 ἐκστρατεύοντι καὶ δεομένῳ χρημάτων συνεβούλευε
 35 τῶν τε ἱερῶν τινα καὶ τῶν ἱερέων¹ τὸ πλῆθος φάναι
 πρὸς τοὺς ἱερεῖς δεῖν παραλυθῆναι διὰ τὴν δαπάνην.
 1351 a ἀκούσαντες δὲ οἱ ἱερεῖς καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς
 ἕκαστοι βουλόμενοι εἶναι, καὶ ἴδια² αὐτοῖς οἱ ἱερεῖς

¹ ἱερέων, "priests," is Sylburg's emendation for ms. ἱερῶν, "sacrifices."

² Perhaps <καὶ κοινὰ> has dropped out after αὐτοῖς. Sylburg suggests ἴδιε ἕκαστοι καὶ κοινῇ. See § 33, last sentence.

When their pay became due, and they demanded it, he had recourse to the following trick. He called a meeting, and told the men that he had plenty of money, but that it was stored in a certain fortress, which he named. He then broke up his encampment and marched in that direction. On reaching the neighbourhood of the fortress, he himself went on ahead, and entering the place seized all the silver vessels in the temples. He then loaded his mules in such a way that this plate was exposed, thus suggesting that silver formed the entire load; and so continued his march. The soldiers, beholding the plate and supposing that they convoyed a full load of silver, were cheered by the expectation of their pay. They were informed however by Didales that they would have to take it to Amisus to be coined—a journey of many days, and in the winter season. And during all this time, he continued to employ the army without giving it more than its necessary rations.

Moreover, all the craftsmen in the army, and the hucksters who traded with the soldiers by barter, were under his personal control, and enjoyed a complete monopoly.

When Taos,^a king of Egypt, needed funds for an expedition he was making, Chabrias of Athens advised him to inform the priests that to save expense it was necessary to suppress some of the temples together with the majority of the attendant priests. On hearing this, each priesthood, being anxious to retain their own temple, offered him money from

^a Called Tachos (Ταχός) by Xenophon and Plutarch. Perhaps that form should be restored here. (Bonitz and Susemihl.) The name recurs in § 37.

1361^a ἐδίδουσαν χρήματα. ἐπεὶ δὲ παρὰ πάντων εἰλήφει, προστάξει αὐτοῖς ἐκέλευσεν εἰς μὲν τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν¹ τῆς δαπάνης τῆς πρότερον ἐποιοῦντο τὸ δέκατον μέρος ποιεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ αὐτῷ δανείσαι, ἕως ὃ πύλεμος ὁ πρὸς βασιλέα διαλυθῇ.

Ἀπ' οἰκίας δὲ ἐκάστης κελεῦσαι ἅπαντας εἰσενέγκαι τάξαντα ὃ δεῖ, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ὡσαύτως· τοῦ σίτου τε πωλουμένου χωρὶς τῆς τιμῆς διδόναι τὸν πωλοῦντα καὶ ὠνούμενον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρτάβης τὸν ὀβολόν· ἀπὸ τῶν πλοίων τε καὶ ἐργαστηρίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ ἐργασίαν ἐχόντων τῆς ἐργασίας μέρος τὸ δέκατον κελεῦσαι ἀποτελεῖν.

Ἐκστρατεύειν δ' αὐτῷ μέλλοντι ἐκ τῆς χώρας, εἴ τις ἔχοι ἄσημον ἀργύριον ἢ χρυσίον, κελεῦσαι ἐνέγκαι πρὸς αὐτόν· ἐνεγκάντων δὲ τῶν πλείστων, ἐκέλευσε τούτῳ μὲν ἐκείνον χρῆσθαι, τοὺς δὲ δανείσαντας συστήσαι τοῖς νομάρχαις, ὥστ' ἐκ τῶν φόρων αὐτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι.

Ἰφικράτης Ἀθηναῖος, Κότυος συναγαγόντος στρατιώτας, ἐπόρισεν αὐτῷ χρήματα τρόπον τοιοῦτον. ἐκέλευσε τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν ἦρχε προστάξει κατασπεῖραι αὐτῷ γῆν τριῶν μεδίμων· τούτου δὲπραχθέντος συνελέγη σίτου πολὺ πλῆθος. καταγαγὼν οὖν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐμπόρια ἀπέδοτο, καὶ εὐπόρησε χρημάτων.

Κότυς Θραξ παρὰ Πειρινθίων ἐδανείζετο χρήματα εἰς τὸ τοὺς στρατιώτας συναγαγεῖν· οἱ δὲ Πειρινθιοὶ οὐκ ἐδίδουσιν αὐτῷ. ἤξιωσεν οὖν αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας γε τῶν πολιτῶν φρουροὺς δοῦναι εἰς χωρία τινὰ,

¹ Reading εἰς αὐτοὺς for ms. εἰς αὐτόν (Aldino edition εἰς αὐτόν).

their private possessions (as well as from the temple funds). When the king had thus received money from them all, Chabrias bade him tell the priests to spend on the temple-service and on their own maintenance one-tenth of what they formerly spent, and lend him the remainder until he had made peace with the King (of Persia).

Moreover, each inhabitant was to contribute a stated proportion of his household and personal possessions; and when grain was sold, buyer and seller were each to contribute, apart from the price, one obol per *artabē*^a; while a tax of one tenth was to be imposed on profits arising from shops and workshops and other sources of gain.

Again, when Taos was on the point of setting out from Egypt, Chabrias advised him to make requisition of all uncoined gold and silver in the possession of the inhabitants; and when most of them complied, he bade the king make use of the bullion, and refer the lenders to the governors of his provinces for compensation out of the taxes.

Iphicrates of Athens provided Cotys with money 26 for a force which he had collected in the following manner. He bade him order (each) of his subjects to sow for him a piece of land bearing $4\frac{1}{2}$ bushels. A large quantity of grain was thus gathered, from the price of which, when brought to the depots on the coast, the king obtained as much money as he wanted.

Cotys of Thrace asked the people of Peirinthus for 27 a loan to enable him to raise an army. On their refusing, he begged them at any rate to let him have some of their citizens to garrison certain fortresses,

^a The *artabē* was a Persian measure containing nearly 50 quarts. The obol was $\frac{1}{4}$ of a drachma of silver.

1351 a

ἵνα τοῖς ἐκεῖ στρατιώταις νῦν φρουροῦσι σχῇ ἀπο-
 χρήσασθαι. οἱ δὲ τοῦτο ταχέως ἐποίησαν, οἰό-
 80 μνοι τῶν χωρίων κύριοι ἔσεσθαι. ὁ δὲ Κότυς τοὺς
 ἀποσταλέντας εἰς φυλακὴν ποιήσας τὰ χρήματα
 αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευσεν ἀποστείλαντας, ἃ ἐδανείζετο παρ'
 αὐτῶν, κομίσασθαι.

Μέντωρ Ῥόδιος¹ Ἑρμείαν συλλαβὼν καὶ τὰ 28
 χωρία αὐτοῦ κατασχὼν τοὺς ἐπιμελητὰς εἶασε κατὰ
 25 χώραν τοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἑρμείου καθεστηκότας. ἐπεὶ
 δὲ ἐθάρρησάν τε ἅπαντες, καὶ εἴ τί ποτ' ἦν αὐτοῖς
 ἀποκεκρυμμένον ἢ ὑπεκκείμενον, μεθ' αὐτῶν εἶχον,
 συλλαβὼν αὐτοὺς πάντα παρείλετο ἃ εἶχον.

1351 b

Μέμνων Ῥόδιος κυριεύσας Λαμψάκον δεηθεὶς 29
 χρημάτων ἐπέγραψε τοῖς πλουσιωτάτοις αὐτῶν
 πλῆθός τι ἀργυρίου, τούτοις δὲ τὴν κομιδὴν ἔσεσθαι
 παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ἔφησεν· ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι
 5 πολῖται εἰσήνεγκαν, ἐκέλευσε καὶ ταῦτα αὐτῷ
 δανείσαι ἐν χρόνῳ² διειπάμενος ἐν ᾧ πάλιν αὐτοῖς
 ἀποδώσει.

Πάλιν τε δεηθεὶς χρημάτων ἠξίωσεν αὐτοὺς
 εἰσενέγκαι, κομίσασθαι δὲ ἐκ τῶν προσόδων· οἱ δ'
 εἰσήνεγκαν, ὥς διὰ ταχέων αὐτοῖς ἐσομένης τῆς
 κομιδῆς· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ καταβολαὶ τῶν προσόδων
 10 παρήσαν, ἔφησεν ἐπ' αὐτῷ³ χρεῖαν εἶναι καὶ τούτων,
 ἐκείνοις δὲ ὕστερον ἀποδώσειν σὺν τόκῳ.

Τῶν τε στρατενομένων παρ' αὐτῷ παρρητεῖτο τὰς
 σιταρχίας καὶ τοὺς μισθοὺς ἐξ ἡμερῶν τὸν ἐνιαυτόν,
 φάσκων ταύταις ταῖς ἡμέραις οὔτε φυλακὴν αὐτοὺς

¹ Ῥόδιος Camerarius for ms. υἱός.

² Perhaps χρόνον (Kirchhoff) should be read for ms. ἐν χρόνῳ.

³ Reading ἐπὶ αὐτῷ (Scaliger) or ἐαυτῷ (Sylburg) for ἐπ' αὐτῷ (most mss.).

and release for active service the men who were there on duty. They readily complied, thinking thus to obtain control of the fortresses. But Cotys placed in custody the men they sent, and told the citizens that they might have them back when they had sent him the amount of the loan he desired.

Mentor of Rhodes, after taking Hermias prisoner ²⁸ and seizing his fortresses, left in their various districts the officials appointed by him. By this means he restored their confidence, so that they all took again to themselves the property they had hidden or had sent secretly out of the country. Then Mentor arrested them and stripped them of all they had.

Memnon of Rhodes, on making himself master of ²⁹ Lampsacus, found he was in need of funds. He therefore assessed upon the wealthiest inhabitants a quantity of silver, telling them that they should recover it from the other citizens. But when the other citizens made their contributions, Memnon said they must lend him this money also, fixing a certain date for its repayment.

Again being in need of funds, he asked for a contribution, to be recovered, as he said, from the city revenues. The citizens complied, thinking that they would speedily reimburse themselves. But when the revenue payments came in, he declared that he must have these also, and would repay the lenders subsequently with interest.

His mercenary troops he requested to forgo six days' pay and rations each year, on the plea that on those days they were neither on garrison duty nor on the march nor did they incur any expense.

1361 b

οὐδεμίαν οὔτε πορείαν οὔτε δαπάνην ποιείσθαι, τὰς
15 ἐξαιρέσιμους λέγων.

Τόν τε πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον διδούς τοῖς στρατιώταις
τῇ δευτέρᾳ τῆς νουμηνίας τὴν σιταρχίαν, τῷ μὲν
πρώτῳ μηνὶ παρέβη τρεῖς ἡμέρας, τῷ δ' ἐχομένῳ
πέντε· τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον προῆγεν, ἕως εἰς τὴν
τριακάδα ἦλθεν.

Χαρίδემος Ὀρείτης ἔχων τῆς Αἰολίδος τινὰ 30
χωρία, ἐπιστρατεύοντος ἐπ' αὐτὸν Ἀρταβάζου
χρημάτων ἐδεῖτο εἰς τοὺς στρατιώτας. τὸ μὲν οὖν
πρώτον εἰσέφερον αὐτῷ, εἶτα οὐκέτι ἔφασαν ἔχειν.
ὁ δὲ Χαρίδემος, ὃ ᾤετο χωρίον εὐπορώτατον εἶναι,
ἐκέλευσεν, [καὶ] εἴ τι νόμισμα ἔχουσιν ἢ τι ἄλλο
σκεῦος ἀξιόλογον, εἰς ἕτερον χωρίον ἀποστέλλειν,
25 παραπομπὴν δὲ δώσειν· ἅμα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο
ποιῶν φανερός ἦν. πεισθέντων δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
προαγαγὼν αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως μικρὸν καὶ ἐρευνή-
σας ἃ εἶχον, ἔλαβεν ὅσων ἐδεῖτο, ἐκείνους δὲ πάλιν
εἰς τὸ χωρίον ἀπήγεν.

Κήρυγμά τε ποιησάμενος ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὧν
30 ἦρχε, μηδένα μηδὲν ὄπλον κεκτηῖσθαι ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ,
εἰ δὲ μή, ἀποτίσειν ἀργύριον ὃ ἐπεκήρυξεν, ἡμέλει
καὶ οὐδεμίαν ἐπιστροφὴν ἐποιεῖτο. τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώ-
πων οἰομένων τὸ κήρυγμα μάτην αὐτὸν πεποιῆσθαι,
εἶχον ἃ ἔτυχον ἕκαστοι κεκτημένοι κατὰ χώραν.
ὁ δ' ἐρευνᾶν ἐξαίφνης ποιησάμενος τῶν οἰκίων, παρ'
33 οἷς εὗρεν ὄπλον τι, ἐπράττετο τὸ ἐπιτίμιον.

* As the moon's cycle is completed in $29\frac{1}{2}$ days, it was customary to alternate "hollow" months of 29 days with the "full" months of 30 days. Memnon paid his men by the month, but deducted a day's pay every "hollow" month.

(He referred to the days omitted from alternate months.^a)

Moreover, being accustomed previously to issue his men's rations of corn on the second day of the month, in the first month he postponed the distribution for three days, and in the second month for five ; proceeding in this fashion until at length it took place on the last day of the month.

Charidemus of Oreus, being in occupation of certain 30 fortress-towns in Aeolis, and threatened with an attack by Aitabazus,^b was in need of money to pay his troops. After their first contributions, the inhabitants declared they had no more to give. Charidemus then issued a proclamation to the town he deemed wealthiest, bidding the inhabitants send away to another fortress all the coin and valuables they possessed, under convoy which he would provide. He himself openly set the example with his own goods, and prevailed on them to comply. But when he had conducted them a little way out of the town, he made an inventory of their goods, took all he wanted, and led them home again.

He had also issued a proclamation in the cities he governed forbidding anyone to keep arms in his house, under pain of a stated fine. At first, however, he took no care to enforce it, nor did he make any inquisition ; so that the people treated his proclamation as nugatory, and made no attempt to get rid of what arms each possessed. Then Charidemus unexpectedly ordered a search to be made from house to house, and exacted the penalty from those who were found in possession of arms.

^a For the circumstances, and a (hostile) account of this commander's adventures, see Demosthenes, *Against Aristocrates*.

1351 b

Φιλόξενός τις Μακεδῶν Καρίας σατραπεύων 31
 δεηθείς χρημάτων Διονύσια ἔφασκε μέλλειν ἄγειν,
 1352 a καὶ χοραγοὺς προέγραψε τῶν Καρῶν τοὺς εὐπορω-
 τάτους, καὶ προσέταττεν αὐτοῖς ἃ δεῖ παρασκευά-
 ζειν. ὁρῶν δ' αὐτοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας, ὑποπέμπων
 τινὰς ἡρώτα, τί βούλονται δόντες ἀπαλλαγῆναι τῆς
 6 λειτουργίας. οἱ δὲ πολλῶ πλεόν ἢ ὅσον ὥντο ἀνα-
 λώσειν ἔφασαν δώσειν τοῦ μὴ ὀχλεῖσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ
 τῶν ἰδίων ἀπείναι. ὁ δὲ παρὰ τούτων λαβὼν ὁ ἐδίδο-
 σαν ἑτέρους κατέγραψεν, ἕως ἔλαβε παρὰ τούτων ἃ
 ἐβούλετο καὶ προσῆν παρ' ἐκάστοις.¹

Εὐδαίσης Σύρος Αἰγύπτου σατραπεύων, ἀφίστα- 32
 10 σθαι μελλόντων τῶν νομαρχῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ αἰσθό-
 μενος, καλέσας αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰ βασιλεία ἐκρέμα
 ἅπαντας· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς οἰκείους ἐκέλευσε λέγειν ὅτι
 ἐν φυλακῇ εἰσιν. ἕκαστος² οὖν τῶν οἰκείων ἔπρατ-
 τον ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου, καὶ χρημάτων ἐξεωνοῦντο τοὺς
 συνειλημμένους. ὁ δὲ διομολογησάμενος ὑπὲρ
 15 ἐκάστου καὶ λαβὼν τὰ ὁμολογηθέντα ἀπέδωκεν
 ἐκάστοις τὸν νεκρόν.

Κλεομένης Ἀλεξανδρεὺς Αἰγύπτου σατραπεύων, 33
 λιμοῦ γενομένου ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις τόποις σφόδρα,
 ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ δὲ μετρίως, ἀπέκλεισε τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν
 τοῦ σίτου. τῶν δὲ νομαρχῶν φασκόντων οὐ δυ-
 20 νῆσθαι τοὺς φόρους ἀποδοῦναι τῷ μὴ ἐξάγεσθαι
 τὸν σίτον, ἐξαγωγὴν μὲν ἐποίησε, τέλος δὲ πολὺ τῷ

¹ Reading *ἕως* (καὶ) (Keil) ἔλαβε παρὰ τούτων, καὶ ἃ ἐβούλετο (Keil) προσῆν παρ' ἐκάστων (Sylburg). The ms. readings are corrupt.

² Perhaps *ἑκαστοι* should be read: "each family on behalf of their kinsman."

A Macedonian named Philoxenus, who was governor of Caria, being in need of funds proclaimed that he intended to celebrate the festival of Dionysus. The wealthiest inhabitants were selected to provide the choruses, and were informed what they were expected to furnish. Noticing their disinclination, Philoxenus sent to them privately and asked what they would give to be relieved of the duty. They told him they were prepared to pay a much larger sum than they expected to spend (on the choruses) in order to avoid the trouble and the interruption of their business. Philoxenus accepted their offers, and proceeded to enrol a second levy. These also paid; and at last he received what he desired from each company.

Euaises the Syrian, when governor of Egypt, received information that the local governors were meditating rebellion. He therefore summoned them to the palace and proceeded to hang them all, sending word to their relations that they were in prison. These accordingly made offers, each on behalf of his own kinsman, seeking by payment to secure their release. Euaises agreed to accept a certain sum for each, and when it had been paid returned to the relations the dead body.

While Cleomenes of Alexandria was governor of Egypt,^a at a time when there was some scarcity in the land, but elsewhere a grievous famine, he forbade the export of grain. On the local governors representing that if there were no export of grain they would be unable to pay in their taxes, he allowed the export, . . . from the time that he received the government, has done immense mischief to your state, and still more to the rest of Greece, by buying up corn for resale and keeping it at his own price" (Kennedy's translation).

1352 ^a σίτω ἐπέβαλεν, ὥστε συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ' . . . ,
ἐξαγομένου ὀλίγου πολὺ τέλος λαμβάνειν, αὐτοὺς
τε τοὺς νομάρχας πεπαῦσθαι τῆς προφάσεως.

Διαπλέοντος δ' αὐτοῦ τὸν νομόν, οὗ ἐστι θεὸς
ὁ κροκόδειλος, ἡρπάσθη τις τῶν παίδων αὐτοῦ.
25 καλέσας οὖν τοὺς ἱερεῖς ἔφη πρότερος ἀδικηθεὶς
ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς κροκοδείλους, καὶ προσέταξε
θηρεῦειν αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ ἱερεῖς, ἵνα μὴ ὁ θεὸς αὐτῶν
καταφρονηθῇ, συναγαγόντες ὅσον ἡδύναντο χρυσίον
ἔδωσαν αὐτῷ, καὶ οὕτως ἐπαύσατο.

Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ βασιλέως ἐντειλαμένου αὐτῷ
30 οἰκίσαι πόλιν πρὸς τῷ Φάρῳ καὶ τὸ ἐμπόριον τὸ
πρότερον ὃν ἐπὶ τοῦ Κανώβου ἐνταῦθα ποιῆσαι,
καταπλεύσας εἰς τὸν Κάνωβον πρὸς τοὺς ἱερεῖς
καὶ τοὺς κτήματα ἔχοντας ἐκεῖ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἤκειν
ἔφη ὥστε μετοικίσαι αὐτούς. οἱ (δὲ) ἱερεῖς καὶ
οἱ κάτοικοι εἰσενέγκαντες χρήματα ἔδωκαν, ἵν'
35 ἔᾳ κατὰ χώραν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἐμπόριον. ὁ δὲ λαβὼν
τότε μὲν ἀπηλλάγη, εἴτα δὲ καταπλεύσας, ἐπεὶ ἦν

1352 ^b εὐτρεπῇ αὐτῷ τὰ πρὸς τὴν οἰκοδομίαν, ἥτει
αὐτοὺς χρήματα ὑπερβαλὼν τῷ πλήθει· τοῦτο γὰρ
αὐτῷ τὸ διάφορον εἶναι, τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐμπόριον
καὶ μὴ ἐκεῖ. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἂν ἔφασαν δύνασθαι
δοῦναι, μετώκισεν αὐτούς.

Ἀποστείλας τέ τινα ἐπ' ἀγόρασμά τι καὶ αἰσθό-
5 μενος ὅτι εὐώνων ἐπιτετύχηκεν, αὐτῷ δὲ μέλλει
ἐκτετιμημένα λογίζεσθαι, πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις τοῦ
ἀγοραστοῦ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἀκηκοὺς εἶη τὰ ἀγοράσματα
αὐτὸν ὑπερτίμια ἡγορακέναι· αὐτὸς οὖν οὐ προσ-

¹ εἰ μὴ, omitted in several mss., I have left untranslated.
Susemihl suspects a lacuna after the words.

but laid a heavy duty on the corn. By this means he obtained a large amount of duty from a small amount of export, and at the same time deprived the officials of their excuse.

When Cleomenes was making a progress by water through the province where the crocodile is worshipped, one of his servants was carried off. Accordingly, summoning the priests, he told them that he intended to retaliate on the crocodiles for this unprovoked aggression ; and gave orders for a battue. The priests, to save the credit of their god, collected all the gold they could, and succeeded in putting an end to the pursuit.

King Alexander had given Cleomenes command to establish a town near the island of Pharos, and to transfer thither the market hitherto held at Canopus. Sailing therefore to Canopus he informed the priests and the men of property there that he was come to remove them. The priests and residents thereupon contributed money to induce him to leave their market where it was. He took what they offered, and departed ; but afterwards returned, when all was ready to build the town, and proceeded to demand an excessive sum ; which represented, he said, the difference the change of site would make to him. They however declared themselves unable to pay it, and were accordingly removed.

On another occasion he sent an agent to make a certain purchase for him. Learning that the agent had made a good bargain, but intended to charge him a high price, he proceeded to inform the man's associates that he had been told he had purchased the goods at an excessive price, and that therefore he did not intend to recognize the transaction ; denouncing

έξειν· καὶ ἅμα τὴν ἀβελτερίαν αὐτοῦ ἐλοιδορεῖ
 μετ' ὀργῆς προσποιήτου. οἱ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούοντες
 10 οὐκ ἔφασαν δεῖν πιστεύειν αὐτὸν τοῖς λέγουσί τι
 κατ' ἐκεῖνου, ἕως αὐτὸς παραγενόμενος τὸν λόγον
 αὐτῷ δῶ. ἀφικομένου δὲ τοῦ ἀγοραστοῦ ἀπήγ-
 γειλαν αὐτῷ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Κλεομένου· ὁ δ' ἐκείνοις
 τε βουλόμενος ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ τῷ Κλεομένει ἀν-
 ἡνεγκε τὰς τιμὰς ὥνπερ ἦν ἡγορακῶς.

Τοῦ τε σίτου πωλουμένου ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ δεκα-
 15 δράχμου, καλέσας τοὺς ἐργαζομένους ἡρώτα,
 πόσου¹ βούλονται αὐτῷ ἐργάζεσθαι· οἱ δὲ ἔφασαν
 ἐλάσσονος ἢ ὅσου τοῖς ἐμπόροις ἐπώλουν. ὁ δ'
 ἐκείνους² μὲν ἐκέλευσεν αὐτῷ παραδιδόναι ὅσουπερ
 ἐπώλουν τοῖς ἄλλοις· αὐτὸς δὲ τάξας τριάκοντα καὶ
 20 δύο δραχμὰς τοῦ σίτου τὴν τιμὴν οὕτως ἐπώλει.

Τοὺς τε ἱερεῖς καλέσας ἔφησε πολὺ τὸ ἀνώμαλον
 ἀνάλωμα³ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γίνεσθαι εἰς τὰ ἱερά· δεῖν
 οὖν καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν τινα καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τὸ πλῆθος
 καταλυθῆναι. οἱ δὲ ἱερεῖς καὶ ἰδία ἕκαστος καὶ
 κοινῇ τὰ ἱερά χρήματα ἐδίδωσαν, οἰόμενοί τε αὐτὸν
 τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέλλειν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ ἕκαστος
 25 βουλόμενος τὸ τε ἱερὸν τὸ αὐτοῦ μέναι κατὰ χώραν
 καὶ αὐτὸς ἱερεὺς.

Ἀντιμένης Ῥόδιος ἡμιόδιος⁴ γενόμενος Ἀλεξ- 34

¹ πόσου Camerarius for πῶς (mss.).

² Reading ἐκείνους with Bekker and the 3rd Basle edition.

³ Or, omitting (with some mss.) ἀνώμαλον before ἀνάλωμα, "complained of the large amount expended on the temples of the country; declaring that some of these . . ."

⁴ Reading ἐπιόδιος (ἐπὶ ὁδῶν Keil) for ms. ἡμιόδιος. Perhaps προσόδιος or ἐπὶ προσόδων, "revenue officer," would be better.

⁵ If the measure intended is the Attic medimnos, it is 1½ bushels. The Persian artabē may however be meant,

at the same time with feigned anger the fellow's stupidity. They on hearing this asked him not to believe what was said against the agent until he himself arrived and rendered his account. On the man's arrival, his associates told him what Cleomenes had said. He, desirous of winning their approval as well as that of Cleomenes, debited the latter with the actual price he had given.

At a time when the price of grain in Egypt was ten drachmae (a measure),^a Cleomenes sent for the growers and asked them at what price they would contract to supply him with their produce. On their quoting a price lower than what they were charging the merchants, he offered them the full price they were accustomed to receive from others; and taking over the entire supply, sold it at a fixed rate of thirty-two drachmae (for the same measure).

He also sent for the priests, and told them that the expenditure on the temples was very unevenly distributed in the country; and that some of these, together with the majority of the attendant priests, must accordingly be suppressed. The priests, supposing him to be in earnest, and wishing each to secure the continuance of his own temple and office, gave him money individually from their private possessions as well as collectively from the temple funds.^b

Antimenos of Rhodes, who was appointed by 34 which was equal to 1 *medimnos* and $\frac{1}{17}$ th. In either case the price is very high compared with 3 drachmae per *medimnos*, the price at Athens in 300 B.C. Yet Polybius (ix 44) says that at Rome during the war with Hannibal (210) corn was sold for fifteen drachmae per *medimnos*. As a contrast cf. what the same author says of the fertility of Gallia Cisalpina, where in time of peace this same measure of wheat was sold for four obols, and of barley for two. See note on § 25.

^a Cf. § 25.

1352 b

ἀνδρου περί Βαβυλῶνα ἐπόρισε χρήματα ὧδε.
νόμον ὄντος ἐν Βαβυλωνίᾳ παλαιοῦ δεκάτην εἶναι
τῶν εἰσαγομένων, χρωμένου δὲ αὐτῷ οὐθενός,
80 τηρήσας τοὺς τε σατράπας ἅπαντας προσδοκίμους
ὄντας καὶ στρατιώτας, οὐκ ὀλίγους τε πρέσβεις
καὶ τεχνίτας κλητοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἄγοντας καὶ ἰδίᾳ
ἀποδημοῦντας,¹ καὶ δῶρα πολλὰ ἀναγόμενα, τὴν
δεκάτην ἔπρασσε κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὸν κείμενον.

Πάλιν τε πορίζων τὰνδράποδα τὰ ἐπὶ στρατο-
πέδῳ ὄντα ἐκέλευσε τὸν βουλόμενον ἀπογράφεσθαι
85 ὅπόσου θέλοι, μέλλειν δὲ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ὀκτὼ δραχ-
μὰς ἀποτίσαι, ἂν δὲ ἀποδρᾷ τὸ ἀνδράποδον, κομί-
1353 a ζεσθαι τὴν τιμὴν ἣν ἀνεγράψατο. ἀπογραφέντων
οὖν πολλῶν ἀνδραπόδων οὐκ ὀλίγον συντελεῖ²
ἀργύριον. εἰ δέ τι ἀποδρῶν ἀνδράποδον, ἐκέλευε
τὸν σατράπην τῆς . . .³ ἐν ᾗ ἐστὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον,
ἀνασώζειν (ᾗ) τὴν τιμὴν τῷ κυρίῳ ἀποδοῦναι.
6 Ὁφέλας⁴ Ὀλύνθιος καταστήσας ἐπιμελητὴν ἐπὶ 35
τὸν νομὸν τὸν Ἀθριβίτην,⁵ ἐπεὶ προσελθόντες αὐτῷ
οἱ νομάρχαι οἱ ἐκ τοῦ τόπου τούτου ἔφασαν βού-
λεσθαι πλείω αὐτοῖ πολὺ φέρειν, τὸν δ' ἐπιμελητὴν
τὸν νῦν καθεστηκότα ἀπαλλάξαι αὐτὸν ἡξίου,
ἐπερωτήσας αὐτοὺς εἰ δυνήσονται συντελεῖν ἅπερ
10 ἐπαγγέλλονται, φησάντων αὐτῶν τὸν μὲν ἐπι-
μελητὴν κατὰ χώραν εἶα, τοὺς δὲ φόρους πρᾶσ-

¹ Reading τοὺς ἄλλους ἄγοντας (Bekker) for ἄλλους τοὺς ἄγοντας (mss.), and ἐπιδημοῦντας, Schneider's correction of ms. ἀποδημοῦντας.

² Reading συντελεῖτο (Sylburg, after Camerarius), or συντελέγη (marginal note in one ms.), for ms. συντελεῖ.

³ Perhaps χώρας has fallen out (Schnelder).

⁴ The spelling Ὁφέλας is restored by Kell for ms. Ὁφέλας.

⁵ Ἀθριβίτην restored by Sylburg for ms. ἀθριβίτην, αἰθριβίτην, or ἀθριβίτην.

Alexander superintendent of highways in the province of Babylon, adopted the following means of raising funds. An ancient law of the country imposed a tax of one-tenth on all imports ; but this had fallen into total abeyance. Antimenes kept a watch for all governors and soldiers whose arrival was expected, and upon the many ambassadors and craftsmen who were invited to the city, but brought with them others who dwelt there unofficially ; and also upon the multitude of presents that were brought (to these persons), on which he exacted the legal tax of a tenth.

Another expedient was this. He invited the owners of any slaves in the camp to register them at whatever value they desired, undertaking at the same time to pay him eight drachmae a year. If the slave ran away, the owner was to recover the registered value. Many slaves were thus registered, and a large sum of money was paid (in premiums). And when a slave ran away, Antimenes instructed the governor of the (province) where the camp lay either to recover the man or to pay his master his value.

Ophellas of Olynthus appointed an officer to super- 35
intend the revenues of the province of Athribis. The local governors came to him and told him they were willing to pay a much larger amount in taxes ; but asked him to remove the present superintendent. Ophellas inquired if they were really able to pay what they promised ; and on their assuring him that they were, left the superintendent in office and instructed him to demand from them the amount of tax which

1353 a

σεσθαι ἐκέλευεν ὅσους αὐτοὶ ὑπετιμήσαντο. οὔτε οὖν ὃν κατέστησεν ἀτιμάσαι ἐδόκει οὐτ' ἐκείνοις πλείους φόρους ἐπιβαλεῖν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἔταξαν, χρήματα δὲ πολλαπλάσια αὐτὸς ἐλάμβανεν.

- 15 Πυθοκλῆς Ἀθηναῖος Ἀθηναίοις συνεβούλευσε 36
τὸν μόλιβδον τὸν ἐκ τῶν Λαυρίων¹ παραλαμβάνειν
παρὰ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τὴν πόλιν, ὥσπερ ἐπώλουν,
δίδραχμον, εἰτα τάξαντας αὐτοὺς τιμὴν ἑξαδράχμου
οὕτω πωλεῖν.

- Χαβρίας πληρωμάτων τε κατειλεγμένων εἰς 37
20 ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι ναῦς, τῷ δὲ Ταῦ ἐξήκοντα μόνον
οὔσης χρείας, προσέταξε τοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἐξήκοντα
νεῶν αὐτοῦ τῶν ὑπομενουσῶν τοὺς πλείοντας εἰς
δίμηνον σιτηρεσιάσαι, ἢ αὐτοὺς πλέειν. αἱ δὲ
βουλόμενοι ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων μεῖναι² ἔδωκαν ἃ προσ-
έταξεν.

- Ἀντιμένης τοὺς τε θησαυροὺς τοὺς παρὰ τὰς 38
25 ὁδοὺς τὰς βασιλικὰς ἀναπληροῦν ἐκέλευε τοὺς
σατράπας κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὸν τῆς χώρας· ὅποτε
δὲ διαπορεύοιτο στρατόπεδον³ ἢ ἕτερος ὄχλος ἄνευ
τοῦ βασιλέως, πέμψας τινὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ⁴ ἐπώλει τὰ
ἐκ τῶν θησαυρῶν.

- 1353 b Κλεομένης προσπορευομένης τε τῆς νουμηνίας 39
καὶ δέον τοῖς στρατιώταις σιταρχίαν δοῦναι κατ-
έπλευσεν ἐξεπίτηδες, προσπορευομένου⁵ δὲ τοῦ

¹ Λαυρίων is Sylburg's correction of ms. Τυρίων.

² Keil, for ms. εἶναι.

³ διαπορεύοιτο στρατόπεδον Sylburg for ms. διαποροῦν τὸ (or διαποροῦντο) στρατόπεδον. The Aldine edition and Bekker read διαποροῖη τὸ στρατόπεδον, "the army was in need of provisions."

⁴ παρ' αὐτοῦ Susemihl for ms. παρ' αὐτοῦ: παρ' αὐτόν, "to them," Bekker.

⁵ Reading προσπορευομένου (Sylburg) for προσπορευομένου MSS.

they themselves had assessed. And so, without being chargeable either with discountenancing the officer he had appointed, or with taxing the governors beyond their own estimate, he obtained from the latter many times his previous revenue.

Pythocles the Athenian recommended his fellow- 36 countrymen that the State should take over from private citizens the lead obtained from the mines of Laurium^a at the price of two drachmae (per talent?) which they were asking, and should itself sell it at the fixed price of six drachmae.

Chabrias had levied crews for a hundred and twenty 37 ships to serve King Taos.^b Finding that Taos needed only sixty ships, he gave the crews of the superfluous sixty their choice between providing those who were to serve with two months' rations, and themselves taking their place. Desiring to remain at their business, they gave what he demanded.

Antimenes bade the governors of the provinces 38 replenish, in accordance with the law of the country, the magazines along the royal highways. Whenever an army passed through the country or any other body of men unaccompanied by the king, he sent an officer to sell them the contents of the magazines.

Cleomenes, as the beginning of the month ap- 39 proached when his soldiers' allowance became due, deliberately sailed away down the river; and not till

^a These silver mines were state property; but mining rights therein were let to private citizens. Lead and silver were found in the same ore and had to be separated. The weight of the lead is not specified: it may have been a talent of 80 lbs. See Boeckh, *Staatshaushaltung der Athener*; and Xenophon, *De vectigalibus*.

^b See § 25.

μηνὸς ἀναπλεύσας διέδωκε τὴν σιταρχίαν, εἴτα τοῦ εἰσιόντος μηνὸς διέλιπεν ἕως τῆς νουμηνίας. οἱ μὲν οὖν στρατιῶται διὰ τὸ νεωστὶ εἰληφέναι τὴν σιταρχίαν ἡσυχίαν εἶχον, ἐκεῖνος δὲ παραλλάξας ἓνα μῆνα παρὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἀφήρει μισθὸν αἰεὶ μηνός.

Σταβέλβιος ὁ Μυσῶν . . . στρατιώταις μισθὸν 40 συγκαλέσας . . . ¹ ἔφησεν αὐτῷ τῶν μὲν ἰδιωτῶν οὐδεμίαν χρεῖαν εἶναι, τῶν δὲ ἡγεμόνων, ὅταν (δὲ) δέηται στρατιωτῶν, ἐκείνων ἐκάστω δοῦς ἀργύριον ἀποστέλλειν² ἐπὶ ξενολογίαν, τοὺς τε μισθοὺς οὓς δεῖ κείνοις δοῦναι, τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν ἂν ἥδιον διδόναι· ἐκέλευεν οὖν αὐτοὺς ἀποστέλλειν ἕκαστον τοὺς αὐτῶν καταλόγους ἐκ τῆς χώρας. τῶν δὲ ἡγεμόνων 15 ὑπολαβόντων χρηματισμὸν αὐτοῖς ἔσσεσθαι, ἀπέστειλαν τοὺς στρατιώτας, καθάπερ ἐκεῖνος προσέταξε. διαλιπὼν δὲ ὀλίγον χρόνον καὶ συναγαγὼν αὐτοὺς οὔτε αὐλητὴν ἄνευ χοροῦ οὔτε ἡγεμόνας ἄνευ ἰδιωτῶν οὐδὲν ἔφη χρησίμους εἶναι· ἐκέλευεν οὖν αὐτοὺς ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἐκ τῆς χώρας.

20 Διονύσιος τὰ ἱερὰ περιπορευόμενος, εἰ μὲν 41 τράπεζαν ἴδοι παρακειμένην χρυσὴν ἢ ἀργυρᾶν, ἀγαθοῦ δαίμονος κελεύσας ἐγγεῖαι ἐκέλευεν ἀφαιρεῖν, ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἀγαλμάτων φιάλην εἶχε προτετακότα, εὔπας ἂν ὅτι δέχομαι, ἐξαιρεῖν ἐκέλευε.

¹ Reading Σταβέλβιος ὁ Μυσῶν <βασιλεὺς> (Raphael Volaterranus) οὐκ ἔχων τοῖς στρατιώταις μισθόν, συγκαλέσας <τοὺς ἡγεμόνας> (Camerarius).

² Reading ἀποστέλλειν for ms. ἀποστέλλειν, "it was his custom to entrust . . . and send . . ."

the month was advanced did he return and distribute the allowance. For the coming month, he omitted the distribution altogether until the following month began. Thus the men were quieted by the recent distribution, and Cleomenes, passing over a month each year, docked his troops of a month's pay.^a

Stabelbius, king of the Mysians, lacking pay to 40 give his troops, summoned a meeting of the officers, and declared that he no longer needed the private soldiers, but only the officers. When he required troops, he would entrust a sum of money to each officer and send him to collect mercenaries; but that meanwhile he preferred to give the officers the pay he would otherwise have to give the men. Accordingly he bade each dismiss the men who were on his own muster-roll. The officers, scenting a source of gain for themselves, dismissed their men, as they were bidden. Shortly afterwards, Stabelbius called them together and informed them that a conductor without his chorus and an officer without his men were alike useless; wherefore let them depart from his country.

When Dionysius was making a tour of the temples, 41 wherever he saw a gold or silver table set, he bade them fill a cup "in honour of the good spirit,"^b and then had the table carried away. Wherever, again, he saw a precious bowl set before one of the images, he would order its removal, with the words "I accept

^a *σῖρα* (corn allowance) and *μισθός* (pay) here seem to be identified; possibly because in a land where grain was readily purchasable the former was given in money. Cf. §§ 23, 29.

^b Cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum*, iii. 3, 4, and Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*, xv. 693.

ARISTOTLE

1358 b

τά θ' ἱμάτια τά τε χρυσᾶ καὶ τοὺς στεφάνους <τοὺς>
 25 . . ¹ περιήρει τῶν ἀγαλμάτων, φάσκων αὐτὸς καὶ
 κουφότερα καὶ εὐωδέστερα δοῦναι· εἴτα ἱμάτια μὲν
 λευκά, στεφάνους δὲ λευκοῖνους² περιετίθει.

¹ <τοὺς> = + inserted by Susemihl, as there is a lacuna in some of the mss. Perhaps it would be better to insert <καὶ τὰργυρᾶ> after τά τε χρυσᾶ, "gold and silver raiment."

it." He also stripped the images of their golden raiment and garlands, and declaring he would give them lighter and more fragrant wear, arrayed them in robes of white (linen) and garlands of white stocks.

² λευκοίρους Camerarius for τις, λευκοίρους, "of poplar."

- I. Bonam mulierem eorum quae sunt intus dominari oportet curam habentem omnium secundum scriptas leges, non permittentem ingredi nullum, si non vir perceperit,¹ timentem praecipue verba forensium
 10 mulierum ad corruptionem animae. Et quae intus sibi contingunt ut sola sciat, et si quid sinistri ab ingredientibus fiat, vir habet causam. Dominam existentem expensarum et sumptuum ad festivitates, quas quidem vir permiserit, expensis et vestimento ac apparatu minori utentem quam etiam leges civitatis
 15 praecipiant, considerantem quoniam nec quaestus vestimentorum differens forma² nec auri multitudo tanta est ad mulieris virtutem quanta modestia in quolibet opere et desiderium honestae atque compositae vitae. Etenim quilibet talis ornatus et elatio animi est³ et multo certius ad senectutem iustas laudes sibi filisque tribuendo.
 20 Talium quidem igitur ipsa se inanimet mulier compositae dominari (indecent enim viro videtur scire quae intus fiunt): in ceteris autem omnibus viro
 p. 141 parere intendat nec quicquam civilium audiens nec

¹ *c reads* praeceperit, "authority."

² *Reading* scientem quod nec vestium quaestus differt pulchritudine (c) (εἰδυῖαν οὐτε κτήσιν ἱματίων διαφέρουσιν καὶ ἄλλαι . . .).

³ *Reading* etenim invidiosus (ἐνλωτός) omnis animae huiusmodi ornatus est. . . . (c).

BOOK III

I. A good wife should be the mistress of her home, having under her care all that is within it, according to the rules we have laid down. She should allow none to enter without her husband's knowledge, dreading above all things the gossip of gadding women, which tends to poison the soul. She alone should have knowledge of what happens within, whilst if any harm is wrought by those from without, her husband will bear the blame. She must exercise control of the money spent on such festivities as her husband has approved, keeping, moreover, within the limit set by law upon expenditure, dress, and ornament; and remembering that beauty depends not on costliness of raiment, nor does abundance of gold so conduce to the praise of a woman as self-control in all that she does, and her inclination towards an honourable and well-ordered life.^a For such adornment of the soul as this is in truth ever a thing to be envied, and a far surer warrant for the payment, to the woman herself in her old age and to her children after her, of the due meed of praise.

This, then, is the province over which a woman should be minded to bear an orderly rule; for it seems not fitting that a man should know all that passes within the house. But in all other matters, let it be her aim to obey her husband; giving no heed

^a Cf. 1 Peter iii. 3, 4.

p. 141

aliquid de his quae ad nuptias spectare videntur velit peragere. Sed cum tempus exigit proprios filios filiasve foras tradere aut recipere, tunc autem pareat quoque viro in omnibus et simul deliberet et oboediat, si ille praeceperit, arbitrans non ita viro esse turpe eorum quae domi sunt quicquam peragere sicut mulieri quae foris sunt perquirere. Sed arbitrari decet vere compositam mulierem viri mores vitae suae legem imponi, a deo sibi impositos, cum nuptiis et fortuna conunctos, quos equidem si patienter et humiliter ferat, facile reget domum, si vero non, difficilius. Propter quae decet non solum cum contingit virum ad rerum esse prosperitatem et ad aliam gloriam, unanimum esse¹ ac iuxta velle servire, verum etiam in adversitatibus. Si quid autem in rebus deerit vel ad corporis aegritudinem aut ad ignorantiam animae esse manifestam, dicat quoque semper optima et in decentibus obsequatur, praeterquam turpe quidem agere aut sibi non dignum, vel memorem esse, si quid vir animae passione ad ipsam peccaverit, de nihilo conqueratur quasi illo hoc peragente, sed haec omnia aegritudinis ac ignorantiae ponere et accidentium peccatorum. Quantum enim in his quis diligentius obsequetur, tanto maiorem gratiam habebit qui curatus extiterit, cum ab aegritudine fuerit liberatus: et si quid ei iubenti non bene habentium non paruerit mulier, multo magis sentiet a morbo curatus. Propter quae decet timere huiusmodi, in

¹ *Reading, with c, prudentia simul intellegere* = σωφρόνως ὁμονοεῖν (?).

² Or (if *manifestam esse* represents δηλονότι) "then plainly it is her part to encourage . . . and to yield . . ."

to public affairs, nor desiring any part in arranging the marriages of her children. Rather, when the time shall come to give or receive in marriage sons or daughters, let her even then hearken to her husband in all respects, and agreeing with him obey his behest ; considering that it is less unseemly for him to deal with a matter within the house than it is for her to pry into those outside its walls. Nay, it is fitting that a woman of well-ordered life should consider that her husband's uses are as laws appointed for her own life by divine will, along with the marriage state and the fortune she shares. If she endure them with patience and gentleness, she will rule her home with ease ; otherwise, not so easily. Wherefore not only when her husband is in prosperity and good report does it becom her to be in modest agreement with him, and to render him the service he wills, but also in times of adversity. If, through sickness or fault of judgement, his good fortune fails, then must she show her quality,^a encouraging him ever with words of cheer and yielding him obedience in all fitting ways ; only let her do nothing base or unworthy of herself, or remember any wrong her husband may have done her through distress of mind. Let her refrain from all complaint, nor charge him with the wrong, but rather attribute everything of this kind to sickness or ignorance or accidental errors. For the more sedulous her service herein, the fuller will be his gratitude when he is restored, and freed from his trouble ; and if she has failed to obey him when he commanded aught that is amiss, the deeper will be his recognition (of her loyalty) when health returns. Wherefore, whilst careful to avoid such (misplaced obedience), in other respects she will

ARISTOTLE

D. 141

aliis autem multo diligentius obsequi, quam si empta venisset ad domum : magno enim pretio empta fuit, societate namque vitae et procreatione liberorum quibus nil maius nec sanctius fieret. Adhuc insuper si quidem cum felici viro vixisset, non quoque similiter

D. 142

fieret divulgata.¹ Et quidem non modicum est uti bene prosperitate et non humiliter, verum etiam adversitatem bene sufferre multo magis merito honoratur : nam in multis iniuriis et doloribus esse et nihil
 5 turpe peragere fortis animi est. Orare quidem igitur decet in adversitatem virum non pervenire, si vero quicquam mali sibi contingat, arbitrari huic² optimam laudem esse sobriae mulieris, existimantem quoniam nec Alcetis tantam acquireret sibi gloriam nec Penelope tot et tantas laudes meruisset, si cum felicibus
 10 viris vixissent : nunc autem Admeti et Ulixidis adversitates paraverunt eis memoriam immortalem. Factae enim in malis fideles et iustae viris, a diis nec immerito sunt honoratae. Prosperitatis quidem enim facile invenire participantes, adversitati vero nolunt communicare non optimae mulierum. Propter quae
 15 omnia decet multo magis honorare virum et in verecundia non habere, si sacra pudicitia³ et opes animositatis⁴ filius secundum Herculem⁵ non sequantur.

II. Mulierem quidem ergo in quodam tali typo

¹ *c reads manifesta for divulgata (cf. esse manifestam above).*

² *Reading hic with c.*

³ *c reads mentis sanitas for the pudicitia of a and b. Both translate apparently σωφροσύνη.*

⁴ *animositatis the mss. of b give the Greek word, εὐθυμοσύνη, in corrupt forms, which Rose emends to euthymosynae.*

⁵ *Reading Orpheum with b and c for Herculem a.*

^a For Orpheus see Index.

serve him more assiduously than if she had been a bondwoman bought and taken home. For he has indeed bought her with a great price—with partnership in his life and in the procreation of children ; than which things nought could be greater or more divine. And besides all this, the wife who had only lived in company with a fortunate husband would not have had the like opportunity to show her true quality. For though there be no small merit in a right and noble use of prosperity, still the right endurance of adversity justly receives an honour greater by far. For only a great soul can live in the midst of trouble and wrong without itself committing any base act. And so, while praying that her husband may be spared adversity, if trouble should come it becoms the wife to consider that here a good woman wins her highest praise. Let her bethink herself how Alcestis would never have attained such renown nor Penelope have deserved all the high praises bestowed on her had not their husbands known adversity ; whereas the troubles of Admetus and Ulysses have obtained for their wives a reputation that shall never die. For because in time of distress they proved themselves faithful and dutiful to their husbands, the gods have bestowed on them the honour they deserved. To find partners in prosperity is easy enough ; but only the best women are ready to share in adversity. For all these reasons it is fitting that a woman should (in time of adversity) pay her husband an honour greater by far, nor feel shame on his account even when, as Orpheus ^a says, Holy health of soul, and wealth, the child of a brave spirit, companion him no more.

II. Such then is the pattern of the rules and ways

ARISTOTLE

p. 142

legum et morum oportet se custodire : vir autem
 20 leges a similibus adinveniat uxoris in usum, quoniam
 tamquam socia filiorum et vitae ad domum viri¹
 devenit, relinquens filios gentorum viri et sui nomina
 p. 143 habituros. Quibus quid sanctius² fieret aut circa quae
 magis vir sanae mentis studebit quam ex optima et
 pretiosissima muliere liberos procreare senectutis
 pastores quasi optimos et pudicos³ patris ac matris
 5 custodes ac totius domus conservatores : quoniam
 educati quippe recte a paire et matre sancte atque
 iuste ipsis utentium⁴ quasi merito boni fient, hoc
 autem non obtinentes patientur defectum. Exem-
 plum enim vitae filiis nisi parentes dederint, puram
 et excusabilem causam adinvicem habere poterunt.
 10 Timor<que> ne contempti a filiis, cum non bene
 viverent, ad interitum ipsis erunt.

Propter quae enim nihil decet omittere ad uxoris
 doctrinam, ut iuxta posse quasi ex optimis liberos
 valeant procreare. Etenim agricola nihil omittit
 studendo, ut ad optimam terram⁵ et maxime bene
 cultam semen consumere, expectans ita optimum sibi
 15 fructum fieri, et vult pro ea, ut devastari non possit,
 si sic contigerit, mori cum inimicis pugnando : et
 huiusmodi mors maxime honoratur. Ubi autem
 tantum studium fit pro corporis esca, ad quam animae
 semen consumitur, quid si pro suis liberis matre atque

¹ *Reading, with c.* quoniam promissa socia vitae et filiorum
 sicut ab extraneitate deprecator ad domum viri . . . (cf.
Bk. I., c. iv. 1).

² *Reading* divinius *c.* *Otherwise, "more sacred."*

³ *Reading* prudentissimos *c.* pudicos is apparently a
 misunderstanding of *σωφρονας*.

⁴ utentibus *c.* a apparently keeps the genitive of the
 Greek.

⁵ ut ad optimam terram = *εις γην ως ἀπλοτην* (?).

of living which a good wife will observe. And the rules which a good husband will follow in treatment of his wife will be similar ; seeing that she has entered his home like a suppliant from without, and is pledged to be the partner of his life and parent-hood ; and that the offspring she leaves behind her will bear the names of their parents, her name as well as his. And what could be more divine than this, or more desired by a man of sound mind, than to beget by a noble and honoured wife children who shall be the most loyal supporters and discreet guardians of their parents in old age, and the pre-servers of the whole house ? Rightly reared by father and mother, children will grow up virtuous, as those who have treated them piously and righteously deserve that they should ; but (parents) who observe not these precepts will be losers thereby. For unless parents have given their children an example how to live, the children in their turn will be able to offer a fair and specious excuse (for unduti-fulness). Such parents will risk being rejected by their offspring for their evil lives, and thus bringing destruction upon their own heads.

Wherefore his wife's training should be the object of a man's unstinting care ; that so far as is possible their children may spring from the noblest of stock. For the tiller of the soil spares no pains to sow his seed in the most fertile and best cultivated land, looking thus to obtain the fairest fruits ; and to save it from devastation is ready, if such be his lot, to fall in conflict with his foes ; a death which men crown with the highest of praise. Seeing, then, that such care is lavished on the body's food, surely every care should be taken on behalf of our own children's

p. 148

20 nutrice¹ nonne omne studium est faciendum? Hoc enim solo omne mortale semper factum immortalitatis participat, et omnes petitiones ac orationes divum permanent paternorum. Unde qui contemnit hoc, et deos videtur negligere. Propter deos itaque, coram quibus sacra mactavit et uxorem duxit, et
25 multo magis se post parentes uxori tradidit ad honorem.

Maximus autem honor sobriae mulieri, si videt virum suum observantem sibi castitatem et de nulla alia muliere curam magis habentem, sed prae ceteris omnibus propriam et amicam et fideliem [sibi] existi-
p. 144 mantem. Tanto etiam magis studebit se talem esse mulier: si cognoverit fideliter atque iuste ad se virum amabilem esse, et ipsa circa virum iuste fidelis erit. Ergo prudentem² ignorare non decet nec paren-
5 tum qui sui honores sunt nec qui uxori et filiis proprii et decentes, ut tribuens unicuique quae sua sunt iustus et sanctus fiat. Multo enim maxime graviter quisque fert honore suo privatus, nec etiam si aliorum quis multa dederit propria auferendo, libenter acceperit. Nihil quoque maius nec propius est uxori ad
10 virum quam societas honorabilis et fidelis. Propter quae non decet hominem sanae mentis³ ut ubicunque contingit ponere semen suum, nec ad qualemcunque accesserit, proprium immittere semen, ut non degeneribus et iniquis similia liberis legitimis

¹ Reading, with one ms. of b, pro suorum filiorum matre atque nutrice. Probably a has misunderstood *πρὸς τὴν μητέρα καὶ τὸν πατέρα*, ad quam animae semen consumitur, misplaced in a, follows nutrice in b and c.

² prudentem = τὸν σώφρονα? c has qui sanae mentis est. Cf. the next note.

³ hominem sanae mentis here o has recte sapientem.

mother and nurse, in whom is implanted the seed from which there springs a living soul. For it is only by this means that each mortal, successively produced, participates in immortality; and that petitions and prayers continue to be offered to ancestral gods. So that he who thinks lightly of this ^a would seem also to be slighting the gods. For their sake then, in whose presence he offered sacrifice and led his wife home, promising to honour her far above all others saving his parents, (a man must have care for wife and children).

Now a virtuous wife is best honoured when she sees that her husband is faithful to her, and has no preference for another woman; but before all others loves and trusts her and holds her as his own. And so much the more will the woman seek to be what he accounts her. If she perceives that her husband's affection for her is faithful and righteous, she too will be faithful and righteous towards him. Wherefore a man of sound mind ought not to forget what honours are proper to his parents or what fittingly belong to his wife and children; so that rendering to each and all their own, he may obey the law of men and of gods. For the deprivation we feel most of all is that of the special honour which is our due; nor will abundant gifts of what belongs to others be welcome to him who is dispossessed of his own. Now to a wife nothing is of more value, nothing more rightfully her own, than honoured and faithful partnership with her husband. Wherefore it befits not a man of sound mind to bestow his person promiscuously, or have random intercourse with women; for otherwise the base-born will share in the

^a i.e., the procreation of children.

p. 144 fiant,¹ et quidem uxor honore suo privetur, filiis
15 vero opprobrium adiungatur.

III. De hiis ergo omnibus reverentia viro debetur² :
appropinquare vero decet eius uxori cum honestate et
cum multa modestia et timore, dando verba coniunc-
tionis eius, qui bene habet, ac liciti operis et honesti,
multa modestia³ et fide utendo, parva quidem et
20 spontanea⁴ remittendo peccata : et si quid autem
per ignorantiam deliquerit, moneat nec metum in-
cutiat sine verecundia et pudore. Nec etiam sit
neglegens nec severus.⁵ Talis quidem enim passio
meretricis (ad) adulterum est, cum verecundia autem
et pudore aequaliter diligere et timere liberae mulieris
25 ad proprium virum est. Duplex enim timoris species
est : alia quidem fit cum verecundia et pudore, qua
utuntur ad patres filii sobrii et honesti et cives com-
p. 145 positi ad benignos rectores, alia vero cum inimicitia
et odio, sicut servi ad dominos et cives ad tyrannos
iniuriosos et iniquos.

Ex hiis quoque omnibus eligens meliora, uxorem
sibi concordem et fidelem et propriam facere decet,
ut praesente viro et non, utatur semper non minus
5 ac si praesens adesset, ut tamquam rerum com-

¹ Or reading, with c, ut non de illegitimis et villis generi-
bus similes his, qui legitime procreati sunt, "for otherwise
the unlawfully and basely born will be undistinguished from
his children of lawful birth."

² Reading, with c, attendendum est viro.

³ c reads mansuetudine, "gentleness."

⁴ Reading quae non sponte c for spontanea a.

⁵ Or reading, with c, nec solutam saevitiam nec voluptatem,
"anger and pleasure must alike be kept in control."

rights of his lawful children, and his wife will be robbed of her honour due, and shame be attached to his sons.

III. To all these matters, therefore, a man should give heed. And it is fitting that he should approach his wife in honourable wise, full of self-restraint and awe ; and in his conversation with her, should use only the words of a right-minded man, suggesting only such acts as are themselves lawful and honourable ; treating her with much self-restraint and trust,^a and passing over any trivial or unintentional errors she has committed. And if through ignorance she has done wrong, he should advise her of it without threatening, in a courteous and modest manner. Indifference (to her faults) and harsh reproof (of them), he must alike avoid. Between a courtesan and her lover, such tempers are allowed their course ; between a free woman and her lawful spouse there should be a reverent and modest mingling of love and fear. For of fear there are two kinds. The fear which virtuous and honourable sons feel towards their fathers, and loyal citizens towards right-minded rulers, has for its companions reverence and modesty ; but the other kind, felt by slaves for masters and by subjects for despots who treat them with injustice and wrong, is associated with hostility and hatred.

By choosing the better of all these alternatives a husband should secure the agreement, loyalty, and devotion of his wife, so that whether he himself is present or not, there may be no difference in her attitude towards him, since she realizes that they are

^a Or "loyalty."

ARISTOTLE

p. 145

munium curatores,¹ et quando vir abest ut sentiat uxor, quod nullus sibi melior nec modestior nec magis proprius viro suo. Et ostendet hoc in principio² ad commune bonum semper respiciens, quamvis novitia sit in talibus. Et si ipse sibi maxime dominetur, 10 optimus totius vitae rector existet et uxorem talibus uti docebit. Nam nec amicitiam nec timorem absque pudore nequaquam honoravit Homerus,³ sed ubique amare praecepit cum modestia et pudore, timere autem sicut Helena ait dicens Priamum: "metuendus et reverendus es mihi et terribilis, amatissime 15 socer," nil aliud dicens quam cum timore ipsum diligere ac pudore. Et rursus Ulixes ad Nausicaam dicit hoc: "te, mulier, valde miror et timeo." Arbitratur enim Homerus sic ad invicem virum et uxorem habere putans ambos bene fieri taliter se habentes. 20 Nemo enim diligit nec miratur unquam peiorem nec timet etiam cum pudore, sed huiusmodi passiones contingunt ad invicem melioribus et natura benignis, minoribus tamen scientia ad se meliores. Hunc habitum Ulixes ad Penelopen habens in absentia nil deliquit, Agamemnon autem propter Chryseidem ad

¹ Or reading, with *c*, ut praesente viro et non, utatur nihilo minus, ac si quando parentes sibi adsint, ut communibus curet rebus, "so that whether he himself is present or not, she may treat him as she would her parents, and act as guardian of the common interests." (Perhaps the translator has confused the Greek word *πατέρας* with the Latin word *parentes*.)

² *c* reads ostendet quidem vir hoc in principio. Perhaps vir is an error for uxor.

³ Or reading, with *c*, sicut et Homerus ait decet habere virum. Non enim . . ., "and so too would the poet Homer have a husband to be. For he . . ."

^a *Iliad* iii. 179:

αἰδοῖός τε μοι ἔσσι, φίλος ἐκπρέ, δεινός τε

ARISTOTLE

p. 145

25 eius uxorem peccavit, in ecclesia dicens mulierem captivam et non bonam, immo ut dicam barbaram, in nullo deficere in virtutibus Clytaemnestrae, non bene

p. 146

quidem, ex se liberos habente,¹ neque iuste cohabitare usus est. Qualiter enim iuste, qui antequam sciret, illam, qualis fieret erga se, nuper per violentiam duxit? Ulixes autem rogante ipsum Atlantis filia sibi cohabitare et promittente semper facere immortalem,² nec ut fieret immortalis proderet praesumpsit uxoris affectum et dilectionem et fidem, maximam arbitrans poenam suam fieri, si malus existens immortalitatem increatur habere. Nam cum Circe iacere noluit nisi propter amicorum salutem, immo respondit ei, quod nihil dulcius eius patria
10 posset videri quamvis aspera existente, et oravit magis mortalem uxorem filiumque videre quam vivere: sic firmiter in uxorem fidem suam servabat. Pro quibus recipiebat aequaliter ab uxore.

IV. Patet etiam et actor³ in oratione Ulixis ad Nausicaam honorare maxime viri et uxoris cum
15 nuptiis pudicam societatem. Oravit enim deos sibi⁴

¹ This points to Κλυταιμνήστρας . . . ἐξ αὐτοῦ παῖδας ἐχούσης. c has deesse a Clytemnestra . . . non bene igitur, liberos habens ex ea, nec iuste puella muliere usus est.

² Reading, with c, et promittente immortalem facere et beatum omni tempore.

³ Reading auctor with one MS. c reads poeta.

⁴ Durand seems to have mistaken αὐτῇ for αὐτῆ. This would account for his writing ipsa in the next sentence.

⁵ *Iliad* i. 113:

καὶ γὰρ βα Κλυταιμνήστρης προβέβουλα,
κουριδίης δλόχου, ἐπεὶ οὐ ἐθέειν ἐστι χερσίων,
οὐ δέμας οὐδὲ φυήν, αὐτ' ἀρ φρένας οὐτε τι ἔργα.

⁶ Calypso. See *Odyssey* v. 136, 203 foll.

⁷ Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 472 foll.

⁸ Cf. *Odyssey* ix. 26 foll.

declaring in open assembly that a base captive woman, and of alien race besides, was in no wise inferior to Clytemnestra in womanly excellence.^a This was ill spoken of the mother of his children; nor was his connexion with the other a righteous one. How could it be, when he had but recently compelled her to be his concubine, and before he had any experience of her behaviour to him? Ulysses on the other hand, when the daughter of Atlas^b besought him to share her bed and board, and promised him immortality and everlasting happiness, could not bring himself even for the sake of immortality to betray the kindness and love and loyalty of his wife, deeming immortality purchased by unrighteousness to be the worst of all punishments.^c For it was only to save his comrades that he yielded his person to Circe; and in answer to her he even declared that in his eyes nothing could be more lovely than his native isle, rugged though it were; and prayed that he might die, if only he might look upon his mortal wife and son.^d So firmly did he keep troth with his wife; and received in return from her the like loyalty.^e

IV. Once again, in the words addressed by Ulysses to Nausicaa^f the poet makes clear the great honour in which he holds the virtuous companionship of man and wife in marriage. There he prays the gods to

* With this chapter cf. the poem of Simon Dach (1648) translated by Longfellow as "Anne of Thuraw."

^f *Odyssey* vi. 180 foll.:

σοὶ δὲ θεοὶ τόσα δοῖεν ὅσα φρεσὶ σῇσι μαινῶε,
 ἄνδρα τε καὶ οἶλον καὶ ὁμοφροσύνην ὀπάσειαν
 ἐσθλήν· οὐ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γε κρεῖσσον καὶ ἀρειον,
 ἢ ὅθ' ὁμοφροσύνῃσι νοήμασιν οἶλον ἔχῃαν
 ἀνὴρ ἢ δὲ γυνή· πόλλ' ἄλγεα θυμωμένεσσιν,
 χάρματα δ' εὐμενέτησι· μάλιστα δὲ τ' ἔλλυνον αὐτοί.

p. 140

dare virum et domum et unanimitatem optatam ad virum, non quameunque, sed bonam. Nihil enim maius bonum ipsa in hominibus ait esse,¹ quam cum concordēs vir et uxor in voluntatibus domum regunt. Hinc patet rursus, quod non laudat unanimitatem
 30 ad invicem, quae circa prava servitia fit, sed eam quae animo et prudentia iuste coniuncta est : nam voluntatibus domum regere² id significat. Et iterum dicens quia cum huiusmodi dilectio fit, multae quidem tristitiae inimicis fiunt, in ipsis amicis vero gaudia
 35 multa,³ et maxime audiunt ipsum sicut vera dicentem. Nam viro et uxore circa optima concorditer existentibus necesse et utriusque amicos sibi ad invicem concordare, deinde fortes existentes esse terribiles inimicis, suis autem utiles : hiis vero discordantibus
 p. 147 different et amici, deinde vero infirmos esse maxime ipsos huiusmodi sentire.⁴

In istis autem manifeste praecipit actor⁵ ea quidem quae prava et impudica, invicem inhibere, ea vero quae iuxta posse⁶ et pudica et iusta sunt, indifferenter⁷
 5 sibi et ipsis servire : studentes primo quidem curam parentum habere, vir quidem eorum qui sunt uxoris

¹ *Reading, with c*, nihil enim hoc maius bonum inquit esse in hominibus. (*But c has sibi above.*)

² *c omits* domum regunt (*above*) and domum regere (*here*).

³ *Or reading, with c*, necesse et amicos utriusque laetari, "of necessity the friends of each will also rejoice."

⁴ *Reading, with c*, oportet et amicos discordes esse, deinde autem debiles esse, maxime autem sentire huiusmodi eos. *The last five words seem to represent* αὐτοὺς δὲ μάλιστα τοιοῦτό τι πρᾶξεν, *echoing* μάλιστα δὲ τ' ἐκλυσαν αὐτοί.

⁵ *Reading auctor with several MSS.* *c has* poeta, *as above*.

⁶ *iuxta posse* = κατὰ δύναμιν *or* κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. *Perhaps the words are misplaced in the Latin, as they appear to qualify obsequi.*

⁷ *indifferenter* = ἀδιαφόρως (?): *c has* cum sollicitudine, "seidulously."

grant her a husband and a home ; and between herself and her husband, precious unity of mind ; provided that such unity be for righteous ends. For, says he, there is no greater blessing on earth than when husband and wife rule their home in harmony of mind and will. Moreover it is evident from this that the unity which the poet commends is no mutual subservience in each other's vices, but one that is rightfully allied with wisdom and understanding ; for this is the meaning of the words " rule the house in (harmony of) mind." And he goes on to say that wherever such a love is found between man and wife, it is a cause of sore distress to those who hate them and of delight to those that love them ; while the truth of his words is most of all acknowledged by the happy pair.* For when wife and husband are agreed about the best things in life, of necessity the friends of each will also be mutually agreed ; and the strength which the pair gain from their unity will make them formidable to their enemies and helpful to their own. But when discord reigns between them, their friends too will disagree and become in consequence enfeebled, while the pair themselves will suffer most of all.

In all these precepts it is clear that the poet is teaching husband and wife to dissuade one another from whatever is evil and dishonourable, while unselfishly furthering to the best of their power one another's honourable and righteous aims. In the first place they will strive to perform all duty towards their parents, the husband towards those of his wife

* The Greek, as cited above, is

μάλιστα δὲ τ' ἐκλυον αὐτοί,

" and themselves best know *their own case*."

ARISTOTLE

p. 147

non minus quam suorum, uxor vero eorum qui sunt viri. Deinde filiorum et amicorum et rerum et totius domus tamquam communis curam habeant, colluctantes ad
 10 invicem, ut plurium bonorum ad commune uterque causa fiat et melior atque iustior, dimittens quidem superbiam, regens autem recte et habens humilem modum et mansuetum,¹ ut cum ad senectutem venerint, liberati a beneficio multaque cura et concupiscentiarum et voluptatum, quae interdum fiunt in
 15 iuventute, habeant invicem et filiis respondere, ut eorum ad domum plurium bonorum rector factus est, et statim scire aut per fortunam malum aut per virtutem bonum. In quibus qui vicerit, maximum meritum a diis consequitur, ut Pindarus ait: dulce enim sibi cor et spes mortalium multiplicem volun-
 20 tatem gubernat, secundum autem a filiis, feliciter ad senectutem depasce. Propter quae proprie et communiter decet iuste considerantes ad omnes deos et homines eum qui vitam habet² et multum ad suam uxorem et filios et parentes.

¹ *c* has mansuetos et domesticos mores, "in a kindly spirit which befits a home."

² *Reading, with c, vivere instead of Durand's eum qui vitam habet. Perhaps the translator confused διαβίωσιν (infm.) and διαβίων (partic.).*

^a Or "which of their parents."

^b A mistranslation of the following words, cited by Plato in *Republic* i. 331 A:

γλυκεῖά οἱ καρδίαν ἀτάλλαισα γηροτρόφος συναορεῖ
 ἐλπίς, ἃ μάλιστα θνατῶν
 πολύτροφον γνῶμαν κυβερνᾷ,

"the old age (of a righteous man) is sustained by a pleasant

no less than towards his own, and she in her turn towards his. Their next duties are towards their children, their friends, their estate, and their entire household which they will treat as a common possession; each vying with the other in the effort to contribute most to the common welfare, and to excel in virtue and righteousness; laying aside arrogance, and ruling with justice in a kindly and unassuming spirit. And so at length, when they reach old age, and are freed from the duty of providing for others and from preoccupation with the pleasures and desires of youth, they will be able to give answer also to their children, if question arise whether child or parent^a has contributed more good things to the common household store; and will be well assured that whatsoever of evil has befallen them is due to fortune, and whatsoever of good, to their own virtue. One who comes victorious through such question wins from heaven, as Pindar says,^b his chiefest reward; for "hope, and a soul filled with fair thoughts are supreme in the manifold mind of mortals"; and next, from his children the good fortune of being sustained by them in his old age. And therefore it behoves us to preserve throughout our lives a righteous attitude towards all gods and mortal men, to each individually, and to all in common^c; and not least towards our own wives and children and parents.

companion that cherishes his heart; even by Hope, who more than aught else guides the wayward mind of mortals."

^a Or "both as individuals and as members of a community."

INDEX TO THE OECONOMICA

(PERSONS AND PLACES)

N.B.—In Books I and II, Arabic numbers refer to the Chapters: In Book II they refer to the Sections of the second Chapter

Abýdos, II. 18. A colony of Miletus, on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont. Famous for the legend of Leander, and in Ulysses's poem.

Admetus, III. 1. A legendary king of Phæria in Northern Greece.

Æolus, II. 80. A district on the coast of Mysia (q.v.).

Agamemnon, III. 8. According to legend, king of Mycenæ in Greece, and with his brother Menelaus leader of the Greeks in the Trojan War.

Alcæstis, III. 1. Wife of Admetus, who according to the legend gave her life instead of her husband's. She is the heroine of a famous play by Euripides.

Alexander the Great, II. 33, 34. King of Macedonia 336-323 B.C.

Alexandria, II. 33. A city at the western end of the Nile Delta, founded by Alexander the Great.

Amisus, II. 24. A city on the south coast of the Black Sea, now Samson.

Antimenes, II. 34, 35. An officer of Alexander the Great.

Antissa, II. 6. A town in the Isle of Lesbos off the N.W. coast of Asia Minor.

Aristotelēs, II. 16. (See note there).

Artabazus, II. 80. Persian governor of Western Asia under Artaverxes III. and Darius III.

Athēnā, I. 4. The patron goddess of Athens.

Athens, Athenians, Attic, I. 6; II. 4, 5, 23, 25, 26, 30.

Athribis, II. 35. The chief city of a province of Lower Egypt.

Atlas, III. 2. A personification of the North African mountain, figured as a giant holding heaven and earth asunder. The goddess Calypso, who entertained Odysseus (Ulysses) on her island, was one of his daughters.

Babylon, II. 34. A great city on the Euphrates; seat of the Chaldean empire from 612 B.C. Cyrus the Persian took it in 539, and Alexander the Great died there in 323.

Bosporus ("Ox-passagē"), II. 2. Ancient name of (1) the Straits of Constantinople, (2) the Straits of Yankaleh, E. of the Crimea. The Crimea was colonized by Greeks from Miletus about 600 B.C., and from this colony afterwards arose the Kingdom of Bosporus, to which this section probably refers.

Byzantium, II. 3. A colony of the Greek city of Megara, situated where Constantinople was afterwards built.

Callistratus, II. 22. An Athenian.

INDEX TO THE OECONOMICA

- statesman, who was condemned by the Athenians in 351 and went into exile in Macedonia, where he is said to have founded the city afterwards called Philippi
- Canopus (Greek *Kanôps*), II. 33. A city of Egypt on the coast about 14 miles east of Alexandria
- Caria, Carians, II. 13, 31. A south-western district of Asia Minor, watered by the river Maeander
- Carthage (Greek *Karchôn*), in the Phoenician, *Qarthadash* = New Town), Carthaginians, I. 5. A Phoenician colony near Tunis on the N. coast of Africa, said to have been founded in the ninth century B.C. It grew rich not only by overseas trade, but by the care and skill of its agriculture. Its use of mercenary soldiers rendered specially necessary the precaution mentioned in the text
- Chabrias, II. 25, 37. An Athenian commander, sent to the aid of King Tachos (q.v.) in 361
- Chalcidion, II. 10. A Greek colony on the Bosphorus, founded from Megara in 685 B.C. Being opposite the far more eligible site afterwards occupied by Byzantium, it was termed "The City of the Blind"
- Charidemus, II. 30. A captain of mercenary troops, who served under Athens as well as under Cotys (q.v.), whose son-in-law he became
- Chios, II. 12. An island off the W. coast of Asia Minor, colonized by Greeks
- Chryseis ("Daughter of Chryses"), III. 3. A maiden named Aetynome, whom, according to legend, the Greeks captured in the Trojan War and gave to King Agamemnon
- Circê (Greek *Kirkê*), III. 3. An enchantress in the *Odyssey*, whom Odysseus (Ulysses) overcame by the help of the gods
- Clarus, II. 15. A Greek city on the coast of Asia Minor, not far from Smyrna
- Cleomenes, II. 48, 59. A native of the Greek colony of Naucratis in Lower Egypt; Receiver of the Egyptian tribute under Alexander the Great
- Clytemnestra (Greek *Klytemnestra*), III. 3. Wife of Agamemnon (q.v.). Her murder of him on his return from Troy is the subject of a famous drama by Aeschylus
- Condatis, II. 14. A governor under Mnucolus (q.v.) ruler of Caria
- Corcyra (Greek *Korcyra*, Italian *Corfu*), II. 25. It was colonized by the Corinthians about 700 B.C.
- Corinth (Greek *Korinthos*), Corinthians, II. 1. A city on the isthmus joining North and South Greece. Famous for its commerce and its luxury
- Cotys, II. 29, 27. King of Thrace, 362-356 B.C.
- Cypselus, II. 1. Ruler of Corinth, 655-625 B.C. His romantic story is told by Herodotus (I. 92)
- Cyprus, II. 11. A Greek city on an island in the Propontis (*Sea of Marmara*), said to have been colonized from Miletus. Now *Bat Kiz*
- Démeter, II. 20. "Earth-Mother," the Greek corn-goddess
- Didaia, II. 24. A Persian officer: perhaps the same as Datis who rebelled against Artaxerxes II. and was slain in 362
- Dion, I. 6. An eminent citizen of Syracuse, and a disciple of Plato. He expelled the despot Dionysius II. in 356, but was assassinated three years later
- Dionysius, I. 8; II. 20, 41. Two despots of this name, father and son, ruled at Syracuse during the fourth century B.C. It is probably the elder, who reigned from 405 to 367, whose deeds are recorded in Book II.
- Dionysus, II. 31. The Greek god of wine, also called Bacchus. His festivals were celebrated by dramatic performances. To train

ARISTOTLE

and equip the choruses for these was a duty and privilege of wealthy citizens

Egypt, Egyptians (Greek *Aigyptos*, from *Hel-ku-Ptah*, an ancient name for the city of Memphis on the Nile), II. 25, 32, 33

Epheus, Ephesians, II. 19. One of the chief Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor; said to have been colonized from Athens in the eleventh century B.C.

Euclates, II. 32. Governor of Egypt, probably under the Persian king

Greece (Greek *Hellus*), II. 14. The name was given to all districts and cities where the Greek language and civilization prevailed

Helen (Latin *Helena*, Greek *Helena*), III. 3. The wife of Menelaus, whose abduction by Paris, son of Priam, brought about the Trojan War

Hellas, II. 8. A Greek colony on the south coast of the Euxine (Black) Sea, founded about 650 B.C.; now *Ereps*

Hermias, II. 23. A Greek who held a small principality near the Hellespont in the middle of the fourth century B.C. He was the friend and father-in-law of the philosopher Aristotle. In 344 he was taken prisoner by Mentor (q.v.) and put to death by the Persians

Hesiod (Greek *Hesiodos*), I. 2, 4. A Greek poet of uncertain date, possibly in the eighth century B.C. He was born at Asura in Northern Greece, and wrote a descriptive poem on farming entitled *Works and Days*

Hippias, II. 14. Son of Peisistratus, whom he succeeded as ruler of Athens in 527 B.C. He was deposed in 510, and died in exile

Homer (Greek *Homeros*), II. 3. A Greek poet of uncertain date, to whom was attributed the com-

position of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Possibly of Smyrna in Asia Minor

Idemartes, II. 26. An Athenian commander in the first half of the fourth century B.C. Like Charidamas, he entered the service of King Ootys (q.v.) and married one of his daughters

Lacedaemonians or Lacedonians, I. 6, II. 3. The inhabitants of Laconia in Southern Greece. Their chief city was Lacedaemon or Sparta. They were famous for the strictness of their military training, the simplicity of their life ("Spartan fare"), and the fewness of their words ("Laconic speech")

Lampascus, II. 7, 23. A Greek city on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont

Laurium, II. 36 (if the conjecture of Sylburg is right). A mountain in Attica, containing a mine of lead and silver, the property of the Athenian people

Leucothea ("White Goddess"), II. 20. According to Greek legend, she was the daughter of Cadmus; her husband Athamas, seized with madness, sought to slay her, whereon she leapt into the sea and was transformed into a goddess

Libya, Libyan, I. 6. The Greek name for Africa

Lydia, Lydians, II. 14. A district on the western end of the S. coast of Asia Minor

Lygdamis, II. 2. An ally of Peisistratus of Athens, by whose aid he became despot of Naxos, about 540 B.C.

Macedonia, Macedonians, II. 22, 31. The native land of Alexander the Great, to the north of the Aegean Sea

Mausolus, II. 13, 14. Ruler of Caria from 377-353 B.C.; at first under the Persians, against whom he afterwards rebelled. Parts of the

INDEX TO THE OECONOMICA

- splendid monument (*Memnosofusa*) erected in his memory by his wife Antemisia are to be seen in the British Museum
- Memoön**, II. 20. A Rhodian in the service of Darius III. He succeeded his brother Mentor as governor of W. Asia Minor, and distinguished himself by his vigorous resistance to the invasion of Alexander the Great in 334 and 333 B.C.
- Mendē**, II. 21. A Greek colony on the coast of Macedonia
- Mentor**, II. 28. A Rhodian in the Persian service, who eventually became governor of W. Asia Minor
- Mylassa**, II. 13. A city in Caria, a seat of the government of Mausolus (q.v.). Now *Milas*
- Myria**, *Myriaus*, II. 40. A district of N.W. Asia Minor, between the Propontis (*Sea of Marmara*) and the Aegean Sea
- Nausicaä**, III. 4. Daughter of Alcimous, king of the Phaeacians, whose reception of Ulysses (*Odysseus*) when cast ashore on her father's kingdom is related in *Odyssey* vi.
- Naxos**, II. 2. An island half-way between Greece and Asia Minor, famous in the legend of Bacchus and Ariadne
- Olynthus** ("Winter Bg"), *Olynthians*, II. 21, 23, 35. A Greek city on the coast of Macedonia. Now *Alo Mianus*
- Ophellās**, II. 35. An officer of Alexander the Great, and afterwards of Ptolemaeus I., king of Egypt 323-285 B.C.
- Orēus**, II. 30. A town in Euboea (*Neorhopot*), colonized by the Athenians in 445 B.C.
- Orpheüs**, III. 1. A poet and musician famous in Greek legend. Most of the poems attributed to him are late forgeries; but a few fragments are as early as 500 B.C.
- Pórinthus** or *Périnthus*, II. 27. A Greek colony on the N. shore of the Propontis (*Sea of Marmara*), founded from the island of Samos about 550 B.C. Now *Eski Ereğli*
- Pénélope**, III. 1. The faithful wife of Ulysses (q.v.)
- Persia**, *Persians*, I. 6; II. 24, 25
- Phäria**, II. 38. An island off the coast of Egypt, opposite to which Alexander founded the city of Alexandria. It was afterwards famous for its lighthouse tower
- Phoxarinos**, II. 31. An officer of Alexander the Great
- Phōcia** ("Seal-town"), II. 15. A Greek colony on the W. coast of Asia Minor, N. of Smyrna, famous for maritime enterprise. The mother-city of Marcellus
- Pindar** (Greek *Pindaros*), III. 4. A famous lyric poet of Thebes in Boeotia. His *Odes* in honour of the victors in the Greek athletic contests have been preserved. For a skilful imitation of their structure see the *Ages* of Thomas Gray
- Pontus**, II. 8, 10. Now the Black Sea. The original Greek name was apparently "*Pontos Ægeius*" "The Inhospitable Sea." This was afterwards, for the sake of omen, changed to "*Euxinus*," "Hospitable"
- Potidea**, II. 3. A city on the coast of Macedonia, colonized from Athens in 429 B.C. It was destroyed 78 years later by Philip, father of Alexander the Great
- Prism** (Greek *Prismas*), III. 3. King of Troy at the time of the Trojan war; father of Paris
- Pythagoreans**, I. 4. The followers of Pythagoras, a Greek philosopher from the island of Samos (q.v.), who founded a sect or brotherhood in S. Italy in the latter part of the sixth century B.C.
- Pythoclēs**, II. 36. Possibly an adherent of Phötelon, put to death along with him in 317 B.C.

ARISTOTLE

Rhégium (Greek *Rhégion*, Italian *Reggio*), II. 20. A Greek city in the extreme S. of Italy, on the Straits of Messina, colonized in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. It was captured by Dionysius I. of Syracuse in 387.

Rhodos (Greek *Rhōdos*), Rhodanus, II. 15, 23, 29, 34. An island off the S.-W. coast of Asia Minor, early colonized by Dorian Greeks. Its capital city, also called *Rhōdos*, which asserted and maintained its independence after the death of Alexander the Great, was built in 408 B.C.

Simos, Samians, II. 9, 28. An island off the W. coast of Asia Minor, occupied by Greeks from very early times. Between 405 and 319 B.C. it passed alternately under the control of Lacedaemonians, Athenians, Persians, and Macedonians. The exiles whose restoration is mentioned in the text were probably supporters of Lacedaemonian suzerainty who had been expelled by the Athenian party.

Selybria, II. 17. A Greek city, founded like Byzantium by Megara, but still earlier, and about 50 miles farther west. Now *Silvria*.

Sōspolus, II. 6. (The name, lacking in the Greek, is supplied from the Latin version, *s*.)
Stobolius, II. 40*.

Syracuse (Greek *Συράκων*), *Syracusans*, II. 20. The chief Greek colony in Sicily, founded from Corinth in 734 B.C.
Syrinn, II. 32.

Tachōs (or Tachūs - Egyptian *Tchahut*), II. 25, 37. An Egyptian king of the XXXth dynasty, who was helped to maintain his throne against Persian attacks by the Athenian Chabrias and the Lacedaemonian king Agésilas (about 361 B.C.).

Thrace (Greek *Θράκη*, Latin *Thraciæ*), Thracian, II. 27. A region between Macedonia and the Black Sea.

Timothæus, II. 23. An Athenian commander, who served in many campaigns in the first half of the fourth century B.C.

Tyrthēna, II. 20. The district in Italy now called *Tuscania*. The inhabitants, called by the Greeks *Τυρηνοί* or *Τυρῆνοί*, by the Latins *Tusci* or *Etrusci*, and by themselves *Ra-Sena*, were thought to have immigrated from Asia Minor.

Ulyssēs (Greek *Ὀδυσσεύς*), III. 1, 3, 4. The hero of the *Odyssey*; a type of steadfastness and resource.

Zōus (other name *Dēus* or *Zēn*), II. 1. The Greek god of the sky, corresponding to the Roman *Dissepiter* or *Juppiter* (= *Iovis-pater*).

* The author of *ε* apparently read *Σταβίσιος* for *Σταβόλιος*.

THE MAGNA MORALIA

INTRODUCTION

THE Peripatetic ^a School, founded at Athens by Aristotle in the second half of the fourth century B.C., has left us four treatises on Ethics, or the Science and Art of Human Conduct. They are known as the *Ethics of Nicomachus*; the *Ethics of Eudemus*; the *Great Ethics* ^b; and the *Tract on Virtues and Vices*.

Nicomachus was the son of Aristotle, and the treatise which bears his name bore it as far back as the days of Cicero.^c That he did no more than edit his father's work was then the opinion of the learned; an opinion confirmed by the studies of modern times.

Eudemus of Rhodes was one of Aristotle's most eminent pupils, the author of several works on Mathematics and Natural Science. The earliest testimony to his authorship of the treatise on Ethics which bears his name is that of Aspasius, a commentator of the first century A.D.; quoted by Susemihl in his Introduction, p. xxix.^d

While it is generally agreed that both the above

^a So called from the Promenade (*περίπατος*) where the philosopher lectured.

^b τὰ μεγάλα Ἠθικά: in Latin, *Magna Moralia*.

^c See *De Finibus* v. 5.

^d Aspasius on Nicomachus, Bk. VIII. c. viii.: λέγει δὲ καὶ Εὐδημος καὶ Θεόφραστος ὅτι καὶ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίας ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς γίνονται ἢ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ δι' ἀρετήν. The reference is to *Eudemus* VII. x. 10.

MAGNA MORALIA

treatises present us with the substance of Aristotle's own lectures on Ethics, the relation between the two has been very differently conceived. Grant (Essay I. pp. 23 foll.), in agreement with Leonhard Spengel, regards the latter as a rewriting of the former. By several German scholars (Jäger, Walzer, Brink) the converse has recently been maintained, and the edition of Eudemus held to be an early sketch which Aristotle afterwards elaborated in the longer work.

Three Books (*Nicomachus* V., VI., VII. : *Eudemus* IV., V., VI.) are common to both editions ; and the question of their authorship has been much discussed. Among British scholars, Munro, Jackson, Grant, and Stock attribute them to Eudemus ; while Burnet and Rackham think they belonged originally to the work of Nicomachus. This is also the opinion of the German editors Spengel and Susemihl,^a though they except the treatise on Pleasure which forms the second part of *Eud.* VI. (*Nic.* VII.). For a full discussion, the reader may be referred to the editions of Grant and Burnet.

Students of the *Great Ethics*, with rare exceptions,^b take them to be a post-Aristotelean epitome. Susemihl (Introduction to *Magna Moralia*, p. xii) says they are extracted chiefly from *Eudemus* ; whilst Brink points out that in their general structure they follow *Nicomachus*. The origin of the title (which cannot be traced higher than the time of Marcus Aurelius) is uncertain. As the two βιβλία or rolls into which the work was divided cover the ground of the eight rolls of *Eudemus*, which nevertheless con-

^a Introduction to *Eudemii Ethica*, pp. ix foll.

^b Notable among these are Schleiermacher and Prof. Hans von Arnim of Vienna.

ARISTOTLE

ground as the first four of *Nicomachus* : namely, the definition and analysis of Moral Virtue.

End IV.
(Nic. V.) Book IV. (= *Nic. V.*) treats of Justice, (1) as an abstract principle, (2) as a Virtue—a State or Habit of the Soul. The *principle* is a species of equality, which assigns to men their deserved proportions of good and ill. Two main types of it are distinguished, the Distributive and the Corrective ; as an instrument of both, Currency is devised, to be a token and a measure of our needs ; which we can keep till the need arises, and then exchange for the needed goods. Justice as a *Virtue* must be voluntary ; its proper sphere is the intercourse of fellow-citizens. No one voluntarily commits injustice against himself or suffers it from another, though he may commit or suffer something contrary to the principle or rule. Finally, Equity (*ἐπιείκεια*) is explained as a Virtue which intervenes in cases where strict Justice is inapplicable.

End. V.
(Nic. VI.) Description of the Moral Virtues (*ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί*) being thus concluded, the question arises, what is the rational Rule or Standard in accordance with which the virtuous man's passions are balanced between excess and defect ?

Determination of this Rule is a task for the Intellect ; but for its calculative or deliberative side (*τὸ λογιστικόν*) which deals with changeable things, not for the speculative part (*τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν*) which embraces pure knowledge. Now just as the Moral Virtues are excellences of the irrational or passionate nature, so in our rational or intellectual nature there are certain outstanding powers or excellences of thought. Chief among these are the Artistic, Scientific, Practical, Philosophical, and Intuitive

MAGNA MORALIA

powers (τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις,^a σοφία, νοῦς). Of these, Practical Thought or Prudence is found to be the seat of that Right Rule which controls Moral Virtue.

After distinguishing the applications of "Prudence" to the life of the State, the Family, and the Individual, the author touches upon certain cognate powers such as Good Counsel, Shrewdness, Considerateness. He then returns to Intuitive Thought (νοῦς), and traces its relation to Prudence. Finally he contrasts Philosophic Thought and Prudence as representative excellences of the two sides of the Intellect. Prudence, however, needs Moral Virtue, or it degenerates into Cleverness; even as apart from Prudence, Moral Virtue becomes a blind and fallible instinct.

After reviewing certain states of soul which transcend ordinary Virtue or Vice, the author proceeds to consider Self-Control (ἐγκράτεια) and its opposite Self-Indulgence (ἡκράσια). Like the Virtue of Temperance (σωφροσύνη) and the Vice of Profligacy (ἀκολασία) they are concerned with bodily pleasure and pain; but whereas the profligate, misguided by a false Rule, purposes wrongly, the self-indulgent, though he knows the true "major premiss" or rule of conduct, and also the "minor premiss" which applies it to his own case, fails to act upon the latter through the influence of Desire; which resembles

Eud. VI.
(*Nic.* VII.).

^a Dr. W. Jäger, who believes the *Eudemian Ethics* to represent an earlier stage of Aristotle's own thought, points out (as Greenwood in his edition of *Nic.* VI. had already done) that in *Eud.* I., VII., VIII. φρόνησις is the highest form of Thought, corresponding rather to σοφία here. He therefore ranges the present Book with the later (*Nicomachean*) version. (*Aristotle*, English trans. c. ix., with concluding note. Oxford, 1934.)

ARISTOTLE

that of slumber, madness, or intoxication. His case is more hopeful than that of the profligate, because the rational Rule in him is as yet uncorrupted.

The remainder of the Book treats, like *Nic. X*, of the relation of Pleasure to Happiness. Here, however, the view is taken that Happiness and the noblest kinds of Pleasure are identical. And though the palm is given to the pleasure of Contemplation, it is recognized that those who are capable of it need a certain measure of material welfare, or their happiness will be incomplete.^a

End VII The seventh Book, treating of Friendship, corre-
End VIII. sponds to *Nic. VIII.* and *IX.* The eighth Book is fragmentary. It comprises discussions on the possibility of mis-using Virtue; on Good Fortune; and on *καλοκάγαθία*—a state of perfect Virtue which, possessing a true criterion of worth, is unharmed by any accession of external advantages. This Book has no counterpart in the treatise of Nicomachus.

ANALYSIS OF THE *GREAT ETHICS* ("MAGNA MORALIA")

M. M. I. 1. 1 The *First Book*, after discovering in Ethics—the Science of Moral Conduct—a branch of Sociology, the Science of Civilized Life, passes in review the opinions on Moral Excellence held respectively by Pythagoras, *L. 9.* Socrates, and Plato. The author then lays down his own, or rather his school's, definition of the object of *L. 10.* Ethical inquiry: which is the Highest Good of Man in his Social Life.

^a Cf. *Nic. I. v., viii.* The opposite view, that a man may be happy in torment, was maintained by the Cynics and Stoics (Grant).

MAGNA MORALIA

Hereupon, like Eudemus and Nicomachus, he introduces a criticism of Plato's Ideal Good. This he finally sets aside as alien to the limited and relative Good with which his science deals ; and concludes his first Chapter ^a with a further criticism of the view of Socrates that Virtue is simply and solely Knowledge of the Truth. c. 12-26. 1. 26, 27.

In the following Chapters the conception of the Highest Human Good (or Chief End for Man) is analysed, and it is identified with Happiness. This is a compound of greater and lesser Goods ; and may be defined briefly as " Living well and Acting well." In the main, such a life consists in the Activity of a virtuous soul ; to the completeness whereof certain external Goods are ancillary. Having thus defined Happiness, the author proceeds to analyse that Moral Virtue or Excellence which enters into his definition. It is distinguished psychologically from Intellectual Virtue as being a state of the Irrational part of the soul, whose passions it orders and regulates. Con- cerned closely with Pleasure and Pain, it may be regarded as a mean between excess and defect of the various kinds of Feeling. Moral Virtue being thus defined, the question is asked whether it can be taught ; and several chapters are devoted to a discussion of Moral Freedom. It is shown that the human Will is *ἀρχὴ κυρία*—a Cause of Action ; and as there is something incalculable in human conduct, and the same person acts differently under the same circumstances, so the Will which causes our actions must be free. This leads to a search for the Motive Force of Voluntary Action ; which is eventually found in *προαίρεσις* or Purposive Choice ; a compound of Impulse or Ap- d. 31. 1. 1. 10. 7. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

* Possibly this portion has become misplaced. See note.

petence and Intelligence (*ὑπερίσ βουλευτικὴ μετὰ
xviii διανοίας*). Through this we choose the means to-
wards our end; but our choice is deflected by
Pleasure or Pain. Hence the possibility of error; we
may overshoot the mark, or we may fall short of it.

The End or Aim of Virtue is next discussed. Just
xix as *προαίρεσις* aims at Virtue (*cf.* xvii. 2), so Virtue
herself aims at τὸ καλόν—Moral Beauty or Nobility.
The author now considers in detail the several
Virtues: those states of soul which maintain a per-
fect balance between the excess of some feeling and
xx, its defect. First he analyses Courage, the mean state
xxi, between excess and defect of Fear; then Temper-
ance, which is intermediate between Profligacy and
xxiv, Insensibility to Pleasure; and so on with Gentleness,
xxv, xxvii, Greatness of Soul, Magnificence, Righteous Indigna-
xxviii, xxix, tion, Dignity, Modesty, Urbanity, Friendship, and
xxviii, Truthfulness. Of these, Righteous Indignation and
Modesty lack the steadfastness of full Moral Virtues,
but as they are "intermediate states of feeling" they
are included here.*

xxviii. The thirty-third Chapter deals with the primary
social Virtue of Justice or Righteousness, correspond-
ing to the treatment of it in *Nic. V.* (= *Eud. IV.*)
of which I have already given a summary (p. 430
xxviii, 1. above). The principle of Justice (τὸ δίκαιον) is two-
fold, consisting either in obedience to human laws,
xxviii, 5 or in equal dealing with one's neighbour. The Virtue
of Justice which corresponds to this latter kind is a
middle state of soul which claims for itself neither too
xxviii, 8 much nor too little. There is just equality between

* Dignity, Urbanity, Friendship, and Truthfulness are regarded as virtues by Nicomachus, but not by Eudenus. See note on xxviii, 1.

MAGNA MORALIA

two men when each is rewarded proportionately to his desert. The division between Distributive and Corrective Justice in *Nic. V. ii. 12* is here ignored; but the criticism of reprisal or requital (*Nic. V. v.*), which is only just if proportioned to the states and culpability of the parties, duly appears. Domestic Justice, which operates between unequal members of a household, is next distinguished from the civic or political Justice which binds together the equal members of a commonwealth; and Natural Right from what is just by convention. Injustice is also differentiated from wrongdoing, as in *Nic. V. vii.*; and its voluntary character is emphasized. Following *Nic. V. ix., xi.*, the writer then discusses the question whether a man can wrong himself, and decides that he cannot. The chapter concludes with the case of Injustice arising from error—either on our part or on that of our neighbour.*

In the thirty-fourth Chapter, which for the most part corresponds to *Nic. VI. (= Eud. V.)*, the formula *πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον* is introduced as a description of morally virtuous action; and leads to the question, what is this *ὀρθὸς λόγος*, this Right Standard or Principle, by which, as by a touchstone, the virtuous man will test his actions?

As its name implies, it is something rational; a rule of which a reasoned account can be given. It is therefore to be sought not in the irrational part of the soul which is the seat of the Moral Virtues, but in the rational part which is the seat of the Intellectual Virtues. In this part we again distinguish the organ of Science or Knowledge, and the organ of Delibera-

* The consideration of Equity (*ἐπιείκεια*, *Nic. V. x.*) is omitted here, but appears below in II. I.

ARISTOTLE

tion and Purpose ; which latter deals with the world that is perceptible through our senses and susceptible to the action of our wills.

xxxiv 7. From this piece of psychological analysis, the author proceeds to an enumeration of five intellectual faculties by which we attain Truth ; the list is that of *Nic. VI. iii. 1*, with the substitution of *ἐπόληψις* for *τέχνη*.^a

xxiv. 8 12. Now of these five, *φρόνησις* or Prudence is shown to be a Virtue of the deliberative part of the soul, enabling us to purpose and to act aright ; and is distinguished on the one hand from *τέχνη* (Art) and on the other from *ἐπιστήμη* (Scientific Thought or Knowledge).

xxiv 11 This latter faculty, which attains Truth by deduction, becomes through union with *νοῖς* (Intuition of First Principles) the intellectual Virtue of

xxiv. 16, 17. *σοφία* or Wisdom, which is an excellence of the scientific part of the soul as Prudence is of the deli-

xxiv. 18-20. berative. *σύνεσις* (Sagacity) and *δαινότης* (Cleverness) are next analysed, and shown to be auxiliary to

xxiv. 23 26. Prudence. This relationship suggests the similar one between natural tendencies towards Courage, Justice, etc., and the fully formed Virtues, which arise from Habit and Purpose, and possess a rational Rule or Standard (*λόγος*).

xxiv. 27-29. In the concluding sections, the status of Prudence as a Virtue, and its practicality, are again emphasized,

xxiv. 30-32 and its relation to Wisdom defined as that of Steward to Householder. (It is to be noticed that the author omits direct answer to the question raised in § 2 "What is the Right Rule or Standard of Conduct ?")

^a See p. 430 above. *ἐπόληψις* (Conception), which like *δόξα* (Opinion) carries no certainty of truth, is dismissed in two lines (§ 15).

MAGNA MORALIA

but leaves us to infer the answer given in *Nic. VI. xiii.* 4, which places it in Prudence or Practical Thought.)

The *Second Book* commences with a brief account of *M.M. II. 1.* Equity or Considerateness—a moral quality corrective of strict Justice. This chapter, which corresponds to *Nic. V. 1.*, would find a more fitting place at the end of *I. xxviii.* above. It seems to be placed here as introductory to the mention of Discrimination, which *u.* (as in *Nic. VI. xi. 1*) is an intellectual quality whereby we determine what is equitable. Good Counsel *u. 1.* (*εὐβουλία*) which, like Sagacity and Cleverness, is auxiliary to Prudence, is next briefly treated; with Discrimination, it would be more naturally considered after *I. xxxiv. 17.* (*Cf. Nic. VI. ix.*)

Five problems are now stated and solved which do not appear in the longer Treatise. According to the conjecture of Susenmihl, they once stood therein as a kind of appendix, either at the end of *Nic. VI. (Eud. V.)* or at the beginning of the following Book. (See his Introduction to *M. M. p. xiii*). They are as follows :

- | | |
|--|-----------------|
| (1) Will the Just treat all men alike ? | <i>III. 2.</i> |
| (2) Can the Unjust be said to possess Prudence ? | <i>III. 4.</i> |
| (3) Can one commit Injustice against a bad man ? | <i>III. 8.</i> |
| (4) Is conflict possible between the Virtues ? | <i>III. 12.</i> |
| (5) Can we have too much Virtue ? | <i>III. 14.</i> |

All these questions are answered in the negative.

The next three Chapters correspond with the *IV.-VI.* greater part of *Nic. VII.* They commence with a distinction between three evil states of soul, namely (1) Self-Indulgence (*ἀκρασία*), which being opposed, not guided, by the sinner's rational Standard (*λόγος*), falls short of full viciousness; (2) the true Vice of Profligacy, which is in agreement with a rational

ARISTOTLE

- Standard, but with a perverted one (*cf.* vi. 11) ; and
- (*cf.* vi. 33) (3) Bestiality, which exceeds the normal measure of human Vice. (Contrast *Nic.* VII. v. 6, where this state is attributed to the absence of a rational Standard, whether good or bad.)
- vi. 1-10 There follows the consideration of four problems touching Self-Control and Self-Indulgence. These are (1) In what sense can the Self-Controlled be said to possess Knowledge or Opinion ? (2) Can we predicate Self-Control of the Temperate (*σώφρων*) ? (3) Is Self-Control always praiseworthy ? (4) In what
- vi. 11 sphere of action is Self-Control shown ? The answer to (1) is that the mere possession of Knowledge must
- vi. 18, be distinguished from its active use ; or again that we may know the " major premiss " or general rule, and yet be ignorant of the " minor premiss " which applies it to our own particular case. (For (2) see
- vi. 18, 10 below.) (3) Self-Indulgence that ignores a perverted Standard (*λόγος*) and thus wins praise, and Self-Control that abides by such a Standard and thus wins blame, are not really what we call them. True Self-Indulgence and Self-Control only exist in relation to a *right* Standard, and are therefore always deserving, the one of censure, and the other of praise.
- vi. 21-26. (4) Those who are self-indulgent in bodily pleasures are properly so-called ; but we use the term in a qualified sense of those who are self-indulgent in temper, or in the pursuit of honour. Indulgence in temper is culpable ; but less so than the sensual kind.
- vi. 27, 28 Self-Control is next distinguished from Endurance, and Self-Indulgence from Feebleness or Softness
- vi. 29, in face of hardships. Finally, the vital distinction between Self-Indulgence and Profligacy, that the former acts against a right Principle, and the latter

MAGNA MORALIA

in accordance with a wrong one, does not preclude vi. 37.
 an affirmative answer to the question propounded
 above (§ 6), whether the temperate man (*τροφιμας*) is
 also self-controlled. Such Self-Control is however
 only potential; the Temperate man, so long as
 he is temperate, does not need to exercise it. (Cf.
Nic. VII. ix. 6.) In the course of the discussion, it is vi. 30, 36.
 pointed out that the sudden failure of a passionate
 nature is less culpable than the weak surrender of a
 colder one; and the question is raised, whether the vi. 30
 profligate is in worse case than the self-indulgent.
 At first he would seem in better case; but finally vi. 40-42.
 the reverse is seen to be true, because the profligate's
 lack of Principle is a natural deficiency, and therefore
 harder to cure.

The Chapter concludes by showing that Prudence is vi. 43, 44.
 incompatible with Self-Indulgence; though Clever-
 ness is not.

The next Chapter contains an account of Pleasure vii.
 corresponding in the main to that of *Nic.* VII.
 (*Eud.* VI.) xi.-xiii., on which see above, p. 432. Six vii. 3.
 arguments are cited by which the goodness of
 Pleasure is impugned: (1) that it is a Process, and
 not a completed State of soul; (2) that there are evil
 Pleasures; (3) that Pleasure is enjoyed by good and
 bad alike; (4) (that there is no Science of Pleasure^a);
 (5) that it is not the best of all things; (6) that it
 impedes noble Action.

Against (1) the author shows that "no Pleasure vii. 4-10.
 is a Process"; against (2) that Pleasure accompanies vii. 11-18.
 every activity of Good, and that Pleasures moreover
 differ in kind; against (3) that all creatures naturally vii. 19-20.

^a This objection seems to have dropped out of the list. It
 is cited and answered afterwards.

ARISTOTLE

- vi 21-2, seek what is good ; against (6) that the Pleasure arising from an Action furthers instead of hindering
- vi 26, that Action ; against (4) that Pleasure is an inseparable accompaniment of Science ; against (5) that Courage and other virtues are good, yet not " best of all."
- vii 28-30. The author now reverts to a subject treated already in I xxxiv. and II. vi. : the respective parts played by Principle and Passion in determining a virtuous Action. Such Action can only take place when both elements are in a right condition, and in harmony with each other : of the two, the unreasoning impulse of a healthy passion for what is noble is the more fundamental.
- viii, A The next three chapters deal in turn with three subjects treated in the fragmentary eighth Book of Eudemus, namely Good Fortune : Moral Nobility (*κολεκάγαθία*) : and the Standard of Conduct.
- viii, 1-5. Good Fortune is an element in Happiness whose origin is obscure. It is difficult to attribute anything so uncertain to Nature ; or again to Intuition, or a rational Rule of Conduct ; while its frequent undeservedness forbids us to see in it the hand of God. We are driven to regard it as a kind of natural gift (*cf. Eud. VIII. ii. 7-9*). It is beyond our control, and thus differs from the Moral Virtues. A man may be
- viii, 6, 7, called " lucky " to be well-born ; but the term is more properly used when we achieve something
- viii, 8, 9, which reason would not expect. Such Good Fortune may be defined as a Natural Instinct which irrationally impels us towards our advantage. Apart from
- viii, 10, 11, such impulse, we speak of Good Fortune as a Cause of unexpected success. This is a different kind from the other, and is due apparently to vicissitudes of

MAGNA MORALIA

circumstance. But it is the instinctive kind which best deserves the name.

Noble Goodness (*καλοκάγαθία*) is the Goodness of one who is complete in virtue, and cannot be harmed by those things which, in themselves good, may to an inferior soul prove injurious.

Conduct conforms to the Right Rational Standard (cf. I. xxiv. 1, 25, 26) when the passions are so controlled by the latter that they offer no hindrance to the activity of the Reasoning faculties. To judge of this condition is a task for common sense. The Chapter ends with a warning that neither Ethics nor any other science can impart the power to use the knowledge it conveys.

The next five Chapters present in abbreviated form the discussion of Friendship (as auxiliary to Happiness) contained in *Eud.* VII., and in *Nic.* VIII.-IX. Four questions are first proposed about Friendship. (1) Is it based on Likeness or Unlikeness? (2) Is it easy to attain? (3) Can the Good be friend to the Bad, (4) or the Bad to the Bad?

To answer these, we must analyse our concept of Friendship. Friendship in the proper sense implies mutual affection or love. Now what is intrinsically good is lovable; but the individual is drawn to love what is good for himself. Truly good men love one another for and because of their intrinsic goodness; but this goodness includes the kind which attracts even those who are not good: the power, namely, of conferring Profit or Pleasure. In the exchange of these two inferior goods an imperfect type of Friendship can subsist between the Good and the Bad; or even between Bad and Bad if their interests agree. The Friendship of the Good being based on Virtue

ARISTOTLE

- and not on Profit or Pleasure, is the firmest and most enduring. We suffer disappointments in our friendships through misconception of their basis.
- Of virtuous Friendship, Pleasure, though not the basis, is yet the necessary accompaniment.
- Friendship may subsist between those who are *unequal as well as between equals*.^a The Friendship of Virtue is between the Like ; that of Profit between the Unlike, who supply one another's deficiencies.
- Differences arise between friends when service is not equal on both sides. We may compensate for deficiency of Pleasure or Profit by surplus of affection.
- The wealthy or ambitious expect this compensation from their poorer or humbler friends ; yet to love is really better than to be loved. There are also partial or imperfect Friendships, which are knit by sympathy, without presenting the other characteristics of Friendship.
- The question whether Friendship for oneself is possible is next discussed. It can only exist in the good man, in whom the elements of the soul are in peace and harmony one with another.
- (The correspondence between different kinds of reciprocal Right or Obligation on the one side, and of Friendship on the other, is parenthetically discussed.)
- Comradeship is taken as a type of Friendship between equals. Where there is inequality between the partners, it is corrected by a proportionate distribution of benefits. The pre-eminence of parental over filial affection is explained by the analogy of the creative artist's love for his work. Next, Favour or Good-will, and Concord are compared with Friendship. The former, arising from the attraction of one

^a An inexactitude: for "unlike" and "like" (*cf.* § 2).

MAGNA MORALIA

character for another, sometimes leads to Friendship ; the latter, in its full sense of desire for the same end, approaches Friendship very closely.

Self-love is manifested by the good man in coveting ^{viii.} for himself noble action ; by the bad man, in coveting pleasure or pelf. The good man, in yielding these ^{ix.} things to his friend, shows greater love for the latter ; but by the very act secures nobility for himself. He is a lover of good rather than of self, loving himself only because he is good. The bad man, loving himself because he is himself, is more truly termed a self-lover.

The self-sufficient man, possessing all good things, ^{x. 1, 2.} will yet need a friend, both for companionship and as ^{x. 11.} the object of his beneficence. The analogy of the ^{x. 3, 4.} Divine life cannot helpfully be applied to Man. A ^{x. 5 8.} friend is one's "second self"; a mirror whose contemplation aids in the difficult task of self-knowledge.

A multitude of friends taxes too severely our finite ^{xvi.} powers of love and sympathy. The number should be suited to our circumstances and capacity.

The last chapter breaks off abruptly, after intro- ^{xvii.} ducing the question how we are to treat our friends so as to avoid recrimination. The author points out that this takes place mostly between friends who, being on an equality, demand from each other equal measure.

Not very much direct help is available to the reader of this treatise, from which students mostly turn aside to the richer and presumedly more authentic presentation of Nicomachus. The Scottish edition of the latter by Sir Alexander Grant (Longmans, 1885) has

ARISTOTLE

been continually in my hands. With its illuminating essays, notes, and paraphrases it forms probably, for a British student, the best introduction to the moral philosophy of the Peripatetic School. The *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics* of Prof. J. A. Stewart (Oxford, 1892) provide a valuable store of illustrative passages; while the more compact commentary of Prof. J. Burnet (Methuen, 1900) has the merit of adding to the Nicomachean text the parallel passages of the Eudemian.

The Greek text of the present edition is reprinted, by kind permission of Messrs. Teubner of Leipzig, from the edition of Prof. Susemihl, to whose Introduction I refer the reader for information about the MSS. and critical editions. (The pages, columns, and lines of Bekker's text are given in the margin.) After completing my translation, I compared it with Mr. Rackham's version of Nicomachus in this series, with a view to bringing my renderings of the ethical and psychological terms into agreement with his. Where I felt unable to do this, I have noted the difference. Adequately to represent these terms is one of the hardest parts of the translator's task. No English words bear the whole connotation of ἀρετή, λόγος, φρόνησις, θυμός, προαίρεσις, and the like; to convey as much of it as I could, I have had frequent recourse to adjectives or alternatives.

Angular brackets < > in the translation denote that words are inserted to complete the sense.

I have occasionally consulted Mr. Stock's translation of the *Magna Moralia* in the Oxford edition, and have been enabled thereby to detect one or two misprints in the Teubner text.

The work of Prof. E. Zeller on *Aristotle and the*

MAGNA MORALIA

Earlier Peripatetics (Longmans, 1897) comprises a discussion of the relations between the three treatises, as well as an abstract of the Nicomachean. I may also mention the essays of Dr. Hans von Arnim (*Die drei aristotelischen Ethiken*, 1924, and *Der neueste Versuch, die Magna Moralia als unecht zu erweisen*, 1929), to whose view I alluded above (p. 427); and on the other side, the tract of Prof. R. Walzer (*Magna Moralia und aristotelische Ethik*). These may be found in the Library of the British Museum. Lastly, Dr. K. Oskar Brink, in *Stil und Form der pseud-aristotelischen Magna Moralia* (Ohlau, 1933), undertakes a careful comparison of the language and structure of the "drei Ethiken." He concludes from the stiffer and more formal style of the *Magna Moralia* that they are a post-Aristotelean compilation; and shows, as I have already mentioned, that they follow the main lines of Nicomachus rather than those of Eudemus.

I have only to add that any corrections or suggestions with which readers may favour me will be very gratefully received.

G. C. A.

June 1935.

[ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΜΕΓΑΛΩΝ

Α

- 1181^a I. Ἐπειδὴ προαιρούμεθα λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἠθικῶν,¹
 πρῶτον ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον τίνοσ ἐστὶ μέρος τὸ ἦθος.
²⁵ ὥς μὲν οὖν συντόμως εἰπεῖν, δόξειεν <ἂν> οὐκ
 ἄλλης ἢ τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι μέρος. ἐστὶ γὰρ
 οὐθέν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς δυνατόν πράξαι ἄνευ τοῦ
 ποῖόν τινα εἶναι, λέγω δ' ὅλον σπουδαῖον· τὸ δὲ
 1181^b σπουδαῖον εἶναί ἐστι τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν· δεῖ ἄρα,²
 εἴ τις μέλλει ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς πρακτικὸς εἶναι, τὸ
²⁵ ἦθος εἶναι σπουδαῖος· μέρος ἐστὶν ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικε,³
 καὶ ἀρχὴ ἢ περὶ τὰ ἦθη πραγματεία τῆς πολιτικῆς,
 τὸ δ' ὅλον καὶ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν δικαίως δοκεῖ ἂν μοι
 ἔχειν ἢ πραγματεία οὐκ ἠθικὴν ἀλλὰ πολιτικὴν.

* In its wider sense πολιτικῇ, as here, includes the whole field of "sociology." In its narrower sense it is limited to the structure and administration of the State (πόλις).

^b The distinction between Moral Character (ἦθος) and Intellect (διάνοια) is drawn at the end of the first and the beginning of the second book of *Nicomachus*. (See especially I. c. xiii. §§ 19-20 : and II. c. i. § 1, where ἦθος is derived from ἔθος, "habit," because by habit character is formed.) Each has its proper excellences (ἀρεταί) ; but the Greek

[ARISTOTLE]

MAGNA MORALIA

BOOK I

(With §§ 1-1 and 9-10 *cf.* *Nicomacheus* I. 1, 11.)

1 I. As we are undertaking to treat of *Ethics* or *Morality*, we must begin by inquiring by what branch of science moral character is considered. We may answer briefly, by *Political or Social science*,^a and no other. For without character, a man can achieve nothing in association with his fellows. He must be a man of moral worth; and moral worth means
 2 possession of the virtues.^b Whosoever therefore would achieve anything in social or political life must
 3 be of good moral character; which indicates that the discussion of character not only belongs to Social science, but is its very foundation or starting-point. And I would go so far as to assert that such a discussion would more fittingly be termed Social than Ethical.

Ethics are a Branch of Sociology.

word is commonly used without qualification to denote the excellences of Character (*ἀρεταὶ ἠθικαί*) and is thus equivalent to the English "Virtues." For the *ἀρεταὶ διανοητικαί* *cf.* c. v. §§ 1, 2 below; for the *ἀρετή* of an artist as artist *cf.* c. iii. § 5; for a definition of *ἀρετή* see c. iv. § 10, and *Eudemus* II. c. 1. § 2.

1182^a Δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πρῶτον ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν,⁴
 τί τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίνεται. οὐθέν γάρ ἴσως
 ὄφελος εἰδέναι μὲν τὴν ἀρετὴν, πῶς δὲ ἔσται καὶ
 ἐκ τίνων μὴ ἐπαίειν. οὐ γὰρ μόνοι ὅπως εἰδήσομεν
 τί ἐστι σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἔσται
⁹ σκέψασθαι. ἅμα γὰρ εἰδήσαι βουλόμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ
 εἶναι τοιοῦτοι· τοῦτο δ' οὐ δυνησόμεθα, εἰ μὴ
 εἰδῶμεν καὶ ἐκ τίνων καὶ πῶς ἔσται.

Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν εἰδήσαι τί ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ (οὐ ὅ
 γὰρ ῥᾶδιον εἰδέναι τὸ ἐκ τίνων ἔσται καὶ πῶς
 ἔσται, ἀγνοοῦντα τὸ τί ἐστίν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἐπιστημῶν).

¹⁰ Οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαιθάειν οὐδ' εἴ τινας πρότερον ὑπὲρ
 τούτων εἰρήκασιν. πρῶτος μὲν οὖν ἐνεχέρησεν⁶
 Πυθαγόρας περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δέ· τὰς
 γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων οὐκ οἰκείαν
 τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖτο· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ
 δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκεις ἴσος.

¹⁵ Μετὰ τοῦτον Σωκράτης ἐπιγενόμενος βέλτιον⁷
 καὶ ἐπὶ πλείον εἶπεν ὑπὲρ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ
 οὐδ' οὗτος. τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐποίει·
 τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν εἶναι ἀδύνατον. αἱ γὰρ ἐπιστήμαι
 πᾶσαι μετὰ λόγου, λόγος δὲ ἐν τῷ διανοητικῷ τῆς
 ψυχῆς ἐγγίνεται μορίῳ· γίνονται οὖν αἱ ἀρεταὶ
 πᾶσαι κατ' αὐτόν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς
²⁰ μορίῳ· συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτῷ ἐπιστήμας ποιοῦντι τὰς
 ἀρετὰς ἀναιρεῖν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦτο

^a The word λόγος is used in many shades of meaning, subjective and objective. (See Grant's note on *Nic.* II. ii. 2.) Here it might seem to signify the reasoning power or faculty; but having regard to its general use as the moral standard in this treatise, I have followed Hackham and translated as in the text. Cf. Burnet on *Nic.* I. x. 4.

4 It seems, then, that we must begin by treating of Virtue—its nature and its origin. For it may fairly be maintained that a knowledge of Virtue is useless, unless one also understands how and from what elements it can be produced. Not only must we consider how we shall know its nature, but from what constituents we may form it. We desire to know Virtue; but at the same time we desire to be virtuous ourselves; and this will be impossible if we are ignorant of the sources and conditions of its birth.

5 We must begin then by inquiring what Virtue is; since if we are ignorant of this, we shall find it no easier to discover its sources and conditions than we should in the case of a science or an art.

In the first place, we must not fail to acquaint ourselves with the opinions of former writers on the subject. Now Pythagoras was the first who undertook to speak of Virtue; but his method is erroneous. In referring Virtue to numerical relations, he considered it from an inappropriate point of view. Justice, for example, is not the "product of two even numbers."

7 After him came Socrates, who dealt more fully and satisfactorily with the matter; still even he did not escape error. For he regarded the Virtues as mere departments of science; which they cannot possibly be. All departments of science presuppose a Rational Principle or Standard^a; and this is the product of the soul's intellectual part. According therefore to Socrates, all the virtues arise in the reasoning part of the soul; from which it follows that in making the virtues departments of science he ignores our irrational part, and thus ignores both

*Nature and
Origin of
Virtue.*

*Earlier
Moralists:*

Pythagoras;

Socrates;

1182 a

δὲ ποιῶν ἀναιρεῖ καὶ πάθος καὶ ἡθος. διὸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἤψατο ταύτη τῶν ἀρετῶν.

Μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ Πλάτων διεῖλετο τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς 8
 25 τε τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄλογον ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἀπέδωκεν ἐκάστῳ [τᾶς] ἀρετὰς τὰς προσηκούσας. μέχρι μὲν οὖν τούτου καλῶς· μετὰ μέντοι τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὀρθῶς. τὴν γὰρ ἀρετὴν κατέμειξε [καὶ συνέζευξεν] εἰς τὴν πραγματείαν τὴν ὑπὲρ τἀγαθοῦ, οὐ δὴ ὀρθῶς· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ὑπὲρ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀληθείας λέγοντα οὐκ ἔδει ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς φράζειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτῳ κάκεῖναι κοινόν.

80 Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφήψαντο καὶ οὕτως· ἢ ἐχόμενον δ' αὖ εἴη μετὰ ταῦτα σκέψασθαι τί δεῖ αὐτοὺς λέγειν ὑπὲρ τούτων.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἰδεῖν δεῖ ὅτι πάσης ἐπιστήμης καὶ δυνάμεως ἐστὶ τι τέλος, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν· οὐδεμία γὰρ οὐτ' ἐπιστήμη οὔτε δύναμις ἕνεκεν 10
 30 κακοῦ ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν πασῶν τῶν δυνάμεων ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, δῆλον ὡς καὶ τῆς βελτίστης βέλτιστον αὖ
 1182 b εἴη. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε πολιτικὴ βελτίστη δύναμις, ὥστε τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς αὖ εἴη | ἀγαθόν.¹ ὑπὲρ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν λεκτέον, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀγαθοῦ οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἡμῖν· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ θεῶν ἀγαθοῦ· ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ μὲν τούτου καὶ ἄλλος
 1 ὁ λόγος καὶ ἄλλοτρία ἢ σκέψις. ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄρα ἡμῖν λεκτέον ἀγαθοῦ.

Πάλιν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διελεῖν δεῖ. ὑπὲρ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ 11
 πῶς λεγομένου; οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀπλοῦν. λέγεται

¹ Reading <τὸ ἀριστον> ἀγαθόν (Bonitz).

^a *Republic* IV. xvi. foll.

^b The dissent from Plato is very striking. To him, the Ideal Good is at once the highest object of knowledge, the fairest pattern of conduct, and the primal cause of the
 460

passion and the moral character. Clearly then this was not the right way to deal with the virtues.

- 8 The next step was taken by Plato, who rightly Plato divided the soul into a rational and an irrational part, and assigned to each its befitting virtues or excellences.^a So far, he was right; but after this, he fell into error. For he confused the treatment of Virtue with that of Ideal Good. This was wrong, because inappropriate. The subject of (moral) Virtue should have been excluded from the discussion of Being and Truth; for the two subjects have nothing in common.^b

- 9 Such then is the nature and extent of these previous inquiries. We must now consider how we ourselves are going to treat the subject.

- First, we must realize that every science and every faculty has an end proposed to it, which is something good; for no science and no faculty exists for an evil end. If, then, all faculties aim at a good end, the aim of the best faculty will be the best of ends. But the best of all faculties is surely that of social life and action; wherefore its aim will be the best of goods. It appears, then, that we must treat of what is good; and not of what is absolutely good, but good for us men. We are not to deal with the good the gods enjoy; another science treats of this, and the consideration of it is of a different nature. The good of man in society is, then, the subject of our discourse.

(*Eudemus* I. viii. : *Nicomachus* I. vi.)

- 11 A further division is however necessary. We must ask in what sense we are using the term; for several universe: even as to the Christian Christ is Truth, Way, and Life. Cf. *Nic.* I. vi. 13; *Eud.* I. viii. 6; and Plato, *Republic* VI. xviii. foll.

γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν ἐκάστω τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν αἰρετόν· ἢ οὐ τᾶλλα μετασχόντα ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ.

- 10 Πότερον οὖν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἰδέας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δεῖ, ἢ οὐ, 12
ἀλλ' ὥς τὸ κοινὸν ἐν ᾗ πασι ὑπάρχει ἀγαθόν;
ἕτερον γὰρ τῆς ἰδέας τοῦτο δόξειεν εἶναι. ἡ μὲν
γὰρ ἰδέα χωριστὸν καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό· τὸ δὲ
κοινὸν ἐν ᾗ πασι ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἐστὶν δὴ ταῦτόν τῳ
15 χωριστῳ. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ
πεφυκὸς αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό εἶναι ἐν πᾶσι ὑπάρχοι.

Πότερον οὖν ὑπὲρ τούτου δεῖ λέγειν τἀγαθοῦ τοῦ 18
ἐνυπάρχοντος; ἢ οὐ; διὰ τί; ὅτι τοῦτο ἐστὶ μὲν
τὸ κοινόν, ὥς ὁ ὀρισμὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ· ὁ δὲ
ὀρισμὸς βούλεται τὴν ἐκάστου οὐσίαν λέγειν, ἥτοι
20 ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ὅτι κακὸν ἢ ὅ τι ἂν ἄλλο ᾖ· λέγει δὲ
ὁ ὅρος ὅτι τὸ τοιόνδ' ἀγαθὸν καθόλου, ὃ ἂν ᾖ αὐτὸ
δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν· τὸ δὲ ἐν ᾗ πασι ἐνυπάρχον ὁμοιον
τῳ ὅρῳ ἐστίν.

Ὁ δὲ ὅρος λέγει ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἐπιστήμη δὲ γε 14
οὐδὲ δύναμις οὐδεμία λέγει ὑπὲρ τοῦ τέλους τοῦ
αὐτῆς ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἄλλης δυνάμεως
25 ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι (οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἰατρὸς οὔτε ὁ οἰκοδόμος

^a So in mediæval times "*universalia ante res*" and "*universalia in re*" became the respective watchwords of Platonic and Aristotelian Schoolmen. (Cf. the disputations in the School of Salerno in Longfellow's *Golden Legend*, canto vi.)

^b This is one of the crucial difficulties of Plato's "Theory of Ideas"; discussed very acutely by Plato himself in *Parmenides* cc. I.-vii. See Professor Jackson's paper in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. xi.

^c Taking *ὅτι* as a pronoun. If taken as a conjunction,

1182 b

λέγει ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ὑγίεια οὐδὲ ἡ οἰκία, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὁ
 μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ, καὶ ὡς ποιεῖ, ὁ δ' οἰκίαν). δῆλον 16
 τοίνυν ὅτι οὐδὲ τῇ πολιτικῇ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λε-
 κτέον τοῦ κοινοῦ. μία γάρ ἐστιν καὶ αὐτὴ τῶν
 λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδεμιᾶς ἦν λέγειν
 80 οὔτε δυνάμεως οὔτ' ἐπιστήμης ὡς τέλος· οὐδ' ἄρα
 τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
 λέγειν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν ὀρισμόν.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν κοινοῦ. 18
 διὰ τί; ὅτι ὅταν βουλόμεθα δεῖξαι [καί] τι τῶν
 μέρος ἀγαθῶν, ἢ τῷ ὀρισμῷ δείκνυμεν ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς
 35 λόγος ἐφαρμόττει ἐπὶ τε τὰγαθὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὃ
 ἂν βουλόμεθα δεῖξαι ὅτι ἀγαθόν, ἢ τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ,
 οἷον ὅταν θέλωμεν δεῖξαι ὅτι ἡ μεγαλοψυχία ἐστὶν
 1183 a ἀγαθόν, φαμέν ὅτι ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀγαθόν καὶ ἡ
 ἀνδρεία καὶ ἀπλῶς αἱ ἀρεταί, ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία
 ἀρετή, ὥστε καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία ἀγαθόν· οὐδὲ δὴ 17
 ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λε-
 κτέον τῇ πολιτικῇ, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἀδύνατα συμβήσεται
 6 τούτῳ καὶ τῷ κατὰ τὸν ὅρον κοινῷ ἀγαθῷ. ὅτι
 γὰρ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἐρεῖ.

Δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀγαθοῦ λε- 18
 κτέον ἐστὶν καὶ ἀρίστου τοῦ ἡμῶν ἀρίστου· τὸ δ' ὅλον
 ἴδοι ἂν τις ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν μιᾶς οὔτ' ἐπιστήμης οὔτε
 δυνάμεως τὸ ὑπὲρ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ σκοπεῖν.

Διὰ τί; ὅτι τὰγαθὸν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις
 10 ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ

thing, nor the builder that a house is a good thing. The former tells us that he produces health, and how he does it; the latter, that he makes a house, and
 15 how he makes it. No more, then, is social science entitled to speak of the good that is common to good things. For she too is a science among the rest; and we have seen that no faculty nor science has the right to predicate goodness of its end. Social science, therefore, is debarred from speaking of that common good which we attribute in defining.

16 Nor again may it speak of the common good which we predicate as the result of induction; and for this reason. When we wish to designate some individual good thing, we either show by definition that the same description fits the general conception of goodness and what we wish to designate as good; or else we use induction. For instance, when we wish to point out that greatness of soul is a good thing, we declare that justice is a good thing, and courage, and so with all the virtues. But greatness of soul is a virtue; whence it follows that this, too, is a good
 17 thing. Social science is therefore equally debarred from speaking of the common good we predicate by induction, because the same obstacles will arise as in the case of the common good predicated in definition. Here, as there, the statement that "it is good" would have to be made.

18 It is clear, then, that the good of which we have to treat is "the best good," and "the best that is best for us men"; whereas we may lay it down as an obvious general truth, that with the "universal good" no single science or faculty is competent to deal.

The reason is this. "Good" may be predicated in every category: in Substance, Quality, Quantity,

ποσῶ καὶ πότε καὶ πρὸς τι [καὶ τινί] καὶ ἀπλῶς ἐν
 ἀπάσαις. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πότε ἀγαθὸν ἐν μὲν ἱατρικῇ 19
 ὁ ἱατρός οἶδεν, ἐν δὲ κυβερνητικῇ ὁ κυβερνήτης, ἐν
 ἐκάστῃ δ' ἕκαστος. πότε μὲν γὰρ δεῖ τεμεῖν ὁ
 15 ἱατρός οἶδεν, πότε δὲ δεῖ πλεῖν ὁ κυβερνήτης. ἐν
 ἐκάστῃ δὲ τὸ πότε ἀγαθὸν ἕκαστος τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν
 εἰδήσει· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἱατρός τὸ ἐν τῇ κυβερνητικῇ
 ἀγαθὸν πότε εἰδήσει, οὔτε ὁ κυβερνήτης τὸ ἐν
 ἱατρικῇ. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' οὕτως ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ
 ἀγαθοῦ λεκτέον· τὸ γὰρ πότε ἐν πάσαις κοινόν.

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ πρὸς τι ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κατὰ 20
 10 τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας κοινόν μὲν ἀπάσαις, οὐδεμιᾶς
 δ' ἐστὶν οὔτε δυνάμει οὔτ' ἐπιστήμης εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ
 τοῦ ἐν ἐκάστῃ [πότε]¹ ἀγαθοῦ, οὐδ' αὖ τῆς πολιτικῆς
 ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγειν. ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
 ἄρα, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀρίστου, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἡμῖν
 ἀρίστου.

25 Ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲ δεῖ βουλόμενόν τι δεικνύναι, τοῖς 21
 μὴ φανεροῖς παραδείγμασι χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῶν
 ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν νοητῶν τοῖς
 αἰσθητοῖς. [καὶ] ταῦτα γὰρ φανερώτερα. ὅταν
 οὖν ὑπὲρ τἀγαθοῦ τις ἐγχειρῇ λέγειν, οὐ λεκτέον
 ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἰδέας. καίτοι οἶονταί γε [δεῖν],²
 30 ὅταν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγωσιν, ὑπὲρ τῆς ἰδέας δεῖν 22
 λέγειν· ὑπὲρ γὰρ τοῦ μάλιστα ἀγαθοῦ φασὶ δεῖν
 λέγειν, αὐτὸ δὲ ἕκαστον μάλιστ' ἐστὶν [τὸ] τοιοῦτον,

¹ Omitting πότε, which has been incorrectly added from § 19.

² Omitting δεῖν with one ms. (bracketed by Scaliger).

* For the ten Categories see *Categories* c. 4; *Topics*, I. c. 9; also Milton, *Vocation Exercise*, where they are called "the ten sons of *Ena*."

- 19 Time, Relation, and the rest.^a Now taking goodness of Time, it is obvious that in Medicine, this is known to the Leech; in Navigation, to the Pilot; and in each science, to him who is proficient therein. The Leech knows when to apply the knife, and the Pilot when to set his sail. In every science, the proficient will know only that goodness or rightness of Time which concerns himself. The Leech will be ignorant of the right time in navigation, and the Pilot of the right time in medicine. Here also it is evident that (no one science) must speak of the "common good" (for goodness in Time is a good common to all the sciences).
- 20 Similarly, what is good in Relation to something, and goodness predicated under the other categories, are common to all the sciences; and no one science nor any one faculty is competent to speak of this goodness which is common to all alike. And of this disability Social science of course partakes; it cannot speak of that "common good." The good of which it does speak is "the best good," and "the best that is best for us men."
- 21 Moreover, when we would make something clear, it is presumably best to avoid comparison with what is itself obscure. Rather we should use plain things to illustrate the obscure; and objects of sense to illustrate the objects of intellect, since the former are plainer than the latter. When therefore we undertake to treat of the good, we should not begin with Ideal
- 22 Good. Yet writers think it incumbent on them, when dealing with the good, to speak of the Ideal. "We must speak," they say, "of Good in its perfection. Now nothing is seen in perfection except in its

1183 a ὥστε μάλιστα ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἰδέα, ὡς οἴονται.
 ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἀληθὴς μὲν ἐστὶν ἴσως· ἀλλ' 23
 οὐχ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δύναμις, ὑπὲρ ἧς νῦν
 ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τούτου σκοπεῖ τὰγαθοῦ,
 33 ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἡμῖν ἀγαθοῦ. [οὐδεμία γὰρ οὐτ' ἐπι-
 στήμη οὔτε δύναμις ὑπὲρ τοῦ τέλους λέγει ὅτι
 ἀγαθόν, ὥστε οὐδ' ἡ πολιτικὴ.] διὸ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ
 κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν ἀγαθοῦ τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται.

Ἄλλ' ἴσως [φησὶ] τούτῳ τὰγαθῷ ἀρχῇ χρησά- 24
 μαιος ὑπὲρ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐκ τούτου προβάς,
 1183 b ἐρεῖ. οὐδ' οὕτως ὀρθῶς. δεῖ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς
 οἰκείας λαμβάνειν. ἄτοπον γάρ, εἰ τις βουλόμενος
 τὸ τρίγωνον ὡς δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχον δεῖξαι,
 λάβοι ἀρχὴν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος. οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία, 25
 δεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν οἰκείαν εἶναι καὶ συνημμένην· νῦν
 3 δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀθάνατον δείξει τις
 δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχον τὸ τρίγωνον. ὁμοίως δὲ 26
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστι θεάσασθαι τὰ ἄλλα ἄνευ
 τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν ἀγαθοῦ διὸ οὐκ οἰκείαν ἀρχὴν
 εἶναι τούτου τὰγαθοῦ.³

•Οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ οὐδ' ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπιστήμας
 ἐποίει τὰς ἀρετάς. ἐκείνος γὰρ οὐδὲν ᾤετο δεῖν
 10 μάτην εἶναι, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμας εἶναι
 συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τὰς ἀρετὰς μάτην εἶναι. διὰ τί;

¹ Bracketed by Wilson and Susemihl.

³ Reading διὰ τὸ οὐκ οἰκείαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τοῦτο τὰγαθόν
 (Bonitz).

* Contrast with this the view of Ruskin (*Mornings in Florence*, § 137). In describing the order in which the Arts and Sciences are represented on the Campanile at Florence, he says "After this sculpture" (the Lamb, with the symbol of Resurrection) "come the Christian arts, -those which necessarily imply the conviction of immortality." The first of these arts is Geometry.

- pure essence. Wherefore the Ideal is the Good
 23 in its perfection." Such is their inference ; and perhaps they are right. But we are now dealing with the Social science and faculty ; and this does not investigate this Ideal Good, but what is good for us men. [For no science or faculty predicates goodness of its end ; and Social science is no exception to the rule.] Ideal Good is therefore not the subject of its discourse.
- 24 It is suggested, however, that our science may take this Ideal Good for starting-point, and from it proceed to discuss particular goods. This again is a mistake. We must choose starting-points which are appropriate to the matters in hand. Suppose we desire to prove that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles ; it would be absurd to make the
 25 immortality of the soul our starting-point. It is not appropriate ; and the starting-point must be both appropriate to the subject and closely connected with it. In the above instance, one can quite well prove that the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles whether the soul be immortal or not.^a
- 26 Similarly, in the case of things good, one can investigate the rest of them without reference to the Ideal ; seeing that this good is not an appropriate starting-point (for demonstration).

^b Socrates again was in error when he treated the virtues as departments of science. It was his opinion that nothing should be useless ; but the consequence of turning the virtues into sciences was to make his virtues useless. And the reason is this. To under-

^a The following passage (with which *cf. Eud. I. v.15*) seems out of place here, as the "error of Socrates" has been dealt with earlier in the chapter (§ 7).

1188 b

ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν συμβαίνει ἅμα εἰδέναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην τί ἐστι καὶ εἶναι ἐπιστήμονα (εἰ γὰρ ἱατρικὴν τις οἶδεν τί ἐστίν, καὶ ἱατρὸς οὗτος εὐθέως ἐστίν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν τοῦτο συμβαίνει. οὐ γὰρ εἴ 27 τις οἶδεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην τί ἐστίν, εὐθέως δίκαιος ἐστίν, ὡς δ' αὖτως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. συμβαίνει οὖν καὶ μάτην τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμας.*

II. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπὲρ τούτων διώρισται, πειραθῶμεν¹ λέγειν τὰγαθὸν ποσαχῶς λέγεται.

20 Ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμια, τὰ δ' ἐπαινετά, τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις. τὸ δὲ τίμιον λέγω τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ βέλτιον, οἷον ψυχὴ, νοῦς, τὸ ἀρχαιότερον, ἢ ἀρχή, τὰ τοιαῦτα· τίμια γὰρ ἐφ' οἷς ἡ τιμὴ, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις πᾶσιν τιμὴ ἀκολουθεῖ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ τίμιον, ὅταν γε δὴ ἀπ' αὐτῆς σπουδαῖός τις γένηται· ἤδη γὰρ οὗτος εἰς τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς σχῆμα ἦκει. τὰ δ' ἐπαινετά, οἷον ἀρεταί· 2 ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος γίνεται. τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις, οἷον ἀρχὴ πλοῦτος ἰσχύς κάλλος· τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εὖ ἂν δύνηται χρή- 30 σασθαι καὶ ὁ φαῦλος κακῶς· διὸ δυνάμεις τὰ τοιαῦτα

¹ Perhaps καὶ should be read.

* Eudemus, in the parallel passage, does not commit this absurdity; but distinguishes accurately between knowledge of a science and proficiency in an art.

^b i.e. on the supposition that we have merely to know them.

^c See Rackham's note on Nic. I. xii. 1.

^d For the use of σχῆμα cf. Philippians ii. 8.

stand the nature of a science at once makes one a *savant*. If a man understands the nature of medicine, he is *ipso facto* a physician,^a and so with the other sciences. But this by no means follows in the case of
 27 the Virtues. A man does not straightway become just by understanding the nature of justice; and so it is with the rest. The conclusion is that the virtues^b are useless: wherefore they cannot really be departments of science.

(Cf. *Nic.* I. xii. and I. vi. vii.)

- 1 II. After thus defining our subject, we will consider the various senses in which the term "good" is employed.

Distinction
between
Goods:
(1) revered.

Now of good things, some are honoured or revered; others praised or commended; whilst others again are but potentially good.^c Among things revered I reckon the Divine, and higher things in general, such as the soul and mind of man; things ancient or original; and the like. Revered things, in fact, are those which command reverence; and to all the above, and their kind, reverence is attached. Virtue, therefore, is a thing revered, when the possession of it renders a man good; for so he himself assumes
 2 the form of virtue.^d On the other hand, the virtues
 themselves are examples of things commended;
 since praise attends upon the deeds they inspire.^e
 Other goods, again, are potentialities: as authority,
 riches, strength, and beauty; for of these the good
 man has power to make good use, and the bad man
 power to make evil use. Hence goods of this kind

(2) com-
mended;

(3) potential.

^a Virtue in the abstract is an *ἐνσώματόν*; when embodied in a good man it is a *ἄλκιμον*—a distinction not found in *Nic.* or *Eud.* (Stock).

1183 b

καλοῦνται ἀγαθὰ. ἀγαθὰ μὲν δὴ εἰσὶν (δοκιμάζεται 3
γὰρ τῇ τοῦ σπουδαίου αὐτῶν ἑκαστον χρήσει, οὐ τῇ
τοῦ φαύλου). τοῖς δ' αὐτοῖς τούτοις συμβέβηκεν
ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τὴν τύχην τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν αἰτίαν
εἶναι. ἵπὸ τύχης γὰρ καὶ πλοῦτος γίνεται καὶ
35 ἀρχὴ καὶ ὅλως ὅσα εἰς δυνάμειος τάξιν ἤκει.
λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ τέταρτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ σωστικὸν 4
καὶ ποιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ, οἷον γυμνάσια ὑγείας καὶ εἴ
τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

Ἄλλ' ἔτι καὶ ἄλλην ἔχει τάγαθὰ διαίρεσιν· οἷόν 5
ἐστὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν πάντα καὶ πάντως αἰρετά,
1184 a τὰ δ' οὐ. οἷον ἢ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι
ἀρεταὶ καὶ πάντα καὶ πάντως αἰρεταί, ἰσχυρὸς δὲ
καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ δύνάμεις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε πάντα
οὔτε πάντως.

Ἔτι καὶ ἄλλως· τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν 6
τέλη τὰ δ' οὐ τέλος, οἷον ἢ μὲν ὑγίεια τέλος, τὰ δὲ
5 τῆς ὑγείας ἕνεκεν οὐ τέλος. καὶ ὅσα οὕτως ἔχει,
τούτων αἰεὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιον, οἷον ἢ ὑγίεια βέλτιον
ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινά, καὶ ἀπλῶς αἰεὶ καθόλου τοῦτο βέλτιον
οὐ ἕνεκεν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα.

Πάλιν αὐτῶν τῶν τελῶν βέλτιον αἰεὶ τὸ τέλειον 7
τοῦ ἀτελοῦς. τέλειον δὲ ἐστὶν οὐ παραγενομένου
10 μῆθενος ἔτι προσδεόμεθα, ἀτελὲς δὲ οὐ παραγενο-
μένου προσδεόμεθα τινός, οἷον τῆς δικαιοσύνης μὲν
[μόνον] παραγενομένης πολλῶν προσδεόμεθα, τῆς
δὲ εὐδαιμονίας παραγενομένης οὐδενός ἔτι προσ-
δεόμεθα. τοῦτο ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ ἄριστον ἡμῖν ὃ ζητοῦ-

^a This inferior class of goods appears to be identical with the auxiliary good of § 4 above. See *Nic. I. vi. 8, 9.*

MAGNA MORALIA, I. II. 3-7

- 3 are termed "potentialities." Such potentialities are undoubtedly good things (since in each case the touchstone is the use made of them by the good man, and not by the bad); they are, however, goods conferred on us by the fortune of birth. For riches, and authority and all things else that come under this heading of "potentialities" are the gift of fortune.
- 4 The fourth and last class of good things comprises (1) auxiliary those which create and preserve some other good: as, for example, gymnastic exercises which create and preserve health.
- 5 There is yet another way in which we may classify Good absolute and relative. good things. Some of them we would choose without reservation and under every circumstance; but not others. Justice, for example, and her sister virtues are entirely and under all circumstances worthy of our choice; but with strength and riches and power it is not so.
- 6 Yet another classification of good things is that Good as End and as Means under ends and means. Health, for instance, is an end; but those good things we seek for the sake of it are not. In all such cases the end is a higher good than the means, for instance, health and the good things which promote it; and we may lay it down as an universal law that whatever things are sought for the sake of something else are inferior to it.^a
- 7 Again, even among ends a complete end is superior Ends complete and partial. to a partial one. A complete end is one whose attainment wholly satisfies us; while the attainment of a partial end leaves us longing for something more. If we attain Justice, there are still many things we desire; but if we attain Happiness, we are wholly content. Happiness, then, is that "best of human goods" which is the object of our inquiry. It is a Happiness the complete End

1184 a

μεν, ὃ ἐστὶ τέλος τέλειον· τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλειον τέλος τὰγαθὸν ἐστὶ καὶ τέλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν.¹

- ¹⁵ Μετὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν πῶς τὸ ἄριστον δεῖ σκοπεῖν; 8
 πότερον οὕτως ὥς καὶ αὐτοῦ συναριθμουμένου;
 ἀλλ' ἄτοπον. τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶ τέλος
 τέλειον, τὸ δὲ τέλειον τέλος ὥς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν οὐθὲν
 ἂν ἄλλο δόξειεν εἶναι ἢ εὐδαιμονία, τὴν δ' εὐδαι-
 μονίαν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν συντίθεμεν· εἰ δὴ τὸ
²⁰ βέλτιστον σκοπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ συναριθμῆς, αὐτὸ
 αὐτοῦ ἔσται βέλτιον. αὐτὸ γὰρ βέλτιστον ἐστίν.
 οἷον τὰ ὑγιεινὰ θεῖς καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν, σκόπει τί
 τούτων πάντων βέλτιστον· βέλτιστον δέ ἐστιν
 ὑγίεια· εἰ δὴ τοῦτο πάντων βέλτιστον, καὶ αὐτὸ
 αὐτοῦ βέλτιστον.² ἄτοπον δὴ συμβαίνει. οὐ δὴ 9
 ἴσως οὕτω γε σκεπτέον τὸ βέλτιστον.

- ²⁵ Ἀλλὰ ἄρα γε οὕτω πως, οἷον χωρὶς αὐτοῦ³; ἢ
 καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον; ἢ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία ἐστὶν ἐκ
 τινων ἀγαθῶν συγκειμένη· τὸ δ' ἐξ ὧν ἀγαθῶν
 σύγκεται, σκοπεῖν εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν βέλτιον, ἄτοπον·
 οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο τι χωρὶς τούτων ἢ εὐδαιμονία,
 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.

- ³⁰ Ἀλλ' ἄρα γε οὕτωςί πως ἂν τις ὀρθῶς σκοποῖτο 10
 συγκρίνων τὸ ἄριστον; οἷον αὐτὴν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
 τὴν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὖσαν συγκρίνων πρὸς
 ἄλλα ἃ μὴ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνόντα, οὕτω τὸ ἄριστον
 σκοπῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν σκοποῖτο; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν
 ἀπλοῦν τὸ ἄριστον ὃ ζητοῦμεν νῦν. οἷον λέγοι ἂν
³⁵ τις εἶναι ἄριστον τὴν φρόνησιν ἀπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν

¹ Rasso's emendation of ms. ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ καὶ τέλος τὸ ἀγαθόν.

² Reading βέλτιον (Spengel) for ms. βέλτιστον.

³ Stock suggests αὐτῶν: "in isolation from the several goods?"

complete end ; and the complete end is " The Good," or best human Good.
and the end or goal of all good things.

- 8 The next question is, how are we to consider this " Best of goods " ? Are we to count it as one among the rest ? That is absurd. For seeing that the " Best " is a complete end, and this complete end appears to be simply Happiness and nothing else ; and seeing, moreover, that our notion of Happiness is composed of many goods : if in considering " the Best " we reckon it among other goods, it will appear better than itself, since it is in itself best of all. Take the parallel instance of health and the good things which promote it, and consider which of all these is best. Health surely is best ; but if it is best " of all these goods," it is better than itself ; and this is an
9 absurd conclusion. Accordingly this cannot be the right way to consider the " Best."

Are we, then, to consider it as if in isolation from itself ? This too is absurd. Happiness is a compound of certain other good things ; and to consider whether the compound is better than its constituent goods is absurd. Happiness is not something isolated from these goods ; it is their sum total.

- 10 Another way of considering " the Best " in comparison with other goods might be suggested. If one took Happiness, the compound of these various goods, and compared it with other goods which do not enter into its composition, would this be the right method of considering it ? But we must remember that " the Best " which is the object of our inquiry is a compound, and not a simple thing. On comparing all (simple) goods severally with each other, we might come to the conclusion that wisdom was the

1184 a καθ' ἐν συγκρινομένων. ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ οὕτως 11
ζητητέον ἐστὶν τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον
ζητοῦμεν ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις μόνη οὕσα οὐ
τέλειον· οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτο τὸ ἄριστον ὃ ζητοῦμεν, οὐδὲ
τὸ οὕτως ἄριστον.

1184 b III. Μετὰ τοίνυν τοῦτο ἔχει τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἄλλην 1
διαίρεσιν. ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ,
οἷον αἱ ἀρεταί, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ σώματι, οἷον ὑγίεια
κάλλος, τὰ δ' ἐκτός, πλοῦτος ἀρχὴ τιμῆ ἢ εἴ
τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων. τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐν ψυχῇ 2
βέλτιστα. τὰ δ' ἐν ψυχῇ διώριστα ἀγαθὰ εἰς 2
τρία, εἰς φρόνησιν εἰς ἀρετὴν καὶ ἡδονήν.

"Ἡδὴ τοίνυν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὃ καὶ λέγομεν πάντες
καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ τέλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τελειότατον
εἶναι, ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ τοῦτο ταυτὸ φαμεν εἶναι
10 τὸ¹ εὖ πράττειν καὶ εὖ ζῆν. τὸ δὲ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐχ 3
ἀπλοῦν ἀλλὰ διπτόν· ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος
αὐτῇ ἢ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ χρήσις, οἷον τῆς ὀψείας
[ἐστὶν ἡ ὄρασις]· καὶ ἔστω γε ἡ χρήσις αἰρετωτέρα
τῆς ἔξεως· τέλος γὰρ ἡ χρήσις· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὢν
βούλοιο ἔχειν τὴν ὀψιν μὴ μέλλων ὀρᾶν ἀλλὰ μῦεν.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ' ἀκοῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ὦν 4
16 ἄρα καὶ [ἡ] χρήσις καὶ ἔξις ἐστίν, αἰεὶ βέλτιον καὶ

¹ Perhaps τῷ should be read for τὸ *ms.*

^a φρόνησις is here used in the sense of σοφία—"Philosophic Thought"—from which it is carefully distinguished in c. xxxiv. 16 below. Cf. *Eud.* I. iv. 2, 3, where three kinds of life—φιλόσοφος, πολιτικός, ἀπολαυστικός—are mentioned as pursuing respectively these three kinds of "Good."

^b The other kind, which is a product (ἔργον) distinct from the activity which produces it, is here ignored. οἰκία, for example, is the ἔργον of the activity οἰκοδόμησις (*Eud.* II. i. 5).

- 11 best of them : but this method can hardly lead to the discovery of the " Best of goods." The object of our search is the " Complete Good," and wisdom by itself is not a thing complete. This, then, is not " the Best " which we are seeking, nor do we look for what is in this sense " best."

(*Cf. End.* II. I. 1. No. I. vii.)

- 1 III. There is yet another method by which we may classify good things. Some, like the virtues, belong to the soul, others, like health and beauty, to the body, whilst others are external to us—riches, authority, honour and the like. Moreover, those which belong to the soul have been classed under the three headings of Wisdom,^a Virtue, and Pleasure.
- 2 Happiness, which we all say and believe is the End of all good things and the most complete, we may now proceed to identify with " living well and doing well." We must premise, however, that " ends " are of two different kinds.^b In some cases, the End of a thing is its activity and use, as with sight : and the use is preferable to the mere state or possession,^c such use being the true End. No man would care to possess sight if instead of seeing he were doomed to keep his eyes shut, and so with hearing and the like.
- 3 Well. Wherever, therefore, one may use as well as possess something, the use is better than the mere possession,

Distinction between Goods of Soul, Body, and Circumstance.
Goods of Soul :
(1) Wisdom,
(2) Virtue,
(3) Pleasure.
Happiness is " living well and doing well."
Activity or Use better than State or Possession

^a *ἔξω* usually = *habitus* : to give the *ἔξω* of a thing is to answer the question *πῶς ἔχει* ; *quomodo se habet* ? Hence it is almost equivalent to *διὰ τοῦ* (*τὸ πῶς διὰ τοῦ*), though a distinction is made in *Categories* viii. § 5 (Grant, vol. i. p. 497). Here, however, it is used (as in *End.* VI. (*Nic.* VII.) c. vi. § 7) rather in the sense of *possession*, corresponding to the transitive verb *ἔχειν*. (*Cf.* cc. vii. and xxi. below ; and *Metaphysics* IV. (V.) xx.

αἰρετώτερον ἢ χρήσις τῆς ἕξεως· ἡ γὰρ χρήσις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τέλος, ἡ δ' ἕξις τῆς χρήσεως ἐνεκεν.

Μετὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν τοῦτ' εἰάν τις σκοπῇ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν πασῶν, ὁψεται οὐκ ἄλλην μὲν ποιουσαν οἰκίαν, ἄλλην δὲ σπουδαίαν οἰκίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκο-
 20 δομικήν· καὶ οὐ ποιητικὸς ὁ οἰκοδόμος, ἡ τούτου ἀρετὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου εὖ ποιητική. ὁμοίως [καὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων.

IV. Μετὰ τοίνυν τοῦτο ὁρώμεν ὅτι οὐθενὶ ἄλλω ἢ ψυχῇ ζῶμεν· ἐν ψυχῇ δὲ ἐστὶν ἀρετή· τὸ αὐτὸ γέ τοι φαμεν τὴν τε ψυχὴν ποιεῖν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς
 25 ἀρετήν. ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ ἐν ἐκάστω τούτο ποιεῖ (εὖ) οὐ ἐστὶν ἀρετή,¹ ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ τὰλλα μὲν,² ψυχῇ δὲ ζῶμεν· διὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴν ἄρα εὖ ζήσομεν.

Τὸ δέ γε εὖ ζῆν καὶ εὖ πράττειν οὐθέν ἄλλο ἢ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν λέγομεν. τὸ ἄρα εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῷ εὖ ζῆν ἐστίν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν ἐν τῷ
 30 κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ζῆν. τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἐστὶν τέλος καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὸ ἄριστον.

Ἐν χρήσει τοίνυν τινὶ ἂν εἴη καὶ ἐνέργεια ἢ εὐδαιμονία. ὧν γὰρ ἦν ἕξις καὶ χρήσις, ἡ χρήσις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τέλος· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις ἐστίν· ἐστὶν δὲ καὶ ἐνέργεια καὶ [ἡ] χρήσις αὐτῆς
 35 τῶν ἀρετῶν³· ὥστε τέλος ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ

¹ Reading ἄλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ ἐν ἐκάστω τούτο ποιεῖ (εὖ) (Bonitz) <ὃ ποιεῖ> οὐ ἐστὶν ἀρετή.

² Possibly the words ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ τὰλλα μὲν are corrupt or interpolated (Bonitz).

³ Omitting τῶν ἀρετῶν (Spengel).

^a See note on c. i. 1 above.

^b See above, c. iii. 3, and note.

and preferable thereto ; for the use of a thing and its *mise en action* are its true end, for the sake of which we possess it.

- 5 Another point which we may now observe in regard to all the arts and sciences is this. A house and a good house are not produced by two different crafts ; but by one and the same craft of architecture ; so that what the architect can build, that his appropriate virtue or excellence ⁴ can build well. And so in all other cases.

Virtue or Excellence in Craftsman or Craft produces good Work.

(*End.* II. i.)

- 1 IV. We next observe that by the soul, and it alone, we live ; and the soul has its own proper excellence or virtue. Accordingly, we assert that the thing which soul produces and the thing which soul's excellence or virtue produces are one and the same. But we have seen that the excellence of anything makes well whatever that thing itself makes. Now soul, [among its other products ?] gives us our life ; wherefore it is through the excellence or virtue of the soul that we shall live well.
- 2 But " living well and doing well " we identify with Happiness. Happiness and being happy consist therefore in living well ; and living well, in living in accordance with the virtues. This then is " the End," and Happiness, and " the Best."
- 3 Happiness moreover must consist in the use and activity of something (we possess). For we saw that where something is both possessed and used, its use and *mise en action* are its End. Now Virtue is a possession or disposition ⁵ of the soul ; but this Virtue can be used, and set in action. The use and activity of Virtue are therefore the End. And so we

so Virtue in the Soul produces good Life.

Happiness therefore is Life according to Virtue.

1184 b

χρήσις αὐτῆς· ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ζῆν. ἐπειδήπερ οὖν τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ αὕτη τέλος καὶ τέλειον τέλος ἐνέργεια,¹ ζῶντες ἂν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς εὐδαιμονες ἂν εἴημεν καὶ ἔχοιμεν τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν.

1185 a

Ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τέλειον ἀγαθὸν καὶ τέλος, οὐδὲ τοῦτο δεῖ λανθάνειν ὅτι καὶ ἐν τελείῳ ἔσται. οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἐν παιδί (οὐ γάρ ἐστι παῖς εὐδαίμων), ἀλλ' ἐν ἀνδρί· οὗτος γὰρ τέλειος.

Οὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ γε ἀτελεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν τελείῳ. τέλειος δ' ἂν εἴη χρόνος, ὅσον ἄνθρωπος βιοῖ. καὶ γὰρ λέγεται ὀρθῶς παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὅτι δεῖ τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ βίου κρῖναι, ὥς δέον τὸ τέλειον εἶναι καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ τελείῳ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ.

Ὅτι δὲ ἐνέργεια ἐστίν, ἴδοι ἂν τις καὶ ἐντεῦθεν. ^θ

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕπνοις, οἷον εἴ τις καθεύδοι διὰ βίου, τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ πάνυ βουλόμεθα λέγειν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ὃ ἦν κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

Μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέλλον λέγεσθαι οὔτε λίαν δόξειεν ἂν οἰκεῖον εἶναι τούτων οὔτε μακρὰν ἀπέχον. ⁷ οἷον ἐπειδήπερ ἔστιν, ὥς δοκεῖ, μῦθόν τι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ τρεφόμεθα, ὃ καλοῦμεν θρεπτικόν (τοῦτο γὰρ εὐλογόν ἐστιν εἶναι· τοὺς γοῦν λίθους ὀρώμεν ἀδυνάτους τρέφεσθαι ὄντας, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τῶν

¹ Or reading, with Stock, ἐνέργεια, "and this is an end; and the complete end is an activity."

* Attributed to Solon by Herodotus (I. 32). Cf. Nic. I. x. 1, *Et d.* II. i. 10.

^θ § 3 above. Cf. c. xix. below.

see that Happiness consists in living in accordance
 4 with the virtues. Since, therefore, the "Best good"
 is Happiness, and this in its activity is an End and
 a Complete End: by living in accordance with the
 virtues we shall be happy and shall possess the "Best
 of goods."

5 Again: seeing that Happiness is a Complete Good and End, we must further admit that it must dwell in a complete being. It cannot dwell in a child, for a child does not enjoy full happiness; but only in adult man, since he has attained completeness.

Such a Life
 requires
 (1) Maturity
 of Soul,

Nor can it be realized in an incomplete period of time, but only in one that is complete; such a period is the normal span of human life. The common saying^a that we must judge of a man's happiness from the longest portion of his life is a true one; since completeness can only be realized in a period and in a human being that are themselves complete.

(2) Length
 of Days;

6 That Happiness is an activity is plain from another consideration. Supposing a man to pass all his life in slumber; we should certainly refuse to regard him as happy. Life indeed he possesses, but not life in accordance with the virtues; for this we took to be life in their active exercise.^b

(3) Waking
 Conscious-
 ness.

(Cf. *Nic.* I. xiii. 11-14: *Eud.* II. I. 15-18.)

7 What we are now about to add might be regarded as not specially germane to the subject; yet it will prove to be closely connected therewith. Apparently there is a part of the soul to which, as the instrument of our bodily nutrition, we give the name of "nutritive." (That there is reason for surmising such a part may be shown as follows. We notice that minerals are unable to nourish themselves, so that this faculty

The nutri-
 tive Part
 of the Soul,
 lacking
 spontane-
 ously, cannot
 contribute
 towards
 Happiness.

1185^a

ἐμφύχων ἐστὶ τὸ τρέφεσθαι· εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐμφύχων, ἡ
 20 ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη αἰτία· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τούτων μὲν τῶν 8
 μορίων οὐθὲν αἴτιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ τρέφεσθαι, οἷον τὸ
 λογιστικὸν ἢ τὸ θυμικὸν ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, ἄλλο
 δέ τι παρὰ ταῦτα, ᾧ οὐθὲν ἔχομεν οἰκειότερον
 ὄνομα ἐπιθεῖναι ἢ θρεπτικόν). τί οὖν, ἂν τις εἴποι, 9
 πότερον καὶ τούτου τοῦ μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν
 25 ἀρετὴ; εἰ γὰρ ἔστι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ταύτῃ δεήσει
 ἐνεργεῖν· τῆς γὰρ τελείας ἀρετῆς ἡ ἐνέργεια
 εὐδαιμονία.

Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τούτου ἢ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄλλος
 λόγος· εἰ δ' ἄρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ταύτης ἐνέργεια.
 ὦν γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν ὁρμή, οὐδ' ἐνέργεια τούτων ἔσται·
 οὐκ ἔοικεν δὲ εἶναι ὁρμή ἐν τῷ μορίῳ τούτῳ, ἀλλ'
 30 ὁμοιον ἔοικεν εἶναι τῷ πυρί. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνο ὃ τι
 ἂν ἐμβάλης καταναλώσει, κἂν μὴ ἐμβάλης, οὐκ ἔχει
 ὁρμὴν πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν. οὕτω καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον
 τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχει· ἂν μὲν γὰρ ἐμβάλης τροφήν, τρέφει,
 ἂν δὲ μὴ ἐμβάλης τροφήν, οὐκ ἔχει ὁρμὴν τοῦ
 τρέφειν. διὸ οὐδὲ ἐνέργεια οὐ μὴδὲ ὁρμή. ὥστ'
 35 οὐδὲν συνεργεῖ τὸ μόριον τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν εὐδαι-
 μονίαν.

Μετὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν λεκτέον ἂν εἴη τί ἐστὶν ἡ 10
 ἀρετὴ, ἐπείπερ ἡ ταύτης ἐνέργειά ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαι-
 μονία. ὥς μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ

* These three parts of the soul are distinguished by Plato logically in the *Republic*, IV. pp. 436-441; mythologically, under the figure of a Charioteer and two horses, in the *Phaedrus*, pp. 246 foll.; and physiologically in the *Timaeus*, pp. 69, 70 (Stephanus).

* Cf. *Nic.* VI. = *Eud.* V. xii. 6.

is clearly confined to animate beings. If this is so, its
 8 cause is to be sought in soul. Now none of those parts
 of soul which we term "rational," "passionate," or
 "desirous" ^a can be the cause of nutrition, but some
 other element; to which we can give no more ap-
 9 propriate name than this of "nutritive.") Now we
 may be asked whether this part of the soul also
 possesses its proper excellence or virtue; "since if it
 does, there must be activity here also, seeing that
 Happiness is activity of the complete excellence or
 virtue of the soul."

Now whether this element possesses such an
 excellence of its own or not is the subject of a
 different inquiry; but even if it does, this excellence
 would not be capable of activity.^b Only those things
 which are subject to spontaneous impulse ^c are
 capable of true activity: and it seems that this part
 of the soul feels no such impulse; herein resembling
 fire. Fire devours what we throw into it; but what
 we withhold, it feels no impulse to take. So it is with
 the nutritive element of soul. If we throw it nourish-
 ment, it nourishes (the body) therewith; but if we
 refrain, it feels no impulse to do so. So, then, that
 which lacks spontaneous impulse lacks also activity:
 and therefore this part of the soul makes no con-
 tribution towards Happiness.^d

10 We must now consider what Virtue is, since it is
 Virtue in activity which constitutes Happiness. In
 general, Virtue or Excellence may be defined as the

^a *όρετή*, a word used occasionally by Nic. and Eud.; as
 later by the Stoics.

^b For the Nutritive part of the Soul cf. *De Anima* II. iv.,
 where its difference from fire is emphasized; also *De Anima*
 III. ix. 2, where it is attributed to plants in common with
 animals.

- 1185^a ἕξις ἢ βελτίστη· ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ ἱκανὸν οὕτως ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον διορίσαι δεῖ.
- 1185^b V. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λεκτέον ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν 1
 ἢ ἐγγίνεται, οὐ τί ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ (ὑπὲρ μὲν γὰρ
 τούτου ἄλλος λόγος), ἀλλ' ὥς τύπῳ διελέσθαι.
 ἔστιν δ' ἡ ψυχὴ, ὡς φαμέν, εἰς δύο μέρη διηρημένη,
 2 εἰς τε τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον. ἐν μὲν δὴ τῷ
 λόγον ἔχοντι ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις ἀγχίνοια σοφία
 εὐμάθεια μνήμη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἄλογῳ
 αὐταὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ λεγόμεναι, σωφροσύνη δικαιοσύνη
 ἀνδρεία ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοῦ ἡθους δοκοῦσιν ἐπαινεταὶ
 εἶναι. κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας ἐπαινετοὶ λεγόμεθα· κατὰ 2
 δὲ τὰς τοῦ [τὸν] λόγον ἔχοντος οὐδεὶς ἐπαινέται.
 10 οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι σοφός, οὐδεὶς ἐπαινέται, οὔτε ὅτι
 φρόνιμος, οὐδ' ὅλως κατὰ τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν.
 οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἄλογον, εἰ μὴ ἢ ὑπηρετικόν ἐστὶν καὶ
 ὑπηρετεῖ τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι μορίῳ.
 Ἔστιν δ' ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ὑπὸ ἐνδείας καὶ 3
 ὑπερβολῆς φθειρομένη. ὅτι δὲ ἡ ἐνδεια καὶ ἡ
 15 ὑπερβολὴ φθείρει, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν ἠθικῶν¹
 (δεῖ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις
 χρῆσθαι). εὐθέως γὰρ ἐπὶ γυμνασίῳ ἴδοι ἂν τις·

¹ Reading αἰσθητῶν (Susemihl) for ἠθικῶν MSS. Cf. I. i. 21.

^a Cf. *Eud.* II. i. 2; and see note on ἕξις, c. iii. 3 above.

^b This inquiry is carried out in Aristotle's treatise *De Anima* (*Περὶ ψυχῆς*), in three Books.

^c For λόγος see c. i. 7 above, and note.

^d For ἀγχίνοια see *De Virtutibus et Vitiis* c. iv. § 2. The word seems not to be used by Nic. or *Eud.*

^e Cf. c. ii. 1, 2 above.

^f The author here differs both from Nic. (I. xiii. 20) and *Eud.* (II. i. 19), who assign praise to intellectual as well as to

best state or disposition of a thing." But this general definition is hardly adequate, and needs to be made more particular.

(Cf. *Eud.* II. i. 13 foll.)

- 1 V. We must begin then by saying something of the soul, in which Virtue arises; not defining its nature, for this is the subject of another inquiry^a; but describing in outline its constituent parts. Now these have been ranged under two headings, namely the rational and the irrational.^b In the rational part arise Prudence, Shrewdness,^d Wisdom, Aptitude, Memory, and the like; while in the irrational part arise these states or dispositions which we call Virtues: namely Temperance, Justice, Courage, and all other states of character which are considered praiseworthy. For it is in respect of these that we men are said to deserve praise^c; whereas no one receives praise in respect of the excellences of his rational nature. No man is commended for being wise or prudent nor in respect of any kindred state of soul.^f On the other hand, praise is not given to the irrational part except in so far as it is qualified to be subservient to the rational, and does actually subserve it.

The rational and irrational Parts of the Soul, and their respective States.

"Virtues" commonly so called are States of the irrational Soul, and deserve Commendation.

(*Nic.* II. ii. 6, 7.)

- 3 Now Excellence of Character or Virtue is liable to be injured either by defect or by excess. That both are alike destructive to it, is clear from the evidence of our senses; and we must use the testimony of what is plain to interpret what is obscure. One need go no further than gymnastic exercises for an example; moral excellence. Moreover in c. xxxiv. 12 below we are told that the prudent *do* merit praise.

Moral Virtue is marred either by Excess or by Defect of Feelings.

1185 b

πολλῶν γὰρ γινομένων φθείρεται ἢ ἰσχύς, ὀλίγων
 τε ὡσαύτως. ἐπὶ τε ποτῶν καὶ σιτίων ὡσαύτως·
 πολλῶν τε γὰρ δὴ γινομένων φθείρεται ἢ ὑγίεια,
 20 ὀλίγων τε ὡσαύτως, συμμέτρων δὲ γινομένων σφύ-
 ζεται ἢ ἰσχύς καὶ ἢ ὑγίεια. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις 4
 συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τινα λίαν ποιήσης
 ἄφοβον, ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς θεοὺς φοβεῖσθαι, οὐκ
 25 ἀνδρείος ἀλλὰ μαινόμενος, ἂν δὲ φοβούμενον πάντα,
 δειλός· ἀνδρείος ἄρα ἔσται οὔτε ὁ φοβούμενος πάντα
 οὔτε ὁ μηθέν. ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ αὖξει καὶ φθείρει τὴν
 ἀρετὴν. καὶ γὰρ οἱ λίαν φόβοι καὶ πάντες¹ φθεί- 5
 ρουσι, καὶ οἱ περὶ μηθέν δὲ ὁμοίως. ἔστιν δ' ἡ
 ἀνδρεία περὶ φόβους, ὥστε οἱ μέτριοι φόβοι αὖξουσιν
 30 τὴν ἀνδρείαν. ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα καὶ αὖζεται καὶ
 φθείρεται ἡ ἀνδρεία· ὑπὸ φόβων γὰρ τοῦτο πάσχου-
 σιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρεταί.

VI. Ἔτι οὐ μόνον τοῖς τοιούτοις τὴν ἀρετὴν 1
 ἀφορίσειεν ἂν τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ λύπη καὶ ἡδονή. διὰ
 35 μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ
 τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα· ὅλως τε οὐκ
 ἔστιν λαβεῖν ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν ἄνευ λύπης καὶ
 ἡδονῆς. ἔστιν οὖν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.

Ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἐντεῦθεν τὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει, 2
 εἰ δεῖ παρὰ γράμμα λέγοντα τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὡς ἔχει
 1186 a σκοπεῖν (δεῖ δ' ἴσως). τὸ γὰρ ἦθος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους

¹ Reading παντός (Spengel) for πάντες mss.

since alike by their excess and by their defect the strength of the body is injured. So too with food and drink : too much or too little of them is injurious to health, but when they are used in appropriate measure, health and strength are preserved.

- 4 The same results follow in the case of Temperance, Courage, and the other virtues. Suppose a man so excessively fearless that he fears not even the gods ; he is not courageous but mad. Suppose a man fears everything ; he is a coward. The courageous man, therefore, is neither he who fears everything nor he who fears nothing. It follows that Virtue is enhanced
5 and injured by the same influences. For excessive fears, and fears excited by everything alike, injure Courage ; and so does their absence even when there is due cause for them. Yet fears are the field wherein Courage works ; so that fear in moderation actually enhances it. Courage, therefore, is both enhanced and injured by the same influences ; such being the effect of (different degrees of) fear on the human soul. And so with the other virtues.

(*Nic. II. iii.*)

- 1 VI. These, however, are not the only terms in which
Virtue can be defined ; we can also define it in terms of pain and pleasure. For pleasure incites us to do ill, while pain deters us from doing well ; and we may lay it down that to become either virtuous or vicious without pain or pleasure is impossible. Virtue, therefore, is concerned with pleasures and pains.

Moral
Virtue deals
with
Pleasures
and Pains.

(*Nic. II. i. ; Eud. II. ii.*)

- 2 If in our consideration of " ethic " virtue we are to keep close, as perhaps we should do, to the literal meaning of the word, we shall remark that it takes its

It is not
innate, but
habitual.

1186 a

ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν· ἠθικὴ γὰρ καλεῖται διὰ τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι. ὥ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία ἡμῖν τῶν 3 ἀρετῶν τῶν τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους φύσει ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄντων φύσει ἔθει ἄλλως γίνεται. οἷον ὁ λίθος καὶ ὅλως τὰ βαρέα πέφυκε κάτω φέρεσθαι· ἂν τις οὖν ἄνω ρίπτῃ πολλάκις καὶ ἐθίζῃ ἄνω φέρεσθαι, ὁμως οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἄνω ἐνεχθείη, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ κάτω. ὁμοίως [καὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων.

VII. Μετὰ τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ βουλομένους εἰπεῖν 1 τὸ τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, εἰδῆσαι τίνα ἐστὶν τὰ ἐν τῇ 10 ψυχῇ γινόμενα. ἔστιν δ' αὖ γίνεται ταῦτα, πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τούτων ἂν τι εἴη ἀρετή. πάθη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὀργὴ φόβος μῖσος πόθος 2 ζῆλος ἔλεος τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷς εἴωθεν παρακολουθεῖν λύπη καὶ ἡδονή· δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ 15 τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ἐσμεν ὀργισθῆναι λυπηθῆναι ἐλεῆσαι, [καὶ] τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἔξεις δ' εἰσὶν καθ' ἃς πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ 3 κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν λίαν ὀργίλως, κακῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς ὀργήν, εἰ δ' ὅλως μὴ ὀργιζόμεθα ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὕτως κακῶς ἔχομεν 20 πρὸς ὀργήν. τὸ ἄρα μέσως ἔχειν τὸ μήτε λίαν ὑπεραλγεῖν μήτε παντελῶς ἀναλγήτως ἔχειν. ὅταν 4 οὖν οὕτως ἔχωμεν, εὖ διακεῖμεθα. ὁμοίως δὲ [καὶ]

* Grant, in the corresponding passage of *Nir.*, translates these three terms by "feelings, faculties, states." Rackham gives "feelings, capacities, dispositions," and uses "states" to include them all. See note on c. iii. 3 above.

name from "*ethos*" or habit; it is called "ethic" because we attain it by habituation. This makes it clear that none of these virtues of our irrational nature is born in us; for no innate quality can by habituation be altered. For example, stones and heavy bodies in general naturally tend downwards; and though one were to habituate them to the contrary movement by repeatedly throwing them upwards, still they would never come of themselves to tend upwards, but would retain their downward tendency. And so it is in all such cases.

(*Nic.* II. v., vi.: *Eud.* II. ii., iii.)

- 1 VII. Furthermore, if we would explain the essential nature of Virtue, we must make ourselves acquainted with the phenomena that arise in the soul. They are of three kinds: feelings or affections, powers or faculties, and states or dispositions.^a Clearly, then,
- 2 Virtue must fall under one of these headings. Now among feelings we have anger, fear, hatred, longing, envy, pity, and the like; and these are all accompanied by pain or pleasure. Faculties, again, are the potentialities by which we are said to be capable of these feelings: the potentialities of anger, grief, pity,
- 3 and the like. Lastly, states or dispositions are the conditions of soul which render us well or ill disposed in regard to the affections. For instance, if we are too much disposed to anger, our disposition is a bad one as regards that affection; nor is it otherwise if we fail to conceive anger when due occasion arises. The mean or middle state is thus one which avoids excess of emotion on the one hand, and entire
- 4 insensibility on the other. When, therefore, such is our state of soul, (as regards anger) our disposition is

Phenomena
of Soul

Feeling:

Faculty:

State.

1186 a

πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ὅμοια. τὸ γὰρ εὐόργητον καὶ τὸ πρᾶον ἐν μεσότητί ἐστιν ὀργῆς καὶ ἀναλγησίας τῆς πρὸς ὀργήν. ὁμοίως [καὶ] ἐπ' ἀλαζονείας καὶ
 25 εἰρωνείας. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλείω προσποιεῖσθαι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἔχειν ἀλαζονείας, τὸ δὲ ἐλάττω εἰρωνείας· ἡ ἄρα μεσότης ἡ τούτων ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐστίν.

VIII. Ὅμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων. τοῦτο 1 γάρ ἐστι τῆς ἕξεως, τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχειν, τὸ δ' εὖ ἔχειν πρὸς ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ μήτε πρὸς
 30 τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἔχειν μήτε πρὸς τὴν ἔνδειαν· πρὸς 2 μεσότητα ἄρα τῶν τοιούτων καθ' ἃ ἐπαινετοὶ λεγόμεθα ἢ ἕξις ἐστὶ τοῦ εὖ ἔχειν, τοῦ δὲ κακῶς πρὸς ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔνδειαν. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ τῶν παθῶν τούτων μεσότης, τὰ δὲ πάθη ἥτοι λυπαί εἰσιν ἢ ἡδοναὶ ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἡδονῆς·
 35 ἡ ἄρα ἀρετὴ ἐστίν¹ περὶ λύπας καὶ ἡδονάς, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐστὶ δῆλον.

"Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὥς δόξειεν ἂν τινι, ἐφ' 3 ὧν ἢ κακία οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει τινί, ὅλον μοιχεῖα καὶ ὁ μοιχός· οὐκ ἔστιν οὗτος ὁ
 1186 b μᾶλλον τὰς ἐλευθέρας διαφθείρων. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτόν ἐστίν, ὃ περιέχεται ἡδονῇ τῇ κατ' ἀκολασίαν, ἢ καὶ ὃ ἐν ἐλλείψει καὶ ὃ ἐν ὑπερβολῇ τὸ ψεκτὸν ἔχει.²

¹ Reading, with Bonitz, ὅτι for ἐστίν.

² Reading ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἐλλείψει ἢ ἐν ὑπερβολῇ τὸ ψεκτὸν ἔχει (after Susemihl) for ἢ καὶ ὃ . . . ἔχει of mss.

good ; and similarly as regards the other feelings. For whereas gentleness of temper and mildness are a mean state between wrathfulness and insensibility to anger, so it is with boastfulness and self-depreciation. To overrate one's endowments is the part of the former, to dissemble them, the part of the latter ; so that it is the just mean between these two which constitutes sincerity.

- 1 VIII. What we have said holds good of all the other affections. The state of our soul determines whether our disposition regarding them be good or bad ; and a good disposition is one which avoids alike their
 2 excess and their defect. And so the state or disposition which we call good is one which tends to moderation in those feelings whose control entitles us to praise ; while the opposite state is one tending either to excess therein or to defect. Since, then, Virtue is a just mean or moderation of these affections ; and the affections are either themselves pains or pleasures or else are accompanied by pain or pleasure : it follows from these considerations also that Virtue is concerned with pains and with pleasures.

A good State of Soul tends to Moderation in Feelings.

(*Nic.* II. vi. 18-20 : *Eud.* II. iii. 17, 18.)

- 3 It might, however, appear to some that there are other affections whose evil does not lie in any excess or defect. They instance adultery,^a and the adulterer. The adulterer, they say, cannot be described as one who debauches free women " to excess." But this affection, and any other which falls under the heading of intemperate pleasure, incurs censure in itself, and not by its defect or excess.

Some Feelings are vicious in themselves, not merely in their Excess or Defect.

^a Cf. St. Matthew v. 28. In the corresponding passage, Nicomachus distinguishes between the evil passion or affection, and the evil act which consummates it.

IX. Μετὰ τοίνυν τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἴσως 1
 ῥηθῆναι τί τῇ μεσότητι ἀντίκειται, πότερον ἢ
 ὑπερβολή ἢ ἡ ἔνδεια. ἐνίαις μὲν γὰρ μεσότησιν
 ἔνδεια ἐναντίον, ἐνίαις δὲ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρεία
 μὲν οὐχ ἢ θρασύτης ὑπερβολή οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἢ δειλία
 ἔνδεια οὔσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ μεσότητι οὔση
 ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας τῆς περὶ ἡδονᾶς οὐ
 10 δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι ἢ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὔσα, ἀλλ'
 ἢ ἀκολασία οὔσα ὑπερβολή.

Ἔστι δ' ἀμφότερα ἐναντίω τῇ μεσότητι, καὶ ἡ 2
 ὑπερβολή καὶ ἡ ἔνδεια· ἡ γὰρ μεσότης τῆς μὲν
 ὑπερβολῆς ἐνδεέστερον, τῆς δ' ἐνδείας ὑπερβάλλον.
 διὸ καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄσωτοι τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἀνελευ-
 15 θέρους φασὶν εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἀνελεύθεροι τοὺς ἐλευ-
 θερίους ἄσώτους, καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς καὶ προπετεῖς
 τοὺς ἀνδρείους καλοῦσι δειλοὺς, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ τοὺς
 ἀνδρείους προπετεῖς καὶ μαυνομένους.

Διὰ δὲ δύο αἰτίας δόξαιμεν ἂν ἀντιτιθέσθαι τῇ 3
 μεσότητι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἔνδειαν. ἡ γὰρ
 ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος σκοποῦσιν πότερον ἐγ-
 20 γύτερόν ἐστι τοῦ μέσου ἢ πορρώτερον, οἷον
 ἐλευθεριότητι πότερον ἄσωτία ἢ ἀνελευθερία πορ-
 ρώτερον. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν ἐλευθεριότης
 ἢ ἄσωτία ἢ ἡ ἀνελευθερία· πορρώτερον ἄρα ἢ
 ἀνελευθερία. τὰ δὲ πλεῖον ἀπέχοντα τοῦ μέσου 4
 ἐναντιώτερα δόξαιεν ἂν εἶναι. ἐκ μὲν ἄρα αὐτοῦ
 τοῦ πράγματος ἡ ἔνδεια ἐναντιώτερον φαίνεται.

^a Cf. Isaiah xxxii. 5 "The foolish person shall no more be called liberal nor the niggard wealthy."

(Nic. H. viii., 18.)

- 1 IX. After this we ought perhaps to consider what is the true opposite of this just mean. Is it the excess of the feeling, or its defect? In some cases it is the former, in others the latter. The opposite of courage, for instance, is not rashness, which is the excess of an affection, but cowardice, which is its defect. On the other hand, whereas temperance is a mean betwixt intemperance or profligacy and insensibility to pleasures, we do not regard this latter, which is a defect of feeling, as its true opposite, but the former, which is feeling in excess.
- 2 (Strictly speaking,) however, both excess and defect are opposite to the just mean; for the mean is defective in comparison with the excess, and excessive in comparison with the defect. Wherefore while the prodigal stigmatizes the liberal as illiberal and mean, the mean call the liberal man a prodigal.^a Again, the rash and headlong call brave men cowards, while cowards say that the brave are headlong and crazy.
- 3 It seems, then, that there are two reasons which influence us in assigning to the just mean the excess or the defect as its opposite. On the one hand, men consider the thing itself, and ask which extreme is nearer to the mean or further from it. For example, is prodigality or meanness further removed from liberality? Surely it is easier to confuse prodigality than meanness with true liberality; and so in this
- 4 case meanness is the further removed. And what is further removed from the middle state is naturally regarded as more opposed to it. So that here from the purely objective standpoint it appears that the defect is more opposed to the mean than is the excess.

One
Extreme
may be
more
opposed to
the Mean
than the
other is

Distance
from the
Mean may
be naturally
greater,

1180 b

25 "Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, οἷον πρὸς ἃ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ. οἷον πεφύκαμεν μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστοι ἢ κόσμιοι εἶναι· ἢ οὖν ἐπίδοσις γίνεται μᾶλλον πρὸς ἃ πεφύκαμεν· πρὸς ἃ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπιδίδομεν, ταῦτα καὶ μᾶλλον
30 ἐναντία· ἐπιδίδομεν δὲ πρὸς ἀκολασίαν μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα· ὥστ' ἐναντιώτερον ἂν εἴη ὑπερβολὴ μεσότητος· ἢ γὰρ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ σωφροσύνης.

"Ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ, ἐπέσκεπται (μεσότης 5 γὰρ δοκεῖ τις εἶναι τῶν παθῶν, ὥστε δέοι ἂν τὸν μέλλοντα κατὰ τὸ ἥθος εὐδοκμήσειν τὴν μεσότητα
35 τῶν παθῶν ἐκάστου διατηρεῖν· διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶν σπουδαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἐκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν 6 ἔργον, οἷον κύκλον μὲν γράψαι παντὸς ἐστί, τὸ δὲ μέσον τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη λαβεῖν χαλεπὸν, ὁμοίως
1187 a δὲ καὶ ὀργισθῆναι μὲν ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον δὲ τούτῳ, τὸ δὲ μέσως ἔχειν χαλεπὸν· ἀπλῶς δὲ ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶν παθῶν ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν ὅτι τὸ ἐμπεριέχον τὸ μέσον ῥάδιον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ μέσον χαλεπὸν, καθ' ὃ ἐπαινούμεθα· διὸ καὶ σπάνιον τὸ σπουδαῖον).

5 "Ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς εἴρηται * *,¹ μετὰ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον πότερον δυνατὴ παραγενέσθαι ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν γενέσθαι τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι ἢ φαῦλον. εἰ γὰρ τις, φησὶν, ἐρωτήσκειν ὄντωαοῦν πότερον ἂν βούλοιτο

¹ Some editors suspect a lacuna. Ramsauer inserts <τὶ ἐστι>, "Having thus explained the nature of Virtue."

* As Rackham observes on *Nic. II. viii. 8*, we should expect "insensibility" (ἀναισθησία) which is the opposite extreme, rather than "sobriety," which is the mean.

Another standpoint is, however, possible, from which the extreme to which we are by nature more inclined appears more opposed to the mean. For example, we are naturally more inclined to profligacy than to sobriety.^a Now our trend is more in the direction of our natural bias ; and that towards which we trend is more opposed to the mean. Now we do in fact trend more towards profligacy than towards sobriety ; so that excess over the mean is here the more opposed (to it). For profligacy is the excess where temperance is the mean.

or it may
be increased
by our own
Proclivity.

- 5 We have thus surveyed the nature of Virtue. We find it to be a just mean or moderation of our feelings or affections ; so that he who would be esteemed for his moral character must preserve moderation in every one of them. It is thus no small task to be a good man, since the middle position is always difficult to find. Anyone may draw a circle ; but to find the centre of a given circle is difficult. Similarly, it is easy to be angry, and easy to be indifferent ; the middle state is difficult to attain. And of all our affections it is true that whereas to stray right or left is easy enough, to keep the middle or mean state, which alone entitles us to praise, is a difficult matter. And this makes goodness rare.

Difficulty of
attaining
the Mean.

(*Cf. Nic. III. v.*)

- 7 Having thus treated of Virtue, we may next proceed to consider whether it can be inculcated, or whether on the contrary Socrates was right in saying that to be good men or bad is placed beyond our own power. Should any man whatsoever, he declares, be asked whether he would prefer to be just or unjust,

Can Virtue
be taught?

View of
Socrates.

1187 A

¹⁰ δίκαιος εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκος, οὐθεὶς ἂν ἔλοιτο τὴν ἀδικίαν, ὁμοίως δ' ἐπ' ἀνδρείας καὶ δειλίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ⁸ ἀρετῶν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως. δῆλον δ' ὡς εἰ φαῦλοί τινες εἰσὶν, οὐκ ἂν ἐκόιντες εἴησαν φαῦλοι· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ σπουδαῖοι.

Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος λόγος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής. διὰ τί ⁹ γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐκ ἔβη τὰ φαῦλα πράττειν, τὰ δὲ ¹⁰ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα κελεύει; καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς φαύλοις ζημίαν τάττει, ἂν πράττῃ, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς, ἂν μὴ πράττῃ; καίτοι ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη ταῦτα νομοθετῶν, ἂ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι πράττειν. ἀλλ' ὡς ¹⁰ ἔοικεν, ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ σπουδαίοις εἶναι καὶ τὸ φαύλοις. —ἔτι δὲ μαρτυροῦσιν οἱ τ' ἔπαινοι καὶ οἱ ψόγοι ¹⁰ γινόμενοι. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀρετῇ ἔπαινος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ κικλία ψόγος· ἔπαινος δὲ καὶ ψόγος οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ὡσαύτως¹ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα ἐστι πράττειν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα.

Ἐλεγον δὲ καὶ τοιαύτην τινὰ παραβολήν, βουλό- ¹¹ μενοι δεικνύναι ὅτι οὐχ ἐκούσιον. διὰ τί γάρ, ¹⁵ φασίν, ὅταν νοσῶμεν ἢ αἰσχροὶ ὦμεν, οὐδεὶς ψέγει τοὺς τοιούτους; τὸ δ' οὐκ ἀληθές· ψέγομεν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους, ὅταν αὐτοὺς οἰηθῶμεν αἰτίους εἶναι τοῦ νοσεῖν ἢ τοῦ κακῶς ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα, ὡς ὅν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἐκούσιον. ἔοικεν οὖν ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον.

¹ Or, reading with the Laurentian ms. καὶ οὕτως instead of ὡσαύτως, "on this ground also it is clear that to do well and to do ill are both within our power."

² Cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* III, ix. ἔφη τὰ τε δίκαια καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὐτ' ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότες ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προσέλπῃαι οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν . . .

8 none would choose injustice." And so with courage and cowardice, and all other virtues (and vices): the rule is universal. If there are bad men, it is clear that they cannot be bad of their own will; and so it is clear that they cannot of their own will be good.

9 Such an argument is surely fallacious. For why does the legislator forbid us to do evil and order us to do what is honourable and good, assessing penalties for the commission of the one and the neglect of the other? Surely it were absurd of him to enjoin by
 10 law what is beyond our power to fulfil. On the contrary, it would seem within our power to be good men or bad; and further testimony is borne to this by the praises and censures which are meted out to us. Praise is the meed of virtue, and censure of vice; and these are not assigned to things which our will does not control. It is clear, then, that to do well and to do ill are alike within our power.

Appeal to
law and
common
usage

(*Nic.* III. v. 15.)

11 To prove that virtue and vice are beyond our control, use was made of the following comparison. Why, it was asked, does no one censure us when we are sick or ugly? There is, however, a mistake here. We do censure the sick and ugly when we are of opinion that they are themselves the cause of their physical disease or deformity; regarding the will as concerned even here. It seems, therefore, that there is a voluntary element in the virtuous or vicious life.

The author here gives a one-sided presentation of Socrates' view. He held that vice is ignorance, and that ignorance is involuntary; yet he did not deny the possibility of learning. Cicero (*Academica* II, 74) similarly misrepresents him when he says: *Socrati nihil risum est sciri posse. Excepit unum tantum, scire se nihil se scire, nihil amplius.*

1187 a

30 X. "Ἐπὶ δ' ἂν τις τοῦτο ἐναργέστερον καὶ ἐν-
 τεύθεν ἴδοι. πᾶσα γὰρ φύσις γεννητικὴ ἐστὶν
 οὐσίας τοιαύτης οἷα ἐστίν, ὅλον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ
 ζῶα· ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ γεννητικά. γεννητικὰ δὲ ἐκ
 τῶν ἀρχῶν, ὅλον τὸ δένδρον ἐκ τοῦ σπέρματος· αὕτη
 γὰρ τις ἀρχή. τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς οὕτως ἔχει·
 35 ὥς γὰρ ἂν ἔχωσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, οὕτως καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν
 ἀρχῶν ἔχει. ἐναργέστερον δ' ἐστὶ κατιδεῖν τοῦτο 2
 ἐν τοῖς κατὰ γεωμετρίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἐπειδὴ
 τινες λαμβάνονται ἀρχαί, ὥς ἂν αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἔχωσιν,
 οὕτω καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς, ὅλον εἰ τὸ τρίγωνον
 δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει, τὸ δὲ τετράγωνον τέτταρσι,
 1187 b καὶ ὥς ἂν μεταβάλλῃ τὸ τρίγωνον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ
 τετράγωνον συµμεταβάλλει (ἀντιστρέφει γάρ),¹ καὶ
 εἰ τὸ τετράγωνον μὴ ἔχη τέτταρσι ὀρθαῖς ἴσας,
 οὐδὲ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔξει δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας.

XI. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ ὁμοίως τούτοις καὶ ἐπ' 1
 5 ἀνθρώπου. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ γεννητικὸν ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος
 οὐσίας, ἐκ τινων ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν πράξεων ὧν πράτ-
 τει ἄνθρωπος γεννητικὸν ἐστίν. τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο;
 οὔτε γὰρ ἀψύχων οὐθέν λέγομεν πράττειν οὔτε τῶν
 ἐμψύχων τῶν ἄλλων ἔξω ἀνθρώπων. δῆλον οὖν
 ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν πράξεων ἐστὶ γεννητικός. ἐπεὶ 2
 10 οὖν ὀρώμεν μεταβαλλούσας τὰς πράξεις καὶ οὐδέ-
 ποτε τὰ αὐτὰ πράττομεν, εἰσὶν δὲ αἱ πράξεις
 γεγεννημέναι ἐκ τινων ἀρχῶν, δῆλον ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ αἱ

¹ I would suggest transposition of ἀντιστρέφει γάρ to the end of the paragraph, rendering: "... change in the quadrilateral. And if the angles of the quadrilateral are not equal to four right angles, those of the corresponding triangle will not be equal to two. For they are conversely related."

² The geometrical *principia* are of course not really liable to change; but for the sake of illustration the author (as 488

(Eud. II, vi.)

- 1 X. A still clearer proof of this may be derived from the following considerations. Every natural growth, whether plant or animal, has the power of producing its like. Plants and animals have both this power; and they produce from the originating cause or *principium*. Such in the tree, for example, is the seed from which it grows. Of what succeeds these *principia*, it always holds good that the character of
- 2 the *principia* determines that of the produce. Light is thrown on this by a geometrical comparison. In geometry, when we assume certain *principia*, their character determines that of all their consequences. If we assume that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, the angles of a quadrilateral will be equal to four right angles; and any change in the triangle^a produces a corresponding change in the quadrilateral which is its counterpart. And (conversely), if the angles of the quadrilateral are not equal to four right angles, those of the corresponding triangle will not be equal to two.
- 1 XI. Now the case of man is closely parallel. Man has the power of producing or creating; and among other things he produces, from certain originating causes or *principia*, his deeds and actions. For what else (has this power)? True action cannot be ascribed to any inanimate substance, nor to any animate being except man; clearly, therefore, it is man who has this power of originating actions.
- 2 Now we see that actions are liable to change, and that we constantly act in different ways. As, therefore, our acts have originated from certain *principia*, Eudemus in the corresponding passage) supposes that they are, and imagines a triangle of 3 or 4 right angles! (Eud. II, vi. 6).

Like Consequences proceed from like Causes.

If the Cause changes, so does the Consequence.

The human Will is a Cause of Action.

Human Actions are changeable.

1187 b

πράξεις μεταβάλλουσιν, καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πράξεων,
 ἀφ' ὧν εἰσὶ, μεταβάλλουσιν, ὥσπερ ἔφαμεν παρα-
 15 βάλλοντες ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶν 3
 πράξεως καὶ σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης προαίρεσις καὶ
 βούλησις καὶ τὸ κατὰ λόγον πᾶν. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι
 καὶ αὐταὶ μεταβάλλουσιν. μεταβάλλομεν δὲ καὶ
 ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐκόντες· ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ [καὶ]²
 ἡ προαίρεσις μεταβάλλει [γὰρ]³ ἐκουσίως. ὥστε
 20 δῆλον ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἴη καὶ σπουδαίοις εἶναι καὶ
 φαύλοις.

Ἰσως οὖν λέγοι ἂν τις, ἐπειδήπερ ἐπ' ἐμοί ἐστιν 4
 τὸ δικαίῳ εἶναι καὶ σπουδαίῳ, εἰάν βούλωμαι,
 ἔσομαι πάντων σπουδαιότατος. οὐ δὴ δυνατόν
 τοῦτο. διὰ τί; ὅτι οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος γίγνεται
 τοῦτο. οὐ γὰρ ἂν τις βούληται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ
 25 σώματος, καὶ δὴ πάντων ἄριστον ἔξει τὸ σῶμα.
 δεῖ γὰρ μὴ μόνον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τῇ φύσει γίνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα καλὸν καγαθόν.
 βέλτιον μὲν οὖν ἔξει τὸ σῶμα, ἄριστα μέντοι πάν-
 των οὐ. ὁμοίως δὲ δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς· 5
 οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ὁ προαιρούμενος εἶναι σπουδαιότατος,
 30 ἂν μὴ καὶ ἡ φύσις ὑπάρξῃ, βελτίων μέντοι ἔσται.

XII. Ἐπεὶ οὖν φαίνεται ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὅν τὸ σπου- 1
 δαῖον εἶναι, ἀναγκαῖον τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ
 ἐκούσιου, τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ
 κυριώτατον πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν, τὸ ἐκούσιον. ἐκού-
 35 σιον δὲ ἀπλῶς μὲν οὕτως ῥηθῆναι ἐστὶν ὁ πρᾶττομεν
 μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι· ἀλλ' ἴσως σαφέστερον λεκτέον
 ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ.

¹ δὲ Bonitz for γὰρ mss.

² καὶ inserted here in some mss. does not affect the meaning.
 The ἀρχὴ in this case is προαίρεσις.

³ γὰρ bracketed by Scaliger.

1187 b

Ἔστιν οὖν καθ' ὃ πράττομεν ὁρεῖς· ὁρέξεως 2
δ' ἐστὶν εἶδη τρία, ἐπιθυμία θυμὸς βούλησις.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὴν κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν πράξιν ἐπι-
σκεπτέον, πότερον ἐκούσιόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀκούσιον.

1188 a [οἷον] τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀκούσιον οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν. διὰ τί
καὶ πόθεν; ὅτι ὅσα μὴ ἐκόντες πράττομεν, ἀναγ-
καζόμενοι πράττομεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἐξ ἀνάγκης
πραττομένοις πᾶσι ἔπεται λύπη, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἐπι-
θυμίαν πραττομένοις ἡδονὴ ἀκολουθεῖ, ὥστε οὕτωςί
γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὰ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν πραττόμενα ἀκούσια,
ἀλλ' ἐκούσια.

Ἄλλὰ πάλιν ἄλλος λόγος τις τούτῳ ἐναντιοῦται, 3
ὃ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ. οὐθεὶς γάρ, φησί, πράττει ἐκὼν
τὰ κακά, εἰδὼς ὅτι κακά ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν, φησὶν, ὅ
γε ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι ταῦτα φαῦλά ἐστιν ὅμως
πράττει, καὶ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γε πράττει· οὐκ ἄρα
10 ἐκὼν ἀναγκαζόμενος ἄρα. ἐνταῦθα πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς 4
λόγος ἀπαντήσεται. καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν,
οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τῇ γὰρ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἡδονὴ ἀκολουθεῖ,
τὰ δὲ δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

Καὶ ἄλλως τοῦτ' ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον, ὅτι ὁ ἀκρατὴς
ἐκὼν πράττει. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικοῦντες ἐκόντες

* Nicomachus (III. ii.) assumes that Purposive Choice or Determination (*προαίρεσις*) is a species of "the Voluntary" (*τὸ ἐκούσιον*); and proceeds to distinguish it from Desire, Passion, Wish, and "a kind of Opinion." Eventually (c. iii. 10) he defines it as "Deliberate Appetence of things within our power" (*βουλευτική ὁρεῖς τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν*).

Eudemus (II. vii.) says that the motive of a voluntary act must be either Appetence (*ὁρεῖς*) or Determination (*προαίρεσις*) or Intelligence (*διάνοια*). Trisecting Appetence as the author of *N.M.* does, he dismisses in turn its three species, and also Determination; and so by exhaustion concludes that voluntary action is action which follows Intelligence (c. ix.).

- 2 The motive power of our actions is what we term an Appetence. Now of Appetence there are three kinds, namely Desire, Passion, and Wish.^a Is it Desire, or Passion, or Wish?

Let us first then consider those actions of which Desire is the motive. Are they voluntary or involuntary? We can hardly suppose they come under the latter heading; and the reason of this is as follows. All we do involuntarily we do under compulsion; and compulsory actions are accompanied by pain. On the other hand, actions whose motive is Desire are attended by pleasure. This would seem to show that what is done from the motive of Desire is not involuntary but voluntary. Each Supposition leads to Antinomy.

- 3 This argument, however, is opposed by another, which, taking the case of Self-Indulgence,^b declares that whereas no one voluntarily does evil knowing it to be evil, the self-indulgent man, knowing that certain acts are base, nevertheless does them, and that from the motive of Desire. Therefore he does *not act voluntarily; and consequently is under compulsion*. This argument can, however, be countered by the one we have already given. If a man acts from the motive of Desire, he is not under compulsion, because Desire is followed by pleasure; and what is done for the sake of pleasure is not compulsory.

Another way of showing that the self-indulgent man acts voluntarily is this. Those who commit

In c. x. he reverts to Determination, and accepts the definitions of Nic. given above. His treatment of the subject is confusing, and gives the impression of a patch applied to the fabric of Nicomachus.

^a The adjective ἀκράτος (literally "undiluted") is sometimes applied to feelings (δυσή, ἡδονή, etc.). The abstract noun ἀκρασία is used (perhaps by confusion) instead of ἀκράτεια as the opposite of ἐγκράτεια (self-control). Grant renders it by "incontinence," Rackham by "unrestraint."

1188 a

15 ἀδικοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀκρατεῖς ἀδικοὶ καὶ ἀδικοῦσιν·
ὥστε ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐκὼν ἂν πράττοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν
ἀκρασίαν.

XIII. Ἄλλὰ πάλιν ἄλλος λόγος ἐναντιοῦται, ὅς 1
φησιν οὐχ ἐκούσιον εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς ἐκὼν
πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν· ἐπαινεῖται γάρ,
ἐπαινοῦνται δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκούσίοις. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν τὸ
20 κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον, τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐπι-
θυμίαν ἀκούσιον· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν
πράττει· ὥστε ὁ ἐγκρατὴς οὐχ ἐκὼν ἂν εἴη ἐγ-
κρατὴς. ἀλλ' οὐ δοκεῖ· οὐδ' ἄρα τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν
ἐκούσιον ἐστίν.

Πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὁμοίως· οἱ γὰρ 2
αὐτοὶ λόγοι οἵπερ καὶ κατὰ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀρμότ-
30 τουσιν, ὥστε τὴν ἀπορίαν ποιήσουσιν· ἔστι γὰρ
ἀκρατῇ καὶ ἐγκρατῇ ὁργῆς εἶναι.

Ἐτι λοιπὴ ἐστὶν τῶν ὁρέξεων ὧν διειλόμεθα ἡ 3
βούλησις, πρὸς τὸ ἐπισκέπτεσθαι εἰ ἐστὶν ἐκούσιον.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ γε ἀκρατεῖς ἐφ' ἃ ὁρμῶσιν, ταῦτα τέως
βούλονται· πράττουσιν ἄρα οἱ ἀκρατεῖς τὰ φαῦλα
30 βουλόμενοι. ἐκὼν δέ γε οὐθεὶς τὰ κακὰ εἰδὼς
πράττει ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ ἀκρατὴς, εἰδὼς τὰ
κακὰ ὅτι κακά, πράττει βουλόμενος. οὐκ ἄρα
ἐκὼν, οὐδ' ἡ βούλησις ἐκούσιον ἄρα ἐστίν.

Ἄλλ' οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀναιρεῖ ἀκρασίαν καὶ τὸν 1

^a θυμός, for which our language has no equivalent word, is the Combative instinct enlisted by Plato as the ally of Reason against Desire. See *Republic* IX. vii.; *Phaedrus* xcv., xcix.; *Timaeus* xcxi.; and Grant's note on *Nic.* III. viii. 10.

^b For ὁρμῶσι cf. ὁρμή, c. iv. 9 above.

injustice do so voluntarily. Now the self-indulgent are unjust and commit injustice; whence it follows that the self-indulgent man commits voluntarily the acts which his self-indulgence urges.

1 XIII. Yet another argument is adduced to show that (action whose motive is desire) is not after all voluntary. It is admitted that the self-controlled man performs voluntarily those actions which accord with his self-control; since he receives praise for them, and it is on voluntary action that praise is bestowed. But if action in accordance with Desire is voluntary, action contrary to Desire must be involuntary. Now the man of self-control acts contrary to his desire; whence it would follow that his self-control is not voluntary. But this is obviously untrue; so that action in accordance with Desire cannot be voluntary.

2 Similar questions arise in the case of actions whose motive is Passion or Temper.^a The same arguments apply as apply to Desire, and lead to the same difficulty; for one may lack or possess self-control in anger (as well as in Desire).

3 Of the kinds of Appetence we have distinguished there remains deliberate Wish; we have still to consider if this be voluntary. Now it is obvious that the self-indulgent for the moment deliberately wish those things to which they feel impelled^b; so that their base actions are wishfully done. Yet no man voluntarily does evil actions knowing that they are evil. If therefore the self-indulgent man, knowing that his evil actions are evil, nevertheless does them because he wishes, he cannot be acting voluntarily; whence it follows that Wish is not voluntary.

4 But this argument destroys (our conception of) Self-Indulgence; and of the self-indulgent man.

1188 a

ἀκρατῇ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐκὼν, οὐκ ἔστιν ψεκτός· ἀλλ'
35 ἔστιν ὁ ἀκρατῆς ψεκτός· ἐκὼν ἄρα· ἡ ἄρα βούλησις
ἐκούσιον.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν λόγοι τινὲς ἐναντίοι φαίνονται, σα-
φέστερον λεκτέον ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐκούσιου.

XIV. Πρότερον τοίνυν ἂν εἴη λεκτέον ὑπὲρ βίας 1
1188 b καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀνάγκης. ἡ μὲν γὰρ βία ἐστὶν καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἀψύχοις. ἐκάστοις γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀψύχων οἰκείος
τόπος ἀποδεδομένος, τῷ μὲν πυρὶ ὁ ἄνω, τῇ δὲ γῇ
ὁ κάτω· ἔστι μέντοι γε βιάσασθαι καὶ τὸν λίθον
5 ἄνω φέρεσθαι καὶ τὸ πῦρ κάτω. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ 2
ζῶον βιάσασθαι, οἷον ἵππον ἐπ' ὀρθὸν θέοντα
ἀντιλαμβανόμενον ἀποστρέψαι. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν
ἐκτός ἡ αἰτία τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν τι ἢ παρ' αὐτοῖς βούλονται
ποιεῖν, ἐροῦμεν βιαζομένοις¹· αὐτοὶ δὲ ποιῶσι ποιεῖν· ἐν
οἷς δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰτία, οὐκέτι τούτους
10 βιάζεσθαι ἐροῦμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὁ ἀκρατῆς ἀντερεῖ, 3
οὐ φάσκων φαῦλος εἶναι· βιαζόμενος γὰρ φήσει ὑπὸ
τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τὰ φαῦλα πράττειν.

XV. Τοῦ οὖν βιαίου οὗτος ἡμῖν ἔστω ὁ ὁρισμός, 1
ὧν ἐκτός ἐστὶν ἡ αἰτία, ὑφ' ἧς βιάζονται πράττειν
(ὧν δ' ἐντός καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰτία, οὐ βία)· πάλιν δ'
15 ὑπὲρ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου λεκτέον. τὸ δὲ
ἀναγκαῖον οὐ πάντως οὐδ' ἐν παντὶ λεκτέον ἐστίν,
οἷον ὅσα ἡδονῆς ἕνεκεν πράττομεν. εἰ γὰρ τις

¹ A misprint for βιαζομένους (Stock).

^a See Aristotle, *De Caelo*, IV, iv. 5.

^b The distinction between βία and ἀνάγκη seems to be that the former is imposed by human wills, the latter by the nature of things. It is not drawn by Nic. or Eud. On βίος βίαιος—the straitened life of the acquisitive—see Nic. I. v. 8 and Grant's note there.

For if a man does not act voluntarily, he deserves no censure. The self-indulgent man, however, does deserve censure; so that he must be acting voluntarily, and Wish must be a voluntary thing after all.

Now since we meet with these various objections, a fuller consideration of "the Voluntary" is desirable.

(*Eud.* II. viii. : *cf.* *Nic.* III. 1.)

1 XIV. We must begin, then, by considering *force majeure* and compulsion. Now even inanimate things are liable to *force majeure*. Each of them has its proper place assigned: fire above, and earth below; yet we may force a stone to ascend and fire to
 2 descend.^a So too we may force a living animal; a horse may be seized and diverted from its direct course. Now whenever anyone is by some external cause made to do what is against his nature or his wish, we shall say that he does it under *force majeure*. But where the cause of action is internal, we shall no longer
 3 regard such an one as forced. Otherwise, the self-indulgent man will meet our censure with the plea that he is not morally base; for his base actions are done, he will say, under *force majeure* of desire.

1 XV. Let this, then, stand as our definition of *force majeure*: it is an external cause compelling us to action (Where the cause of action is internal, within ourselves, there is no *force majeure*.) And now we must turn to consider compulsion and the compulsory.^b

We must not plead compulsion under every circumstance nor for every incitation. For example, (we cannot say that) what we do under the incitement of pleasure (is compulsory). The man who should

force majeure
an external
Cause of
Action

Compulsion.

1188 b

- λέγοι ὅτι ἡναγκάσθην τὴν τοῦ φίλου γυναῖκα δια-
φθεῖραι ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη. τὸ γὰρ 2
ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐν παντί, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός,
20 οἷον ὃς ἂν καταβλάπτηται ἀντικαταλλαττόμενός τι
ἄλλο μείζον ἀναγκαζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων.
οἷον ἡναγκάσθην συντονώτερον βαδίσαι εἰς ἀγρόν·
εἰ γὰρ μή, ἀπολωλὸς² ἂν εὗρον τὰ ἐν ἀγρῷ. ἐν τοῖς
τοιούτοις ἄρα τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.
- 25 XVI. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκούσιον ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ὁρμῇ¹
ἐστίν, λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐκ διανοίας γιγνόμενον. τὸ
γὰρ ἀκούσιόν ἐστι τό τε κατ' ἀνάγκην καὶ κατὰ
βίαν γιγνόμενον, καὶ τρίτον δὲ μὴ μετὰ διανοίας
γίγνεται. δῆλον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων.
ὅταν γάρ τις πατάξῃ τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείνῃ ἢ τι τῶν
30 τοιούτων ποιήσῃ μηδὲν προδιανοηθεὶς, ἄκοντά
φασιν ποιῆσαι, ὡς τοῦ ἐκουσίου ὄντος ἐν τῷ
διανοηθῆναι. οἷον φασὶ ποτὲ τινα γυναῖκα φίλτρον²
τινὶ δοῦναι πιεῖν, εἰτα τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ
τοῦ φίλτρον, τὴν δ' ἄνθρωπον ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ
ἀποφυγεῖν³. οὐ παρούσαν δι' οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀπέλυσαν
35 ἢ διότι οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας. ἔδωκε μὲν γὰρ φίλια,
διήμαρτεν δὲ τούτου· διὸ οὐχ ἐκούσιον ἐδόκει εἶναι,
ὅτι τὴν δόσιν τοῦ φίλτρον οὐ μετὰ διανοίας τοῦ
ἀπολέσθαι αὐτὸν ἐδίδου. ἐνταῦθα ἄρα τὸ ἐκούσιον
πίπτει εἰς τὸ μετὰ διανοίας.

¹ Reading *φυγεῖν* for *ἀποφυγεῖν* (Bernays and one ms.).

² *ὁρμή* (see c. iv. 9 above) seems to be used here as the equivalent of *δρεψις*, whose three species have been reviewed in cc. xii. and xiii. So again in c. xvii. 5 below.

³ This Court, which took its name from the "Hall of Ares" at Athens (cf. Acts xvii. 19, 23), on which it met, tried cases

say "I was compelled by pleasure to defile my
 2 friend's wife " would make a foolish plea. Not every
 incitement can be compulsory, but only those which
 come from without ; as, for example, when a man is
 compelled by his affairs to forgo one advantage
for the sake of another more important. "I was
 compelled," one might plead, "to visit my estate
 more assiduously ; otherwise I should have found the
 crops ruined." In such incitements as these we must
 therefore look for " the compulsory "

(*Eud.* II. iv.)

1 XVI. Since the Voluntary cannot be found in any
 kind of spontaneous Impulse,^a only actions which
 proceed from Intelligence can deserve the name.
 For the Involuntary is that which is done either under
 compulsion, or under *force majeure*, or lastly, without
 Intelligence or Understanding. This is obvious from
 our experience. When one smites or kills another,
 or the like, without understanding what he is about
 to do, we say he acted involuntarily, regarding
 Intelligence as that which alone makes the deed
 2 voluntary. We are told that a woman once gave a
 man a love-potion which proved fatal to him. She
 was put on her trial before the court of Areopagus^b ;
 and was acquitted expressly on the ground that
 she acted without understanding the consequence.
 Affection prompted the deed ; and she failed of her
 loving purpose. Because, then, the cup was given
 with no thought of the man's death, it was regarded
 as an involuntary homicide. In this case, then, the
 Voluntary falls under the head of Understanding.

of murder. In the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus, Orestes is
 acquitted of matricide by it.

1189 a XVII. Ἐτι δὲ λοιπόν ἐστιν ἐπωκέφασθαι τὴν 1
 προαίρεσιν, πότερόν ἐστιν ὁρεξίς, ἢ οὐ. ὁρεξίς μὲν
 γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ἐγγίγνεται, προαίρεσις
 δὲ οὐ. ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου, λόγος δὲ ἐν
 οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐστίν. ὁρεξίς μὲν δὴ οὐκ
 5 ἂν εἴη· ἀλλ' ἄρα γε βούλησις; ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο;
 βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον 2
 βουλόμεθα μὲν ἀθάνατοι εἶναι, προαιρούμεθα δὲ
 οὐ. ἔτι δὲ προαίρεσις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν τοῦ τέλους,
 ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον οὐθεὶς προαιρεῖται
 10 ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν προαιρούμεθα,
 περιπατεῖν, τροχάζειν· βουλόμεθα δὲ τὰ τέλη.
 ὑγιαίνειν γὰρ βουλόμεθα. ὥστε δῆλον καὶ οὕτως 3
 ὅτι οὐ ταῦτόν ἢ βούλησις καὶ ἢ προαίρεσις· ἀλλὰ ἢ
 προαίρεσις ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῦνομα
 αὐτῆς ἔχει, οἷον προαιρούμεθα τόδε ἀντὶ τοῦδε, οἷον
 τὸ βέλτιον ἀντὶ τοῦ χείρονος. ὅταν οὖν ἀντι-
 15 καταλλαττώμεθα τὸ βέλτιον ἀντὶ τοῦ χείρονος ἐν
 αἰρέσει ὄντος, ἐνταῦθα τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι δόξειεν ἂν
 οἰκεῖον εἶναι.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἢ προαίρεσις οὐθὲν τούτων ἐστίν, ἄρα 4
 γέ ἐστιν τὸ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐν προαιρέσει; ἢ οὐδὲ
 τοῦτο; πολλὰ γὰρ διανοούμεθα καὶ δοξάζομεν
 κατὰ διάνοιαν· ἄρ' οὖν ἂ διανοούμεθα, ταῦτα καὶ
 20 προαιρούμεθα; ἢ οὐ; πολλάκις γὰρ διανοούμεθα

* For *προαίρεσις* cf. *Nic.* III. ii. and the notes of Grant and Rackham thereon. Observe that the dismissal of its claim to be the "Motive" of voluntary action in *Eud.* II. viii. 1 is not reproduced here.

* See c. i. 7 above, and note.

* A striking piece of carelessness on the author's part. In

MAGNA MORALIA, I. XVII. 1-4

(*End.* II. x.; *Nor.* III. ii, iii, iv.)

- 1 XVII. We have still to consider purposive Choice, or Determination, and to ask whether it is an Appetence or not.^a Now Appetence is found in the beasts as well as in man; but Determination only in the latter. For Determination is based on a Rational Principle^b; and man is the only animal that possesses such. So purposive Choice, or Determination, cannot be mere Appetence. Can it then be a kind of Wish? ^{(1) from Appetence,}
- 2 Hardly. Wishes may be directed to impossible objects; for instance we wish, but do not purpose, to be immortal. Moreover, the object of Determination is not the End, but the means thereto. No man determines to be healthy; we determine on means to that end, such as walking or running. But the Ends are the object of our Wish: for we wish to be healthy. Here again it is clear that Wish and purposive Choice are two different things. The nature of purposive Choice would seem to agree with its name. We purposely choose one thing instead of another, for example, the better instead of the worse. When we can choose between the two, and purposely take the better in exchange for the worse, in such a case the term purposive Choice would appear to be correctly used. ^{(2) from Wish,}
- 4 Seeing, then, that Determination is neither Appetence nor Wish, is the object of Intelligence the same as that of purposive Choice? Again, this can hardly be so. Through Intelligence we have understanding and opinion of many things; but do we purpose all that we thus understand? Surely not. Often we have understanding of what is happening ^{(3) from Intelligence,}

cc. xii. and xiii. he has accepted βούλησις as a species of ὁρεξις! Cf. *End.* II. v. 3.

1189 a

ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς, ἀλλ' οὔτι καὶ προαιρούμεθα.
οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ διάνοιά ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν καθ' ἕκαστον τούτων οὐθέν ἐστιν ἡ 5
προαίρεσις, ταῦτα δὲ ἐστιν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα,
ἀναγκαῖον [δὴ] συνδυαζομένων τινῶν τούτων εἶναι
τὴν προαίρεσιν.

- 25 Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέχθη, ἡ
προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀγαθῶν καὶ οὐ τοῦ
τέλους, καὶ τῶν δυνατῶν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν ἀντιλογίαν
παραδιδόντων πότερον τοῦτο ἢ τοῦτο αἰρετόν, δῆλον
ὅτι δέοι ἂν πρότερον διανοηθῆναι ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ
βουλευσασθαι, εἰθ' ὅταν ἡμῖν φανῇ κρείττον διανοη-
30 θεῖσιν, οὕτως ὁρμή τις τοῦ πράττειν ἐστίν, καὶ
τοῦτο δὴ πράττοντες κατὰ προαίρεσιν δοκοῦμεν
πράττειν.

- Εἰ τοίνυν ἡ προαίρεσις ὁρεξίς τις βουλευτική 6
μετὰ διανοίας, οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἐκούσιον προαιρετόν.¹
ἐκόντες γὰρ πολλὰ πράττομεν πρὸ τοῦ διανοηθῆναι
καὶ βουλευσασθαι, οἷον καθίζομεν καὶ ἀνιστάμεθα
25 καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκόντες μὲν ἄνευ δὲ τοῦ
διανοηθῆναι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν πᾶν ἦν μετὰ
1189 b διανοίας. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἐκούσιον προαιρετόν, ἀλλὰ 7
τὸ προαιρετόν ἐκούσιον· ἂν τι γὰρ προαιρώμεθα
πράττειν βουλευσάμενοι, ἐκόντες πράττομεν.

Φαίνονται δέ τινες ὀλίγοι καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν

¹ Perhaps we should read <τὸ> προαιρετόν with the Laurentian ms.

^a Indian affairs gained interest in Greece through the campaigns of Alexander, and subsequently through the relations between Seleucus Nicator and Chandragupta. The illustration is given by Eud.; Nic. speaks of "Scythians."

^b § 2 above.

^c The function of Intelligence (διάνοια) as a factor in

in India ¹⁶ : yet none of it is matter for our determination. Determination therefore is distinct also from Intelligence.

- 5 Since, then, these are the phenomena of the soul, and in none of them, taken severally, is purposive Choice or Determination to be found, it must be composed of two (or more ¹⁷) in association. but is compounded of Appetence and Intelligence,

Now we have already seen that Determination deals not with the End but with those goods which are means thereto,¹⁸ are within our power to compass, and present alternatives for our choice. It follows that we must, before determining, submit them to our Intelligence and its deliberation. Then, when Intelligence has decided that one is better than the other, there follows an impulse to act in this way ; and in so acting, it seems that we act with purposive Choice.

- 6 If, then, Determination is a deliberate Appetence accompanied by Understanding, "the Voluntary" cannot be identified with it. For we perform many an action voluntarily before Intelligence has reflected and deliberated thereon : such as sitting down and rising up and many other actions of the kind, which are indeed done voluntarily, but without that Intelligence which, as we have seen, always accompanies and may be defined as a deliberate, intelligent Appetence.

- 7 whatever is deliberately done. It follows, then, that what is voluntary is not always determined, though what we determine is always voluntary ; since whatever action we determine after deliberation to perform, we perform voluntarily. The Actions it induces are always voluntary though there are other kinds of voluntary Action.

Even among legislators a few seem to draw the

προαίρεσις is deliberative. Hence *διανοεῖσθαι* and *βουλευέσθαι* are in these chapters practically equivalent. Cf. *Nic.* III. ii. 17.

διορίζειν τὸ τε ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἐκ προαιρέσεως
 5 ἕτερον ὄν, ἐλάττους τὰς ζημίας ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις
 ἢ τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τάττοντες.

"Ἔστιν οὖν ἡ προαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς, καὶ 8
 τούτοις ἐν οἷς ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶν καὶ πράξαι καὶ μὴ
 πράξαι, καὶ οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτως, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἔστι
 λαβεῖν τὸ διὰ τί. τὸ δὲ διὰ τί οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἐστίν.
 10 ἐν μὲν γὰρ γεωμετρία, ὅταν φῇ τὸ τετράγωνον 9
 τέτταρσιν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχειν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ διὰ τί, ὅτι,
 φησὶν, καὶ τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει. ἐν
 μὲν οὖν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὠρισμένης
 ἔλαβον τὸ διὰ τί. ἐν δέ γε τοῖς πρακτοῖς, ἐν οἷς ἡ
 15 προαίρεσις, οὐχ οὕτως (οὐδεμία γὰρ κείται ὠρι-
 σμένη), ἀλλ' ἂν ἀπαιτῇ τις, διὰ τί τοῦτο ἔπραξας;
 16 ὅτι οὐκ ἐνῆν ἄλλως, ἢ ὅτι βέλτιον οὕτως. ἐξ αὐτῶν
 τῶν συμβαυνόντων, ὅποῦ ἂν φαίνεται βελτίως εἶναι,
 ταῦτα προαιρεῖται καὶ διὰ ταῦτα. διὸ δὴ ἐν τοῖς 10
 τοιούτοις τὸ βουλευσασθαι ἐστὶ τὸ πῶς δεῖ, ἐν δὲ
 ταῖς ἐπιστήμας οὐ. οὐθεὶς γὰρ βουλεύεται πῶς
 20 δεῖ γράψαι τὸ ὄνομα Ἀρχικλέους, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὠρι-
 σμένον πῶς δεῖ γράψαι τὸ ὄνομα Ἀρχικλέους. ἡ
 οὖν ἀμαρτία οὐ γίνεταί ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ
 ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ γράφειν. ἐν οἷς γὰρ μὴ ἐστὶν ἡ

* τὸ "διὰ τί;" or τὸ οὐ ἐνεκα of an Action is its End (τέλος), Purpose, or Final Cause. In the case of a mathematical proposition, τὸ διὰ τί is rather the Formal Cause (τὸ "τί ἦν, "). It is part of the εἶδος or λόγος of the quadrilateral that it is divisible into two triangles, and part of the εἶδος of a triangle to contain two right angles. (Cf. *Eud.* II. x. 24, and *Metaphysics* IV. (V.) ii.)

ᵇ Cf. *Nic.* III. iii. 8 (with the notes of Grant and Burnet), and *Eud.* II. x. 13. ἐπιστήμη seems here to include τέχνη. *Nic.* distinguishes those ἐπιστήμαι which are fixed and complete—like writing—from those which are less definitely

correct distinction between deeds done voluntarily and those done of Purpose; and to assign, accordingly, less severe penalties to the former class of offences than to the latter

- 8 Determination, therefore, is concerned with actions, and with those actions which it is in our power to perform or not to perform, or to perform in two different ways; actions moreover whose "wherefore" ^{It chooses between Actions which are in our Power,} we can comprehend (Now we speak of the "wherefore" ^{and whose Wherefore we can grasp} of a thing in more senses than one. In geometry, when we are told that the angles of a quadrilateral are equal to four right angles, and are asked, wherefore? the answer is "because the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles." In such cases as this, the "wherefore" is inferred from a *principium* already defined. But in the case of actions, with which Determination is concerned, it is not so: for here there exists no previously defined *principium*. If, then, one is asked "wherefore did you thus act?" he answers "Because I could not act otherwise," or "Because it was the better alternative." It is in view of their (expected) results that a man determines on whatever actions appear better; and these (results) are the "wherefore" of his determination.
- 10 And this is why, in matters of this kind, we deliberate with ourselves how we should act: but not in the sciences and arts.^b No one debates with himself how the name of Archicles should be written, for that is already defined; so that errors arise, not in the conscious Understanding, but in activity of writing. For where there is no possibility of error in grounded, like medicine. About the rules of the latter we deliberate; not about those of the former. *τέχνη* affords greater scope for deliberation than does *ἐπιστήμη* in the stricter sense of the term.

1180 b

ἁμαρτία ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, οὐδὲ βουλευόνται ὑπὲρ τού-
των· ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς ἤδη ἀόριστόν ἐστι τὸ ὡς δεῖ,
25 ἐνταῦθα ἡ ἁμαρτία. ἔστιν δ' ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τὸ
ἀόριστον, καὶ ἐν οἷς διτταὶ αἱ ἁμαρτίαι. ἁμαρ-
τάνομεν οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς
ἀρετὰς ὁμοίως. τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς στοχαζόμενοι
ἁμαρτάνομεν ἐπὶ τὰς¹ πεφυκυίας ὁδοῦς. ἔστι γὰρ
καὶ ἐν ἐλλείψει καὶ ἐν ὑπερβολῇ ἁμαρτία, ἐφ'
30 ἐκάτερα δὲ τούτων φερόμεθα δι' ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην·
διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ
δὲ τὴν λύπην τὰ καλὰ φεύγομεν.

XVIII. Ἐτι δ' ἐστὶν ἡ διάνοια οὐχ ὥσπερ 1
αἰσθησις, οἷον τῇ ὄψει οὐκ ἂν δύναται οὐθὲν ἂν
ἄλλο ποιῆσαι ἢ ἰδεῖν, οὐδὲ τῇ ἀκοῇ οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἢ
35 ἀκοῦσαι. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ βουλευόμεθα πότερον δεῖ
ἀκοῦσαι τῇ ἀκοῇ ἢ ἰδεῖν. ἡ δὲ διάνοια οὐ τοιοῦτον,
1180 a ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο δύναται πράττειν καὶ ἄλλα. διὰ
τοῦτο βουλευέσθαι ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ὑπάρχει. ἔστιν οὖν 2
ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῇ αἰρέσει τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐ περὶ τὰ
τέλη (ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντες ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον
τὴν ὑγίειαν ὅτι ἀγαθόν), ἀλλ' ἤδη τὰ κατὰ τὸ τέλος,
3 οἷον πότερον ἀγαθὸν πρὸς ὑγίειαν φαγεῖν τοῦτο ἢ
οὐ. μάλιστα οὖν ποιεῖ ἐν τούτοις τὸ σφάλλεσθαι
ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη· τὴν μὲν γὰρ φεύγομεν, τὴν δὲ
αἰρούμεθα.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν διήρηται ἐν τίνι ἡ ἁμαρτία καὶ πῶς, 3
λοιπόν ἐστι τίνος ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ στοχαστική, πότε-

¹ Reading ἐπὶ <διε>τὰς πεφυκυίας ὁδοῦς

the intellectual concept, we do not need to take counsel with ourselves; but wherever the right course is undefined, there is the possibility of error.

- 11 Now it is in action that this uncertainty exists, and wherever two different kinds of error are possible. Our errors, therefore, in action and in morals are alike. In aiming at moral virtue, we err in ways which are by nature twofold; since error is possible either by defect or by excess, and we are borne in one direction or the other through pleasure or pain. For pleasure induces us to perform base actions, and pain to avoid noble ones.

It is in the practical and moral life that Error is possible, and deliberation needed.

- 1 XVIII. Understanding differs from Sense Perception in one important way. By the sense of sight we are enabled to see, and nothing else; and by hearing, merely and solely to hear. We do not deliberate whether we should hear with our ears, or see. It is otherwise with our Intelligence, which has the power of acting in different ways. It is here, when we come to make a purposive Choice, that there is room for deliberation with ourselves.

The Senses perceive what is before them. Intelligence can take different views of the same Matter.

(*End. II. xi.*)

- 2 Error, then, arises in the choice of what is good. But not in the realm of Ends; for about these all are agreed. No man, for example, doubts that health is a good. It is when we come to choose our means that we err; for example, in deciding whether such and such a food is good for our health. In this choice, it is pleasure and pain that chiefly lead us astray; since we choose the former and seek to avoid the latter.
- 3 Having thus defined where and how error arises, we have still to consider what is the goal at which

Error arises in the Choice of Means, and is chiefly caused by Pleasure and Pain.

Value is more concerned with

1190 a

10 ρον τοῦ τέλους ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον πότερον
 τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὸ καλόν. πῶς οὖν ἢ 4
 ἐπιστήμη; πότερον τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς ἐστὶν ἐπι-
 στήμης τὸ τέλος καλῶς προθέσθαι, ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸ
 τέλος ἰδεῖν; ἂν γὰρ τοῦτο καλῶς προθῇται, οἷον
 καλὴν οἰκίαν ποιῆσαι, καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλος
 τις εὐρήσει καὶ ποριεῖ ἢ οἰκοδόμος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 15 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπασῶν ἐπιστημῶν. ὡσαύτως ἄρα 5
 δόξειεν ἂν ἔχειν καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῆς, μᾶλλον εἶναι αὐτῆς
 τὸν σκοπὸν [πρὸς] τὸ τέλος, ὃ δεῖ ὀρθῶς προθέσθαι,
 ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος· καὶ ἐξ ὧν τοῦτ' ἔσται οὐθεὶς
 ἄλλος ποριεῖ, καὶ εὐρήσει ἃ δεῖ πρὸς τοῦτο. καὶ
 20 εὐλογον δὲ τούτου εἶναι προθετικὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν· ἐν
 οἷς γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐστίν, ἕκαστον καὶ
 προθετικόν καὶ ποιητικόν. οὐθὲν οὖν βέλτιον τῆς
 ἀρετῆς ἐστίν· ταύτης γὰρ ἕνεκα καὶ τᾶλλα ἐστίν,
 καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχή, [καὶ τούτου ἕνεκεν
 μᾶλλον τὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἐστίν· τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀρχῇ τινι 6
 25 ἔοικεν, καὶ τούτου ἕνεκέν ἐστιν ἕκαστον. ἀλλὰ
 κατὰ τρόπον τοῦτο ἔσται.]¹ ὥστε δῆλον ὡς κατὰ
 τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἐπειδὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν αἰτία, ὅτι τοῦ
 τέλους ἐστὶ στοχαστικὴ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὸ
 τέλος.

XIX. Ἀρετῆς δέ γ' ἐστὶ τέλος τὸ καλόν. τούτου 1

¹ Reading, with Scaliger, τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀρχῇ ἔοικεν, καὶ τούτου ἕνεκεν μᾶλλον τὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἐστίν. instead of the passage between the brackets, which is corrupt.

^a Is this consistent with c. i. 14 above, where we are told that no science or art can predicate goodness of its End?

^b Cf. *Eud.* II. xi. 5, 6: especially ὥστε γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. An alternative rendering is "— and with

Virtue aims. Is it an end, or means thereto; moral beauty, for example, or such things as conduce to it? the End than with the Means.

- 4 How is it with arts and sciences? Is it the task of architecture well and truly to propose its own end, or merely to seek the means of attaining it? But assuming it to have done the former—to have proposed, for example, the construction of a noble house,^a it is again the architect and none other who will devise and provide the means of accomplishing it. And so it is with all other arts and sciences; whence
- 5 we may infer the like of Virtue. Its goal is the right establishment of the End more than (the provision of) the means; yet the materials and means will be provided and devised by none other (than the virtuous man himself). And it is with reason that we attribute to Virtue this task of proposing her End; for wherever we find the origin or *principium* of what is best, there resides the power both of proposing the End and of accomplishing it. Now (whilst) nothing is better than Virtue—since it is for her sake that other things are, and towards her the *principium* points (as to an
- 6 End)—yet in her case the End itself may be regarded as a *principium*^b: and it is for the sake of the End that the means exist rather (than the converse). And so even in her case it is plain that, being as she is the best of all causes, her task is to seek rather the End than the means thereto.^c

- 1 XIX. Now the End of Virtue is the morally

her the *principium* abides; yet in her case . . . " (With *πρὸς ταύτην* might be compared St. John i. 1 *ὁ λόγος ᾧν πρὸς τὸν θεόν*.)

^a A corrupt and obscure passage. Perhaps the meaning is that Virtue, whilst herself a *τέλος*, is also the *ἀρχή* of another *τέλος*, i.e. τὸ καλόν, which it is therefore her task to set up and pursue.

1190 a

ἄρ' ἐστὶ[ν ἡ ἀρετὴ] στοχαστικὴ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐξ
 30 ὧν ἔσται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ταύτης. ὅλως δὲ δὴ
 φαίνεται ἄτοπον· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν ἐν γραφικῇ εἴῃ τις
 ἀγαθὸς μιμητής, ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἐπαινεθῇ, ἂν μὴ
 τὸν σκοπὸν θῇ τὰ βέλτιστα μιμείσθαι. τῆς ἀρετῆς
 ἄρα παντελῶς τοῦτ' ἐστίν, τὸ καλὸν προθέσθαι.

Διὰ τί οὖν, ἂν τις εἴποι, πρότερον μὲν ἐλέγουμεν 2
 35 τὴν ἐνέργειαν κρεῖττον εἶναι ἢ τὴν ἔξιν τὴν αὐτήν,
 νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἐξ οὗ ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦτο τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀπο-
 δίδομεν ὡς κάλλιον, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνέργεια;
 1190 b ναί, ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν φαμεν τοῦτο ὁμοίως, τὴν ἐνέργειαν 3
 τῆς ἔξεως βέλτιον εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι
 τὸν σπουδαῖον θεωροῦντες κρίνουσιν ἐκ τοῦ πράτ-
 τειν, διὰ τὸ μὴ δυνατόν εἶναι δηλῶσαι τὴν ἐκάστου
 προαίρεσιν ἣν ἔχει, ἐπεὶ εἰ ἦν εἰδέναι τὴν ἐκάστου
 2 γνώμην, ὡς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ
 πράττειν σπουδαῖος ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι.

[Ἐπεὶ δὲ μεσότητάς τινας τῶν παθῶν κατηριθμη-
 σάμεθα, λεκτέον ἂν εἴῃ περὶ ποῖα τῶν παθῶν
 εἰσίν.]

XX. * * Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνδρεία περὶ θάρρη 1
 10 καὶ φόβους, σκεπτέον ἂν εἴῃ περὶ ποίους φόβους
 καὶ θάρρη. ἄρ' οὖν εἰ μὲν τις φοβεῖται μὴ ἀπο-
 βάλλῃ τὴν οὐσίαν, οὗτος δειλός, εἰ δὲ τις θαρρεῖ

¹ Reading ἄλλως δὲ δὴ (suggested by Susemihl) for ὅλως
 δὲ δὴ.

* Cf. *Poetica* c. 11. ² c. iv. § above. ³ Cf. St. James c. 11.

⁴ These "mean states" are of course the Moral Virtues (*ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί*), as explained in cc. v.-ix. above. Ramsauer and Susemihl think that the bracketed sentence has been inserted to fill a lacuna in the text; and Ramsauer suggests that a "table of virtues" (and their "provinces"?) like that in *End.* II. iii. 4 originally stood in its place.

MAGNA MORALIA, I. XIV. 1—XX. 1

beautiful or noble ; so that this, rather than its materials, is the goal at which she aims, though she is concerned with its materials also. The contrary would be obviously impossible. A painter might be an excellent copyist ; but he would receive no honour if he failed to make it his aim to portray the best models.^a There can, therefore, be no questioning the office of Virtue to propose the noble as her end.

Moral
Beauty
the End
of Virtue.

- 2 But here it may possibly be objected that whereas we formerly stated the use or activity of anything to be better than the corresponding possession of it,^b we are now assigning to Virtue, as the nobler province, not the materials of her activity, but something in which there is no activity. Our view, however, is still the same : we still assert that virtuous activity is better than the mere state or possession of Virtue. When mankind behold a virtuous man they judge him by his actions, because his inward Determination or Purpose is necessarily hidden from them. If, however, they could look into a man's mind and see its attitude towards what is morally beautiful, the virtuous man would be known for such even apart from his activity.^c

Yet Virtue
in Action
is better
than Virtue
as a State.

(*Eud.* III. i. 1 : *Nic.* III. v. 21-23.)

[Having enumerated certain "mean states"^d of the feelings or affections, we must now specify the kind of feelings with which they are severally concerned.]

(*Eud.* III. i. : *Nic.* III. vi.-ix.)

- 1 XX. . . . Since, then, feelings of fear and intrepidity are the province of Courage, we must consider the kinds of fear and intrepidity with which it deals. Is a man a coward if he fears the loss of his property, and

Nature and
Province of
the several
Virtues :
(1) of
Courage ;

1190 b

περὶ ταῦτα, ἀνδρείος; ἢ οὐ; ὁμοίως δ' εἴ τις
 φοβεῖται νόσον ἢ θαρρεῖ, οὔτε δειλὸν φατέον εἶναι
 τὸν φοβούμενον οὔτ' ἀνδρεῖον τὸν μὴ φοβούμενον.
 15 οὐκ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις φόβοις καὶ θάρρεσιν ἔστιν
 ἡ ἀνδρεία. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, οἷον 2
 εἰ μὴ τις φοβεῖται βροντὰς ἢ ἀστραπὰς ἢ ἄλλο τι
 τῶν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων φοβερῶν, οὐκ ἀνδρείος ἀλλὰ
 μαινόμενός τις. ἐν φόβοις ἄρα καὶ θάρρεσιν ἔστιν
 ὁ ἀνδρείος τοῖς κατ' ἀνθρώπους· λέγω δέ οἷον ἃ οἱ
 20 πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἢ οἱ πάντες, ἐν τούτοις ὁ ὢν
 θαρραλέος, οὗτος ἀνδρείος.

Τούτων τοίνυν διωρισμένων σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη, 3
 ἐπειδὴ κατὰ πολλά εἰσιν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὁ ποῖος
 ἀνδρείος. ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τις ἀν-
 δρείος, οἷον οἱ στρατιῶται. οὗτοι γὰρ οἶδασιν δι'
 25 ἐμπειρίαν ὅτι ἐν τοιούτῳ τόπῳ ἢ ἐν τοιούτῳ καιρῷ
 ἢ οὕτως ἔχοντι ἀδύνατόν τι παθεῖν. ὁ δὲ ταῦτα
 εἰδὼς καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὑπομένων τοὺς πολεμίους οὐκ
 ἀνδρείος· ἐὰν γὰρ τούτων μὴθὲν ὑπάρχη, οὐχ ὑπο- 4
 μένει. διὸ τοὺς δι' ἐμπειρίαν οὐ φατέον ἀνδρείους.

Οὐδὲ Σωκράτης δὴ ὁρθῶς ἔλεγεν ἐπιστήμην
 φάσκων εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἐξ
 30 ἔθους τὴν ἐμπειρίαν λαβοῦσα ἐπιστήμη γίνεται·
 τοὺς δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένοντας οὐ φάμεν, οὐδ'
 ἐροῦσιν ἀνδρείους αὐτοὺς εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ἀνδρεία
 ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη.

Πάλιν δ' αὖ εἰσιν ἀνδρεῖοι ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τῆς 5
 ἐμπειρίας· οἱ γὰρ ἄπειροι τῶν ἐκβησομένων οὐ
 φοβοῦνται διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν. οὐδὲ δὴ οὐδὲ τούτους
 25 φατέον ἀνδρείους.

* For what Socrates actually said see Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, III. ix. 1, 2.

brave if he faces it with intrepidity? Hardly so; nor can we rightly predicate Cowardice and Courage of those who respectively fear or do not fear disease.

2 These, then, are not the kinds of fear and intrepidity with which Courage deals. Supposing again that a man has no fear of thunder or lightning or other superhuman terrors: he is not brave, but mad. The fears and intrepidities with which a brave man deals are clearly those commensurate with human powers. That man, I mean, is brave who shows intrepidity in the midst of perils which most men or all men fear.

3 After thus much of definition, seeing that brave men are (brave) in many different ways, we must consider what kinds of men are rightly so called. In the first place, men may be brave through experience, as soldiers are. They know by experience that in certain places, times, or positions they are quite safe. But one who knows this, and in the confidence of such
4 knowledge awaits the foe, is not brave; for if these conditions be lacking, he flees. We cannot therefore call the man who is brave from experience truly brave.

Again, Socrates was surely mistaken in declaring that Courage is a branch of science or knowledge.^a Knowledge becomes such through attaining experience by practice. But we deny that those who are brave from experience are really brave; and our denial will be generally approved. Courage, therefore, is not a branch of science.

5 Again, some men are brave through the very opposite of experience; for those who have no experience of results have, for that reason, no fear of them. These, too, have no just claim to the title.

1190 b

Εἰσὶν δ' αὖ ἄλλοι δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι εἶναι διὰ τὰ α
πάθη, ὅλον οἱ ἐρώντες ἢ οἱ ἐνθουσιάζοντες. οὐδὲ
δὴ τούτους φατέον ἀνδρεῖους εἶναι· ἐὰν γὰρ αὐτῶν
1191 a τὸ πάθος ἀφαιρεθῇ, οὐκέτι εἰσὶν ἀνδρεῖοι, δεῖ δὲ
τὸν ἀνδρεῖον αἰεὶ εἶναι ἀνδρεῖον. διὸ οὐδὲ τὰ θηρία γ
ὅλον τοὺς σῶς οὐκ ἂν τις εἴποι ἀνδρεῖους διὰ τὸ
ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ πληγέντες λυπηθῶσι, οὐδὲ δεῖ
τὸν ἀνδρεῖον διὰ [τὸ] πάθος εἶναι ἀνδρεῖον.

6 Πάλιν ἔστιν ἄλλη ἀνδρεία πολιτικὴ δοκοῦσα β
εἶναι, ὅλον εἰ δι' αἰσχύνην τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας
ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἀνδρεῖοι
εἶναι. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου· καὶ γὰρ Ὅμηρος πε-
ποίηκε τὸν Ἑκτορα λέγοντα

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει,

10 διὸ οἶεται δεῖν μάχεσθαι. οὐδὲ δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην
φατέον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ τούτων
διορισμὸς ἀρμόσει. οὐ γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένου¹ μὴ
διαμένει ἡ ἀνδρεία, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι ἀνδρεῖος· ἂν οὖν
τὴν αἰσχύνην περιέλῳ δι' ἣν ἦν ἀνδρεῖος, οὐκέτι
ἔσται ἀνδρεῖος.

Ἔτι καὶ ἄλλως εἰσὶν ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι οἱ γ
15 δι' ἐλπίδα καὶ προσδοκίαν ἀγαθοῦ. οὐδὲ δὴ τού-
τους φατέον εἶναι ἀνδρεῖους, ἐπειδὴ τοὺς τοιούτους
καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρεῖους λέγειν ἄτοπον
φαίνεται.

Οὐδένα οὖν τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρεῖον θετέον εἶναι·

¹ Perhaps <τὸ> should be inserted.

^a See Plato, *Phaedo* xxvi.

^b *Iliad* xlii. 100.

- 6 There are, besides, others reputed brave owing to the feelings which possess them—such as love, or divine inspiration. These, too, are not really entitled to the name. If they lose the feeling, they cease to
 7 be brave; and true Courage is permanent. It is for this reason that no one would call boars and other wild beasts brave because they defend themselves when wounded and in pain. No more can the truly brave man owe his courage to his feelings.
- 8 Moreover there is another so-called Courage which is of a civic or social nature^a; shown, for example, by those who face perils and win reputation for courage because they are ashamed to appear cowards in the eyes of their fellow-citizens. Testimony to this we find in Homer, whose Hector declares that

First will Polydamas for faint-heart temper reproach me^b

and therefore determines to fight. And here again we must withhold the name of true Courage. For in all the above cases, the same criterion may be applied; whenever the loss (of some incentive) involves the loss of courage, the man (who is apparently brave) will be brave no longer. If, then, I strip a man (who is civically or socially brave) of that feeling of shame which was his incentive, he will no longer be brave at all.

- 9 Another type of apparent courage is that of men who win the title under the incentive of hope and expectation of good to come. These, too, we must refuse the name. To call men brave who are only brave in this way and under these circumstances seems, indeed, absurd.

Since, then, of none of the above types can we predicate true Courage, let us consider what kind of

1191 a

τὸν [ό] ποῖον οὖν¹ ἀνδρείον, καὶ τίς ό ἀνδρείος
σκεπτέοι. ὡς ἀπλῶς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ό διὰ μηθέν τῶν 10
20 προειρημένων ἀνδρείος ὢν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ νομίζειν
αὐτὸ εἶναι καλόν, καὶ τοῦτο ποιῶν κἂν παρῇ τις
κἂν μὴ παρῇ.

Οὐδὲ δὴ παντελῶς ἄνευ πάθους καὶ ὀρμῆς ἐγ-
γίγνεται ἡ ἀνδρεία. δεῖ δὲ τὴν ὀρμὴν γίνεσθαι ἀπὸ
τοῦ λόγου διὰ τὸ καλόν. ό δὴ ὀρμῶν διὰ λόγον
ἔνεκεν τοῦ καλοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν, ἄφοβος ὢν
25 περὶ ταῦτα, οὗτος ἀνδρείος, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία περὶ
ταῦτα. ἄφοβος δὲ οὐχ ὅταν οὕτω συμπέσῃ τῷ 11
ἀνδρείῳ ὥστε ὅλως μὴ φοβεῖσθαι. ό μὲν γὰρ
τοιούτος οὐκ ἀνδρείος, ὥ ὅλως μηθέν ἐστι φοβερόν·
οὕτω μὲν γὰρ (ἂν) ό λίθος εἴη καὶ τᾶλλα ἄψυχα
ἀνδρεία· ἀλλὰ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι μὲν, ὑπομένειν δέ· εἰ
30 γὰρ αὖ μὴ φοβούμενος ὑπομένει, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀν-
δρείος.—ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπάνω διειλόμεθα, περὶ 12
φόβους καὶ κινδύνους οὐ πάντας ἀλλὰ² τοὺς ἀν-
αιρετικούς τῆς οὐσίας.—ἔτι δὲ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ τυχόντι
καὶ παντὶ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ οἱ φόβοι καὶ οἱ κίνδυνοι
πλησίον εἰσίν. εἰ γάρ τις τὸν εἰς δέκατον ἔτος
κίνδυνον μὴ φοβεῖται, οὕτω ἀνδρείος· ἔνιοι γὰρ
35 θαρροῦσιν διὰ τὸ μακρὰν ἀπέχειν, ἂν δὲ πλησίον
γένωνται, ἀποθνήσκουσιν τῷ δέει.

¹ Spengel for ὁποιοῦσιν MSS.

² In § I it is suggested that peril to one's οὐσία (property?) is not the field in which true Courage is shown. This is the regular meaning of the word οὐσία in Nic. (see IV. i. *passim*), save where it serves as a logical term (= substance). Perhaps therefore we should read οὐ περὶ φόβους καὶ κινδύνους τοὺς ἀναιρετικούς τῆς οὐσίας, "nor . . . will true Courage concern itself with fears and dangers that threaten property."

10 man (we can so term), and who is the truly brave. We may define him simply by saying that he is one who owes his courage to none of the above incentives, but is brave because he thinks it noble so to be, and brave whether he is alone or in company.

Courage, however, does not arise wholly apart from feeling and impulse. But the impulse must start from Rational Principle," with moral beauty or nobility as its aim. He, therefore, who is rationally impelled to face danger for the sake of what is fair and noble, being fearless of that danger, is a brave
 11 man; and this is the true province of Courage. I do not however mean the fearlessness of one (reputed) brave who happens to be incapable of fear. A man is not truly brave in whose sight nothing whatever is formidable. By the same token a stone were brave, or any other inanimate thing. The brave man will fear, but will nevertheless stand firm; for if he stands
 12 firm without fearing, he cannot be truly brave. Moreover, in accordance with the distinctions we made above, true Courage will not concern itself with all kinds of fear and peril; but only with those which threaten one's very existence.^b Nor can it be shown at all times, or on any chance occasion; but only when fears and perils are close at hand. If a man has no fear of a peril which is to be encountered nine years hence, that does not prove him brave. For some are intrepid because the peril is afar who on its approach are ready to die of fear.

^a Cf. Nic. III. vii., *And.* III. i. 12; also i. 7 above, with note.

^b See note on text.

The corruption might be that of a scribe who misunderstood the word *oûdia*. Cf. c. xxxiii. 31 below.

1191 a

XXI. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεία καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τοιοῦ-¹
 τος· σωφροσύνη δ' ἐστὶν μεσότης ἀκολασίας καὶ
 ἀναισθησίας τῆς περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς. ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ
 σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀπλῶς ἅπαντα ἀρετὴ ἕξις ἢ βελτίστη,
 1191 b ἢ δὲ βελτιστὴ ἕξις τοῦ βελτίστου ἐστίν, βέλτιστον
 δὲ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐνδείας τὸ μέσον· κατ'
 ἀμφοτέρα γὰρ εἰσι ψεκτοί, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ
 κατ' ἐνδειαν. ὥστε εἴπερ τὸ μέσον βέλτιστον, ἡ
 σωφροσύνη μεσότης τις ἂν εἴη ἀκολασίας καὶ
 ἀναισθησίας.

⁶ Μεσότης μὲν οὖν ἂν εἴη τούτων· ἔστιν δὲ ἡ ²
 σωφροσύνη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, οὐ πάσας δὲ
 οὐδὲ τὰς περὶ πάντα. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἡδεται θεωρῶν
 γραφὴν ἢ ἀνδριάντα ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ
 δὴ οὗτος ἀκόλαστος, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ ἀκοῆς
 οὐδὲ περὶ ὁσφρήσεως· ἀλλ' ἐν ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ
 10 ἀφῆν καὶ γεῦσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ταύτας ἀνὴρ ³
 σώφρων ἔσται (ὁ) οὕτως ἔχων ὥστε μηδ' ὑπὸ
 μιᾶς τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν μηθὲν πάσχειν (ὁ μὲν
 γὰρ τοιοῦτος ἀναίσθητος), ἀλλ' ἡδὴ ὁ πάσχων καὶ
 μὴ ἀγόμενος, ὥστε εἰς ὑπερβολὴν αὐτῶν ἀπολαύων
 πάντα τὰλλα ποιεῖσθαι πάρεργα, καὶ αὐτόν¹ γε τὸν
 15 ἡδὴ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκεν καὶ μὴ ἄλλου πράτ-
 τουντα σώφρονα * *.² ὅστις γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ⁴
 ἡδονῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἀπέχεται ἢ διὰ φόβον ἢ δι'
 ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, οὐ σώφρων. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰλλα
 ζῶα λέγομεν εἶναι σώφρονα ἔξω ἀνθρώπου, διὰ τὸ

¹ Reading αὐτό (Scaliger).

² Inserting <καλοῦμεν> (Rieckher) or the like.

* See c. iii. 3 above. Here the author, after using *ἕξις* in its neuter sense of *habitus*, proceeds to construct it with the
 518

(End. III. ii. : Nic. III. v.)

- 1 XXI. Such is the nature of Courage and of the brave man. We next proceed to consider Temperance, which is a mean betwixt Profligacy and Insensibility to pleasures. Temperance, like all other virtues, is a "best state (of the soul)." Now a best state is a state which possesses what is best^a; and what is best is the mean betwixt excess and defect, since for both of these, men are liable to blame. As therefore the mean is best, the virtue of Temperance will be a mean state betwixt Profligacy and Insensibility.
- 2 Such, then, are the extremes between which Temperance mediates. Pleasures and pains are its province, though not with all pleasures and pains does it deal, nor with those arising from all sources. Because a man takes pleasure in the contemplation of a picture or statue or other beautiful object, he is not on that account a profligate; nor again because he enjoys the pleasures of hearing or of smell; only in those pleasures which arise from touch or taste is
- 3 there profligacy. Nor of course is a man temperate who is so constituted as to be entirely unaffected by any of these pleasures; for such a man is simply indifferent. The temperate man is he who is affected by them, and yet not led away to take such excessive delight therein that he regards all else as of secondary importance. It is the man who thus resists pleasure for the sake of what is morally beautiful or noble, and for no other cause, that we term tem-
- 4 perate; for he who refrains from such pleasures through fear or the like motive is not truly temperate. We do not call the brute beasts temperate; since

objective genitive proper to its active sense (*ἐξαι τοῦ βελτίστου*
= τὸ τὸ βελτίστου ἐχέω).

μη εἶναι ἐν αὐτοῖς λόγον, ὥς δοκιμάζοντα τὸ καλὸν
 αἰροῦνται. πᾶσα γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῦ καλοῦ¹ καὶ πρὸς
 τὸ καλὸν ἐστίν. ὥστε εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη περὶ
 ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, καὶ ταύτας τὰς ἐν ἀφῇ καὶ γεύσει
 γινομένας.

XXII. Ἐχόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη τούτου λέγειν ὑπὲρ 1
 πραότητος, [καὶ] τί ἐστι καὶ ἐν τίσιν. ἔστιν [μὲν]
 οὖν ἡ πραότης ἀνὰ μέσον ὀργιλότητος καὶ ἀοργη-
 σίας. καὶ ὅλως δὲ δοκοῦσιν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μεσότητές
 τινες εἶναι. ὅτι δ' εἰσὶ μεσότητες, καὶ οὕτως ἂν
 τις εἴποι· εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐν μεσότητι τὸ βέλτιστον,
 ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη ἔξις, [βέλτιστον δ'
 ἐστὶ τὸ μέσον,] ἡ ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον. δῆλον 2
 δὲ ἔσται μᾶλλον καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον σκοποῦσιν.

Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὀργίλος ὁ παντὶ καὶ πάντως
 καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ὀργιζόμενος, καὶ ψεκτὸς δὲ ὁ
 τοιοῦτος (οὔτε γὰρ παντὶ δεῖ ὀργίζεσθαι οὔτ' ἐπὶ
 πᾶσιν οὔτε πάντως καὶ ἀεί, οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν οὕτως
 ἔχειν δεῖ, ὥστε μηθενὶ μηδέποτε· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος 3
 ψεκτὸς, ἀνάληγτός γε ὢν).² ἐπεὶ τοίνυν καὶ ὁ κατὰ
 τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ψεκτὸς καὶ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἑλλειψιν· ὁ
 μέσος ἂν τούτων εἴη καὶ πρᾶος καὶ ἐπαινετός. οὔτε
 γὰρ ὁ ἐλλείπων τῇ ὀργῇ οὔτε ὁ ὑπερβάλλων
 ἐπαινετός, ἀλλ' ὁ μέσως ἔχων πρὸς ταῦτα, οὗτος
 πρᾶος.³ καὶ ἡ πραότης δὲ τούτων τῶν παθῶν
 μεσότης ἂν εἴη.

¹ Reading τοῦ καλοῦ <ἐνεκόν> (?).

² I place the bracket after ἀεί and a comma after ὢν.

³ Stopping ὁ μέσως ἔχων πρὸς ταῦτα. οὗτος πρᾶος· καὶ ἡ
 πραότης δὲ . . . (So Stock.)

they possess not the touchstone of reason wherewith to test moral beauty before choosing it. For moral beauty is ever the End of Virtue, and towards this she is drawn.—Temperance, then, is concerned with such pleasures and pains as arise from touch and taste.

(*Eud.* III. iii. : *Nec.* IV. v.)

- 1 XXII. From this we may pass to treat of Gentleness ; its character and its province. Now Gentleness occupies a mid position between Irascibility and Lack of Spirit. (The virtues would seem in every case to be mean states between extremes ; and this may be demonstrated as follows. If the best occupies a mean position, and Virtue is the best state (of the soul),
2 Virtue must be a mean. But this will be clearer from a consideration of the virtues severally) "

(3) of
Gentleness

For the irascible man is one who is liable to excessive anger against everyone and on all occasions ; and he deserves our censure. It is not right to be angry with all men, nor for every cause, nor on all occasions and at all times. On the other hand, the opposite state, that of never being angry with any-
3 one, is also wrong ; such a man is insensible, and he too deserves our blame.—Since, then, the man who shows excess of anger deserves censure, and likewise he who shows defect, he who keeps the just mean is the gentle man who merits our praise. Praise is not for him who is deficient in anger, nor for him who is therein excessive ; but for one whose state is between the two. This man is gentle ; and gentleness will be a mean state between these two affections.

^a An awkwardly placed parenthesis.

1191 b

XXIII. Ἐλευθεριότης δέ ἐστιν μεσότης ἀσωτίας¹
 1192 a καὶ ἀνελευθερίας. ἔστιν δὲ περὶ χρήματα τὰ
 τοιαῦτα πάθη· ὁ τε γὰρ ἄσωτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀναλίσκων
 εἰς ἃ μὴ δεῖ καὶ πλείω ὢν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, ὁ
 τ' ἀνελεύθερος ἐναντίως τούτῳ ὁ μὴ ἀναλίσκων εἰς
 ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ. ἀμφότεροι δὲ οὗτοι²
 ψεκτοί. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ὁ μὲν κατ' ἔλλειψιν ὁ δὲ
 καθ' ὑπερβολήν. ὁ ἄρα ἐλευθέριος, ἐπειδὴ ἐστιν
 ἐπαινετός, μέσος τις ἂν εἴη τούτων. τίς οὖν ἐστίν;
 ὁ ἀναλίσκων εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ.

XXIV. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀνελευθεριότητος εἷδη¹
 πλείω, οἷον κίμβικας τινὰς καλοῦμεν καὶ κυμινο-
 πρίστας καὶ αἰσχροκερδεῖς καὶ μικρολόγους. πάντες
 10 δ' οὗτοι ὑπὸ τὴν ἀνελευθεριότητα πίπτουσιν. τὸ
 μὲν γὰρ κακὸν πολυειδές, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν μονοειδές,
 οἷον ἢ μὲν ὑγίεια ἀπλοῦν, ἢ δὲ νόσος πολυειδές.
 ὁμοίως ἢ μὲν ἀρετὴ ἀπλοῦν, ἢ δὲ κακία πολυειδές.
 πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι περὶ χρήματά εἰσι ψεκτοί.

15 Πότερον οὖν τοῦ ἐλευθερίου καὶ τὸ κτήσασθαι²
 ἐστι καὶ τὸ παρασκευάσασθαι χρήματα; ἢ οὐ;
 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ἀρετῆς οὐδεμιᾶς. οὔτε γὰρ τῆς
 ἀνδρείας ἐστὶ τὸ ὅπλα ποιῆσαι, ἀλλ' ἄλλης,¹ ταύτης
 δὲ λαβούσης τούτοις ὀρθῶς χρήσασθαι, ὁμοίως ἐπὶ
 σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· οὔτε δὲ τῆς ἐλευ-
 20 θεριότητος, ἀλλ' ἤδη χρηματιστικῆς.

XXV. Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία μεσότης μὲν ἐστὶν¹
 χαυνότητος καὶ μικροψυχίας, ἔστι δὲ περὶ τιμὴν

¹ Perhaps ὀπλοποιικῆς should be restored in place of ἄλλης: "this is the task of the armourer; from him Courage. . ."

* Or "Meanness" (Rackham).

² Or "skinflints" (Grant and Rackham).

(Eud. III. iv. : Nic. IV. i.)

- 1 XXIII. Liberality is a mean state between Prodigality and Illiberality.^a Such affections have wealth for their province ; for the prodigal is one who spends excessively for wrong purposes and at wrong times, while the illiberal on the contrary does not spend as much as he ought, nor where he ought nor when. ^{(1) of Liberality ;}
- 2 Both deserve censure ; the one errs in defect, and the other in excess. The liberal man therefore, deserving as he is of praise, will occupy a position midway between them. Who then is this liberal man ? One who spends the right amount, on the right objects, and at the right time.
- 1 XXIV. Of Illiberality there are various forms ; we speak for example of the niggards, the grain-splitters,^b the greedy and the penurious. All these fall under the heading of illiberality. Evil takes various forms, where good has only one : health, for example, is a simple thing, but disease is manifold. So too virtue is simple, and vice manifold. For all those whom we have enumerated deserve censure for their misuse of wealth.
- 2 Is it, then, the duty of the liberal man (as such) to acquire property and provide himself wealth ? Hardly. Such tasks are not for liberality nor for any other virtue. Courage is not expected to provide arms ; a different (activity) provides them, and Courage takes them and uses them aright. So it is with Temperance and the other virtues. Finance therefore, and not Liberality, provides us with wealth.

(Eud. III. v. : Nic. IV. iii.)

- 1 XXV. Greatness of Soul is a state midway between Vanity and Littleness of Soul. Its province is honour ^{(5) of Greatness of Soul ;}

1192 a

καὶ ἀτιμίαν, καὶ περὶ τιμὴν οὐ τὴν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἀλλὰ τὴν παρὰ τῶν σπουδαίων, καὶ μᾶλλον
 25 δὲ δὴ περὶ ταύτην. οἱ γὰρ σπουδαῖοι εἰδότες καὶ κρίνοντες ὀρθῶς τιμήσουσιν· βουλήσεται οὖν μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν συνειδότων αὐτῷ ὅτι ἄξιός ἐστι τιμῆς τιμᾶσθαι. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ πᾶσαν τιμὴν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν βελτίστην, καὶ τὸ τίμιον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀρχῆς τάξιν ἔχον.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν εὐκαταφρόνητοι ὄντες καὶ φαῦλοι, 2
 30 μεγάλων δ' αὐτοὺς ἀξιοῦντες καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τιμᾶσθαι οἰόμενοι δεῖν, χαῖνοι· ὅσοι δὲ ἐλαττόνων αὐτοὺς ἀξιοῦσιν ἢ προσῆκον αὐτοῖς, μικρόψυχοι. ὁ ἄρα μέσος τούτων ἐστὶν ὃς μήτε ἐλάττονος τιμῆς 3 αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἢ προσήκει, μήτε μείζονος ἢ ἀξίος ἐστίν, μήτε πάσης· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος.
 35 ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ μεγαλοψυχία μεσότης ἐστὶ χαυνότητος καὶ μικροψυχίας.

XXVI. Μεγαλοπρέπεια δ' ἐστὶν μεσότης σαλα- 1
 κωνείας καὶ μικροπρεπείας. ἔστιν δ' ἡ μεγαλο-
 1192 b πρέπεια περὶ δαπάνας ἃς τῷ πρέποντι γίνεσθαι
 προσήκει. ὅστις μὲν οὖν δαπανᾷ οὐ μὴ δεῖ, σαλά-
 κων, ὅλον εἴ τις ἐστιᾷ ἐρανιστὰς ὡς ἂν γάμους
 τις ἐστιῶν, ὁ τοιοῦτος σαλάκων (ὁ γὰρ σαλάκων
 τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, ὁ ἐν ᾧ μὴ δεῖ καιρῷ ἐνδεικνύμενος
 2 τὴν ἑαυτοῦ εὐπορίαν)· ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς ὁ ἐναντίος 2

¹ Reading ἡ μᾶλλον γε (? Susemihl) for καὶ μᾶλλον δέ (MSS.).

* Cf. c. ii. 1 above, *Eud.* III. v. 10, *Nic.* I. xii. 8.

² The word σαλάκων comes from *Eud.* who also gives δαπανηρία, "extravagance," as the excess. *Nic.* prefers βαναυσία, "vulgarity," and ἀπειροκαλία, "lack of taste."

and dishonour : not such honour as the multitude confer, but that paid by the good—or at any rate the latter kind more than the former. For the good know and judge aright when they honour a man ; a great soul, therefore, will prefer to be honoured by those who know, as he knows, that he is worthy of honour. For he will not concern himself with every kind of honour, but with the best ; with that good which confers honour, and ranks as something original or fundamental.^a

- 2 Now men who are despicable and of small worth, but account themselves of great worth, and believe moreover that they are entitled to honour, are vain ; while they who account themselves of less worth than
3 is their due are little of soul. Between the two, therefore, stands he who, though claiming his full meed of honour, expects neither more than he deserves nor all that man can give ; and this is the man who is great of soul. It is clear, therefore, that Greatness of Soul is a state midway between Vanity and Littleness of Soul.

(*Eud.* III. vi. : *Nic.* IV. ii.)

- 1 XXVI. Munificence or Magnificence is a state of soul midway between Ostentation^b and Niggardliness.^c Its province is the expenditure (of large amounts) where due measure should be observed. He who is lavish in the wrong place is ostentatious. A man, for example, who entertains the members of his club with all the lavishness of a wedding feast is ostentatious ; such being the name we give to one who displays his wealth on the wrong
2 occasion. His opposite is the niggard, who where

(it) of
Munificence
or Magni-
ficence

^a " Pettiness," Giant ; " shabbiness," Rackham.

1192^b

τούτῳ, ὅς οὐ δεῖ μὴ μεγαλείως δαπανήσῃ, ἢ τοῦτο μὴ ποιῶν, ὅλον εἰς γάμους ἢ χορηγίαν δαπανῶν, μὴ ἀξίως ἀλλ' ἐνδεῶς, ὁ τοιοῦτος μικροπρεπής.¹

Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος ³ φανερά ἐστιν οὕσα τοιαύτη οἷαν λέγομεν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ¹⁰ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῷ πρέποντι τὸ μέγα δαπανᾷ, ὀρθῶς τῇ μεγαλοπρεπείᾳ τοῦνομα κεῖται. ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἄρα ἂν εἴη, ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶν ἐπαινετή, μεσότης τις ἐλλείψεως καὶ ὑπερβολῆς τῆς περὶ δαπάνας τὰς προσηκούσας, ἐν οἷς δεῖ.

Εἰσὶ δέ, ὡς οἴονται, καὶ πλείους μεγαλοπρέπειαι, ⁴ ¹⁵ οἷόν φασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς τ' ἐβάδισε, καὶ ἄλλαι δὲ τοιαῦται μεγαλοπρέπειαι μεταφοραῖς λέγονται, οὐ κυρίως· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐν τούτοις μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς εἰρήκαμεν.

XXVII. Νέμεσις δὲ ἐστὶν μεσότης φθονερίας ¹ καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας· ἀμφοτέραι γὰρ αὗται ψεκταὶ ²⁰ εἰσὶν, ὁ δὲ νεμεσητικός ἐπαινετός. ἔστι δ' ἡ νέμεσις περὶ ἀγαθὰ, ἃ τυγχάνει ὑπάρχοντα ἀναξίῳ ὄντι, λυπὴ τις. νεμεσητικός οὖν ὁ ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λυπητικός. καὶ ὁ αὐτός γε πάλιν οὗτος λυπῆσεται, ἂν τινα ἴδῃ κακῶς πράττοντα ἀνάξιον ὄντα.

¹ Reading ὅς οὐ δεῖ μεγαλείως δαπανῆσαι ἢ τοῦτο μὴ ποιῇ, ὅλον εἰς γάμους ἢ χορηγίαν, ἢ μὴ ἀξίως ἀλλ' ἐνδεῶς. ὁ τοιοῦτος μικροπρεπής. (μὴ omitted before μεγαλείως by the Laurentian ms. and another. Perhaps ὅλον εἰς γάμους ἢ χορηγίαν should be placed after δαπανῆσαι.)

* The intermediate states of Righteous Indignation and Modesty are not regarded as virtues by Nic. or Eud. The former's discussion of them (promised in II. vii.) is broken off at the end of Bk. IV. The latter (III. vii.) extends the conception of νέμεσις to include pleasure when prosperity or adversity is deserved, as well as pain when they are undeserved.

lavish expense is called for, either shuts his purse—for example when a wedding or the equipment of a public chorus demands expenditure—or else spends inadequately and unworthily of the occasion. Such a man then is a niggard.

- 3 As for Magnificence, the very word shows that the state is what we describe it to be. Truly is that virtue termed *megaloprepeia* which lavishes great (*mega*) wealth on the fitting (*preponé*) occasion. Magnificence therefore, being a state worthy of praise, lies intermediate between deficiency and excess of fitting expenditure on the right occasions.

- 4 There are commonly thought to be several kinds of magnificence; men say, for example, "he strode along magnificently"; and there are other similar kinds of magnificence to which the term is applied not properly but metaphorically. True Magnificence is not shown in such matters; but in the province we have defined.

(*Eud.* III. vii. ; cf. II. iii. and *Nic.* II. vii.)

- 1 XXVII. Righteous Indignation stands midway between Grudge of Good and Pleasure at Ill.^a Both these are deserving of censure; whereas he who is given to Righteous Indignation is worthy of our praise. Now this feeling is a kind of pain excited by the good things which an unworthy man enjoys. One, therefore, to whom such goods occasion pain, is a man of Righteous Indignation; and the same man will feel pain if he sees another suffering undeserved ills.

deserved. It is thus not merely "Righteous Indignation," but rather "Love of the Just Meed." As Grant and Rackham observe in their notes on *Nic.* II. iii. 15, Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* recognizes that *phóros* and *érixusperantía* are two manifestations of one state of feeling.

1192 b

Ἡ μὲν οὖν νέμεσις καὶ ὁ νεμεσητικὸς ἴσως 2
 25 τοιοῦτος, ὁ δὲ γε φθονερός ἐναντίος τούτῳ. ἀπλῶς
 γάρ, ἂν τε ἀξίος τις ᾗ ἂν τε μὴ τοῦ εὖ πράττειν,
 λυπήσεται. ὁμοίως τούτῳ ὁ ἐπιχαιρέκακος ἡσθή-
 σεται κακῶς πράττοντι καὶ τῷ ἀξίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀναξίῳ.
 ὁ δὲ γε νεμεσητικὸς οὐ [τοιοῦτος], ἀλλὰ μέσος τίς
 ἐστὶ τούτων.

30 XXVIII. Σεμνότης δὲ ἐστὶν αὐθαδείας ἀνὰ μέσον 1
 τε καὶ ἀρεσκείας, ἐστὶν δὲ περὶ τὰς ἐντεύξεις. ὁ
 τε γὰρ αὐθάδης τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷος μηθεὶ ἐντυχεῖν
 μηδὲ διαλεγῆναι (ἀλλὰ τοῦνομα ἔοικεν ἀπὸ τοῦ
 τρόπου κείσθαι· ὁ γὰρ αὐθάδης αὐτοάδης τις ἐστίν,
 ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν)· ὁ δὲ ἀρεσκος τοιοῦ- 2
 35 τος οἷος πᾶσιν ὁμιλεῖν καὶ πάντως καὶ πανταχῇ.
 οὐδέτερος δὲ τούτων ἐπαινετός, ὁ δὲ γε σεμνὸς
 ἀνὰ μέσον τούτων ὧν ἐπαινετός· οὔτε γὰρ πρὸς
 πάντας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους, οὔτε πρὸς οὐθένα,
 ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους.

1193 a

XXIX. Αἰδὼς δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ 1
 καταπλήξεως, ἐστὶν δὲ περὶ πράξεις καὶ λόγους.
 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀναισχυντός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν παντὶ καὶ πρὸς
 πάντας λέγων καὶ πράττων ἅ ἔτυχεν, ὁ δὲ κατα-
 6 πεπληγμένος ὁ ἐναντίος τούτῳ, ὁ πάντα καὶ [πρὸς]
 πάντας εὐλαβούμενος καὶ πράξαι καὶ εἰπεῖν (ἀ-

* In *End.* iii. 7 the treatment of Dignity follows that of Modesty.

* With Truthfulness, Urbanity and Friendship, Nic. closes his list of Virtues in II. vii. In IV. vi. he distinguishes from Friendship a dispassionate state, for which he finds no name; *Eud.* calls it σεμνότης (Dignity). Friendship itself is fully discussed in *Nic.* VIII. and IX. (*Eud.* VII.). *Eud.* (III. vii. 10) denies the name of Virtue to all four states "since they do not proceed from Determination."

2 Such perhaps is the feeling, and such the man who feels it. His opposite is the *grudging* man ; who will feel an indiscriminate grudge against the fortunate, whether he deserve his good fortune or not. Similarly, the man who rejoices in ill fortune will feel pleasure when another suffers ills, whether he deserve them or not. Not so the man of Righteous Indignation : his position is between the two.

(*Eud.* II. iii., III. vii. : *Nic.* II. vii., IV. vi.)

1 XXVIII.^a Dignity occupies a position midway (of Dignity) between Self-Sufficiency and Easy Complaisance.^b Its province is social intercourse. The self-sufficient man is one who avoids all intercourse and conversation with his fellows ; his very name seems to have been given him from this peculiarity, for the self-sufficient
2 is one who suffices himself. The complaisant^c man on the other hand will consort with all in every way and under every circumstance. Neither of these is deserving of praise ; but the dignified man, holding an intermediate position, does deserve it ; since he neither consorts with all men, nor yet with no man ; but with the worthy, and with them alone.

(*Eud.* II. iii., III. vii. : *Nic.* II. vii., IV. ix.)

XXIX. Modesty or Honourable Shame is a mean (of Modesty) betwixt Shamelessness and Bashfulness. Both actions and words are its province. The shameless man is one who speaks and acts on every occasion and to all men just as occurs to him. His opposite is the bashful^d man, who shrinks altogether from speech or

^a " Obsequious " (Rackham), " weak assentor " (Grant).

^b " Grovelling " (Rackham).

πρακτος γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος, ὁ πάντα καταπληττόμενος).
 ἢ δὲ αἰδῶς καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων μεσότης τις τούτων.²
 οὔτε γὰρ ἅπαντα καὶ πάντως, ὡς ὁ ἀναίσχυτος,
 καὶ ἔρεϊ καὶ πράξει, οὔτε ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ, ἐν παντὶ
 10 καὶ πάντως εὐλαβηθήσεται, ἀλλὰ πράξει καὶ ἔρεϊ
 ἐν οἷς δεῖ καὶ ἂ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ.

XXX. Εὐτραπελία δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης βωμολοχίας¹
 καὶ ἀγροικίας, ἔστιν δὲ περὶ [τὰ] σκώμματα. ὁ τε
 γὰρ βωμολόχος ἐστὶν ὁ πάντα καὶ πᾶν οἶόμενος
 δεῖν σκώπτειν, ὃ τε ἄγροικος ὁ μήτε σκώπτειν
 15 βουλόμενος δεῖν μήτε σκωφθῆναι, ἀλλ' ὀργιζόμενος.
 ὁ δ' εὐτράπελος ἀνὰ μέσον τούτων, ὁ μήτε πάντας²
 καὶ πάντως σκώπτων μήτ' αὐ[τὸς]¹ ἄγροικος ὢν.
 ἔσται δὲ ὁ εὐτράπελος διττῶς πως λεγόμενος· καὶ
 γὰρ ὁ δυνάμενος σκῶψαι ἐμμελῶς, καὶ ὃς ἀν
 ὑπομείνῃ σκωπτόμενος, εὐτράπελος· καὶ ἡ εὐτρα-
 πελία τοιαύτη.

20 XXXI. Φιλία δ' ἐστὶν μεσότης κολακείας καὶ
 ἔχθρας, ἔστιν δὲ περὶ πράξεις καὶ λόγους· ὁ μὲν
 γὰρ κόλαξ ἐστὶν ὁ πλείω τῶν προσηκόντων καὶ
 ὄντων προστιθείς, ὁ δὲ ἀπεχθητικὸς ἐχθρὸς καὶ
 τῶν ὑπαρχόντων περιαιρῶν. οὐδέτερος οὖν ὀρθῶς
 ἐπαινετὸς ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ φίλος ἀνὰ μέσον τούτων·
 25 οὔτε γὰρ πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσθήσει, οὔτ'

¹ [τὸς] bracketed by Spengel.

* Rackham gives "Wittiness . . . Buffoonery . . . Boorishness." See Grant's notes on *Nic.* IV. viii. with the references to passages on Wit and Humour in the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*.

* Or "Flattery."

action towards his fellows ; such a man, being complete in bashfulness, is necessarily debarred from
 2 action. Honourable Shame, and the man who is inspired by it, stand midway between the two. Such a man will not, like the shameless man, say and do anything and everything without regard to circumstances ; nor, like the bashful man, will he on every occasion and under every circumstance refrain ; but will, at the right occasion and time, do and speak what is right.

(*Eud.* II. iii., III. vii. : *Nic.* II. vii., IV. viii.)

1 XXX. Urbanity is a state intermediate between
 Buffoonery and Dullness^a : its province is wit and humour. The buffoon is a man who must needs make
 jest of everything without discrimination : the dullard
 is he who dislikes to make a jest, or to be the object of
 2 one ; if he is, he grows angry. The urbane occupies a
 position midway between. He neither jests on every
 man or under every circumstance, nor again is he
 dull of wit. And we shall predicate urbanity of a man
 in two senses ; for not only is he urbane who can jest
 gracefully, but urbane, also, is he who takes another's
 jest in good part. Such is the nature of Urbanity.

(*Eud.* III. vii. : *Nic.* II. vii., iv., vi. ; and see note on
 xxviii. I above.)

1 XXXI. Friendship is a state intermediate between
 Sycophancy^b and Hatred ; both actions and words
 are its province. The sycophant is one who eulogizes
 another beyond truth and desert ; the hater is his
 neighbour's enemy, and strips him of the credit that
 is justly his. Neither of these can rightly be com-
 2 mended ; but midway between them stands the true
 friend, who will neither attribute to a man more than

1193 a

ἐπαινέσει τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα, οὐτ' αὖ πάλιν ἐλάττω ποιήσει, οὔτε πάντως ἐναντιώσεται παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ.

XXXII. Ὁ μὲν οὖν φίλος τοιοῦτος· ἀλήθεια δέ 1
ἐστὶν μεταξὺ εἰρωνείας καὶ ἀλαζονείας. ἔστι δὴ
περὶ λόγους, οὐ πάντας δέ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀλαζών
30 ἐστὶν ὁ πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ προσποιού-
μενος εἶναι, ἢ εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ οἶδεν, ὁ δ' εἰρων ἐναντίος
τούτῳ καὶ ἐλάττω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος
αὐτῷ εἶναι, καὶ ἢ οἶδεν μὴ φάσκων, ἀλλ' ἐπι-
κρυπτόμενος τὸ εἰδέναι. ὁ δὲ ἀληθής οὐδέτερον τού- 2
των ποιήσει. οὔτε γὰρ προσποιήσεται πλείω τῶν
36 ὑπαρχόντων οὐτ' ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῷ
ταῦτα φήσει καὶ εἶναι καὶ εἰδέναι.

Εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἢ μὴ ἀρεταί, ἄλλος
ἂν εἴη λόγος· ὅτι δὲ μεσότητές εἰσι τῶν εἰρημένων,
δηλον. οἱ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὰς ζῶντες ἐπαινοῦνται.

XXXIII. Περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη 1
εἰπεῖν, τί ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τίσιν καὶ περὶ ποῖα.

1193 b

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ λάβοιμεν τί ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον,
ἔστιν δὴ διττὸν τὸ δίκαιον, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ
νόμον. δίκαια γὰρ φασιν εἶναι ἢ ὁ νόμος προσ- 2
τάττει. ὁ δὲ νόμος κελεύει τάνδρεϊα πράττειν καὶ .

* "Self-depreciation," Rackham. See his note on *Nic.* II. vii. 12, and Grant's note on *Nic.* IV. vii. 3. Observe also that in II. vii. *Nic.* provisionally terms the virtue ἀλήθεια, whereas in IV. vii. he prefers to leave it nameless.

^b Comparing *End.* III. vii. 1-10, we may take these to be the six states treated in cc. xxvii.-xxxii. See notes on cc. xxvii. 1 and xxviii. 1.

his due, nor commend what does not deserve praise ; nor on the other hand will he detract, nor ever set himself in opposition unless he feels it is right. Such is the genuine Friend.

(*Eud.* II. iii., III. vii., *Nic.* II. vii., IV. vii.)

- 1 XXXII. Truthfulness lies between Dissimulation ^a of (Truthfulness) ; and Boastfulness ; words are its province, but words of certain kinds only. The hoaster is one who claims to possess more than is really his, or to know what he really knows not. His opposite is the dissembler, who pretends to less than is really his, or denies his
2 real knowledge, concealing what he knows. The truthful man will avoid both these extremes, claiming neither more nor less than he really possesses, but declaring the truth concerning his qualities and his knowledge.

Now whether these states ^b are virtues or not, is matter for another discourse. That they are states intermediate between the said extremes is however clear ; since those who live in them receive honour.

(The next Chapter is based according to Susemihl on *Nic.* V. = *Eud.* IV., the Sections corresponding as follows :

1-3, to *Nic.* V. i. 1-18 ; 4-14, to iii.-v. 16 ; 15-21, to vi. 4-vii. 5 ; 22-26, to vii. 7-viii., with insertions from *Nic.* III. ii and v. ; 27-30, to ix. 1-7 ; 31-35, to xi. ; and the concluding portion to ix. 8-13.)

- 1 XXXIII. We have still to speak of Justice ^c : its ^{(7) of Justice} essence, occasions, and province.

In the first place, if we grasp the essential Principle ^{The Principle of Justice} of Justice,^d we find that it is of two kinds. One of ^{two-fold} these is Legal Justice ; for men say that what the law ^{(1) Legal ;} enjoins is just. Now the law commands brave and

^c δικαιοσύνη. Justice the Virtue or State of soul.

^d τὸ δίκαιον : Justice the Rule or Principle.

1193^b

τὰ σώφρονα καὶ ἀπλῶς ἅπαντα ὅσα κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς λέγεται. διὸ καί, φασίν, δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τελεία τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ δίκαια μὲν ἔστιν ἡ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ νόμος τὰ κατὰ πάσας ἀρετὰς ὄντα προστάττει, ὁ ἄρα τοῖς κατὰ νόμον ἐμμένων δικαίοις τελείως σπουδαῖος ἔσται, ὥστε ὁ δίκαιος καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τελεία τις ἀρετὴ ἔστιν.

Ἐν μὲν δὴ τι δίκαιον ἔν τε τούτοις ἔστι καὶ περὶ ταῦτα· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ τοῦτο τὸ δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν περὶ ταῦτα δικαιοσύνην ζητοῦμεν. κατὰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ δίκαια ἔστιν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὄντα δίκαιον εἶναι (ὁ γὰρ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔστι τοιοῦτος)· ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ πρὸς ἕτερον ἄλλο τοῦ εἰρημένου κατὰ νόμον δικαίου ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον δικαίοις οὐσιν καθ' αὐτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ὃ ζητοῦμεν δίκαιον καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν περὶ ταῦτα.

Τὸ τοίνυν δίκαιόν ἔστιν τὸ πρὸς ἕτερον ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν τὸ ἴσον. τὸ γὰρ ἄδικον τὸ ἄνισον ἔστιν· ὅταν γὰρ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μείζω αὐτοῖς νέμωσι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν τὰ ἐλάσσονα, ἄνισον τοῦτ' ἔστί, καὶ οὕτως ἄδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι οἴονται. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀδικία ἐν ἀνίσοις, ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἰσότητι συμβολαίων. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τις ἂν εἴη ὑπεροχῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως καὶ πολλοῦ καὶ ὀλίγου. ὁ τε γὰρ ἄδικος τῷ ἄδικεῖν πλεῖον ἔχει, καὶ ὁ ἀδικούμενος δὲ τῷ

^a See Rackham on *Nic. V. i. 1*.

^b Cf. Plato's definition of Justice as "doing one's own business" (*Republic*, IV. x.).

^c The author here diverges from *Nic. V. i. 15*, where we read that Legal Justice is perfect Virtue, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς, 534

temperate action ; and in a word, all action which we recognize as inspired by the virtues. On this account we are told that Justice or Righteousness ^a may be regarded as a kind of perfect Virtue. For if what the law bids us do is just, and the law enjoins actions inspired by all the virtues, he who observes the precepts of Justice given by law is a good man ; and so of the just man and his Justice we may predicate a perfect virtue.^b

3 This then is one kind of Justice : and such are its occasions and province. Yet it is not this principle, nor the kind of virtue which rules in this province that is the object of our inquiry. A man who observes these rules of Justice may be just even in solitude, since the temperate and self-controlled are such in and by themselves ^c ; but Justice in our dealings with our neighbour is something different from this legal Justice of which we have been speaking. The Justice that is seen in our dealings with another cannot be merely self-contained. And it is this (principle of social) Justice, and the corresponding virtue whose province is social life, for which we are now inquiring.

4 Broadly speaking, social Justice may be defined as equality. Injustice is inequality ; for example, when (2) Equative, men apportion to themselves the larger share of good things and the less share of evil things, this is unequal, 5 and we say that Injustice is done and suffered. Since, therefore, Injustice is found in unequal conditions, the Rule and Virtue of Justice are both manifested when our dealings are on equal terms. Clearly, therefore, the virtue of Justice is a mean betwixt excess and 6 defect, much and little. By doing Injustice the unjust man receives more : through suffering Injustice the

ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον, "though with a qualification, namely that it is displayed towards others" (Rackham.)

1183 b

ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔλαττον· τὸ δέ γε μέσον τούτων δίκαιον
 ἐστί. τὸ δέ μέσον ἴσον· ὥστε τὸ ἴσον ἂν πλείονος
 30 καὶ ἐλάττονος εἶη δίκαιον, καὶ δίκαιος δὲ ὁ τὸ ἴσον
 βουλόμενος ἔχειν. τὸ δέ γε ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις 7
 δυσὶν ἐγγίνεται· τὸ ἄρα πρὸς ἕτερον ἴσον εἶναι
 δίκαιον ἐστί, καὶ δίκαιος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἶη.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐν δικάῳ καὶ ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ 8
 ἐν μεσότητι, (καὶ)² τὸ μὲν δίκαιόν [ἐν]³ τισι
 35 λέγεται δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἴσον ἐν τισιν ἴσον, τὸ δὲ
 μέσον τισὶ³ μέσον· ὥστε ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ
 δίκαιον ἔσται καὶ πρὸς τινὰς καὶ ἐν τισίν.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον, καὶ τὸ τῷ ἀντί- 9
 λογον ἴσον δίκαιον⁴ ἂν εἶη. τὸ δ' ἀνάλογον ἐν
 τέτταρσι γίνεται ἐλαχίστοις· ὥς γὰρ τὸ Α πρὸς
 τὸ Β, τὸ Γ πρὸς τὸ Δ. οἷον ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν τὸν
 1194 a τὰ πολλὰ κεκτημένον πολλὰ εἰσφέρειν, τὸν δὲ τὰ
 ὀλίγα κεκτημένον ὀλίγα· πάλιν ὁμοίως τὸν μὲν
 πολλὰ πεπονηκότα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν, τὸν δὲ ὀλίγα
 πεπονηκότα ὀλίγα λαμβάνειν. ὥς δὲ ἔχει ὁ πε-
 πονηκὼς πρὸς τὸν μὴ πεπονηκότα, οὕτω τὰ πολλὰ
 5 πρὸς τὰ ὀλίγα. ὥς δὲ ὁ πεπονηκὼς πρὸς τὰ πολλὰ,
 οὕτως ὁ μὴ πεπονηκὼς πρὸς τὰ ὀλίγα.

Ἔοικεν δὲ καὶ Πλάτων τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ ταύτῃ τοῦ 10
 δίκαιου χρῆσθαι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ γεωρ-
 γός, φησί, σῖτον ποιεῖ, ὁ δ' οἰκοδόμος οἰκίαν, ὁ
 δὲ ὑφάντης ἱμάτιον, ὁ δὲ σκυτοτόμος ὑπόδημα.
 10 ὁ μὲν οὖν γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ σῖτον δίδωσιν,
 ὁ δ' οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ οἰκίαν· ὁμοίως δὲ οἱ

¹ Reading καὶ τὸ δίκαιον (Spengel) for ἐν δικάῳ καὶ (MSB.).

² Omitting (καὶ) (inserted by Rieckher and Susenuhl) and [ἐν] (bracketed by the same editors).

- wronged man receives less. The mean state betwixt this more and less is Justice; and such a mean is equality. Equality therefore, which avoids alike the more and the less, will be Justice, and the just man, he who desires to share equally with his neighbour;
- 7 such equality implying at least two terms. So that equality with another is Justice, and the man who is satisfied with it is just.
- 8 Since, then, the virtue and principle of Justice are found in equality and in mediety, we speak of Justice Justice
equates
proportionally towards someone, of an equality of two or more terms, and of a mean betwixt certain extremes; and accordingly virtue and principle alike demand certain persons and a certain sphere for their manifestation.
- 9 Seeing, then, that the principle of Justice is an equality, it is the proportionate kind of equality that will be Justice. Now proportion requires at least four terms, being an equality between the two ratios A to B and C to D. It is proportionate, for example, that one who has large possessions should pay a large amount in taxes, whilst he who possesses little pays little; and likewise that one who has toiled much should receive much, whilst he who has toiled little also receives little. The ratio of the labours should equal the ratio of the receipts, and the ratios of labour to receipt equal one another.
- 10 Plato apparently makes use of this proportionate Justice in his model State. The farmer, he says, produces food, the builder a house, the weaver a dress, the shoemaker shoes. Accordingly the farmer gives the builder food, and the builder gives the farmer a
- ³ Reading τῶν (Spengel) for τοῖ (MS.). (Cf. Nic. V. iii. 4 foll.)
- ⁴ Or, omitting δίκαιον, "it will be the proportionate kind of equality."

1194 a

ἄλλοι πάντες οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὥστε τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις.

Ἔστιν δ' ἡ ἀναλογία αὕτη· ὡς γὰρ ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ¹ οἰκοδόμῳ, οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ¹ ὁμοίως τῷ σκυτεῖ, τῷ ὑφάντῃ, τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ἡ αὕτη ἀναλογία πρὸς ἀλλήλους γίνεται· καὶ συνέχει δὴ αὕτη <ἡ> ἀναλογία τὴν πολιτείαν. ὥστε τὸ δίκαιον ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ ἀνάλογον. τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον συνέχει τὰς πολιτείας, τὸ αὐτὸ δ'² ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῷ ἀνάλογον.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ οἰκοδόμος πλείονος ἄξιον ποιεῖ τὸ¹² αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἢ ὁ σκυτεὺς, καὶ ἦν ἔργον ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι [καὶ] τῷ σκυτεῖ πρὸς τὸν οἰκοδόμον, ἀνθ' ὑποδημάτων δ' οὐκ ἦν οἰκίαν λαβεῖν, ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐνόμισαν, οὐ ταῦτα πάντα ὠνητὰ εἶσιν, ἀργύριον προσαγορεύσαντες νόμισμα, τούτῳ χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστον ἐκάστου διδόντας τὴν ἀλλαξιν²⁵ ποιεῖσθαι παρ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ τούτῳ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχουσιν.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐν τούτοις καὶ τοῖς¹³ εἰρημένους ἔμπροσθεν, ἡ περὶ ταῦτα δικαιοσύνη ἂν εἴη τῇ ἕξει³ ὁρμὴν ἔχουσα μετὰ προαιρέσεως περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τούτοις.

Ἔστιν δὲ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, οὐ μέντοι³⁰ γε ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔλεγον. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ᾤοντο δίκαιον εἶναι, ἃ τις ἐποίησεν, ταῦτ' ἀντιπαθεῖν· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἔστιν πρὸς ἅπαντας.

¹ Reading ὡς γὰρ ὁ γεωργὸς πρὸς τὸ τοῦ οἰκοδόμου οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ (? Wilson). Or perhaps ὡς γὰρ ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ οὕτως τὸ τοῦ οἰκοδόμου τῷ τοῦ γεωργοῦ, "as is the farmer to the builder, so is the builder's produce to the farmer's." This comes to the same thing (for if $A : B :: b : a$, then likewise $A : b :: B : a$); and it is

house ; in like manner all the other producers are inter-related by mutual exchange of their produce.^a

- 11 Now this is the nature of the proportion : as the farmer is to the builder's produce, so is the builder to the farmer's produce. And so too with the shoemaker, weaver, and the rest. The same proportion must be observed between them, and this proportion is the bond of the commonwealth. Justice therefore is proportion ; for Justice is the bond of commonwealths. Justice then is the same as proportion.

- 12 But since the produce of the builder is of more value than that of the shoemaker, and difficulty arose in effecting an exchange between them—it being impossible to buy a house with pairs of shoes—the practice became current of using, as common means of buying, the silver which was therefore termed " currency " ; and for every purchaser to effect the exchange by giving the value of his purchase (in silver) which thus became the bond of social unity.

- 13 Since then Justice as a principle is concerned with these matters and with those we have previously mentioned, the Virtue whose province they are will be a state of the soul which produces a purposive impulse concerning them and within their limits.^b

Reprisal is also a kind of Justice, though not in the sense the Pythagoreans meant. They thought it just for a man to suffer in return whatever he had done ; but such reprisal is not just between all men.

^a Republic, II. xl.

^b Cf. c. xx. 10 above.

rather nearer the mss. " Farmer " and " Builder " seem to stand for the labour each respectively spends on his product. See Stewart on Nic. V. v. 10.

^a Putting a full stop at *πολεμίας* and reading (with two mss.) *δὴ* for *δ'*.

^b Reading *τις ἐξῆς* (Spengel) for *τῇ ἐξῆς* mss.

1194 a

οὐ γάρ ἐστι δίκαιον οἰκέτη πρὸς ἐλεύθερον ταυτόν· 14
 ὁ οἰκέτης γὰρ εἰάν πατάξῃ τὸν ἐλεύθερον, οὐκ ἔστιν
 δίκαιος ἀντιπληγῆναι, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις. καὶ τὸ ἀντι-
 πεποιθὸς δὲ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον. ὡς
 15 γὰρ ὁ ἐλεύθερος ἔχει πρὸς τὸν δοῦλον τῷ βελτίων
 εἶναι, οὕτως τὸ ἀντιποιῆσαι πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι.
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ πρὸς ἐλεύθερον ἔξει οὐ
 γὰρ δίκαιον, εἴ τις τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐξέκοψεν τινός,
 ἀντεκκοπῆναι μόνον, ἀλλὰ πλείονα παθεῖν, ἀκολου-
 θήσαντα τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ἦρξε πρότερος καὶ
 1194 b ἡδίκησεν, ἀδικεῖ δὲ κατ' ἀμφοτέρα, ὥστε ἀνάλογον
 καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα, καὶ τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν πλείω ὢν
 ἐποίησεν δίκαιον ἐστίν.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον πολλαχῶς λέγεται, διοριστέον 15
 ἂν εἴη ὑπὲρ παίου δικαίου ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις.

Ἔστιν δὴ δίκαιόν τι, ὡς φασίν, οἰκέτη πρὸς
 δεσπότην καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα. τὸ δ' ἐν τούτοις
 δίκαιον ὁμωνύμως ἂν δόξειεν λέγεσθαι τῷ πολιτικῷ
 δικαίῳ (ἐστὶν γὰρ <τὸ> δίκαιον, ὑπὲρ οὗ ἐστὶν ἡ
 σκέψις, τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον)· τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα 16
 ἐστὶν ἐν ἰσότητι (κοινωνοὶ γὰρ οἱ πολῖταί τινες, καὶ
 10 ὅμοιοι βούλονται εἶναι τῇ φύσει, τῷ δὲ τρόπῳ
 ἕτεροι), τῷ δὲ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα καὶ οἰκέτη πρὸς
 δεσπότην οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐθέν. οὔτε
 γὰρ τῷ ποδὶ τῷ ἐμῷ πρὸς ἐμὲ οὔτε τῇ χειρὶ,
 ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ' ἐκάστῳ τῶν μορίων· ὡσαύτως ἂν
 οὐδὲν δόξειεν ἔχειν καὶ ὁ υἱὸς πρὸς πατέρα· ὥσπερ
 15 γὰρ μέρος τί ἐστι τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός. πλὴν ὅταν

- 14 Justice for instance between slave and free is not the same (as that between freemen). For if a slave strikes a freeman, he will justly receive, not blow for blow, but many blows. But this kind of Justice, too, is contained in proportion. For as the free man is related to the slave in rank, so is the reprisal he may take to the injury he suffered. And a like proportionateness will govern reprisals between the free. If one man has knocked out another's eye, Justice demands not merely that his eye be knocked out in return, but that he suffer a worse penalty in accordance with the law of proportion. He was the aggressor, and he inflicted an injury; he is therefore guilty of a twofold injustice. So that acts of injustice also fall under the law of proportion: and it is just that one suffer in return more than one has inflicted.

(Nic. V. = End IV. vi)

- 15 Since the word Justice is used in a number of different senses, we must define the kind of Justice we are to investigate.

- In the first place, men speak of a Justice between slave and master, and between son and father. But Justice in these relationships would seem identical only in name with social Justice: that social Justice into which we are inquiring. The latter consists chiefly in equality; for fellow-citizens are partners in common, and accept a fundamental parity though their characters differ. But of the relation between son and father, slave and master, Justice is hardly predicable. Justice does not operate between my foot or hand or other of my members and myself; and so it seems to be with son and father. The son may be regarded as a part of his father, until he is separated

1194 b

ἤδη λάβῃ τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τάξιν καὶ χωρισθῇ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τότε ἤδη ἐν ἰσότητι καὶ ὁμοιότητι ἐστὶν τῷ πατρί· οἱ δὲ πολῖται τοιοῦτοί τινες ἐθέλουσιν εἶναι.

Ὡς δ' αὕτως οὐδ' οἰκέτῃ πρὸς δεσπότῃν ἐστὶ 17
δίκαιον διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· τοῦ γὰρ δεσπότου τί
ἐστὶν ὁ οἰκέτης. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτῷ
20 δίκαιον, τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐστίν.
οὐ τοῦτο δέ γε ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολιτικόν·
ἐν ἰσότητι γὰρ καὶ ὁμοιότητι τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον
ἔοικεν εἶναι.

Ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἐν γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς κοινωνία 18
δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐγγὺς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου· χεῖρον
25 μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἢ γυνὴ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς, ἀλλ' οἰκείότερον,
καὶ μετέχει ἰσότητός πως μᾶλλον, διότι ἐγγὺς τῆς
πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ὁ βίος αὐτῶν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ
δίκαιον τὸ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα μάλιστα πως ἤδη
τῶν ἄλλων πολιτικὸν ἐστίν.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶ δίκαιον τὸ ἐν πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ 19
ὄν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁ δίκαιος περὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν
δίκαιον ἔσται.

20 Τῶν δὲ δικαίων ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν φύσει τὰ δὲ νόμῳ.
δεῖ δ' οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ ὡς μηδέποτε ἂν
μεταπεσόντα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ φύσει ὄντα μεταλαμ-
βάνουσι μεταβολῆς. λέγω δ' οἷον εἰ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ 20
μελετῶμεν πάντες ἀεὶ βάλλειν, γινοίμεθα ἂν ἀμφι-
35 δέξιοι· ἀλλὰ φύσει γε ἀριστερὰ ἐστίν, καὶ τὰ δεξιὰ
οὐδὲν ἥττον φύσει βελτίω¹ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀριστερᾶς,
καὶ πάντα ποιῶμεν τῇ ἀριστερᾷ καθάπερ τῇ δεξιᾷ.

¹ Reading ἡ δεξιὰ . . . βελτίων.

^a Cf. *Oeconomica* I. iv., and III. *passim*.

^b Or "since then one kind of Justice is that which operates

from him by attaining manhood. Not till then is he his father's equal and peer, as fellow-citizens would fain be one of another.

- 17 Similarly, and for the same reason, Justice does not operate between slave and master ; for the slave is a chattel of his lord. Even if we grant that he has some right in Justice, it is Justice of the domestic or household kind. Not this, however, but social Justice is the object of our research ; for this latter appears to consist in equality and parity.

- 18 On the other hand, the Justice which operates in the partnership of husband and wife approaches near to the social kind. The wife is inferior to her husband, yet closer to him than others (of his household), and in a sense is more nearly his equal than they. Married life, therefore, is closely akin to the partnership between citizens ; so that in a sense the Justice that operates between the pair is of a kind more social than that between the others.^a

- 19 Since, then, Justice (in its strict sense) is Justice as shown in the social partnership of the commonwealth, the virtue of Justice and the just man will find their province in this kind.^b Justice
πρωτοβου
λονική

(*Nic. V.* = *Eud. IV.* vii.)

- Now some kinds of Justice are natural, others conventional. And we must not think of them as wholly exempt from alteration. Even nature's rules are sometimes liable to change. For instance if we all constantly practised throwing with our left hands, we should become ambidextrous ; yet the left hand is such by nature, and the right hand is none the less superior to the left, however much we equalize the in the social partnership of fellow-citizens, there will be scope for Justice and the just man in this kind." Natural
and Con-
ventional
Justice.

1194 b

οὐδ' ὅτι μεταπίπτουσι, διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν φύσει· ἀλλ' εἰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸν πλείω χρόνον οὕτω διαμένει ἢ ἀριστερὰ οὔσα ἀριστερὰ καὶ ἡ δεξιὰ δεξιὰ, τοῦτο φύσει ἐστίν.

1195 a

Ἦσαύτως ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει δίκαιων, μή, εἰ μετα- 21
βάλλει διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν χρῆσιν, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιον φύσει; ἀλλ' ἔστιν. τὸ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ διαμένον, τοῦτο φύσει δίκαιον προφανές. ὁ γὰρ ἂν ἡμεῖς θώμεθα καὶ νομίσωμεν, τοῦτο καὶ 5
ἐστὶ δίκαιον ἤδη καὶ καλοῦμεν κατὰ νόμον δίκαιον. βέλτιον οὖν δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ νόμον. ἀλλ' ὁ ζητοῦμεν, δίκαιόν ἐστι πολιτικόν. τὸ δὲ πολιτικόν ἐστὶν τὸ νόμῳ, οὐ τὸ φύσει.

Τὸ δ' ἄδικον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκημα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι 23
οὕτω ταυτόν, οὐκ ἔστι δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄδικόν ἐστιν 10
τὸ νόμῳ ὠρισμένον, οἷον τὸ τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποστερηῆσαι ἄδικον ἐστί, τὸ δ' ἀδίκημά ἐστιν τὸ ἤδη ἀδίκως τι πράξει. ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ δικαιοπράγημα οὐ ταυτόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον τὸ τῷ νόμῳ ὠρισμένον, τὸ δὲ δικαιοπράγημα τὸ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν.

15 Πότε οὖν τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ πότε οὔ; ὡς ἀπλῶς 23
μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ ἐκου-
σίως (τὸ δὲ ἐκουσίως ὁ ἦν, εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω
ἡμῖν), καὶ ὅταν εἰδῶς καὶ ὄν καὶ ᾧ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα,
οὕτως δίκαιον πράττει. ὁμοίως καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ
ὁ ἄδικος ἔσται ὁ εἰδῶς καὶ ὄν καὶ ᾧ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα.

^a Nic. V. vii. 1 on the contrary admits that both types belong to "Social Justice."

^b Understanding *πράττει τις* or the like. The author's distinction would, I think, be clearer had he written *δικαίως* here, in l. 14, and in l. 19 instead of *τὸ δίκαιον*, *τὰ δίκαια*, and *δίκαιον*.

^c See above, I. vii.-xvi., *Eud.* II. vii.-xv., *Nic.* III. i.-v.

use of the two. Change of use does not abolish the natural distinction. If in general and at most times left retains the familiar character of left, and right of right, the distinction is a natural one.

- 21 And so with the rules of natural Justice. If through our practice they are changed, is there on that account no such thing as natural Justice? Surely there is such a thing. For that which in general prevails is obviously natural Justice; whilst the law we ourselves lay down and observe takes thereby the character of Justice, and is termed by us conventional Justice. Natural Justice, then, is superior to the other kind; but what we are seeking is social Justice; and this is the conventional and not the natural type.^a

- 22 So far, Injustice and the wrongful deed might seem to be identical; and yet they differ. Injustice is what the law defines as such; for example, it is unjust to rob a man of goods he has committed to one's keeping; while a wrong does not occur until one has committed an unjust act. Similarly, Justice and the just deed are not identical; the former is what the law has defined as such, while the just deed consists in doing such things as are just.

Injustice
and Wrong-
doing.

(*Nic. V.* = *Eud. IV.* viii.)

- 23 Now when is (a deed) ^b just, and when is it not? In general, we may state that (a man acts justly) when he acts with purposive Choice and voluntarily; what we mean by voluntarily we have previously defined.^c Moreover, it is when he acts knowing the person he acts upon, and the instrument and aim of his action, that a man really does a just act. And the unjust man is he who likewise acts with knowledge of person, of instrument, and of aim. But when a man has done

Just Deeds
must be
done
purposely,
voluntarily,
knowingly.

1196 ^a

²⁰ ὅταν δὲ μηθὲν τούτων εἰδὼς πράξῃ τι ἄδικον, ἄδικος μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀτυχῆς δέ. εἰ γὰρ οἴομενος τὸν πολέμιον ἀποκτείνειν τὸν πατέρα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἄδικον μὲν τι ἔπραξεν, ἀδικεῖ μέντοι οὐθένα, ἀτυχεῖ δέ.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὰ ἄδικα πράττοντα ἐν ²⁴ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν ἔστι τοῦτο, ὃ καὶ μικρὸν ἐπάνω ἐλέγετο, ²⁵ ὅταν μὴ εἰδὼς μήθ' ὃν βλάπτει μήθ' ᾧ μηθ' οὐ ἔνεκεν· ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν διοριστέον ἐστίν, πῶς ἂν γνωμῆνης τῆς ἀγνοίας, ὃν βλάπτει, οὐκ ἀδικήσῃ. ἔστω δὲ οὗτος ὁ διορισμός. ὅταν μὲν ²⁵ γὰρ ἡ ἀγνοια αἰτία ᾗ τοῦ πράξαι τι, οὐχ ἑκὼν τοῦτο πράττει, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖ· ὅταν δὲ τῆς ἀγνοίας αὐτὸς ᾗ αἴτιος, καὶ πράττῃ τι κατὰ τὴν ³⁰ ἀγνοιαν ἧς αὐτὸς αἰτιος ἐστίν, οὗτος ἤδη ἀδικεῖ, καὶ δικαίως ἄδικος ὁ τοιοῦτος κληθήσεται. οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν μεθύοντων. οἱ γὰρ μεθύοντες καὶ πράξαντές τι κακὸν ἀδικοῦσιν· τῆς γὰρ ἀγνοίας αὐτοὶ εἰσιν αἴτιοι· ἐξῆν γὰρ αὐτοῖς μὴ πίνειν τοσοῦτον, ὥστ' ἀγνοήσαντας τύπτειν τὸν πατέρα. ὁμοίως ²⁸ ³⁵ [καὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγνοιῶν ὅσαι μὲν γίνονται δι' αὐτοὺς, οἱ κατὰ ταύτας ἀδικοῦντες ἄδικοι· ὧν δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ εἰσιν αἴτιοι, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀγνοια κακείνοις ἐστίν αἰτία τοῖς πράξασιν τοῦ πράξαι, οὐκ ἄδικοι. ἔστιν δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ἀγνοια ἡ φυσικὴ, οἷον τὰ παιδία ¹¹⁹⁵ ^b ἀγνοοῦντα τοὺς πατέρας τύπτουσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐν τούτοις ἀγνοια φυσικὴ οὕσα οὐ ποιεῖ διὰ τὴν

^a Cf. Nic. V. viii. 2 ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὥριται τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκούσίῳ· ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τότε ἐστίν· ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν, ἀδίκημα δὲ οὐπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προσῇ.

something unjust in ignorance of all these things, he is not unjust, but unfortunate. Supposing, for example, he has slain his father, thinking that he was slaying a foeman; he has done a thing that is unjust, and yet he is only unfortunate, and is guilty of unjust action against no man.^a

Thus one may do something unjust without committing an Unjust Deed.

- 24 Since, then, the condition of doing what is unjust without committing a wrong is ignorance such as we have described a few lines above; namely, that the deed be done without knowing either the person injured, the instrument used, or the end aimed at; we must further define this ignorance, and show how it must arise, if it is to relieve the agent from the charge of wronging the man whom he harms.

- 25 Let this then be our definition. When ignorance is the cause of an action, the agent acts involuntarily and so is innocent; except when he is the cause of his own ignorance. In that case, when he acts in self-caused ignorance, (and harms another,) he inflicts a wrong, and will rightly be termed unjust. In the case of the intoxicated, for example, those who do harm under the influence of drink inflict a wrong; since they are the cause of their own ignorance. They were free to refrain from the excess which robbed them of their wits, and allowed them (for example) to strike a father. And so it is with all other kinds of self-caused ignorance. Those who inflict injury therein, are unjust; while those who act in ignorance of which they are not the cause—whose ignorance, on the contrary, is of itself the cause of their acting as they do—are not unjust. This kind of ignorance is the "natural" kind. For instance, young children ignorantly strike their fathers; but their ignorance, being a natural one, does not cause

Self-caused Ignorance NO EXCUSE.

πρᾶξιν ταύτην τὰ παιδία λέγεσθαι ἄδिका· ἡ γὰρ ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ πράττειν ταῦτα, τῆς δ' ἀγνοίας οὐκ αὐτὰ αἷτια, διὸ οὐδ' ἄδिका λέγονται.

ζ Ὑπὲρ δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι πῶς; πότερον 27 ἐκόντα ἔστιν ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἢ οὐ; δίκαια μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄδिका πράττομεν ἐκόντες, ἀδικούμεθα δὲ οὐκέτι ἐκόντες· τὸ γὰρ κολάζεσθαι φεύγομεν, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἀδικοίμεθα ἐκόντες. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐκὼν βλάπτεσθαι ὑπομένει· τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι βλάπτεσθαι ἐστίν.

10 Naί, ἀλλ' εἰσὶ τινες οἱ δέον αὐτοὺς τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν 28 παραχωροῦσι τισίν, ὥστε εἰ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἦν δίκαιον, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἔχειν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐστίν, ἔλαττον δὲ ἐκὼν ἔχει, ἐκὼν ἄρα, φησίν, ἀδικεῖται.

Ἄλλ' ἐντεῦθεν δῆλον πάλιν ὅτι οὐχ ἐκὼν. πάντες γὰρ οἱ ἔλαττον λαμβάνοντες ἀντικαταλλάττονται ἢ 15 τιμὴν ἢ ἔπαινον ἢ δόξαν ἢ φιλίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁ δ' ἀντικαταλλαπτόμενός τι ἀνθ' οὗ προίεται, οὐκέτι ἀδικεῖται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖται, οὐδὲ ἐκὼν ἄρα.

Ἔτι πάλιν οἱ τὸ ἔλαττον λαμβάνοντες καὶ ἀδικού- 20 μενοι, ἢ οὐκ ἴσον λαμβάνουσιν, οὗτοι καλλωπίζονται καὶ σεμνύνονται ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ὅτι φασίν
"ἐξόν μοι ἴσον λαμβάνειν οὐκ ἐλάμβανον, ἀλλὰ

* Cf. Nic. III. v. 8.

them to be termed unjust on account of such act. The act is caused by ignorance ; but for the ignorance they are not themselves responsible ; and so no one calls them unjust.^a

(*Nie.* V. = *End.* IV ix)

27 We must now turn to the case of the sufferer, and ask whether one can voluntarily suffer wrong. It seems impossible ; for whilst we act both justly and unjustly of our own free will, when we suffer injustice we are no longer free agents. Even just punishment we seek to escape ; which clearly shows that we would not voluntarily submit to be wronged. To suffer a wrong is to be harmed ; and this no man voluntarily endures.

Can one
voluntarily
suffer
Wrong?

28 And yet there are some who, though entitled to an equality, yield their right to others. If, then, equality would have been a man's just due, and to receive less is to suffer injustice ; and if in spite of this he is content to take less : such a man must, we are told, be suffering injustice of his own free will.

The following consideration will, however, show that here too there is no voluntary (suffering of injustice). All those who take less (than their just due) are exchanging their due for honour, praise, credit, friendship, or the like. But he who forgoes one thing and takes another in exchange for it, suffers no injustice. He does not "suffer voluntarily" simply because he suffers not at all.

29 Moreover those who take less than their due and thus, (we are told,) suffer injustice, in so far as they miss their equal portion, plume and pride themselves on their forbearance. "I might have taken an equal share," they say, "but instead of this I gave way to

1198 b

παρῆκα τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ ἢ τῷ φίλῳ." ἀδικούμενος
 δέ γε οὐδείς σεμνύνεται. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀδικήμασι
 μὴ σεμνύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις σεμνύνονται, ὅλως
 οὐκ ἂν ἀδικοῦντο οὕτως ἐλαττούμενοι. εἰ δὲ μὴ
 ἀδικοῦνται, οὐδ' ἂν ἐκόντες ἀδικοῦντο.

30 Πρὸς δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις¹ ὁ ἐπὶ 30
 τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς λόγος ἐναντιοῦται· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς
 βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτὸν τὰ φαῦλα πράττων, καὶ ἐκὼν
 γε ταῦτα πράττει, βλάπτει ἄρα αὐτὸς αὐτὸν εἰδώς,
 ὥστε ἐκὼν αὐτὸς ὑφ' αὐτοῦ ἀδικεῖται.

Ἄλλ' ἐνταῦθα [ὁ] διορισμὸς προστεθείς κωλύσει
 30 τὸν λόγον τοῦτον. ἔστιν δὲ ὁ διορισμὸς οὗτος, τὸ
 μηδένα βούλεσθαι ἀδικεῖσθαι. ὁ δέ γε ἀκρατὴς
 βουλόμενος πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀκрасίαν, ὥστε
 αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ· βούλεται ἄρα τὰ φαῦλα πράτ-
 τειν αὐτῷ. ἀλλ' οὐδείς βούλεται ἀδικεῖσθαι· ὥστ'
 οὐδὲ ὁ ἀκρατὴς αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἐκὼν (ἂν) ἀδικοίῃ.

35 Ἄλλ' ἴσως ἐνταῦθα πάλιν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, ἄρά 31
 γε ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν; ἐκ μὲν δὴ τοῦ
 ἀκρατοῦς σκοποῦμένῳ ἔοικεν ἐνδέχεσθαι. καὶ πάλιν
 οὕτως. εἰ γὰρ ἂ ὁ νόμος πράττειν τάττει, ταῦτά
 1198 a ἔστιν δίκαια, ὁ μὴ πράττων ταῦτα ἀδικεῖ· καὶ εἰ
 πρὸς ὃν κελεύει πράττειν, πρὸς τοῦτον εἰ μὴ
 πράττει, τοῦτον ἀδικεῖ, ὁ δὲ νόμος κελεύει σώφρονα

¹ Keeping, with Stock, τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους, the reading of the Laurentian and of other mss.

my elder or my friend." But no man who is suffering an injustice prides himself thereon; and if men do not pride themselves on their wrongs, but do pride themselves on such forbearance as this, those who thus accept less than their due can suffer no manner of injustice. But if they suffer not at all, they cannot "suffer voluntarily."

- 30 To all this, and to reasonings of a like character, is opposed the argument drawn from the case of one lacking self-control.^a Such a man by his evil actions harms himself. These actions are voluntary; so that he harms himself knowingly; and therefore suffers voluntary injustice at his own hands.

There is however a definition which if applied here will traverse this argument. It is that "the endurance of injustice is never the subject of a deliberate wish." Now the self-indulgent man, (we are told,) performs the actions suggested by his lack of control with deliberate wish, thus wronging himself; and so wishes to do himself evil. But (according to our definition) no one deliberately wishes to be wronged. It cannot, therefore, be that even the uncontrolled man voluntarily wrongs himself.

- 31 Yet at this point a doubt may perhaps still be felt by some, whether after all it is quite impossible for a man to do himself injustice. Not only does the case of the self-indulgent man seem to indicate that he can, but there is besides this further difficulty. If acts which the law enjoins are just, he who does them not is acting unjustly. And if he fails to perform such acts towards one whom the law points out as their proper object, on that man he inflicts injustice. Now the law enjoins that one should be temperate, should

^a See above, cc. xlii., xliii., xlv.

εἶναι, οὐσίαν κεκτηῖσθαι, σώματος ἐπιμελείσθαι, καὶ
τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὃ ἄρα ταῦτα μὴ πράττων ἀδικεῖ
5 αὐτόν. εἰς οὐθέννα γὰρ ἄλλον τῶν τοιούτων ἀδικη-
μάτων ἢ ἀναφορά ἐστίν.

Ἄλλὰ μὴ ποτε ταῦτα οὐκ ἀληθῆ ἦν, οὐδ' ἐν- 32
δέχεται αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν αὐτόν. τὸν γὰρ αὐτόν οὐκ
ἐνδέχεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτόν χρόνον πλεῖον ἔχειν καὶ
ἐλαττον, οὐδ' ἐκόντα ἅμα καὶ ἄκοντα¹. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ
10 ἀδικῶν, ἢ ἀδικεῖ, πλεῖον ἔχει, ὃ δ' ἀδικούμενος, ἢ
ἀδικεῖται, ἐλαττον. εἰ ἄρα αὐτὸς αὐτόν ἀδικεῖ,
ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτόν κατὰ τὸν αὐτόν χρόνον καὶ
πλεῖον ἔχειν καὶ ἐλαττον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον· οὐκ
ἄρα ἐνδέχεται αὐτόν αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν.

Ἐτι ὁ μὲν ἀδικῶν ἐκὼν ἀδικεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἀδικούμενος 33
15 ἄκων ἀδικεῖται, ὥστε εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτόν αὐτόν
ἀδικεῖν, ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν ἅμα καὶ ἀκουσίως καὶ ἐκου-
σίως πράττειν τι· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ'
οὕτως ἐνδέχεται αὐτόν αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν.

Ἐπι εἴ τις λαμβάνοι ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικη- 34
μάτων. ἀδικοῦσι γὰρ πάντες ἥτοι παρακαταθήκην
20 ἀποστεροῦντες ἢ μοιχεύοντες ἢ κλέπτοντες ἢ τι
ἄλλο τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων ποιοῦντες· οὐδεὶς
δὲ πώποτε αὐτὸς αὐτόν παρακαταθήκην ἀπεστέρη-
σεν, οὐδ' ἐμοίχευσεν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα, οὐδ'
ἔκλεψεν αὐτὸς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ· ὥστε εἰ τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἐν
τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐστίν, τούτων δὲ μὴθὲν ἐνδέχεται
πρὸς αὐτόν ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν.

25 Εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐ τό γε πολιτικὸν ἀδίκημα, ἀλλὰ τὸ 35
οἰκονομικόν. ἢ γὰρ ψυχὴ εἰς πλείω μεμερισμένη
ἔχει τι αὐτῆς τὸ μὲν χεῖρον τὸ δὲ βέλτιον, ὥστ' εἰ

¹ Omitting οὐδ' ἐκόντα ἅμα καὶ ἄκοντα (bracketed by Ramsauer).

hold property, care for one's body, and so forth. The man, then, who does not so act is wronging himself; since to no other object can such unjust deeds be referred.

- 32 Probably, however, this is erroneous, and self-wrong an impossibility. For the same man cannot at the same time have more and less (than his due). But surely he who does injustice, in so far as he does it, takes more (than his due), whilst he who is wronged, in so far as he is wronged, receives less. If then a man really wrongs himself, it is possible for the same person at the same time to have more and less (than his due). This, however, cannot be; whence it follows that self-wrong is impossible.
- 33 Moreover, he who commits an injustice does so voluntarily, while he who suffers one is wronged involuntarily. Hence, if it is possible for a man to wrong himself, it were also possible to do the same action both involuntarily and voluntarily. This however is impossible, so once again we see there can be no such thing as wronging oneself.
- 34 Again, if we take unjust acts one by one (the same inference follows). Those who inflict a wrong do so by appropriating a deposit, committing adultery, stealing, or inflicting some other specific wrong. But no man yet robbed himself of his own deposit, or committed adultery with his own wife, or stole his own goods. Wherefore if unjust action consists in such deeds as these, none of which it is possible to do against oneself, to wrong oneself were an impossibility.
- 35 If such an act is at all possible, it is a wrong of the "domestic" and not of the social or civic kind. The soul is divided into several parts, and possesses an inferior as well as a superior element; and any unjust act

1196 a

τι ἐγγίνεται τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ ἀδίκημα, τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶ
 πρὸς ἀλλήλα· τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δὲ ἀδίκημα διειλόμεθα
 30 τῷ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ βέλτιον· ὡς γίνεσθαι πρὸς
 αὐτὸν ἀδικον καὶ δίκαιον. οὐ τοῦτο δ' ἡμεῖς
 ἐπισκοποῦμεθα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολιτικόν. ὥστ' ἐν τοῖς 36
 τοιούτοις ἀδικήμασιν, ἐν οἷς ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, οὐκ
 ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν.

Πότερος δὲ πάλιν ἀδικεῖ, καὶ ἐν ποτέρῳ ἐστὶ τὸ
 35 ἀδίκημα, ἐν τῷ ἀδίκως ὁτιοῦν ἔχοντι; ἢ τῷ
 κρίναντι καὶ τῷ ἀπονείμαντι, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;
 καὶ γὰρ ὁ λαβὼν τὸν φοῖνικα παρὰ τοῦ ἐφέστωτος
 καὶ ταῦτα κρίναντος οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, κἂν ἀδίκως αὐτῷ
 ἀποδοθῇ· ἀλλ' ἤδη ὁ κρίνας κακῶς καὶ δούς, οὗτος
 1196 b ἀδικεῖ. καὶ οὗτος ἐστὶ μὲν ἢ ἀδικεῖ, ἐστὶ δὲ ἢ οὐκ
 ἀδικεῖ· ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τῇ φύσει ὄν
 δίκαιον μὴ ἔκρινεν, ταύτῃ μὲν ἀδικεῖ, ἢ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ
 δοκοῦν εἶναι δίκαιον, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ.

XXXIV. Ἐπειδὴ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται, 1
 3 καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν καὶ ἐν τίσιν καὶ περὶ ποῖα, καὶ περὶ
 ἐκάστης αὐτῶν, ὅτι εἰ πράττομεν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
 λόγον τὸ βέλτιστον, τὸ μὲν οὕτως εἰπεῖν, τὸ κατὰ
 τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν, ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν
 εἴ τις εἴποι ὅτι ὑγίεια ἀριστ' ἂν γένοιτο, εἴ τις τὰ

^a See §§ 15-18 above.

^b Cf. § 23 above; according to which the man who acts in error ἀδικόν τι ἐπραξεν, ἀδικεῖ μόντοι οὐδένα.

^c That is, with the Moral Virtues (ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί). See Rackham's note on *Nic.* VI. i. 9.

^d This is, however, the first mention of this formula (κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον) in the work. It occurs in *Nic.* II. ii. and *Eud.* II. v., in both Chapters with promise of future elucidation. This is fulfilled in *Nic.* VI = *Eud.* V., to which Book the present chapter mainly corresponds. (Sussemihl says the

done within the soul must be done by one part against another. Now we have distinguished the "domestic" or internal kind of wrongs as done (not to an equal but) to an inferior or a superior; so that in this way a man may be unjust or just towards himself. But it is not this kind of injustice, but the social or civic
 30 kind, which we are now surveying.^a We conclude, therefore, that within the limits of those wrongs to which we are confining our research, a man cannot truly commit injustice against himself.

Again; when a man possesses something to which he is not justly entitled, is it the possessor, or he who has adjudged and assigned the possession, who commits injustice, and is responsible for the wrong? Take for example an athletic contest. Surely the man who has received the palm from the presiding judge does no injustice, even if it be unjustly assigned to him. The injustice is his who has wrongly adjudged and given the prize. And yet in a sense even he is guiltless. So far as he failed to give a decision just in truth and in fact, he is guilty of injustice; but guiltless so far as his decision was a just one to the best of his own belief.^b

Injustice arising
 (a) from another's Error,
 (b) from one's own.

(*Nic.* VI. = *Eud.* V. I.)

- 1 XXXIV. We have dealt with the Virtues,^c their characters, their spheres, and provinces; showing that each of them consists in acting in the best possible way in accordance with Right Principle.^d Now this formula, "Action in accordance with Right Principle" is no more definite than if we were to say that health would best be attained by the employ-

Moral Virtue is Action in accordance with Right Principle

first three §§ of *Nic.* VI. i. are certainly spurious.) For *ὁρθὸς λόγος* see on I. i. 7 above.

1196 b

ὑγιεινὰ προσφέροιο. τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἀσαφές· ἀλλ'
 10 ἔρεϊ μοι, τὰ ποῖα διασάφησόν ἐστιν ὑγιεινά. οὕτως 2
 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου, τί ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος καὶ τίς ὁ
 ὀρθὸς λόγος;

Ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως ἐστὶν πρῶτον μὲν, ἐν ᾧ ὁ λόγος
 ἐγγίνεται, ὑπὲρ τούτου διελέσθαι. διωρίσθη μὲν 3
 οὖν ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς ὡς τύπῳ καὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν
 15 αὐτῆς ἐστὶ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον μόνιον τῆς
 ψυχῆς· ἐστὶν δ' εἰς δύο τὴν διαίρεσιν ἔχον τὸ λόγον
 ἔχον μόνιον τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν βουλευτικὸν
 τὸ δὲ ἐπιστημονικόν. ὅτι δὲ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστίν,
 ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν. ὥσπερ 4
 γὰρ δὴ ἕτερά ἐστιν ἀλλήλων χρώμα τε καὶ χυμὸς
 20 καὶ ψόφος καὶ ὁσμή, ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις
 ἑτέρας αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἀπέδωκεν (ψόφον μὲν γὰρ
 ἄκοψι, χυμὸν δὲ γεύσει γνωρίζομεν, χρώμα δὲ ὄψει),
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰλλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δεῖ ὑπολαμ-
 βάνειν· ἐπεὶ δὴ ἕτερα τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐστίν, ἕτερα
 καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι μέρη οἷς ταῦτα γνωρίζομεν.
 25 ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν· ταῦτα δὲ 5
 ψυχῇ γνωρίζομεν· ἕτερον ἄρ' ἂν εἴη τὸ μόνιον τὸ
 περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ νοητά. τὸ δὲ βουλευτικὸν
 καὶ προαιρετικὸν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ ἐν κινήσει
 καὶ ἀπλῶς ὅσα ἐν γενέσει τε καὶ φθορᾷ ἐστίν.
 30 βουλευόμεθα γὰρ ὑπὲρ ταύτων ἃ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶν καὶ 6
 πράξαι καὶ μὴ πράξαι προελομένοις, περὶ ἃ ἐστὶν
 [καὶ] βουλὴ καὶ προαίρεσις τοῦ πράξαι ἢ μὴ πράξαι.¹
 ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν αἰσθητὰ καὶ ἐν κινήσει τοῦ μετα-

¹ A curiously redundant clause. Can it be a "gloss" on the preceding one?

ment of healthy measures. We might justly be asked
 2 to define those healthy measures; and so we may
 be asked, what is this Rational Principle, and when
 is it "Right"?

Perhaps we ought to begin by giving a clear and
 definite account of that wherein Rational Principle
 3 originates. Now we have already sketched in outline
 the nature of the soul, distinguishing its rational part
 from its irrational.^a And this rational part is again
 divisible into two: the property of one being to de-
 liberate on action and that of the other to acquire
 knowledge. That these are distinct may be proved
 4 by comparing their respective provinces. We know
 that colour, flavour, sound and smell are all distinct,
 and that Nature has assigned distinct senses to per-
 ceive them; since we recognize sound by hearing,
 flavour by taste, and colour by sight. A similar dis-
 tinction must be applied to our other faculties. The
 provinces being different, different also must be the
 parts of the soul whereby we take cognisance of them.
 5 Now the objects of Understanding and of Sense are
 distinct, though we take cognisance of both by means
 of the soul. It follows that the parts of the soul
 concerned with them are likewise distinct. Now the
 deliberative and purposive faculty is concerned with
 objects of sense; with things in motion; and—to
 speak comprehensively—with whatever is liable to
 6 growth and decay. We deliberate on what is in our
 power to do or not to do by purposive action; (in
 other words,) on matters which admit of deliberation
 and of purpose whether positive or negative; such
 matters being perceptible by sense, and subject to
 the movement of change. So that, according to our

Parts of
 the Soul.
 (i) Rational
 and (ii)
 Irrational;
 the former
 (1) Deliberative,
 (2) Scientific.

^a See cc. iv. 7-v. 1 above.

1198 b

βάλλειν· ὥστε τὸ προαιρετικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστίν.

Τούτων δὴ διωρισμένων, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον ἂν 7
35 εἶη, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὲρ τάληθοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος καὶ τάλη-
θές ὡς ἔχει σκοπούμεθα, ἔστιν δ' ἐπιστήμη φρόνη-
σις νοῦς σοφία ὑπόληψις, περὶ τί δὴ ἕκαστον
τούτων ἐστίν.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ περὶ ἐπιστητόν, καὶ 8
1197 a τοῦτο μετ' ἀποδείξεως καὶ λόγου διατενωόμενον.¹

Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ πρακτά, ἐν οἷς αἵρεσις
καὶ φυγὴ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶν πράξαι καὶ μὴ πράξαι.

Ἔστιν δὴ τῶν ποιουμένων καὶ πραττομένων οὐ 9
ταῦτὸ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν. τῶν μὲν γὰρ
3 ποιητικῶν ἐστὶ τι παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν ἄλλο τέλος,
οἷον παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν, ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶν ποιητικὴ
οἰκίας, οἰκία αὐτῆς τὸ τέλος παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν,
ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τεκτονικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ποιη-
τικῶν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο οὐθέν 10
τέλος παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν πράξιν, οἷον παρὰ τὸ κιθα-
10 ρίζειν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο τέλος οὐθέν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο
τέλος, ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ πράξις. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν

¹ Reading διατενωόμενων (cf. *Nic.* IX. viii. 7).

^a "Intelligence" (Rackham).

^b The nouns (with one exception) are those adopted by Mr. Rackham in *Nic.* VI. iii. 1. The adjectives will help in elucidating further the connotation of the Greek terms. On comparing the two lists, it will be seen that the author rejects τέχνη—Art—and admits ὑπόληψις—Conception—instead. See Grant's note on *Nic.* VI. iii. 1, and the extract there given from *Analytica Posteriora* I. xxiii. 8.

^c "Science" (Grant); "Scientific Knowledge" (Rackham).

reasoning, the purposive faculty of the soul is concerned with perceptible things.

(*Nic. VI. = Eud. V. iii.*)

- 7 Having made the above distinctions we must proceed a step further. The subject of our discourse is Truth, and we are considering what the nature of Truth may be. (For its attainment) we possess the following kinds of Thought; Scientific, or Knowledge; Practical, or Prudence; Intuitive, or Intuition^a; Philosophical, or Wisdom; and Apprehensive, or Conception.^b What, then, are the kinds (of Truth) with which they severally deal?
- 8 Scientific Thought, or Knowledge,^c is concerned with the knowable, when we strive (to know it) by means of demonstration and reasoned discourse.

Intellectual
Faculties
whose
Object is
Truth:

Knowledge,

(*Nic. VI. = Eud. V. v.*)

Practical Thought, or Prudence, deals with the sphere of actions; where election and rejection are alike open to us, and it lies in our power to act or not to act.

Prudence,

- 9 (Now the faculty by which we make what we make is different from the faculty by which we do what we do. The former kind of faculty has an end over and above the process itself. The art of building, for example, since it possesses the faculty of making a house, has, over and above that process, the house as its end; and so it is with the art of carpentry and other constructive arts. In the case of the other faculties, however,—those which do, but make not,—there is no other end apart from the action or process itself. Harping, for example, has no further end; the activity or practice itself being its own end.

(distinguish-
ed from Art,

πραῖξιν καὶ τὰ πρακτὰ ἢ φρόνησις, περὶ δὲ τὴν ποιήσιν καὶ τὰ ποιητὰ ἢ τέχνη· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ποιητοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐστὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν.

Ὡστε ἡ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη ἕξις τις προαιρετικὴ 11

καὶ πρακτικὴ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὄντων καὶ πράξαι καὶ μὴ πράξαι, ὅσα εἰς τὸ συμφέρον ἤδη συντείνει. ἔστω δ' ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετὴ, ὡς δόξειεν ἂν, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη. ἐπαινετοὶ γὰρ εἰσιν οἱ φρόνιμοι, ὁ δ' ἐπαινος ἀρετῆς· ἔτι δ' ἐπιστήμης μὲν πάσης ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, φρονήσεως δὲ ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἔστω, ἀλλ' ὡς 12

ἔοικεν, αὐτό τί ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ.

Ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν νοητῶν καὶ τῶν ὄντων· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τῶν μετ' ἀποδείξεως ὄντων ἐστίν, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς.

Ἡ δὲ σοφία ἐστὶν ἐξ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ συγ- 14
κειμένη. ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ σοφία καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἤδη δεικνύμενα, περὶ ἃ ἡ ἐπιστήμη· ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, τοῦ νοῦ αὐτῇ¹ μετέχει, ἡ δὲ περὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς μετ' ἀποδείξεως ὄντα, τῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἐκ τε νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης συγκει- μένη, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν περὶ ταυτὰ, περὶ ἃ καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη.

¹ Reading, with several mss., αὐτῇ.

^a This digression, distinguishing between the faculty of action (φρόνησις) and that of construction (τέχνη), corresponds to Nic. VI. (Eud. V.) iv.

^b Cf. c. v. 2 above, and note there.

^c Cf. Nic. VI. v. 3 οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ τέχνη· ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως . . . 7. ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἐστὶν . . . δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετὴ τίς ἐστι καὶ οὐ τέχνη.

Now Prudence or Practical Thought is concerned with what we can do and the doing of it, while Art or Handicraft is concerned with what we make and its making ; craftsmanship being manifested in what is made rather than in what is done.)^a

- 11 Prudence, therefore, will be a state of the soul which purposes and performs such actions as it rests with us to do or not to do ; and such as contribute to our
- 12 welfare. Nor, apparently, is this Practical Thought a kind of Science ; but a virtue or excellence (of the soul). For the prudent merit praise ; and praise is the meed of virtue.^b Moreover, whereas every kind of Science or Knowledge has its own peculiar excellence, there is no excellence of Prudence, which appears on the contrary to be itself a kind of excellence or virtue.^c
- 13 Intuitive Thought, or Intuition, deals with the *principia* of the intelligible and truly existent world. For whereas Scientific Thought considers what can be demonstrated, the first *principia* are undemonstrable ; so that they fall within the province not of Science but of Intuition.

and from
Science or
Knowledge).

Intuition,

(*Nic.* VI. = *Eud.* V. vii.)

- 14 Philosophic Thought or Wisdom is a compound of Scientific Thought and Intuition. It is concerned firstly with the *principia*, and then with truths which we demonstrate by their aid ; those in fact which are the province of Science. So far, therefore, as Philosophic Thought deals with *principia*, it partakes of Intuition ; and so far as it deals with what can thereafter be demonstrated, it partakes of Scientific Thought, or Knowledge. Clearly then it is (as we have said) a compound of these two kinds of thought ; and its province is thus coterminous with theirs.

Philosophic
Thought or
Wisdom,

1197 a

30

Ἡ δὲ ὑπόληψις ἐστίν, ἥ ὑπὲρ πάντων ἐπ- 15
αμφοτερίζομεν, πρὸς τὸ καὶ εἶναι ταῦτα οὕτω καὶ
μὴ εἶναι.

Πότερον δ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία ταυτόν; 16
ἡ οὐ; ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία ἐστὶν περὶ τὰ μετ' ἀποδεί-
ξεως καὶ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως ὄντα, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις οὐ περὶ
35 ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ ἐν μεταβολῇ ὄντα. λέγω δὲ
οἷον εὐθὺ μὲν ἡ καμπύλον καὶ κοῖλον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά
ἐστὶν αἰεὶ τοιαῦτα, τὰ δὲ συμφέροντα οὐκέτι οὕτως
ἔχουσιν τὸ μὴ εἰς ἄλλο τι μεταβάλλειν, ἀλλὰ μετα-
βάλλουσιν, καὶ νῦν μὲν συμφέρει τοῦτο, αὔριον δ'
οὐ, καὶ τῷ μὲν, τῷ δ' οὐ, καὶ οὕτω μὲν συμφέρει,
1197 b ἐκείνως δὲ οὐ συμφέρει. περὶ δὲ τὰ συμφέροντά
ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις, ἡ δὲ σοφία οὐ. ἕτερον ἄρα ἡ
σοφία καὶ ἡ φρόνησις.

Πότερον δ' ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία ἀρετὴ ἡ οὐ; διὰ τοῦτο 17
δῆλον ἂν γένοιτο, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς
6 φρονήσεως. εἰ γὰρ ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, ὡς
φαμέν, τοῦ μορίου τοῦ ἑτέρου τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων,
ἐστὶν δὲ χείρων ἡ φρόνησις τῆς σοφίας (περὶ χείρων
γὰρ ἐστίν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία περὶ τὸ αἰδιδιον καὶ τὸ
θεῖον, ὡς φαμέν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὸ συμφέρον
ἀνθρώπων), εἰ οὖν τὸ χεῖρον ἀρετὴ ἐστί, τό γε
10 βέλτιον εἰκὸς ἐστὶν ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι
ἡ σοφία ἀρετὴ ἐστίν.

Ἡ δὲ σύνεσις τί ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τί; ἔστιν δ' ἡ 18
σύνεσις ἐν οἷσπερ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις, περὶ τὰ πρακτά.
ὁ γὰρ συνετός που λέγεται τῷ δυνατός βουλευέσθαι

* Excluded from the list of "Faculties of Truth" in Nic.
VI. iii. on the ground that (like Opinion) it may mislead.

- 15 Apprehensive Thought, or Conception^a is that faculty by which we hold different opinions on all kinds of subjects, *conceiving that they are so, or that they are otherwise.* Conception
- 16 Are Practical and Philosophic Thought identical? Instinctual between Prudence and Wisdom
 Surely not. The latter deals with demonstrable truth and with invariable fact; while Practical Thought is concerned not with these but with the world of changing phenomena. For example, such facts as straightness, curvature, concavity are always the same; but with expediency it is otherwise. So far from being exempt from change, it changes; the same thing may be expedient to-day, but not to-morrow; expedient for me, but not for you; expedient under some circumstances, but not under others. And matters of expediency are the province of Practical, not of Philosophic Thought. These two faculties are accordingly distinct.
- 17 Is Philosophic Thought, or Wisdom, a virtue or not? The one is a Virtue of the Deliberative Part of Soul, the other of the Scientific Part.
 By comparison with Practical Thought we may show that it is. Prudence or Practical Thought is a virtue, as we assert, of one of the two rational divisions of the soul; but it is lower than Philosophic Thought, since its province is an inferior one. For whilst Wisdom, as we assert, deals with the eternal and the Divine, Prudence is concerned with what is expedient for us men. If, then, the lower faculty is a virtue, it is surely reasonable to suppose that the higher one is also a virtue. Clearly, therefore, Philosophic Thought is a virtue.
- 18 What is the nature of Shrewdness or Sagacity, and what is its province? Shrewdness
 It operates in the same field as Prudence; that, namely, of practical affairs. Men, I take it, are termed shrewd because they are able

1197 b

(εἶναι) καὶ ἐν τῷ ὀρθῶς τι κρῖναι καὶ ἰδεῖν· περὶ
 16 μικρῶν δὲ καὶ ἐν μικροῖς ἢ κρίσις αὐτοῦ. ἔστιν οὖν
 ἢ σύνεσις καὶ ὁ συνετὸς μέρος τι φρονήσεως καὶ
 τοῦ φρονίμου, καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ τούτων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 χωρίσαις τὸν συνετὸν τοῦ φρονίμου.

Ὁμοίως δ' ἂν δόξειεν ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς 19
 δεινότητος. ἢ γὰρ δεινότης καὶ ὁ δεινὸς οὐκ ἔστι
 20 μὲν οὔτε φρόνησις οὔτε φρόνιμος, ὁ μέντοι φρόνιμος
 δεινός, διό καὶ συνεργεῖ πως τῇ φρονήσει ἢ δει-
 νότης· ἀλλὰ δεινὸς μὲν καὶ ὁ φαῦλος λέγεται, οἷον 20
 Μέντωρ δεινὸς μὲν ἐδόκει εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ φρόνιμος
 ἦν. τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως ἔστι τὸ
 τῶν βελτίστων ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τούτων προαιρετικὸν
 25 εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὸν αἰετῶς, τῆς δὲ δεινότητος καὶ τοῦ
 δεινοῦ σκέψασθαι ἐκ τίνων ἂν ἕκαστον γένοιτο τῶν
 πρακτῶν, καὶ τὸ ταῦτα πορίσαι.

Δόξειεν ἂν οὖν εἶναι ὁ δεινὸς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις τε
 καὶ περὶ ταῦτα.

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις καὶ θαυμάσειε, διὰ τί ὑπὲρ 21
 ἡθῶν λέγοντες καὶ πολιτικῆς τινας πραγματείας
 20 ὑπὲρ σοφίας λέγομεν. ὅτι ἴσως γε πρῶτον μὲν
 οὐδ' ἄλλοτρία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι ἢ σκέψις ἢ ὑπὲρ
 αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὥς φαμέν. ἔτι δ' ἴσως
 ἐστὶν φιλοσόφου καὶ περὶ τούτων παρεπισκοπεῖν
 ὅσα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντα. καὶ ἀναγκαῖον 22

° Prudence and Shrewdness (or Understanding, as Mr. Rackham translates the word) are similarly contrasted in *Nic.* VI. x. But there the distinction is that the former gives precepts, whereas the latter only pronounces judgements.

counsellors, and can judge and discern aright; the judgement of the shrewd, however, is in and about matters of small importance. Shrewdness, therefore, is essentially a part of Prudence, and the shrewd man, (as such,) a part of the prudent man. To separate him from the prudent is impossible."

(*Nic. VI. = End. V. 11. 9.*)

19 The case of Cleverness would seem to be similar. Cleverness.

Cleverness and the clever man are not identical with Prudence or the prudent man; yet the prudent man is clever; wherefore Cleverness acts as a kind of
20 auxiliary to Prudence. But the bad man as well as the good may be styled clever; even as Mentor was regarded as clever, though prudent he was not. For whereas it is the task of the prudent and of Prudence to aim at what is best, and to be ever ready to purpose it and put it into action, it is the part of Cleverness and of the clever man to consider the conditions necessary for every action, and to see that they are forthcoming.

Such then would appear to be the sphere and province of the clever man.

21 That in a treatise on morals, while we are discussing the social relations of man, we should introduce the subject of Philosophic Thought, may cause some difficulty and surprise. In the first place, we may suggest that the consideration of this kind of thought is not altogether alien to our theme, since it is, as we assert, a virtue. In the second place, it may not beseem a philosopher ill if he extends his survey to other phenomena (than those with which he is mainly concerned) if their region or seat is the
22 same; indeed, it may be our duty, as we are speaking

- 1197^b δέ, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ λέγομεν, περὶ πάντων
 3⁵ λέγειν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σοφία ἐν ψυχῇ· ὥστε οὐκ
 ἄλλοτρίως ὑπὲρ * * ψυχῆς¹ ποιούμεθα τοὺς λόγους.
 "Ὡς περ δ' ἔχει ἡ δεινότης πρὸς φρόνησιν, οὕτως 23
 δόξειεν ἂν ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀπασῶν. λέγω δὲ
 οἷον εἰσὶν ἀρεταὶ καὶ φύσει ἐν ἐκάστοις ἐγγινόμεναι,
 οἷον ὀρμαί τινες ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἄνευ λόγου πρὸς τὰ
 1198^a ἀνδρεία καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην πρὸς τὰ
 τοιαῦτα· εἰσὶ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἔθει καὶ προαιρέσει. αἱ δὲ 24
 δὴ μετὰ λόγου οὔσαι τελέως ἀρεταὶ εἰσιν ἐπαινέται
 ἐπιγινόμεναι. ἔστιν οὖν ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ αὕτη ἡ
 ἄνευ λόγου χωριζομένη μὲν τοῦ λόγου μικρὰ καὶ
 5 ἀπολειπομένη τοῦ ἐπαινεῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν λόγον
 καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν προστιθεμένη τελείαν ποιεῖ τὴν
 ἀρετήν. διὸ καὶ συνεργεῖ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν²
 ἄνευ τοῦ λόγου ἡ φυσικὴ ὁρμή πρὸς ἀρετήν. οὐδ' 25
 αὖ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ πάνυ τελειοῦται
 10 τῷ εἶναι ἀρετὴ ἄνευ τῆς φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς. διὸ οὐκ
 ὀρθῶς Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, φάσκων εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν
 λόγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄφελος εἶναι πράττεν τὰ ἀνδρεία
 καὶ τὰ δίκαια, μὴ εἰδότε καὶ προαιρούμενον τῷ
 λόγῳ. διὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔφη λόγον εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς,

¹ Reading *αὐτῆς* (Spengel) for *ψυχῆς* (mss.). Susemihl suspects a lacuna.

² Reading *οὐκ ἔστι <τελεία>*.

* This apology does not appear in *Nic.* or *Eud.* That Philosophic Thought is a "virtue" would not *prima facie* entitle it to a place in a treatise on Ethics, since it is obviously an intellectual and not an ethical virtue. Cf. § 1 above.

^b See c. iv. 9 above.

^c For the importance of Habit in the formation of Virtue see *Nic.* II. i.

of the phenomena of soul, to include them all in our discourse. Now Philosophic Thought is a phenomenon of soul; so that in dealing with it we are not really wandering from our subject.^a

(*Nic. VI. - End. V. xiii.*)

- 23 We may suppose that there are states of soul related to the other virtues as Cleverness is related to Prudence. I mean that in every province there is a kind of excellence which arises spontaneously by nature; irrational impulses^b towards what is brave and just, or otherwise in accordance with one of the
 24 true virtues. Other excellences arise from habitude^c and purposive Choice^d; and it is only to those which are conscious of a Rational Standard or Rule that we assign the full rank of virtues. They appear later, and are worthy of praise.^e And so the natural kind of virtue, being of itself irrational, when divorced from any such Rule is a slight thing and fails to win praise; but when it is associated with a Standard and a deliberate Choice, the result is the full and complete sort of virtue. In producing virtue, therefore, the natural impulse collaborates with the Rule, and does not reach completeness apart from it;
 25 nor on the other hand do the Rational Rule and deliberate Choice ever reach their consummation in virtue without the natural impulse. Socrates, therefore, was mistaken when he declared that Virtue was merely a Rational Rule, on the ground that it is useless to act in a brave and just manner unless one knows what one does and makes a rational choice. On this account he pronounced Virtue to be a Rational

Moral Virtue
(1) natural,
and (2)
rational

^a See cc. xi. and xvii. above.

^b See cc. ii. 2 and xxiv. 12 above.

ἀλλ' οἱ νῦν βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον
 15 πράττειν τὰ καλὰ, τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι ἀρετὴν· ὀρθῶς 26
 μὲν οὐδ' οὗτοι. πράξαι μὲν γὰρ ἂν τις τὰ δίκαια
 προαιρέσει μὲν οὐδεμιᾷ, οὐδὲ γνώσει τῶν καλῶν,
 ἀλλ' ὁρμῇ τινι ἀλόγῳ, ὀρθῶς δὲ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ
 τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (λέγω δέ, ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς
 κελεύσειεν, οὕτως ἔπραξεν). ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ τοιαύτη
 20 πρᾶξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἐπαινετόν. ἀλλὰ βέλτιον, ὡς
 ἡμεῖς ἀφορίζομεν, τὸ μετὰ λόγου εἶναι τὴν ὁρμὴν
 πρὸς τὸ καλόν· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ
 ἐπαινετόν.

Πότερον δ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετὴ ἢ οὐ, ἀπορή- 27
 σειεν ἂν τις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν ἂν γένοιτο
 δῆλον ὅτι ἀρετὴ. εἴπερ γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ
 25 ἀνδρεία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρεταί, διότι τῶν καλῶν
 πρακτικαί, καὶ ἐπαινεταὶ εἰσὶν, δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἡ
 φρόνησις τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἂν τι εἴη καὶ τῶν ἐν
 ἀρετῆς τάξει ὄντων. ἐφ' ᾧ γὰρ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὁρμῇ
 πράττειν, ἐπὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον
 ὡς ἂν αὕτη προστάτῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία πράττει,
 30 ὥστε εἰ αὕτῃ ἐπαινετὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ᾧ ἂν ἡ φρόνησις
 προστάτῃ, ἥ γε φρόνησις τελείως ἂν εἴη καὶ
 ἐπαινετὴ καὶ ἀρετὴ.

* That is, not the mere act, but the state of soul in which it is performed or willed, determines its moral excellence. For the (ὀρθός) λόγος see note on § 1 above. In *Nic.* VI. xlii. δ it seems to be actually identified with φρόνησις; but this is perhaps an inexactitude, and the former should be distinguished as the rational Standard and the latter as the

Rule ; but he was in error, and the moralists of to-day do better when they define virtue as " noble action in agreement with right Principle." Yet even here there is a mistake. One might act justly with no deliberate purpose, nor knowledge of what is noble, but under some irrational impulse ; and yet one's acts might be right and in accordance with right Rule ; in cases, I mean, where one has acted as the Rule *would* prescribe. But such action does not carry any title to praise. Better, as we do, to define Virtue as the " impulse towards what is noble," guided by Rational Principle ; such a state of the soul is a true virtue, and a thing which deserves praise.^a

27 Now some may feel a doubt whether Prudence, or Practical Thought, is itself a virtue or not.^b The following considerations however will prove that it is. For since Justice and Courage and the other (recognized) virtues are deserving of praise because they inspire noble acts, on the same grounds it is clear that Prudence too is a thing worthy to be commended and placed among the virtues. For it impels us to the same acts as Courage. In every case, Courage acts as Prudence directs ; so that if the former itself wins honour by doing the behests of the latter, surely Prudence has every right to be regarded as a praiseworthy state and a true virtue.

rational Faculty which sets it up. (See Rackham's and Burnet's notes on the above passage.)

^a The sense in which Prudence is a " virtue " has already been discussed in § 12, where it is shown to be an " excellence of the Deliberative soul." Here the status of a virtue seems to be claimed for it because it co-operates with the moral Virtues—" excellences of the Irrational soul." §§ 27-29 correspond to nothing in *Nic.* VI.

1198 a

Πότερον δ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ ἢ οὐ, ἴδοι 28
 ἂν τις ἐντεῦθεν, ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐπιβλέψας, οἷον
 ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν. ἔστιν γάρ, ὥς φαμέν, ἐν
 35 οἰκοδομικῇ ὁ μὲν ἀρχιτέκτων τις καλούμενος, ὁ δὲ
 ὑπηρετῶν τούτῳ οἰκοδόμος· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ποιη-
 τικὸς οἰκίας. ἐστὶν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων, καθὼς
 οὗτος ἐποίει οἰκίαν, ποιητικὸς οἰκίας. ὁμοίως δὲ
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ποιητικῶν ἔχει, ἐν αἷς ἔστιν
 1198 b ἀρχιτέκτων καὶ ὑπηρέτης τούτου. ποιητικὸς ἄρα
 τινὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων ἔσται, καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου
 <οὔ>¹ ποιητικὸς καὶ ὁ ὑπηρετικὸς. εἰ τοίνυν 29
 ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει, ὅπερ εἰκὸς καὶ
 εὐλογον, καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη πρακτικὴ. αἱ γὰρ
 5 ἀρεταὶ πᾶσαι πρακτικαὶ εἰσὶν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ὥσπερ
 ἀρχιτέκτων τις αὐτῶν ἐστίν· ὅπως γὰρ αὕτη προσ-
 τάξει, οὕτως αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ οἱ κατ' αὐτὰς πράτ-
 τουσιν· ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ ἀρεταὶ πρακτικαί, καὶ ἡ φρόνησις
 πρακτικὴ ἂν εἴη.

Πότερον δὲ αὕτη πάντων ἄρχει τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, 30
 10 ὥσπερ δοκεῖ καὶ ἀπορεῖται; ἢ οὐ; τῶν γὰρ
 βελτιόνων οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν, οἷον τῆς σοφίας οὐκ
 ἄρχει. ἀλλὰ, φησὶν, αὕτη ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων, καὶ
 κυρία ἐστὶ προστάττουσα.

Ἄλλ' ἴσως ἔχει ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ ὁ ἐπίτροπος. 31
 οὗτος γὰρ πάντων κύριος καὶ πάντα διοικεῖ· ἀλλ'
 οὕπω οὗτος ἄρχει πάντων, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζει τῷ
 15 δεσπότῃ σχολήν, ὅπως ἂν ἐκεῖνος μὴ κωλυόμενος

¹ <οὔ> inserted by Bonitz and Bussemaker. Breier inserts it after ποιητικὸς.

- 28 Whether Prudence is practical and leads to action, or not, we can see by comparing the case of a handicraft such as building. In building, we recognize a director, whom we call architect, and a builder, who carries out his behests. The latter has the power of constructing a house, and this power the architect shares inasmuch as the house was also his work. So too it is with the other constructive arts, where there is this distinction between master and journeyman. The architect is himself a constructor of something; of that very thing, namely, which the journeyman too constructs.
- 29 If then the same holds good of the (moral) virtues, as there is every reason to suppose, Prudence too will be active or practical. For all the virtues inspire to action, and Prudence is their architect or master-craftsman; for as she enjoins, so the virtues act, and those who act in accordance with them. Since, then, the virtues are practical, so too will Prudence be practical.

(*Nic. VI. = Eud. V. xiii.*)

- 30 Is Prudence mistress of all the soul's faculties, as some think, though others doubt it? Hardly so. One cannot regard her as dominant over faculties higher (than herself); she is not, for instance, dominant over Wisdom or Philosophic Thought. Still, it is urged, she has all the faculties in her care, and the right of issuing orders to them.
- 31 Perhaps her position is rather that of a steward or housekeeper. Such an one has rights over everything in the house, and exercises dispensation thereof; still, he is not the master of all, but ministers leisure to his lord, so that he, undistracted by the care of

Prudence
the Steward
of Wisdom.

1198 b

ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐκκλείηται τοῦ τῶν καλῶν τι
καὶ προσηκόντων πράττειν. οὕτω καὶ ὁμοίως 32
τούτῳ ἢ φρόνησις ὥσπερ ἐπίτροπός τις ἐστὶ τῆς
σοφίας, καὶ παρασκευάζει ταύτῃ σχολὴν καὶ τὸ
ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον, κατέχουσα τὰ πάθη καὶ
20 ταῦτα σωφρονίζουσα.

daily necessities, may not be debarred from any of those noble actions which befit him.

- 32 So likewise, Prudence or Practical Thought is a dispenser or steward to Philosophic Thought, ministering to it leisure and the freedom to perform its own task, by restraining and disciplining the passions of the soul.

B

1198 b

I. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὑπὲρ ἐπιεικείας δέοι ἂν τὴν ¹
²⁵ ἐπίσκεψιν ποιήσασθαι, τί τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐν τίσι καὶ
 περὶ ποῖα. ἔστιν δὲ ἡ ἐπιείκεια καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς ὁ
 ἐλαττωτικὸς τῶν δικαίων τῶν κατὰ νόμον. ἃ γὰρ
 ὁ νομοθέτης ἐξαδυνατεῖ καθ' ἕκαστα ἀκριβῶς
 διορίζειν, ἀλλὰ καθόλου λέγει, ὁ ἐν τούτοις παρα-
 χωρῶν, καὶ ταῦθ' αἰρούμενος ἃ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐβού-
⁵⁰ λετο μὲν τῷ¹ καθ' ἕκαστα διορίσαι, οὐκ ἡδυνήθη δέ,
 ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικὴς. οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ ἐλαττωτικὸς τῶν
 δικαίων ἀπλῶς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ φύσει καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς
 ὄντων δικαίων οὐκ ἐλαττοῦται, ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ
 νόμον, ἃ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐξαδυνατῶν ἀπέλιπεν.

II. Ἡ δὲ εὐγνωμοσύνη καὶ ὁ εὐγνώμων ἐστὶν περὶ ¹
³⁵ ταῦτα περὶ ἃ καὶ ἡ ἐπιείκεια, περὶ τὰ δίκαια [καὶ]
 τὰ ἐλλειμμένα ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου τῷ μὴ ἀκριβῶς
 διωρίσθαι, κριτικὸς ὢν τῶν ἐλλειμμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ
 νομοθέτου, καὶ γινώσκων ὅτι ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ νομο-
 θέτου ἐλλέλειπται, ἔστι μέντοι δίκαια, ὁ τοιοῦτος
^{1199 a} εὐγνώμων.

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἄνευ ἐπιεικείας ἡ εὐγνω-

¹ "τῷ falsum" Susemihl.

* Grant and Rackham translate by "Considerateness"; a word which bears a moral connotation that seems better to fit ἐπιείκεια. The ἐπιεικὴς has not only γνώμη but also συγγνώμη; perhaps "Consideration" might be kept for this latter term. (In *Nic.* VI. xi. 1, I would suggest, following

BOOK II

(*Nic.* I. v. = *Eud.* IV. v.)

- 1 I. We must now discuss Equity or Considerateness : Equity its nature, its field and province. Now Equity, and the equitable or considerate man, are distinguished by readiness to take less than their just legal right. Where the lawgiver is unable to make nice distinctions, but lays down broad general rules, a man who there stands aside, and is content with what the lawgiver would have assigned him had he been able to distinguish individual cases, is an equitable man. He is not indeed one who always waives the fulfilment of his just claims ; what is naturally and essentially just, he does not waive, but only such legal claims as the lawgiver was obliged to leave unqualified.

(*Nic.* VI. = *Eud.* V. vi.)

- 1 II. Discrimination,^a and the man who possesses it, Discrimina- are concerned with the same matters as Equity ; tion. namely with those rights which the lawgiver has left insufficiently distinguished. Of such rights the discriminating man has a keen appreciation. He recognizes that the lawgiver has passed them over, but that they are none the less rights. Such a man we call discriminating.

Discrimination, then, is closely associated with the lead of Trendelenburg and Stewart, ἡ δὲ [συγγνώμη] γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς [ὀρθῆς] ὀρθὴ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς).

μοσύνη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίναι τοῦ εὐγνώμονος, τὸ δὲ δὴ πράττειν [καὶ] κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἐπεικειοῦς.

III. Ἡ δέ γε εὐβουλία ἐστὶ μὲν περὶ ταῦτα τῇ 1
 φρονήσει (περὶ γὰρ τὰ πρακτά ἐστὶ τὰ περὶ αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ὄντα), ἔστιν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ τούτων ἐστὶ, ἡ δὲ εὐβουλία ἕξις ἢ διάθεσις ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἢ ἐπιτευκτικὴ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς βελτίστων καὶ συμφωρωτάτων. διὸ οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐβουλίας ἂν 2
 10 δόξειεν, τὰ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου συμβαίνοντα κατὰ τρόπον· οἷς γὰρ μὴ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ σκοπῶν τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐκέτι ἂν εἴποις, ὥς συνέβη τι κατὰ τρόπον, τοῦτον εὐβουλον, ἀλλ' εὐτυχῇ· τὰ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ κρίνοντος γινόμενα κατορθώματα εὐτυχήματα ἐστίν.

Πότερον δέ ποτε τοῦ δικαίου ἐστὶν τὸ τῇ ἐντεύξει 3
 15 τὸ ἴσον ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι (λέγω δὲ οἷον, ὅποιος ἂν ᾗ ἕκαστος, τοιοῦτον γινόμενον ἐντυγχάνειν); ἢ οὐ; τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ κόλακος καὶ ἀρέσκου δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι· ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι τὴν ἐντευξιν, τοῦτο καὶ δικαίου καὶ σπουδαίου ἀπλῶς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι.

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοῦτο. εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ 4
 20 ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα καὶ εἰδότα καὶ ὄν καὶ ὥς¹ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα, ἔστι δ' ἡ βλάβη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία ἐν

¹ Perhaps we should read ϕ , "wherewith" (mss. ω s, δ son, or δ s. Cf. I. xxxiii. 23, 24).

^a Cf. the distinction between Shrewdness and Prudence drawn in *Nic.* VI. x.

^b "Deliberative Excellence," Rackham.

^c For the terms *ἐντευξις*, *ἐντυγχάνω*, *ἀρεσκος* see I. xxviii. above. For the distinction between flattery and complaisance cf. *Nic.* II. vii. 13, IV. vi. 9.

Equity; the discriminating man discerns, and the equitable man acts according to that discernment.^a

(*Nic.* VI. = *Eud.* V. ix.)

- 1 III. The province of Good Counsel^b is the same as that of Prudence or Practical Thought; since it is concerned with our actions in choosing or refusing, it is closely associated with Prudence, which leads us to (good) actions, whilst Good Counsel is the state, condition, or the like, which discovers the best and most expedient ways in which we can perform them.
- 2 Accordingly we shall not assign to Good Counsel successes which happen spontaneously. When a man who lacks the reasoning power that looks for what is best, has met with some success, one would not term him wise of counsel, but fortunate; for successes which happen apart from reason's decision are the windfalls of luck, (and not the gatherings of counsel).

(The remainder of c. iii. proposes and answers five moral questions. They seem out of place here, and correspond to nothing in *Nic.* V. or VI. See Introduction, p. 437.)

- 3 In social intercourse, will the just man render equal measure to each? Will he, I mean, assimilate himself to the character of those with whom he converses? Surely not. We should deem such conduct that of a flatterer or one who is weakly complaisant; ^c our universal rule being that the wise and good man will in his converse with others treat each according to his worth.
- 4 A second difficulty is this. Whereas to injure a man is to harm him voluntarily, knowing whom we harm and how and why we do it; and whereas the field and sphere of harm and injustice are things which are

Problems:
(1) Will the just render the same measure to all?

(2) How far is the unjust prudent?

1199 a

ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ περὶ ἀγαθὰ, ὁ ἀδίκων ἄρα καὶ ὁ
 ἀδικος εἰδείη ἂν ὅποια ἀγαθὰ καὶ ὅποια κακὰ· τὸ
 δέ γε ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἴδιον τοῦ
 25 φρονίμου καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως· ἄτοπον δὴ συμβαίνει
 τὸ τῷ ἀδίκῳ συμπαρακολουθεῖν τὸ μέγιστον
 ἀγαθὸν τὴν φρόνησιν.

Ἡ οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν παρακολουθεῖν τῷ ἀδίκῳ ἢ 5
 φρόνησις; οὐ γὰρ σκοπεῖ ὁ ἀδικος οὐδὲ δύναται
 κρίνειν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ
 διαμαρτάνει. τῆς δὲ φρονήσεως τοῦτό ἐστι, τὸ 6
 30 ὀρθῶς δύνασθαι ταῦτα θεωρεῖν, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ
 τῶν κατ' ἰατρικὴν τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ
 ὑγείας ποιητικὸν οἶδαμεν ἅπαντες, ὅτι ἐλλέβορος
 καὶ τὸ ἐλατήριον καὶ αἱ τομαὶ καὶ αἱ καύσεις
 ὑγιεινὰ εἰσιν καὶ ὑγείας ποιητικά, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ
 85 ἔχομεν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι οἶδαμεν
 τὸ καλὸν ἕκαστον ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ ὁ ἰατρὸς οἶδεν τίνα
 ἐστὶ τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς διακειμένῳ·
 ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ ἤδη ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη. τὰ μὲν οὖν
 ἀπλῶς ὑγιεινὰ εἰδότες ὅμως οὐκ ἔχομεν οὐδὲ
 παρακολουθεῖ ἡμῖν ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη.

1199 b

Ὡς δ' αὐτως ὁ ἀδικος. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡ 7
 τυραννὶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ ἐξουσία, οἶδεν·
 ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἢ μή, ἢ πότε, ἢ πῶς δια-
 8 κειμένῳ, οὐκέτι οἶδεν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν μάλιστα τῆς
 9 φρονήσεως, ὥστε τῷ ἀδίκῳ οὐ παρακολουθεῖ ἡ
 φρόνησις. αἰρεῖται γὰρ τὰγαθὰ, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀδικεῖ,

• Powerful drugs which only an adept can employ with safety and success.

good ; it follows that he who inflicts an injury and is unjust will know the nature of good things and of evil things. But knowledge of this kind is the prerogative of the prudent and of Prudence ; whence follows the absurd inference that Prudence, that greatest of good things, accompanies the unjust man.

5 Or should we not rather deny that Prudence accompanies the unjust ; since (as it seems) he does not consider or discern (the difference between) what is absolutely good and what is good for himself, but falls into error concerning it ?

6 The fact is, that the power of Prudence rightly to distinguish what is good finds a parallel in the realm of medicine. We all know what is absolutely and essentially healthful and health-giving ; that such, (for instance,) are hellebore and claterrum^a and the applications of knife and cautery. And yet we lack the science of medicine ; since we are still ignorant of what is good in particular cases. We do not know for whom a particular treatment is good, or when, or under what conditions. All this the physician knows : for without it medical knowledge is not complete. Thus, even while knowing what is absolutely healthful, we yet lack medical science ; the general knowledge does not involve the particular.

7 Now this is exactly the case of the unjust man. He knows that supreme power, and rule, and authority are in themselves good things ; but he is still in ignorance whether for him they be good or not ; or (if they are) when they are good and under what conditions. This latter knowledge is the special province of Prudence or Practical Thought ; wherefore she is no companion of the unjust. The good things he chooses as the sphere of his injustice are

1199 b

τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ, οὐ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ. ὁ γὰρ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀπλῶς μὲν ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ μέντοι ἴσως οὐκ ἀγαθόν· εὐπορήσας γὰρ καὶ ἄρξας πολλὰ κακὰ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ποιήσει καὶ τοῖς φίλοις· οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται ἀρχῇ ὀρθῶς χρῆσασθαι.

- 10 Ἐχει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὑπορίαν καὶ σκέψιν, πότερόν 8
 ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸν φαῦλον ἀδικία, ἢ οὐ. εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀδικία ἐστὶν ἐν βλάβῃ, ἡ δὲ βλάβη ἐν στερήσει τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν βλάπτειν· τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ ἂ αὐτῷ οἶεται εἶναι ἀγαθὰ, οὐκ ἀγαθὰ εἰσὶν· ἡ γὰρ
 16 ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος τὸν φαῦλον οὐ δυνάμενον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι ὀρθῶς βλάπτει· εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν βλάβῃ παρα-
 γενόμενα, ὁ τούτων στερίσκων οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν ἀδικεῖν. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος λόγος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι 9
 παράδοξος τοῖς πολλοῖς· πάντες γὰρ οἴονται καὶ ἀρχῇ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ πλούτῳ δυνατοὶ εἶναι χρῆ-
 20 σθαι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνοντες. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο 10
 καὶ ἐκ τοῦ νομοθέτου· ὁ γὰρ νομοθέτης οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπιτρέπει τὸ ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ὥριστα καὶ ἡ ἡλικία καὶ ἡ εὐπορία ἣν δεῖ ὑπάρχειν τῷ μέλλοντι ἄρχειν, ὥς οὐ δυνατόν ὄν παντὶ ἄρχειν ὑπάρξαι. εἰ δὲ
 τις ἀγανακτοίῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἄρχει ἢ οὐδεὶς αὐτὸν ἐᾷ
 26 κυβερνᾶν, “οὐ γὰρ ἔχεις” εἴποι ἂν τις “οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὧ δυνήσῃ καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ
 κυβερνᾶν.” ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ σώματος ὀρώμεν οὐ 11
 δυναμένους ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ προσ-
 φερομένους, ἀλλ' εἰ μέλλει τις ὑγιαίνειν τὸ σῶμα
 τὸ φαῦλον, ὕδωρ αὐτῷ πρότερον καὶ ὀλίγα σιτία
 30 προσενεκτέον· τῷ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν φαύλην ἔχοντι πρὸς
 τὸ μῆτ' ἐν κακὸν ἐργάζεσθαι οὐκ ἀφεκτέον καὶ

those which are in themselves good, not those which are good for himself. For riches and rule are good things absolutely, yet perhaps not such for him. By obtaining wealth and rule he may bring much evil upon himself and his friends ; since he may not prove competent rightly to use his power.

- 8 A further problem which arises for our consideration is whether one can or cannot commit injustice against a bad man. For if injustice involves harm, and harm involves deprivation of what is good, it would seem that one cannot hurt a bad man ; because the good things which he considers good for himself are not really so. Rule and riches will harm the bad man who cannot use them aright ; so that if their presence hurts him, it would seem that one who
 9 deprives him of them does him no injustice. Such an argument will indeed seem strange to the majority ; because all imagine themselves able to make use of
 10 rule and power and wealth. But they are mistaken, as is shown among other things by the practice of legislators. Legislators do not entrust rule to every man, but define the age and property that qualify for rule ; it being impossible, as they suppose, to leave open the right of ruling to all. If then anyone were to express indignation at being debarred from rule, or not permitted to steer a ship, the answer might well be, that he has none of the mental qualifications for
 11 the one task or the other. When men are ailing in body, we see that they cannot recover health by treating themselves with things absolutely and essentially good. An ill body can only become sound if the patient is first placed on a diet of water and scanty food. And if a man's soul be ill, to save him from doing evil deeds, must he not all the more refrain

(10) Can one injure a bad man?

1199 b

πλούτου καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀπλῶς τῶν
τοιούτων, ὅσῳ εὐκινητότερον καὶ εὐμεταβολώτερον
ψυχῇ σώματος; ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ φαῦλος τὸ σῶμα
οὕτως ἦν ἐπιτήδειος διαιτᾶσθαι, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τὴν
ψυχὴν οὕτως ἐπιτήδειος διάγειν, μὴθὲν τῶν τοιού-
των ἔχων.

Ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπορίαν, οἷον ἐπειδὴν 12
μὴ ἢ ἅμα πρᾶξαι τάνδρεϊα καὶ τὰ δίκαια, πότερ' ἂν
τις πράξειεν; ἐν μὲν δὴ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἀρεταῖς
1200 a ἔφαμεν τὴν ὁρμὴν μόνον [δεῖν] τὴν πρὸς τὸ καλὸν
ὑπάρχειν ἄνευ λόγου· ᾧ δ' ἐστὶν αἵρεσις, ἐν τῷ
λόγῳ καὶ τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι ἐστίν. ὥστε ἅμα τὸ
ἐλέσθαι [καὶ] παρέσται καὶ ἡ τελεία ἀρετὴ ὑπάρξει,
ἣν ἔφαμεν μετὰ φρονήσεως εἶναι, οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς
φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ καλόν. οὐδ' ἐναντιώ- 13
σεται ἀρετὴ ἀρετῇ. πέφυκεν γὰρ ὑπέκειν τῷ λόγῳ,
[ἢ] ὡς οὗτος προστάττει, ὥστ' ἐφ' ὃ ἂν οὗτος ἄγῃ,
ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἀποκλίνει. τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον οὗτός ἐστιν
ὁ αἰρούμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ἄνευ τῆς φρονήσεως αἱ
ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ γίνονται, οὔθ' ἡ φρόνησις τελεία ἄνευ
10 τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, ἀλλὰ συνεργουσί πως μετ'
ἀλλήλων ἐπακολουθοῦσαι τῇ φρονήσει.

Οὐχ ἥττον δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπορήσεται, πότε- 14
ρόν ποτε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ ἐπὶ
τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τῶν τ' ἐκτός καὶ τῶν περὶ σῶμα.
15 ταῦτα γὰρ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν γνωόμενα χεῖρους ποιεῖ,
οἷον πλοῦτος πολὺς γενόμενος ὑπερόπτας καὶ

* c. xxxiv. 23-26 above.

² As in *Nic.* VI. xiii. 5, φρόνησις and (ἀρετὴς) λόγος are treated as interchangeable terms. See notes on I. i. 7, I. xxxiv. 1, 26 above; also *Nic.* V. i. 2, where the ἀρετὴς λόγος

from riches, rule, power, and the like, in proportion as the soul is a thing more easily moved and more readily changed than the body? For even as we saw that a sparing diet was the fitting one for a man whose body is ill, so a frugal life without such "good things" as these is the one which best befits a man ailing in soul.

- 12 Another type of difficulty is the choice between acting bravely, or justly, when both at once are impossible. Now we have stated that in the case of those virtues which arise by nature, the mere impulse towards what is good exists apart from reason; but where there is choice, that choice abides in the rational Principle and in the rational part of the soul.^a So that only when choice is present shall we find that complete Virtue which we said was associated with Prudence or Practical Thought, though there must also be the
- 13 natural impulse towards good. And Virtue cannot be in opposition to Virtue; since its very nature is to obey rational Principle. Wherever this leads, in that direction therefore Virtue inclines; since rational Principle it is which chooses what is better. In fine: the other virtues cannot come into being without Prudence, nor can Prudence herself be complete without the other virtues, which collaborate with one another whilst they follow her lead.^b
- 14 Another kind of question which equally demands an answer is whether the virtues resemble other good things—the weal of body and estate—in the following respect. These latter, if enjoyed in excessive measure, render men worse. Great riches, for example, have been known to make them proud and disagreeable;

(1) Can the Virtues be in Conflict one with another?

(2) Can we suffer from Excess of Virtue?

is compared to the science of Medicine, and *ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων* to the physician (Burnet, *ad loc.*).

1200^a

ἀηδεῖς ἐποίησεν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, ἀρχῆς τιμῆς κάλλους μεγέθους. πότερον 15 οὖν καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῆς οὕτως ἔχει, ὥστε εἰάν τινι δικαιοσύνη ἢ ἀνδρεία εἰς ὑπερβολὴν παραγένηται, χείρων ἔσται, ἢ οὐ; <οὐ,> φησὶν.¹ ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν 20 τῆς ἀρετῆς τιμὴ γίνεται, ἡ δὲ τιμὴ μεγάλη γινομένη χείρους ποιεῖ· ὥστε δηλὸν ὅτι, φησὶν, ἀρετὴ εἰς ἐπίδοσιν βαδίζουσα μεγέθους χείρους ποιήσκει· τῆς γὰρ τιμῆς ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιοίη ἂν χείρους μείζων γινομένη.

Ἡ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀληθές; τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς εἰ καὶ 16 25 ἄλλα πολλὰ ἔστιν ἔργα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔστιν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα, τὸ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τούτοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις δύνασθαι ὀρθῶς παραγενομένοις χρῆσθαι· εἰ δὴ ὁ σπουδαῖος παραγενομένης αὐτῷ ἢ τιμῆς ἢ ἀρχῆς μεγάλης μὴ χρήσεται ὀρθῶς τούτοις, οὐκέτι ἂν εἴη σπουδαῖος· οὔτε δὴ ἡ τιμὴ οὔτε ἡ ἀρχὴ 30 ποιήσκει τὸν σπουδαῖον χείρων, ὥστε οὐδ' ἡ ἀρετὴ· τὸ δ' ὅλον ἐπειδήπερ ἡμῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ διώρισται, ὅτι 17 εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μεσότητες, καὶ ἡ μᾶλλον ἀρετὴ μᾶλλον ἔστι μεσότης· ὥστ' οὐχ ὅτι χείρων ποιήσκει εἰς μέγεθος ἡ ἀρετὴ ἰοῦσα, ἀλλὰ βελτίω· ἡ γὰρ μεσότης ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς τῆς τῶν παθῶν ἢν μεσότης.

85 IV. Ταῦτα μὲν μέχρι τούτου· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα 1 ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἐτέραν ἀρχὴν ποιησαμένοις λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας. ὥσπερ δὲ [καὶ] ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία αὐταὶ εἰσιν αἰτοποι, ὡσαύτως

¹ MSS. ἢ οὐ, φησὶν. Bonitz and Bussemaker insert <οὐ>. I prefer to bracket φησὶν with Scalliger and Ramsauer. The ἀλλ' then introduces an objection to the second alternative, ἢ οὐ;

and so it is with the other goods—power and honour,
 15 beauty and stature. Is this, then, true of Virtue also? If a man possesses Justice or Courage in excessive measure, will he be a worse man? Surely not. Nevertheless, honour is the fruit of Virtue; and if men enjoy great honour they become worse. It is therefore plain, we are told, that Virtue when it advances in degree, will make men worse; for the virtue is the cause of the honour, and is therefore
 by its own increase responsible for the result.

16 But surely this is not true. Many, indeed, are the properties of Virtue; yet chief among them all is that of enabling us to make right use of such goods as these when they befall us. If then the virtuous man, when great honour or power befall him, does not make right use of them, he will be a virtuous man no longer. Seeing, therefore, that neither honour nor power can make a really good man worse, much
 17 less can Virtue have that effect. And speaking generally, since we originally defined the virtues as mean states; and the better the virtue, the nearer it approaches the perfect mean: it follows that Virtue, as it advances in degree, will make a man better instead of worse; for the mean state of which we spoke was a just mean betwixt excess and deficiency of the various passions.

(*Nic.* VII. = *Eud.* VI. i.)

1 IV. Having dealt with these questions, we must now treat of Self-Control and Self-Indulgence. These we must approach from a different standpoint.^a As both the virtue and the vice are anomalous, our treatment

States akin
to Virtue
and Vice.

^a “. . . begin a fresh part of the subject,” Rackham (*Nic.* VII. i. i). Note that *Nic.* (or *Eud.*) commences more logically with the classification that here follows in § 3.

1200 a ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὺς περὶ τούτων λόγους λεχθήσο-
 1200 b μένους ἀτόπους γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοία ἡ ἀρετὴ 2
 αὕτη ἐστὶν ταῖς ἄλλαις. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις
 ἐπὶ ταῦτά καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ τὰ πάθη ὀρμῶσιν καὶ
 οὐκ ἐναντιοῦνται ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτης ἐναντιοῦν-
 ται ἀλλήλοις ὃ τε λόγος καὶ τὰ πάθη.

11 "Ἐστὶ δὲ τρία τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα, καθ' ἃ 3
 φαῦλοι λεγόμεθα, κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης. ὑπὲρ
 μὲν οὖν κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς τί ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τίσιν,
 εἴρηται ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω· νῦν δὲ ὑπὲρ ἀκρασίας
 καὶ θηριότητος λεκτέον ἂν εἴη.

V. "Ἐστὶν δὲ ἡ θηριότης ὑπερβάλλουσά τις κακία. 1
 10 ὅταν γὰρ τινα παντελῶς ἴδωμεν φαῦλον, οὐδ'
 ἀνθρωπὸν φαμεν εἶναι ἀλλὰ θηρίον, ὥς οὐσαν τινὰ
 κακίαν θηριότητα. ἡ δὲ ἀντικειμένη ἀρετὴ ταύτη 2
 ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμος, ἔστιν δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπου
 οὐσα, οἷον ἡρωϊκὴ τις καὶ θεία. ἀνώνυμος δὲ ἐστὶν
 αὕτη ἡ ἀρετὴ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν θεοῦ ἀρετή· ὁ γὰρ
 15 θεὸς βελτίων τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ οὐ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐστὶ
 σπουδαῖος· οὕτω μὲν γὰρ βέλτιον ἔσται ἡ ἀρετὴ 3
 τοῦ θεοῦ. διὸ ἀνώνυμος ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ τῇ κακίᾳ τῇ
 θηριότητι ἀντικειμένη. θέλει δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀντι-
 κεῖσθαι ἡ θεία καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπου· ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ
 ἡ κακία ἡ θηριότης ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπου ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ
 ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἀντικειμένη.

20 VI. Ὑπὲρ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ ἐγκρατείας πρῶτον 1
 <ἂν> δέοι εἰπεῖν τὰ ἀπορούμενα καὶ τοὺς ἐναν-
 τιουμένους λόγους τοῖς φαινομένοις, ὅπως ἐκ τῶν

* So that, strictly speaking, it is not a Virtue at all. Cf.

2 of them must needs be anomalous also ; for the virtue of Self-control is unlike the other virtues. In the case of the others, the impulse of reason and of the passions is in the same direction : there is no antagonism between them. But in the case of this virtue, reason and the passions are in opposition to one another.^a

3 Now among the phenomena presented by the soul, there are three which cause men to be styled bad. These are Vice, Self-Indulgence, and Bestiality. Of the nature and provinces of Vice and Virtue we have spoken above ; it remains for us to speak of Self-Indulgence and of Bestiality.

1 V. Bestiality is a kind of vice which exceeds all measure. For when we behold a man who is utterly bad, we say that he is not a man but a beast—imply-

Bestiality
and its
opposite.

2 ing that bestiality is a species of vice.^b But the virtue opposed to it has no name ; such virtue is of a super-human kind, fit for a hero or a god. It is nameless because Virtue is not really predicable of God. For God is better than Virtue itself ; His goodness is not goodness in accordance with Virtue, or else Virtue would be something better than He. Therefore we assign no name to the virtue which is opposed to Bestiality, but regard it as a godlike one, which is beyond the measure of a man. For even as the vice of Bestiality is beyond human measure, so is its opposing virtue.

1 VI. In dealing with Self-Indulgence and Self-Control, our best method will be to state first the difficulties they raise and the arguments which are brought against the received views of them ; so that

Self-
indulgence
and its
opposite.

Nic. IV. ix. 8 οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ τις μικρὴ, *End. II. xi. 1* ἔστι δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἕτερον.

^b In *Nic. VII. i. 2-4, v. 5-6*, it is shown that Bestiality is not really a Vice, since those who exhibit it are devoid, like beasts, of any rational Standard.

1200 b

ἀπορουμένων καὶ ἐναντιουμένων λόγων συνεπισκεψάμενοι καὶ ταῦτα ἐξετάσαντες τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν εἰς τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἴδωμεν· ῥᾶον γὰρ οὕτως ἰδεῖν τάληθές ἐσται.

- 25 Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ἀνῆρει ὅλως καὶ 2
οὐκ ἔφη ἀκρασίαν εἶναι, λέγων ὅτι οὐθεὶς εἰδὼς τὰ
κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ εἰσιν ἔλοιτ' ἄν· ὁ δὲ ἀκρατής δοκεῖ,
εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα εἰσίν, αἰρεῖσθαι ὅμως, ἀγόμενος
ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους. διὰ δὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον οὐκ
30 ᾤετ' εἶναι ἀκρασίαν· οὐ δὲ ὀρθῶς. ἀτοπον γὰρ τῷ 3
λόγῳ τούτῳ πεισθέντας ἀναιρεῖν τὸ πιθανῶς γινόμενον·
ἀκρατεῖς γὰρ εἰσὶν ἄνθρωποι, καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰδότες ὅτι
φαῦλα ὅμως ταῦτα πράττουσιν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν ἔστιν ἀκρασία, πότερον ὁ ἀκρατής 4
ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, ἢ θεωρεῖ καὶ ἐξετάζει τὰ
φαῦλα; ἀλλὰ πάλιν οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν. ἀτοπον γὰρ
35 τὸ κράτιστον καὶ βεβαιότατον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἡττᾶσθαι
ὑπὸ τινός· ἐπιστήμη γὰρ πάντων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν
μονιμώτατόν ἐστι καὶ βιαστικώτατον· ὥστε πάλιν
ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἐναντιοῦται * * τῷ¹ μὴ εἶναι ἐπι-
στήμην.

Ἄλλ' ἄρα γε ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐ, δόξα δέ; ἀλλ' 5
1201 a εἰ δόξαν ἔχει ὁ ἀκρατής, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ψεκτός. εἰ
γὰρ φαῦλόν τι πράττει μὴ ἀκριβῶς εἰδὼς ἀλλὰ

¹ Reading <ὥστ' αὐτῷ> (Sussemihl).

^a Socrates is called ὁ πρεσβύτης in *Eud.* I. v. 15, and ὁ γέρον in *Eud.* VII. i. 14 to distinguish him from Σ. ὁ νεώτερος (*Metaphysics*, V. xi. 1; cf. Plato, *Theaet.* 147 c, *Soph.* 218 v, *Pol.* 257 c foll.), a contemporary of Theaetetus, and probably a student in Plato's "Academy" (Lutoslawski, *Origin of Plato's Logic*, p. 55). For the view of Socrates see Grant on *Nic.* VII. ii. 1, who cites Plato, *Protag.* 352 v and 357 z. Cf. also I. ix. 7 above, and note thereon.

after considering these and critically examining them we may discern as far as we can the true nature of the opposed qualities. This we shall find the easiest approach to the truth.

(*Nic.* VII. = *Eud.* VI. ii.)

- 2 Now Socrates the elder ^a simply swept away the notion of Self-Indulgence, declaring that there was no such thing. For he said that none would choose evil knowing that it is evil; whereas the self-indulgent man seems to know that evil is bad, and yet to choose it under the influence of passion. From this reasoning, then, he concluded that the vice of Self-Indulgence does not exist.
- 3 But surely he was mistaken. It is absurd for us in deference to such an argument as this to deny what in all appearance exists. For there are self-indulgent men, and they do what is bad, though themselves know it to be such.
- 4 Assuming, then, that Self-Indulgence exists, does the self-indulgent man possess a species of knowledge whereby he surveys moral evil and examines it critically? But this again seems impossible. It is absurd to suppose that the best and most firmly grounded of our faculties should be overcome by something else; for of all those faculties, Knowledge is at once the most steadfast and the most forceful. This argument then supports our contention that the self-indulgent is not possessed of Knowledge.
- 5 Can it be, then, that while devoid of Knowledge he yet possesses Opinion? If, however, the self-indulgent man possesses Opinion, we should not justly blame him. For if without accurate Knowledge he commits wickedness under the influence of Opinion,

Problems.
(1) How far does the Self-indulgent possess Knowledge?

1201 a

δοξάζων, συγγνώμην ἂν τις ἀποδοίῃ προσθέσθαι
τῇ ἡδονῇ καὶ πρᾶξαι τὰ φαῦλα, μὴ ἀκριβῶς εἰδόντα
ὅτι [οὐ] φαῦλα εἰσὶν, ἀλλὰ δοξάζοντα· οἷς δέ γε
συγγνώμην ἔχομεν, τούτους οὐ ψέγομεν· ὥστε
ὁ ἀκρατής, εἴπερ δόξαν ἔχει, οὐκ ἔσται ψεκτός.
ἀλλ' ἔστιν ψεκτός.

Οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν θ
γὰρ οὐκ ἔφασαν εἶναι ἐπιστήμην, ἄτοπόν τι γὰρ
συμβαίνειν ἐποιοῦν· οἱ δὲ πάλιν οὐδὲ δόξαν, καὶ γὰρ
οὗτοι ἄτοπόν τι πάλιν [ἐποιοῦν] συμβαίνειν.

10 Ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν τις ἀπορήσειεν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ γ
δοκεῖ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ἐγκρατής εἶναι, πότερον τῷ
σώφρονι τι ποιήσει σφοδρὰς ἐπιθυμίας; εἰ μὲν οὖν
ἔσται ἐγκρατής, σφοδρὰς δεήσει αὐτὸν ἔχειν ἐπι-
θυμίας (οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴποις ἐγκρατῆ, ὅστις μετρίων
ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖ). εἰ δέ γε σφοδρὰς [μὴ]¹ ἔξει
15 ἐπιθυμίας, οὐκέτι ἔσται σώφρων (ὁ γὰρ σώφρων
ἔστιν ὁ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν μηδὲ πάσχων μηθέν).

Ἐχει δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάλιν ἀπορίαν. συμ- 8
βαίνει γὰρ ἐκ τῶν λόγων καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ ποτε
ἐπαινετὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ ψεκτόν. ἔστω γὰρ
τις, φησὶν, διημαρτηκὸς τῷ λογισμῷ, καὶ δοκεῖτω
20 αὐτῷ λογιζομένῳ τὰ καλὰ εἶναι φαῦλα, ἢ δ' ἐπι-
θυμία ἀγέτω ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ· οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν λόγος οὐκ
ἑάσει πράττειν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀγόμενος
πράσσει (τοιοῦτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ ἀκρατής). πράξει ἄρα
τὰ καλὰ, ἢ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἀγέτω (ὁ δὲ
25 λόγος κωλύσει· διαμαρτανέτω γὰρ τῷ λογισμῷ τῶν

¹ μὴ is bracketed by Rassow and Susemihl. It appears to destroy the sense.

* See I. xxxiv. 1, and note there.

we should pardon his cleaving to pleasure and committing the wickedness on the ground that he does not accurately know that it is wickedness, but is of opinion (that it is not). And those whom we pardon we do not blame; so that if the self-indulgent possesses Opinion, he will not be deserving of blame. Yet deserve it he does.

- 6 Arguments of this kind, then, lead us into difficulties. Some of them sought to prove that the self-indulgent had not Knowledge, by deducing an absurdity (from his possession of it); others again refused him even Opinion, again by deducing an absurdity.

- 7 Another difficulty that may be raised is this. To the man of Temperance we attribute also Self-Control. Can anything cause such a man to feel strong desires? On the one hand, if he is self-controlled, such desires he must have; since one would not call him self-controlled if the desires he controls are no more than moderate. On the other hand, if he has strong desires, he ceases to be temperate; for the temperate man is one who lacks desire, and passion of any kind.

- 8 A further kind of difficulty is the following. It may actually be argued that at times the self-indulgent deserves praise and the self-controlled, blame. For we are asked to imagine a man whose reasoning is in error, and leads him to believe that what is good is bad; while his desire draws him towards the good. Rational Rule,^a then, will forbid him to do the good; but he does it under the influence of desire; this being our definition of the self-indulgent. This man, therefore, will do what is good, since we suppose that his desire draws him thereunto, though rational Principle will hold him back, since we premise that he reasons wrongly about good. It follows that such a

(2) Is the Temperate self-controlled?

(3) Does Self-Control always deserve Praise?

1201 a

καλῶν)· οὐκοῦν οὗτος ἀκρατὴς μὲν ἔσται, ἐπαινετὸς μέντοι· ἢ γὰρ πράττει τὰ καλὰ, ἐπαινετός. ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ συμβαῖνον.

Πάλιν δ' αὖ διαμαρτανέτω τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ τὰ καλὰ 9
αὐτῷ μὴ δοκεῖτω καλὰ εἶναι, ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἀγέτω ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ· ἐγκρατὴς δέ γέ ἐστιν ὁ ἐπιθυμῶν
30 μὲν, μὴ πράττων δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τὸν λόγον· οὐκοῦν ὁ διαμαρτάνων τῷ λόγῳ¹ τῶν καλῶν κωλύσει ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ πράττειν, κωλύει ἄρα τὰ καλὰ πράττειν (ἐπὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἤγαγεν)· ὁ δέ γε τὰ καλὰ μὴ πράττων δέον πράττειν ψεκτός· ὁ ἄρα ἐγκρατὴς ἔσται ποτὲ ψεκτός. ἄτοπον δὴ καὶ οὕτω τὸ συμβαῖνον.

80 Πότερον δ' ἡ ἀκρασία καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐν ᾧ πᾶσιν 10
ἐστιν καὶ περὶ πάντα, οἷον περὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ὀργὴν καὶ δόξαν (περὶ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντα δοκοῦσιν ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι), ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τι ἀφωρισμένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρασία, ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις.

1201 b

Τὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν παρέχοντα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν· ἀναγκαῖον δὲ λῦσαι τὰς ἀπορίας. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν 11
τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· ἄτοπον γὰρ ἐδόκει εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα ταύτην ἀποβάλλειν ἢ μεταπίπτειν.

Ἄλλος δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης· οὐθὲν γὰρ 12
διαφέρει δόξαν εἶναι ἢ ἐπιστήμην· εἰ γὰρ ἔσται ἡ δόξα σφοδρὰ τῷ βέβαιον εἶναι καὶ ἀμετάπειστον, οὐθὲν διοίσει τῆς ἐπιστήμης, δόξης ἐχούσης τὸ πιστεύειν οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς δοξάζουσιν, οἷον Ἡρά-
κλειτος.

¹ Reading γε ἔστω, for γέ ἐστιν ὁ MSS.

² Reading, with Bonitz, λόγος for τῷ λόγῳ MSS.

man, though self-indulgent, will yet deserve praise ; for he is praiseworthy in that he does what is good. The conclusion is of course absurd.

- 9 Once more let us suppose a man's Principle to be in error, and good not to be good in his opinion ; but let desire draw him towards the good. And let him be a man of self-control—one who desires, but on account of his Principle refrains from doing. In this case his Principle, which is in error concerning good, will prevent him from doing what he desires, and therefore from doing good, since it was towards good that his desire drew him. But he who does not good when good should be done is worthy of blame. Wherefore the self-controlled man is at times blameworthy. This conclusion is, like the other, absurd.

- 10 Finally it may be asked whether Self-Indulgence and the self-indulgent are revealed on every kind of occasion and in every province—those, for instance, of property, honour, temper and pride, matters in all of which men are reckoned to show Self-Indulgence—or is the fault confined, on the contrary, to some particular sphere ?

(4) How is the Sphere of Self-Indulgence defined ?

(*Nic. VII. = Eud. VI. III.*)

- Such, then, are the questions which raise difficulty ; and these difficulties it behoves us to resolve. And first, the difficulty concerning Knowledge ; for it seemed absurd that a man who possessed Knowledge should cast it aside, or change.
- 12 The same holds good of Opinion ; it is indifferent which we suppose a man to have. For if Opinion through its firm and tenacious quality be very strong, it will not differ (in effect) from Knowledge, since Opinion involves belief that things are as we opine them to be. Such for instance was the " Opinion "

Solutions :
(1) Knowledge may be possessed, yet inactive ;

1201 b

κλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος τοιαύτην ἔχει δόξαν ὑπὲρ ὧν αὐτῷ ἐδόκει.

- 10 Οὐθέν· δὲ ἄτοπον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ, οὐτ' εἰ ἐπιστήμην 13
ἔχει οὐτ' εἰ δόξαν οἷαν λέγομεν, πράττειν τι φαῦ-
λον. ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι διττόν, ὧν τὸ μὲν
ἐστι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν (ἐπίστασθαι γάρ φαμεν
τότε, ὅταν τις ἐπιστήμην ἔχῃ), τὸ δ' ἕτερον τὸ
ἐνεργεῖν ἤδη τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. ἀκρατὴς οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ
15 ἔχων τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῶν καλῶν, οὐκ ἐνεργῶν δὲ
αὐτῇ· ὅταν οὖν μὴ ἐνεργῇ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ταύτῃ, 14
οὐδὲν ἄτοπον αὐτόν ἐστιν πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα
ἔχοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην. ὅμοιον γάρ ἐστιν ὥσπερ
ἐπὶ τῶν καθευδόντων. οὗτοι γὰρ ἔχοντες τὴν ἐπι-
στήμην ὅμως ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ πολλὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ
πράττουσι καὶ πάσχουσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ ἐν
20 αὐτοῖς ἡ ἐπιστήμη. ὡσαύτως δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς.
ὥσπερ γὰρ καθευδόντι ἔοικεν, καὶ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ οὐκ
ἐνεργεῖ. λύεται δὴ ἀπορία οὕτως. ἡπορεῖτο γὰρ 15
πότερον ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐκβάλλει τότε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ
μεταπίπτει. ἄτοπον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα δοκεῖ εἶναι.

- Ἄλλὰ πάλιν ἐντεῦθεν ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν, ὥσπερ
25 ἔφαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς, ἐκ δύο προτάσεων γίνε-
σθαι τὸν συλλογισμόν, καὶ τούτων εἶναι τὴν μὲν
πρώτην καθόλου, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν ὑπὸ ταύτην τε
καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους. οἷον ἐπίσταμαι πάντ' ἀνθρώπων
πυρέττοντα ὑγίῃ ποιῆσαι· οὗτοσὶ δὲ πυρέττει·
ἐπίσταμαι ἄρα καὶ τοῦτον ὑγίῃ ποιῆσαι. ἐστὶν οὖν

¹ Reading δὴ <ῆ> (Susemihl).

^a Cf. Republic, IX. c. i.

^b *Analytica priora*, I., II. Cf. *An. pr.* I. iv. 25 b 32:
"When three terms are so related that the third (e.g. this
man) is contained by the second (e.g. fevered) and the
594

of Heraclitus of Ephesus touching those matters on which he held one.

- 13 But there is nothing absurd in the notion that the self-indulgent does evil though he possesses Knowledge, or Opinion of the kind we have mentioned. There are in fact two different grades of knowing. One is the mere possession of Knowledge; for when a man possesses Knowledge, we say that he knows. The other is its active use. Now one who possesses Knowledge of what is good, but makes no active use
- 14 of it, is self-indulgent; so that while he is thus inactive there is nothing absurd in the notion that he does evil though possessing this Knowledge. His case is like that of sleepers, who though possessing the knowledge (of good) yet both do and suffer many unpleasant things in their sleep; since their Knowledge is inactive.^a And so it is with the self-indulgent. He is like a man asleep; his Knowledge is inactive.
- 15 Thus then we solve our difficulty, which was whether the self-indulgent loses for a time his Knowledge, or changes; either alternative seeming absurd

The difficulty can also be solved in the light of our treatise on the Syllogism.^b We there explained that deductive reasoning depends on two premisses, the first being general, and the second subordinate to it and particular. For example

"I know how to cure all sufferers from fever;

"This man suffers from fever;

"Therefore, I can cure this man."

second contained (or excluded) by the first (*e.g.* curable by me) we have a perfect Syllogism (this man is (or is not) curable by me)." The first Term predicated of the second gives the major or general Premiss; the second predicated of the third gives the minor or particular Premiss (*in. pr.* I. i. 24 b 16).

(3) The Major Premiss may be known, but not the Minor;

1201 b

90 ὁ τῇ μὲν καθόλου ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπίσταμαι, τῇ δ' ἐπὶ
 μέρους οὐ. γίνεται οὖν ἁμαρτία τῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην 10
 ἔχοντι καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ὅλον ἅπαντα μὲν τὸν πυρέτ-
 τοντα ὑγιῇ ποιῆσαι (ἐπίσταμαι), εἰ μέντοι οὗτος
 πυρέττει, οὐκ οἶδα. ὡσαύτως τοίνυν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρα-
 τοῦς τοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντος ἡ αὐτὴ ἁμαρτία
 80 συμβήσεται. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν ἀκρατῆ τὴν μὲν
 καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα φαῦλα
 καὶ βλαβερά, μὴ μέντοι γε ὅτι ἐστὶν ταῦτα φαῦλα¹
 ἐπὶ μέρους εἰδέναι, ὥστε οὕτως ἔχων τὴν ἐπι-
 στήμην ἁμαρτήσεται· ἔχει γὰρ τὴν καθόλου, τὴν
 δ' ἐπὶ μέρους οὐ.

Οὐδὲν οὖν ἄτοπον οὐδ' οὕτω συμβήσεται ἐπὶ τοῦ 17
 ἀκρατοῦς, τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην φαῦλόν τι
 1202 a πράττειν. ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν μεθύνοντων. οἱ
 γὰρ μεθύοντες, ὅταν αὐτοῖς ἡ μέθη ἀπαλλαγῇ,
 πάλιν οἱ αὐτοὶ εἰσὶν· οὐκ ἐξέπεσεν δ' αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος
 οὐδ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ' ἐκρατήθη ὑπὸ τῆς μέθης,
 1 ἀπαλλαγέντες δὲ τῆς μέθης πάλιν οἱ αὐτοὶ εἰσὶν.
 ὁμοίως οὖν ἔχει ὁ ἀκρατής [πάλιν]. ἐπικρατήσαν
 γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἡρεμεῖν ἐποίησε τὸν λογισμὸν· ὅταν
 δ' ἀπαλλαγῇ τὸ πάθος ὥσπερ ἡ μέθη, πάλιν ὁ
 αὐτὸς ἐστίν.

* Ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλος τις λόγος ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκρασίας ὅς 18
 παρεῖχεν ἀπορίαν, ὡς ἐπαινετοῦ ποτε τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς
 10 ἰσομένου καὶ ψεκτοῦ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς. οὐ συμβαίνει
 δὲ τοῦτο. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὐτ' ἐγκρατής οὐτ' ἀκρατής

¹ Reading ταῦτα τοιαῦτα for ταῦτα φαῦλα or τὰ φαῦλα mss.

* i.e. where I know the first or major Premiss, but not the second or minor. Perhaps one might suggest ἔστιν οὖν ὁ, "there is a case where," for ἔστιν οὖν ὁ mss. It is rather awkward to take ἔστιν ὁ first as the object of general

- Now there are cases where I possess the general knowledge, but lack the particular ^a : and it is just here that the possibility of error lies for the man who possesses Knowledge. " I know," he says, " how to cure all sufferers from fever : but whether this man suffers from fever, I know not." And so in the same way an identical error may occur in the case of the self-indulgent, though he possesses Knowledge (of good and evil). He may quite well possess the general Knowledge, that a whole class of things is evil and hurtful, and yet not know in particular that this or that belongs to such class. And so he will be liable to error although he possesses this Knowledge ; for he possesses the general kind, but not the particular.
- 17 Here again we see that no absurdity is involved in the case of the self-indulgent who does evil while possessing moral knowledge. His case is like that of men intoxicated. When they are rid of their intoxication, they are themselves again. Neither rational Principle nor Knowledge has deserted them, but intoxication has proved victorious over these ; and when they are freed from it, they are again themselves. So it is, then, with the self-indulgent. His passion has overcome his reasoning power and reduced it to inaction ; but when, like intoxication, the passion has passed away, he is himself once more.
- 18 We mentioned another argument on the subject of Self-Indulgence which suggested the difficulty that the self-indulgent might on occasion deserve praise and the self-controlled deserve blame. The inference is false. It is not the man deceived by a faulty knowledge, and then as the (different) object of particular knowledge as the sense seems to demand.

(3) Self-Control and its Opposite are only attributable to the Man of Right Principle,

ὁ τῷ λόγῳ διεψευσμένος, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγον ἔχων ὀρθὸν
καὶ τούτῳ τὰ φαῦλα ὄντα κρίνων καὶ τὰ καλὰ, καὶ
ἀκρατῆς μὲν ὁ τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ ἀπειθῶν, ἐγκρατῆς
δὲ ὁ πειθόμενος καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀγό-
15 μενος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ᾧ τινι οὐ δοκεῖ τὸν πατέρα τύπτειν
αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, ἐπιθυμῶν¹ δὲ τύπτειν, ὁ τούτου
ἀπεχόμενος ἐγκρατῆς ἐστι· ὥστε εἰ μὴ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ 19
τῶν τοιούτων μήτε ἐγκράτεια μήτε ἀκρασία, οὐδ'
ἂν ἐπαινετὴ εἶη ἡ ἀκρασία οὐδὲ ψεκτὴ ἡ ἐγκράτεια,
ὥσπερ ἐδόκει.

Εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν αἱ μὲν νοσηματικαὶ αἱ δὲ 20
φύσει. ὅλον νοσηματικαὶ μὲν αἱ τοιαῦται· εἰσὶ γάρ
τινες οἱ τίλλοντες τρίχας * * * διατρῶγουσιν. εἰ οὖν
τις ταύτης τῆς ἡδονῆς κρατεῖ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαινετός,
οὐδὲ ψεκτός, εἰ μὴ κρατεῖ, ἢ οὐ σφόδρα γε. φύσει
δέ, ὅλον υἷόν ποτέ φασι κρινόμενον ἐν δικαστηρίῳ,
25 ὅτι τὸν πατέρα τύπτει, ἀπολογεῖσθαι λέγουσιν² ὅτι
"καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα," καὶ ἀπο-
φυγεῖν δὴ· δοκεῖν γὰρ τοῖς δικασταῖς φυσικὴν εἶναι
τὴν ἁμαρτίαν. εἰ δὲ τις³ τοῦ τὸν πατέρα τύπτειν
κρατοίη, οὐκ ἐπαινετός. οὐ δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας 21
ζητοῦμεν νῦν ἀκρασίας οὐδ' ἐγκρατείας, ἀλλὰ καθ'
ὡς ψεκτοὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἐπαινετοὶ λεγόμεθα.

¹ Or adopting Susseml's conjecture <οὐκ> ἐπιθυμῶν, "be-
cause he has no desire."

² Susseml suggests <ἕτεροι δ' ὄνυχας> (Nir. has τριχῶν
τρίχας καὶ ὄνυχων τρώξεις), "pluck off their hairs, or of others
who chew their nails."

³ Perhaps we should read <τοιούτους> τις "Such an
one . . ."

Principle that is either self-controlled or self-indulgent, but the man who possesses the right Principle ^a and thereby judges of evil and good. He who disobeys this right Principle is self-indulgent, while he who obeys it and is not led by his desires is self-controlled. For it is not the man who deems it no disgrace to strike his father, and yet refrains from doing so in spite of his desire, who is self-controlled, and if in such cases there can be neither Self-Control nor Self-Indulgence the paradox of the former deserving blame and the latter praise is avoided.

(*Nic.* VII. = *Eud.* VI. v.)

- 20 There are forms of self-indulgence which are morbid, and others again which are implanted by nature. Of morbid self-indulgence we may take as an example that of some people who pluck off their hairs and chew them. Now one who masters this pleasure does not deserve praise, nor if he fails to master it does he deserve blame, or at any rate much blame. Of self-indulgence implanted by nature we may take for example that of the son who, we are told, was brought into court on a charge of striking his father. He defended himself by the plea that the father had treated his own father in the same way ^b; and he was acquitted, as the jury accounted the fault as natural or congenital. One, then, who should overcome the desire to strike his father would deserve
- 21 no praise for it. Such kinds of self-indulgence and self-control as these are not the object of our inquiry, but only those which render us liable to unqualified blame or praise.

not are we concerned with morbid and congenital forms of Self-Indulgence.

^a Cf. § 8 above.
^b See *Nic.* VII. vi. 2.

1202 a

30 Ἔστιν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐκτός, οἷον πλοῦτος ἀρχὴ τιμῇ φίλοι δόξα, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα καὶ περὶ σῶμα ἐστίν, οἷον ἀφῆ τε καὶ γεῦσις [ὁ οὖν περὶ ταῦτα ἀκρατῆς, οὗτος ἀπλῶς ἂν [καὶ] ἀκρατῆς δόξειεν εἶναι,] καὶ ἡδοναὶ σωματικά.¹ * + καὶ ἡν ζητοῦμεν ἀκρασίαν, ἥδη περὶ ταῦτα δόξειεν <ἂν> εἶναι. ἡπορεῖτο δὲ περὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρασία

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τιμὴν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς ἀκρατῆς· 22 ἐπαινεῖται γάρ πως ὁ περὶ τιμὴν ἀκρατῆς· φιλότιμος γάρ τις [ἐστίν]. τὸ δ' ὅλον λέγομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων τὸν ἀκρατῆ προστιθέντες, περὶ τιμὴν ἀκρατῆς ἡ δόξαν ἡ ὀργήν. ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατεῖ 1202 b οὐ προστίθεμεν περὶ αἶ, ὥς ὑπάρχοντος αὐτῷ καὶ φανεροῦ ὄντος ἄνευ τῆς προσθέσεως, περὶ αἶ ἐστίν· ἔστιν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικὰς ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατῆς.

15 Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, ὅτι περὶ ταῦτα ἡ ἀκρασία· 23 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ψεκτὸς ὁ ἀκρατῆς, ψεκτὰ εἶναι δεῖ τὰ ὑποκείμενα· τιμὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ δόξα καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ χρήματα καὶ περὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται, οὐκ εἰσὶν ψεκτά, αἱ δ' ἡδοναὶ αἱ σωματικαὶ ψεκταί· διὸ εἰκότως ὁ περὶ ταύτας ὦν μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος, οὗτος ἀκρατῆς τελῶς λέγεται.

¹ Placing (with Rassow and Susemihl) the words *ὁ οὖν* δόξειεν εἶναι, after *σωματικά*. ἡδοναὶ is Rassow's emendation of *οἷον αἱ* (mss.). The whole passage down to δόξειεν <ἂν> εἶναι looks like an interpolation. It anticipates the result of the discussion in § 23, and I have bracketed it in the translation.

(Nic. VII. = End. VI. h.)

Now of good things, some are external, as riches, power, honour, friends, reputation; others are bound up with our bodily nature, as touch and taste [and all bodily pleasures. The man then who is self-indulgent in these last may be considered self-indulgent without further qualification; and we may consider that they are the province of that Self-Indulgence about which we are inquiring]. And we asked ourselves the question, with which good things in particular Self-Indulgence is concerned.

- 22 Now no man is self-indulgent in the unqualified sense regarding honour: for one who herein indulges himself is praised; we call him a lover of honour. Yet even in the case of such things as these we do in common parlance use the word "self-indulgent," though with a qualification; we say that a man indulges himself in honour or reputation or temper. But when a man is self-indulgent in the unqualified meaning of the term, we do not specify wherein he is self-indulgent; this being already pre-supposed and plain without such specification. For the man of unqualified self-indulgence is self-indulgent in the province of bodily pleasures and pains.

- 23 And we have a further reason for assurance that this is the proper province of Self-Indulgence. Since the self-indulgent is liable to blame, the material with which he deals must be so liable. Now no blame is attached to honour and reputation and power and wealth, and other things wherein men are said specifically to be self-indulgent. The pleasures of the body, however, are liable to blame: so that we are reasonable in speaking of one who is concerned with these to an excessive degree as self-indulgent without qualification.

yet we transfer the term to the spheres of Ambition

10 Ἐπειδὴ δέ ἐστι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀκρασιῶν 24
 λεγομένων ἢ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν οὕσα ἀκρασία ψεκτο-
 τάτη, πότερον ψεκτοτέρα ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἢ
 ἢ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς;

Ἔστιν οὖν ἢ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἀκρασία ὁμοία τῶν
 παίδων τοῖς πρὸς τὸ διακονεῖν προθύμως ἔχουσιν·
 καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι, ὅταν εἴπῃ ὁ δεσπότης “δός μοι,”
 15 τῇ προθυμίᾳ ἐξενεχθέντες, πρὸ τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι ὃ δεῖ
 δοῦναι, ἔδωκαν, καὶ ἐν τῇ δόσει διήμαρτον· πολ-
 λάκις γὰρ δέον βιβλίον δοῦναι γραφεῖον ἔδωκαν.
 ὁμοιον δὲ πέπονθε τούτῳ ὁ τῆς ὀργῆς ἀκρατής· 25
 ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούσῃ τὸ πρῶτον ῥῆμα ὅτι ἡδίκησεν,
 ὠρμησεν ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τὸ τιμωρήσασθαι, οὐκέτι
 20 ἀναμείνας ἀκοῦσαι πότερον δεῖ ἢ οὐ δεῖ, ἢ ὅτι γε
 οὐχ οὕτω σφόδρα. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη ὁρμὴ πρὸς 26
 ὀργὴν, ἢ δοκεῖ ἀκρασία εἶναι ὀργῆς, οὐ λίαν ἐπι-
 τιμητέα ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ πρὸς [τὴν] ἡδονὴν ὁρμὴ ψεκτὴ
 γε. ἔστιν γὰρ διαφορὰν ἔχουσα¹ πρὸς ταύτην διὰ
 τὸν λόγον, ὃς ἀποτρέπει τοῦ μὴ πράττειν, ἀλλ’
 25 ὁμῶς πράττει παρὰ τὸν λόγον· διὸ ψεκτὴ ἐστὶ
 μᾶλλον τῆς δι’ ὀργὴν ἀκρασίας. ἢ μὲν γὰρ δι’
 ὀργὴν ἀκρασία λύπη ἐστίν (οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος
 οὐ λυπεῖται), ἢ δὲ δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν μεθ’ ἡδονῆς· διὸ
 μᾶλλον ψεκτὴ· ἢ γὰρ δι’ ἡδονὴν ἀκρασία μεθ’
 ὑβρεως δοκεῖ εἶναι.

Πότερον δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ καρτερία ταύ- 27
 30 τόν ἐστιν; ἢ οὐ; ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι περὶ

¹ Or, reading <ἢ> before πρὸς ταύτην, “For the propensity towards pleasure is different through its relation to reason.”

1202 b

ἡδονὰς καὶ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς ὁ κρατῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἡ δὲ καρτερία περὶ λύπας ὁ γὰρ καρτερῶν καὶ ὑπομένων τὰς λύπας, οὗτος καρτερικὸς ἐστίν.

Πάλιν ἡ ἀκρασία καὶ ἡ μαλακία οὐκ ἐστὶν ταύ- 28
τόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ μαλακία ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ μαλακὸς ὁ μὴ
35 ὑπομένων πόνους, οὐχ ἅπαντας δὲ ἀλλ' οὓς ἀναγ-
καίως ἂν ἄλλος τις ὑπομείνειεν, ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ὁ μὴ
δυνάμενος ὑπομένειν ἡδονάς, ἀλλὰ καταμαλακιζό-
μενος καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀγόμενος.

Ἔστιν αὖ πάλιν τις καλούμενος ἀκόλαστος· πό- 29
1203 a τερον οὖν ὁ ἀκόλαστος [ἀκρατὴς] καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ὁ
αὐτός; ἢ οὐ; ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκόλαστος τοιοῦτός τις
οἷος οἶεσθαι, ἃ πράττει, ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστα εἶναι
αὐτῷ καὶ συμφωρότατα, καὶ λόγον οὐδένα ἔχειν
ἐναντιούμενον τοῖς αὐτῷ φαινομένοις ἡδέειν· ὁ δὲ
3 ἀκρατὴς λόγον ἔχει ὅς ἐναντιοῦται αὐτῷ, ἐφ' ἃ ἡ
ἐπιθυμία ἄγει.

Πότερος δὲ εὐαιότερος, ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἢ ὁ ἀ- 30
κρατὴς; οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν ἴσως οὐχ ὁ
ἀκρατὴς· ὁ γὰρ ἀκόλαστος εὐαιότερος· εἰ γὰρ αὐτῷ
λόγος ἐγγένοιτο ὁ διδάξων ὅτι φαῦλα, οὐκέτι
10 πράξει· τῷ δέ γε ἀκρατεῖ ὑπάρχει ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁμως
πράττει, ὥστε ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἀνίατος εἶναι.

Ἀλλὰ πότερος διάκειται χειρόν, ᾧ μηδὲν ἀγαθόν 31
τι ὑπάρχει, (ἢ ᾧ ἀγαθόν τέ τι ὑπάρχει)¹ καὶ τὰ

¹ The words in brackets are added by Bonitz.

* Or "Softness" (Grant and Rackham).

* So rendered by Marchant in *Thucydides Hist.* I. 64.

* This suggestion is controverted below, § 42. (So *Nic.* VII. ii. 10 is corrected by VII. vii. 2, viii. 1.)

the province of Self-Control is (bodily) pleasure, and the self-controlled is one who masters it; whereas Endurance deals with pain. For he who endures and bears pain is a man of endurance.

- 28 Nor again are Self-indulgence and Feebleness ^{and Self-Indulgence from Feebleness} "one and the same. Feebleness and the feeble man cannot bear hardships; those hardships, I mean, which another would endure with resignation.^b The self-indulgent on the other hand is one who cannot bear pleasures; it is they which make him "feeble" and lead him astray.

(*Nic.* VII. = *Eud.* VI. viii.)

- 29 There is, moreover, a type of man whom we style profligate. Is, then, such a man as this identical with the self-indulgent? Surely not. For it is characteristic of the profligate man that he believes what he does to be the best and most advantageous for himself; nor does he possess any Principle that opposes what he deems pleasant. The self-indulgent on the other hand possesses a Principle which opposes him (when he turns) whither his lust leads. ^{How Self-Indulgence differs from Profligacy}
- 30 Of these two types, the profligate and the self-indulgent, which is more amenable to treatment? The following considerations seem to suggest that it is not the self-indulgent, but the profligate.^c For if a rational Rule were set up within him which showed him that his deeds were evil, he would cease to do them; whilst the self-indulgent possesses that Rule or Principle and yet does evil; so that one might regard him as incurable.
- 31 On the other hand, which is in a worse state, he who has nothing good in him, or he who has something good, but also such vices as we have described?

κακὰ ταῦτα; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκεῖνος, καὶ ὅσῳ γε ὁ
τιμιώτερον κακῶς διάκειται. ἔστι τοίνυν ὁ μὲν
ἀκρατὴς ἀγαθὸν ἔχων τὸν λόγον ὀρθὸν ὄντα· ὁ δὲ
15 ἀκόλαστος οὐκ ἔχει. ἔτι ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ἐκάστου 32
ἀρχή· τοῦ μὲν οὖν ἀκρατοῦς ἡ ἀρχὴ τιμιώτατον ὄν
εὖ διάκειται, τοῦ δὲ ἀκολάστου κακῶς· ὥστε
χείρων ἂν εἴη ὁ ἀκόλαστος τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς.

Ἔτι ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς θηριότητος ἥς ἐλέγομεν 33
κακίας οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐν θηρίῳ οὖσαν, ἀλλ' ἐν
20 ἀνθρώπῳ· ἢ γὰρ θηριότης ὀνομά ἐστιν τῇ ὑπερβαλ-
λούσῃ κακίᾳ—διὰ τί; δι' οὐδέν ἢ ὅτι ἀρχὴ φαύλη
ἐν θηρίῳ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἔστιν δὲ ἡ ἀρχὴ ὁ λόγος. ἐπεὶ
πότερος ἂν πλείω κακὰ ποιήσειεν, λέων, ἢ Διο-
νύσιος ἢ Φάλαρις ἢ Κλέαρχος ἢ τις τούτων τῶν
μοχθηρῶν; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι οὗτοι; ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ
25 ἐνοῦσα φαύλη μέγала συμβάλλεται, ἐν δὲ θηρίῳ
ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχή. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ ἀκολάστῳ 34
ἔνεστιν ἀρχὴ φαύλη. ἢ γὰρ πράττει φαῦλα ὄντα
καὶ ὁ λόγος σύμφησιν ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ταῦτα
δεῖν πράττειν, ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔνεστιν οὐχ ὑγιής.
διὸ βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι ὁ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ ἀκο-
λάστου.

30 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀκρασίας δύο εἶδη, ἡ μὲν 35
προπετική τις καὶ ἀπρονόητος καὶ ἐξαίφνης γινο-
μένη (οἷον ὅταν ἴδωμεν καλὴν γυναῖκα, εὐθέως τι
ἐπάθομεν, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πάθους ὁρμὴ ἐγένετο πρὸς

^a Cf. §§ 8, 18. For ὀρθός λόγος see notes on I. i. 7, I. xxxiv. 1.

^b Cf. Nic. VII. vi. 7 ἀνοετότερα γὰρ ἡ φαυλότης δὲ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχή, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. νοῦς is here used generally, of the reasoning power which distinguishes man from beast.

Clearly the former ; and in just such measure as the most precious part of him is corrupted. Now the self-indulgent is possessed of something good : namely of a right rational Principle ^a ; and this the profligate
 32 man lacks. Moreover, whilst each possesses a rational Principle as his guide, in the self-indulgent this guide—the most precious thing he owns—is uncorrupt, but in the profligate it is corrupted ; so that the latter is worse than the former.

33 Let us illustrate this by reference to the kind of vice which we termed Bestiality. It is not in a beast that we behold it, but in man ; for we use the word to designate an excessive degree of (human) vice. Now what is the reason of this ? Simply that in a beast there exists no evil guide (of conduct) ; the guide (of conduct) being the rational Principle.^b For which of the two is more potent for mischief—a lion, or a pestilent man like Dionysius, Phalaris, Clearchus ? Obviously the latter. For the existence of an evil guide within is a mighty factor (in mischief) : but the beast has no guide (of conduct), either good
 34 or evil. On the other hand in the profligate man such an evil guide undoubtedly exists. For inasmuch as he does what is evil, and his rational Principle consents thereto, and he believes that he ought to do what he does, the guide within him is diseased. Wherefore we may regard the self-indulgent as a better man than the profligate.

(*Nic.* VII. = *Eud.* VI. vii. 8, viii.)

35 Of Self-Indulgence moreover there are two forms. Two kinds of Self-indulgence. One is headlong, unpremeditated, sudden ; as when the sight of a fair woman inspires us with an immediate passion, and from this passion arises an

1208^a τὸ πράξαί τι ὦν ἴσως οὐ δεῖ), ἢ δ' ἑτέρα οἶον
ἀσθениκή τις, ἢ μετὰ τοῦ λόγου οὔσα τοῦ ἀποτρέ-
ποντος.

35 Ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν οὐδ' ἂν λίαν δόξειεν εἶναι ψεκτή·
καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἡ τοιαύτη ἐγγίνεται, ἐν
1208^b τοῖς θερμοῖς καὶ εὐφύεσιν· ἡ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς καὶ
μελαγχολικοῖς, οἳ δὲ τοιοῦτοι ψεκτοί. ἔτι τέ 36
ἔστιν τῷ λόγῳ προλαβόντα μηθὲν παθεῖν, ὅτι ἥξει
γυνὴ εὐπρόσωπος, δεῖ οὖν κατασχεῖν αὐτόν. τῷ δὲ
τοιοῦτῳ λόγῳ προκαταλαβὼν ὁ ἐκ τῆς προσφάτου
φαντασίας ἀκρατῆς οὐδὲν πείσεται οὐδὲ πράξει
οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν. ὁ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ μὲν εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐ
δεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδιδούς καὶ καταμαλακι-
ζόμενος, ὁ τοιοῦτος ψεκτότερος. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ σπου-
δαῖος οὐδέποτε οὕτω γένοιτ' ἂν ἀκρατῆς, ὃ τε
λόγος προκαταλαβὼν οὐκ ἂν ἰάσαιτο. ἡγεμὼν γὰρ
10 οὗτος ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, ᾧ οὔτι πειθαρχεῖ, ἀλλὰ
τῇ ἡδονῇ ἐνδίδωσι, καὶ καταμαλακίζεται καὶ ἐξ-
ασθενεῖ πῶς.

Πότερον δ' ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατῆς ἐστίν, ἡπορήθη 37
μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν. ἔστιν γὰρ ὁ
σώφρων καὶ ἐγκρατῆς· ὁ γὰρ ἐγκρατῆς ἐστίν οὐ
μόνον ὁ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐνουσῶν ταύτας κατέχων διὰ

^a Or, if with Spengel we transpose ἢ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς after μελαγχολικοῖς, "if they be of a warm, vigorous and bilious temperament; whereas the second is found in colder natures, and such natures are deserving of blame." In his note on *Nic.* VII. vii. 8, Grant explains that "both passionate impetuosity and cold sluggishness were considered by the ancient physiologist to be different manifestations" of μέλαινα χολή (citing *Problematika*, xxi. 1). *Nic.* indeed couples the μελαγχολικοί with the δέξεις and προπετεῖς; but the author may have misread him, or be seeking to correct him.

impulse to act in a way which may well be wrong. The other is a weakling kind, which exists alongside of the Rational Principle that seeks to prevent (wrong action).

Now the first of these would seem not to deserve any very great blame ; for it is found in good men, if they be of a warm and vigorous temperament ; whereas the second is found in cold and atrabilious natures, and such natures as these are deserving of blame.^a Besides, if forewarned by reason,^b one can avoid the passion. " A woman fair of face is coming : therefore one must control oneself." Forewarned by such reasoning as this, the man who loses self-control through some recent impression ^c will avoid passion, and will do nothing of which he need be ashamed. On the other hand, the type of man who though Principle tells him that some act is wrong, feebly surrenders to pleasure, is more deserving of blame. For a good man would never yield to self-indulgence of this kind ; and even if reason forewarned such an one, it would not cure the evil. He has in fact within him a leader whose command he disobeys, and surrenders instead to pleasure, acting the part of a weak and feeble man.

(*Nic.* VII. = *Eud.* VI. ix. 6.)

37 We will now answer the question we raised above, whether the temperate man is self-controlled. He is ; and for this reason. The man of self-control is not merely one who possesses desires and yet restrains

^a λόγος is here subjective, " the reasoning power." Cf. *Nic.* VII. vii. 8 *προειράσαντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν* . .

^b For φαντασία see Grant's note on *Nic.* III. v. 17. It is the image or idea which a sense-impression leaves on the mind.

15 τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὢν οἷος καὶ μὴ ἐνουσῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος¹ εἰ ἐγγέ-
 νοιντο κατέχειν. ἔστιν δὲ σώφρων ὁ μὴ ἔχων ἐπι- 38
 θυμίας φαύλας τὸν τε λόγον τὸν περὶ ταῦτα ὀρθόν,
 ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς ὁ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχων φαύλας τὸν τε
 λόγον τὸν περὶ ταῦτα ὀρθόν.² ὥστ' ἀκολουθήσει τῷ
 20 σώφρονι ὁ ἐγκρατὴς, καὶ ἔσται <ὁ>³ σώφρων
 <ἐγκρατὴς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς σώφρων>.³ ὁ μὲν
 γὰρ σώφρων ὁ μὴ πάσχων, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς ὁ πάσχων
 καὶ τούτων κρατῶν ἢ οἷός τε ὢν πάσχειν· οὐδέ-
 τερον δὲ τούτων τῷ σώφρονι ὑπάρχει· διὸ οὐκ
 ἔστιν ὁ ἐγκρατὴς σώφρων.

Πότερον δὲ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκρατὴς ἐστίν, ἢ ὁ 39
 25 ἀκρατὴς ἀκόλαστος; ἢ οὐδετέρῳ ἕτερος ἀκολου-
 θεῖ; ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατὴς ἐστίν οὗ ὁ λόγος τοῖς
 πάθεσι μάχεται, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ'
 ὁ τῷ πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα ἅμα τὸν λόγον σύμψηφον
 ἔχων· οὔτε δὴ ὁ ἀκόλαστος οἷος ὁ ἀκρατὴς οὐθ' ὁ
 ἀκρατὴς οἷος ὁ ἀκόλαστος. ἔτι δὲ καὶ φαυλότερος 40
 80 ὁ ἀκόλαστος τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. δυσιατότερα γὰρ τὰ
 φυσικὰ τῶν ἐξ ἔθους γενομένων (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔθος

¹ Removing τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος as redundant.

² ἔστιν δὲ σώφρων . . . τὸν περὶ ταῦτα ὀρθόν] these words give a narrower definition of ὁ ἐγκρατὴς than is consistent with the following conclusion. I have therefore bracketed the translation of them. In *Nic.* VII. ix. we read that self-control is predicated of the temperate only by analogy, καθ' ὁμοιότητα.

³ Inserted by Bonitz and Susseml.

* The meaning of this confused and probably corrupt passage (§§ 37-38) seems to be that Self-Control is a power which exists independently of the activity of desire in the soul. The temperate possess this power, but are never called upon to use it: because, unlike the genuinely self-controlled,

them under the guidance of Rational Rule. He is also one who even when he has no desires is of such a character that if desires arose he could still restrain
 38 them. [A man is temperate when he has no evil desires, and possesses the Rule which rightly judges of such matters: whereas the man of self-control is one who, along with that Rule, has evil desires.] "Temperate" therefore connotes "Self-controlled"; and the temperate will have Self-Control though the (merely) self-controlled will not have true Temperance. For the temperate man is one who feels no desires, while the self-controlled feels desires which he controls, or is at least able to feel them. Such desires the temperate neither feels nor can feel: wherefore the self-controlled is not truly temperate.^a

(Cf. *Nic.* VII. = *Eud.* VI. ix. 7.)

39 Again, we ask whether the profligate man is self-indulgent, or the self-indulgent profligate? ^b Or does neither connote the other? For the self-indulgent is one in whom Principle is at strife with passions, whilst in the profligate, on the contrary, Principle is a consenting party to evil doing. The two are thus quite different from one another in character. Moreover, the profligate is worse than the self-indulgent.
 40 For qualities implanted by nature are less amenable to cure ^c than those induced by habit; since habit

Self-indulgence and Profligacy

they are free not only from evil desire but from the possibility thereof. The question of course arises, how one can be sure of the existence of a power which is never seen in exercise.

^b This section, which reverts to the questions raised in §§ 20-32 above, seems out of place here.

^c Cf. § 31 and contrast § 30 above. Here it seems to be assumed that less curable evils are necessarily worse.

ARISTOTLE

- 1203 b διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ ἰσχυρόν εἶναι, ὅτι εἰς φύσιν καθ-
 ἴστησιν). ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος¹ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτός 41
 ἐστὶν οἷος φαῦλός τις τῇ φύσει εἶναι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ
 ἀπὸ τούτου ὁ λόγος φαῦλος ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστί· ἀλλ' οὐχ
 30 ὁ ἀκρατὴς οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος ἐστίν,
 ὁ λόγος οὐ σπουδαῖος (φαῦλον γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔδει εἶναι,
 1204 a εἰ αὐτὸς τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτος ἦν οἷος ὁ φαῦλος). ὁ 42
 μὲν [οὖν] ἄρα ἀκρατὴς ἔθει ἔοικε φαῦλος εἶναι, ὁ δὲ
 ἀκόλαστος φύσει· δυσιατότερος δὴ ὁ ἀκόλαστος.
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔθος ἄλλω ἔθει ἐκκρούεται, ἡ δὲ φύσις
 οὐδενὶ ἐκκρούεται.
 5 Πότερον δὲ ἐπείπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀκρατὴς τοιοῦτος 43
 [τις] οἷος εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ διεψεῦσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, ἐστὶν
 δὲ καὶ ὁ φρόνιμός τοιοῦτος ὁ τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ὀρθῷ
 ἕκαστα θεωρῶν, πότερον [δ'] ἐνδέχεται τὸν φρόνι-
 μον ἀκρατῇ εἶναι, ἢ οὐ; ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν τις τὰ
 εἰρημένα· εἰ δὲ παρακολουθήσωμεν τοῖς ἔμπροσ-
 10 θεν εἰρημένοις, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ φρόνιμος ἀκρατὴς.
 ἔφαμεν γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον εἶναι οὐχ ᾧ ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος
 μόνον ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ᾧ καὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κατὰ τὸν
 λόγον φαινόμενα βέλτιστα· εἰ δὲ πράττει τὰ βέλ-
 τιστα ὁ φρόνιμος, οὐδ' ἂν ἀκρατὴς εἴη ὁ φρόνιμος,
 ἀλλ' ὁ τοιοῦτος δεινὸς μὲν ἐστίν. διηρημέθα γὰρ 44
 ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω τὸν τε δεινὸν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον ὡς
 ἐτέρων ὄντων. περὶ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτά· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν

¹ Perhaps <ὄτι> should be inserted here.

^a Cf. "naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret,"
 Horace, *Ep.* I. x. 24.

^b See I. xxxiv. 11, 12, 20 above.

^c I. xxiv. 20.

^d i.e. τὰ πρακτά; see I. xxxiv. 8.

itself we reckon strong just because it becomes
 41 a second nature. Now whereas it is characteristic
 of the profligate that he is evil by nature, the result
 and outcome of this is that the Rational Principle
 within him is evil. But with the self-indulgent it is
 otherwise. He suffers from no vice of the Rational
 Principle arising from his innate character; for were
 he by nature as the bad man is, his Principle too were
 42 of necessity bad. It seems, then, that while the self-
 indulgent is a man who is bad by habit, the profligate
 is bad by nature. And so the latter is less
 amenable to treatment: for while one habit can be
 expelled by another, there is nothing which can
 expel a man's nature.^a

(*Nic.* VII. = *Eud.* VI. 3.)

43 And since the self-indulgent is a man who knows
 (what is right) and has not been deceived by his
 Principle, and the man of prudence is of similar quality
 since he surveys everything in the light of right Prin-
 ciple; is it possible for the prudent man to be self-in-
 dulgent? Not so: for whilst what we have (just) said
 might cast doubts upon the matter, if we are consistent
 with our previous statements, we shall find that the
 prudent cannot lack self-control. For we laid it down
 that the prudent was one who is not merely possessed
 of right Principle, but also performs what, when tested
 by that Principle, seems best.^b Now if the prudent
 man performs what is best, he cannot be self-indul-
 44 gent. Such a man (—one, that is, who possesses right
 Principle but does not act in accordance with it—)
 may however be clever; for between the merely
 clever man and the prudent we have already drawn
 our distinction.^c Both have the same province^d; but

The self-
indulgent
cannot be
prudent,

but may
be clever

1204 a

15 πρακτικὸς περὶ αὐτοῦ δεῖν, ὃ δ' οὐ πρακτικός. τὸν οὖν
 δεινὸν ἀκρατῇ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ πρακτικὸς
 περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ δεῖν),¹ τὸν φρόνιμον δ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται
 ἀκρατῇ εἶναι.

VII. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον ἂν εἴη περὶ ἡδονῆς, 1
 20 ἐπειδήπερ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, τὴν δ'
 εὐδαιμονίαν οἶονται πάντες ἥτοι ἡδονὴν εἶναι καὶ
 τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ γε ἡδονῆς. οἱ δὲ καὶ
 τῇ ἡδονῇ δυσχεραίνοντες καὶ οὐκ οἰόμενοι δεῖν
 τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐναριθμεῖσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἀλλὰ τό γε
 ἄλυπον προστιθέασιν· ἐγγὺς οὖν τὸ ἀλύπως τῆς
 ἡδονῆς ἐστίν.

25 Διόπερ λεκτέον ὑπὲρ ἡδονῆς, οὐ μόνον δὲ διότι 2
 καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἶονται δεῖν, ἀλλὰ δὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν
 ἐστὶν λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἡδονῆς. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὑπὲρ εὐ-
 δαιμονίας ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν
 διωρίκαμεν καὶ φαμέν εἶναι ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν ἐν βίῳ
 τελείῳ, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην·
 30 ὑπὲρ ἡδονῆς ἂν εἴη ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ
 ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἄνευ ἡδονῆς.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰπωμεν ἃ τινες λέγοντες οὐκ 3

¹ Reading *περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ δεῖν* with the mss. If *δεῖν* be read for *δεῖν* (with Rieckher), "does not connote right action"

² *i.e.* a man may be clever at planning right acts, without ever doing them.

³ The differing views of Pleasure taken in *Nic. X.* and *Nic. VII.* (= *Eud. VI.*) are noticed in the Introduction, pp. 427, 429, 432. I have there mentioned that Sussemihl, though treating *Nic. V., VI., VII.* as in the main the work of Nicomachus, excepts this particular part of Bk. VII.

while it is the part of the latter to put into action what is right, the clever man (as such) does not act, (but merely provides the conditions for action). He, therefore, may be self-indulgent, since his cleverness does not connote action within its province^a; the prudent, on the other hand, may not be.

(*Nic.* VII. = *Eud.* VI. xi., vii.^b)

- 1 VII. We must now consider Pleasure, since we are treating of Happiness, and since all regard Happiness as either identical with Pleasure or a pleasant life, or at any rate as impossible without it. Even those who dislike the conception of Pleasure and would refuse it a place in the tale of things good, count nevertheless freedom from Pain among the constituents (of happiness); now a life free from Pain is very close to Pleasure. On Pleasure.
- 2 For these reasons we must treat of Pleasure; and yet not merely because common opinion enjoins it. There is a further reason which makes it essential for us to deal with the subject. For since we are treating of Happiness; and in our definition we state that Happiness is "the activity of Virtue in a complete life"; and since Virtue deals with Pleasure and Pain:^c on this account we must needs treat of Pleasure, seeing that Happiness cannot be separated from it.
- 3 Let us begin then by recounting the arguments by The Goodness of
(xi.-xiv.). As an ancient commentary in the Vatican Library remarks the divergence, and attributes the identification of Pleasure and Happiness not to Aristotle but to Eudemus, the authorship of the latter may be provisionally accepted. See Grant, *Essay* I., and note on *Nic.* VII. xiii. 2, also Susemihl, *Introd. to Eth. Eud.* p. x.

^a Cf. I. iv. 1-6; vi. 1.

1204 a

οἶονται δεῖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ὥς ἐν ἀγαθοῦ μέρει λαμβάνειν.

Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ γένεσιν ἀτελές τι, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν οὐδέποτε
85 τὴν τοῦ ἀτελοῦς χώραν ἔχειν.

Δεύτερον δ' ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν οὐδέποτε ἐν φαυλότητι εἶναι.

Πάλιν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἐγγίγνεται· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ φαύλῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ καὶ ἐν θηρίῳ καὶ ἐν βοσκήματι· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἀμιγές ἐστι τοῖς φαύλοις καὶ οὐ πολύκουνον * *.¹

1204 b

Καὶ ὅτι οὐ κράτιστον ἡδονή, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν κράτιστον.

Καὶ ὅτι ἐμπόδιον τοῦ πράττειν τὰ καλά, τὸ δὲ κωλυτικὸν τῶν καλῶν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἂν εἴη λεκτέον, *s* πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ πειρατέον τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λύειν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀληθῆ εἶναι. ἔστι γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις. ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἡδονὴ γινομένη οὐκ ἔστιν γένεσις, οὐδ' ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ <ἰδεῖν καὶ>² ὁσφρανθῆναι. οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδείας γινομένη, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ

¹ Spengel thinks that <καὶ ὅτι ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη> (which I have translated), or the like, has fallen out after πολύκουνον. Cf. § 26 below.

² <ἰδεῖν καὶ> inserted by Susemihl.

* See note on Greek text.

^b In *Nic. VII.* (*Eud. VI.*) xi. three views are distinguished :

(a) that no pleasure is a good thing ;

(b) that most pleasures are evil ;

(c) that Pleasure is at any rate not the highest good.

(a) was held by Speusippus, Plato's successor ; (b) by Plato himself ; and (c) by Nicomachus (X. ii., iii.). (See the notes

which some thinkers support their refusal to reckon Pleasure among things good. Pleasure is denied

In the first place, they state that Pleasure is a "process of becoming"; that such a process is something incomplete; and that in the realm of the incomplete there is no room for what is good. because
(1) it is a
"Process of
Becoming".

Secondly, they tell us that there are certain evil pleasures; and that what is good has no place in moral evil. (2) because
there
are evil
Pleasures,

Thirdly, we are told that Pleasure is enjoyed by all; by the bad man as well as by the good, and by animals both wild and tame; whereas what is good is no common possession, and cannot be shared by the bad. (3) because
it is enjoyed
by all alike;

Fourthly, that there is no scientific knowledge of Pleasure.^a (4) because
there is no
Science of
Pleasure;

Fifthly, that what is good is best of all things; and this, Pleasure is not; and (5) because
it is not
"Best";

Sixthly, that Pleasure is a hindrance to noble action; and whatever is such cannot be good.^b (6) because
it hinders
noble
Actions.

4 We will begin by meeting the first of these objections, the (one which insists that Pleasure is a) process; and will attempt to solve the difficulty by proving the argument untrue. For in the first place, not every pleasure is a "process of becoming." The pleasure arising from mental contemplation is no process, nor is that which arises from hearing and sight and smell. For these are not the consequence of some need or deficiency, as in the case of the others; those, for example, which follow eating or drinking.

of Grant and Rackham on the above passage). Only (a) is here definitely propounded for discussion. Of the six arguments by which it is supported, the second and the fifth are almost identical with (b) and (c) above. The others are adduced against (a) by Eudemus.

1204 b

10 φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν. αὗται μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδείας καὶ
 ὑπερβολῆς γίνονται, τῷ ἢ τὴν ἐνδειαν ἀναπληροῦ-
 σθαι ἢ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· διὸ γένεσις
 δοκεῖ εἶναι. ἢ δ' ἐνδεια καὶ ὑπερβολὴ λύπη. 5
 οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἔνθα ἡδονῆς γένεσις. ἐπὶ δέ γε τοῦ
 ἰδεῖν καὶ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ὀσφρανθῆναι οὐκ ἔστιν
 15 προλυπηθῆναι· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡδόμενος τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ τῷ
 ὀσφραίνεσθαι προελυπήθη. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς β
 διανοίας ἔστι θεωροῦντά τι ἡδεσθαι ἄνευ τοῦ προ-
 λυπηθῆναι. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονὴ ἢ οὐκ ἔστι
 γένεσις.

Εἰ οὖν ἡ μὲν ἡδονή, ὥς ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν ἔφη, διὰ
 20 τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι γένεσις, ἔστι δέ τις ἡδονή,
 ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν γένεσις, αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν.

Τὸ δ' ὅλον οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ γένεσις· οὐδὲ 7
 γὰρ αὗται αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ φαγεῖν καὶ πιεῖν ἡδοναὶ οὐκ
 εἰσὶ γενέσεις, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ταύτας
 φάσκοντες εἶναι τὰς ἡδονὰς γενέσεις. οἴονται γάρ,
 25 ἐπειδὴ τῆς προσφορᾶς γινομένης γίνεται ἡδονή, διὰ
 τοῦτο γένεσιν εἶναι· ἔστι δ' οὐ. ἐπειδὴ γάρ ἐστι 8
 τῆς ψυχῆς τι μέρος ᾧ ἡδόμεθα ἅμα τῇ προσφορᾷ
 ὧν ἐσμεν ἐνδεεῖς, τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς
 ἐνεργεῖ καὶ κινεῖται, ἢ δὲ κίνησις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ
 ἐνέργειά ἐστίν ἡδονή· διὰ δὴ τὸ ἅμα τῇ προσφορᾷ
 30 ἐκείνο τὸ μόριον τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ διὰ τὴν
 αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν, οἴονται γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν
 τῷ τὴν προσφορὰν δῆλῃν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς
 μόριον ἄδηλον. ὁμοιον οὖν εἴ τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον θ
 οἶεται εἶναι σῶμα, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐστίν, ἢ
 618

These latter arise from deficiency or excess, either when the deficiency is replenished or when we are deprived of the excess ; and so we regard them as a process. But deficiency and excess are pain ; so that where
 5 pleasure arises, there is pain. But in the case of sight and hearing and smell there is no previous pain ; for no one, who takes pleasure in seeing or in smelling,
 6 suffers an antecedent pain. So, too, in the case of the mind's activity one can take pleasure in the contemplation of something without any antecedent pain. There is, therefore, a kind of pleasure which is not a process.

If, then, Pleasure, as its opponents declare, is not a good thing (merely) because it is a process : and if it is proved that there is a pleasure which is not a process, it follows that this pleasure is a good thing.
 7 But more than this : no pleasure is ever a " process of becoming." Not even these pleasures which arise from eating and drinking are processes, but those who declare them to be such are quite mistaken. They suppose that because pleasure is felt when our need is in process of being supplied therefore the
 8 pleasure (itself) is a process. But this is not so. For whereas there is a part of the soul in which we feel pleasure contemporaneously with the supply of what we lack, this part is in activity and movement ; and its movement and activity are Pleasure. And so because this part of the soul is in activity when the need is being supplied, or again merely because it is in activity, some fancy that the pleasure is a process : the supply being manifest to them, whilst the
 9 part of the soul concerned is not. It is just like believing that a human being is all body, because the body can be perceived while the soul cannot ; whereas

and a fuller
 Analysis
 shows that
 no Pleasure
 is really a
 Process ;

1204 b

δὲ ψυχὴ οὐ· ἔστι δέ γε καὶ [ἡ] ψυχὴ. ὁμοίως δὲ
 35 καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου· ἔστιν γὰρ μῶριόν τι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ
 ἡδόμεθα, ὃ ἅμα τῇ προσφορᾷ ἐνεργεῖ. διὸ οὐκ
 ἔστιν οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ γένεσις.

Καὶ ἀποκατάστασις δέ, φασίν, εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή. 10
 καὶ γὰρ μὴ ἀποκαθισταμένοις εἰς φύσιν ἔστιν
 ἡδονή· τὸ γὰρ ἀποκαθίστασθαι ἔστι τὸ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς
 1205 α τῇ φύσει, τούτου τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν γενέσθαι, ἔστιν
 δέ, ὡς φαμέν, μὴ ὄντα ἐνδεᾶ ἡδεσθαι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ
 ἔνδεια λύπη, ἄνευ δὲ λύπης καὶ πρὸ λύπης φαμέν
 ἡδεσθαι· ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀποκατάστασις
 1 τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς· ἐνδεές γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν
 οὐδέν.

Ὡστε εἰ διότι μὲν γένεσις ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν
 ἐδόκει εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ γένεσις,
 ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη ἡ ἡδονή.

Ἄλλὰ μετὰ τοῦτο οὐ πᾶσα, φασίν, ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν. 11
 συνίδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου οὕτως. ἐπεὶ γὰρ
 τὰγαθὸν φάμεν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις λέγε-
 10 σθαι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν οὐσίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι καὶ ποσῷ
 καὶ πότε καὶ ὅλως ἐν ἀπάσαις), ἥδη γ' ἐκείνο
 φανερόν. κατὰ πάσας γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ἐνεργείας ἡδονὴ
 τις ἀκολουθεῖ, ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν πάσαις

^a ἀποκατάστασις (or κατάστασις, *Rhet.* I. xi. 1) is no doubt a process (γένεσις), and therefore, according to §§ 7-9, no pleasure can be identified with it. The author, however, leaves this to be inferred; specifically, he only

he is in fact soul as well as body. And so it is in the present case; for there exists a part of the soul which is the seat of Pleasure, and this is active when the need is being supplied.—Thus we have proved that no pleasure is a "process of becoming."

- 10 Agam, some speak of Pleasure as a "perceptible restoration to a natural state." But the fact is that we feel pleasure even when we are not undergoing such "restoration." Restoration is the making good of what our nature lacks; but as we have said, one may feel pleasure without being in need; for need or deficiency is pain, and we assert that we feel pleasure apart from pain and before pain. This pleasure, therefore cannot be a "restoration of something we lack"; since in the case of such pleasures, there is nothing lacking.^a

It follows that if Pleasure was considered to be no good thing (merely) because it is a process; and it is now proved on the contrary that no pleasure is a process: Pleasure must then be something good.

(§§ 11-18 contain but little of Eudæmus.)

- 11 Next, we are told that "not every pleasure is a good thing." The error of this objection also can be seen from the following considerations. Since we assert that "good" may be predicated in all the categories—in Substance, Relation, Quantity, Time, and the rest ^b—the case of Pleasure too becomes at once clear. For every activity of Good is accompanied by a pleasure; so that since Good is predicated proves that the definition will not cover all kinds of pleasure.

to (2) that Pleasure always accompanies an Activity of Good,

^b See I. I. 18, 19 above, and cf. Nic. I. vi. 3 and Eud. I. viii. 7.

1206^a ταῖς κατηγορίαις, καὶ ἡδονὴ ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν¹. ὥστ'
 15 ἐπειδὴ ἐν τούτοις² μὲν τὰγαθὰ καὶ ἡδονή, ἢ δ' ἀπὸ
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡδονὴ ἡδονή, ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη πᾶσα
 ἡδονή.

Ἄμα δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τούτου ὅτι καὶ διάφοροι τῷ 12
 εἶδει αἱ ἡδοναὶ εἰσὶν. διάφοροι γὰρ καὶ αἱ κατ-
 ηγορίαι, ἐν αἷς ἐστὶν ἡδονή. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἐπιστημῶν ἔχει, οἷον τῆς γραμματικῆς ἢ ἄλλης
 ἡστινosoῦν. ἐὰν ἔχη γὰρ Λάμπρος τὴν γραμ-
 20 ματικὴν, ὁμοίως [δὲ] διακείσεται ὑπὸ τῆς γραμ-
 ματικῆς ταύτης ὁ γραμματικὸς ἄλλω ὅτῳ οὖν ἔχοντι
 γραμματικὴν, οὐ<δὲ> δύο εἰσὶν διάφοροι αἱ γραμ-
 ματικαί, ἢ τ' ἐν Λάμπρῳ καὶ ἐν Ἰλεῖ.³ ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς
 ἡδονῆς οὐχ' οὕτως. ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς μέθης ἡδονὴ
 καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ συγγίνεσθαι οὐχ' ὁμοίως δια-
 25 τιθέασιν. διὸ διάφοροι τῷ εἶδει δόξαιεν ἂν εἶναι
 αἱ ἡδοναί.

Ἄλλὰ δὴ καὶ διότι φαῦλαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί τινες, καὶ 13
 διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐδόκει ἡ ἡδονὴ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι.
 τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη κρίσις οὐκ ἰδίως ἐστὶν
 ἡδονῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ φύσεως καὶ ἐπιστήμης. ἐστὶ
 30 γὰρ καὶ φύσις φαύλη, οἷον ἡ τῶν σκωλήκων καὶ ἡ

¹ Reading ἐν ἀπάσαις (Rassow) for ἀγαθόν mss. This alteration mends the logic; but in any case the argument (which is not found in *Eud.*) seems to rest on two doubtful assumptions: (1) that the pleasure which accompanies any category of Good must itself belong to that category, and (2) that there is no pleasure that does not accompany an "activity of Good." In *Eud.* VII. v. the existence of evil pleasures is expressly recognized; so, too, in § 15 below.

² Reading ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς (Rassow) for ἐν τούτοις mss.

³ Some mss. read Νηλεῖ.

in every category, Pleasure too must be so predicable. Thus we conclude that as good things and Pleasure are found together, and the pleasure which comes from good things is indeed Pleasure, every pleasure is a good thing.

- 12 It is at the same time clear from this consideration that pleasures also differ in their form or kind ; for so do the categories in which they are found. It is quite otherwise with grammar and knowledge in its various branches. If Lamprus possesses a knowledge of grammar, the effect upon him of this knowledge will be the same as its effect on anyone else who possesses it ; nor are the grammatical knowledge in Lamprus and that in Ilcus^a of two different kinds. Not so with Pleasure. The pleasure, (for example,) which is given by strong drink and that which arises from sexual intercourse differ in their effects upon us ; and it would therefore seem that pleasures differ in kind.

- 13 ^b Again, the existence of certain pleasures which are base has been another ground for this belief that Pleasure is no good thing. Neither the fact however nor the criticism grounded on it can be confined to Pleasure, but must apply also to natural products and to knowledge.^c Some natural products are base—as maggots and beetles and vermin in

and that
if there
are base
Pleasures,
there are
also base
kinds of
Knowledge
and of
Animal ;

^a See note on Greek text. Wilamowitz remarks that a certain Neleus was the friend and heir of Theophrastus. This reading would point to a late date for the treatise. (R. Walzer in the Essay mentioned in the Introduction.)

^b This Section might follow naturally after § 10.

^c Cf. *Nic.* VII. viii. 2.

1205 a

τῶν κανθάρων καὶ ὅλως ἢ τῶν ἀτίμων ζώων, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ἢ φύσις τῶν φαύλων· ὁμοίως δ' εἰσὶ 14 καὶ ἐπιστήμαι φαῦλαι, οἷον αἱ βάνανσοι, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐ διὰ τοῦτο φαῦλον ἢ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ' ἀγαθὸν τῷ γένει καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ φύσις. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδ' 35 ἀνδριαντοποιὸν θεωρεῖν δεῖ ποῖός τις ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν ἀπέτυχε καὶ κακῶς εἰργάσατο, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν εὖ, οὕτως οὐδ' ἐπιστήμην οὐδὲ φύσιν οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ποῖόν τί ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν φαύλων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν σπουδαίων.

1205 b

Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ τῷ γένει ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, 15 ἐπεὶ ὅτι γέ εἰσιν φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, οὐδὲ ἡμᾶς λανθάνει. ἐπεὶ γὰρ καὶ φύσεις τῶν ζώων εἰσὶν διάφοροι, οἷον καὶ φαύλη καὶ σπουδαία, οἷον ἡ μὲν ἀνθρώπου 5 σπουδαία ἢ δὲ λύκου ἢ τινος ἄλλου θηρίου φαύλη, ὁμοίως δ' ἑτέρα φύσις ἵππου καὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ὄνου καὶ κυνός, ἢ δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐστὶ κατάστασις ἐκ τοῦ 16 παρὰ φύσιν· εἰς φύσιν ἐκάστω τὴν αὐτοῦ· ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἴδιον, τῇ γε φαύλῃ φύσει ἢ φαύλῃ ἡδονῇ. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ ταῦτόν καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, 10 ὁμοίως οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶπερ αἱ φύσεις διάφοροι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ διάφοροι. ἡ γὰρ ἡδονὴ ἦν ἀποκατάστασις, καὶ ἡ ἀποκατάστασις, φασίν, εἰς φύσιν καθίστη, ὥστε τῆς μὲν φαύλης φύσεως ἡ κατάστασις φαύλη, τῆς δὲ σπουδαίας σπουδαία.

* Cf. J. G. Wood on the "Burying Beetles": "It is owing to the exertions of these little scavengers that the carcasses of birds, small mammals, and reptiles are never seen to cumber the ground, being buried at a depth of several inches, where they serve to increase the fertility of the earth instead of tainting the purity of the atmosphere." Also J. H. Fabre on the "Dor Beetles": "Les services rendus par ces ensevelisseurs sont d'une haute importance dans l'hygiène des champs; et nous, principaux intéressés en ce travail incessant d'épuration, à peine accordons-nous un regard dédaigneux

general^a; yet nature is not on this account to be
 14 placed among things base. Likewise there are base
 kinds of knowledge, such as the mechanical; yet
 knowledge is not therefore a base thing; both know-
 ledge and nature belong to the class of good things.
 For just as one should not judge a sculptor's quality
 from his bad and unsuccessful work, but from his
 good work, so the quality of knowledge or nature or
 anything else is not to be gauged by its base products,
 but by its good ones.

15 In like manner, Pleasure too belongs to the class
 of good things; for (we are sure of this, though) we
 too are well aware that some pleasures are base. For
 different creatures have different natures, some for
 instance being base and some good: as the nature of
 man is good, and that of the wolf or other wild beast
 is base, while similarly the natures of horse, man,
 16 ass, and dog are all different. But Pleasure, (it is
 maintained,) ^b is the "restoration" of every creature
 from what is unnatural to its own proper nature;
 whence it follows that base pleasure is a thing
 peculiar to a base nature. Pleasure is not the same
 thing for horse and man, or in general for one creature
 and another; their natures differ, and so accordingly
 do their pleasures. For Pleasure, we were told, is a
 restoration, and a restoration restores us to our true
 nature; hence the restoration of a base nature is
 base, and that of a good nature is good.

à ces vaillants." (The comparison is not made by Eudemus.)
 For contempt of mechanical skill and invention—to be expected
 in a slave-based polity—*cf. Seneca, Epist. Moral. XIV, ii. 25.*

^b I insert these words to show that this is the opinion of
 the "anti-hedonist," here adduced *argumenti causa*; not
 the view of the author himself. See § 10 above, and note
 thereon.

Ἄλλ' οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐ σπου- 17
δαίαν πεπόνθασιν οἷον οἱ μὴ εἰδότες τὸ νέκταρ
10 οἷονται τοὺς θεοὺς οἷνον πίνειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τού-
του ἡδίων οὐδέν. τοῦτο δὲ πάσχουσι διὰ τὴν ἀγ-
νοίαν. οἷς ὁμοίον πεπόνθασιν οἱ πάσας τὰς ἡδονὰς
γενέσεις φάσκοντες εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν· διὰ γὰρ
τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ἄλλ' ἢ τὰς σωματικὰς,
ταύτας τε ὁρᾶν γενέσεις τε οὐσας καὶ μὴ σπουδαίας,
20 ὅλως οὐκ οἷονται εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονὴ καὶ καθισταμένης τῆς 18
φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, οἷον καθισταμένης μὲν
αἱ ἐξ ἐνδείας ἀναπληρώσεις, καθεστηκυίας δὲ αἱ
ἀπὸ τῆς ὀφειμῆς καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων
οὔσαι, βελτίους ἂν εἴησαν αἱ καθεστηκυίας τῆς
20 φύσεως ἐνέργειαι· αἱ γὰρ ἡδοναὶ κατ' ἀμφοτέρους
λεγόμεναι τοὺς τρόπους ἐνέργειαι εἰσὶν· ὥστε δῆλον
ὅτι αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀφειμῆς ἡδοναὶ καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τοῦ
διανοεῖσθαι βέλτισται ἂν εἴησαν, ἐπεὶ αἱ γε σωμα-
τικαὶ ἐξ ἀναπληρώσεως.

Ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγετο, ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ 19
30 ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν οὐκ ἀγαθόν. τὸ δὲ
τοιούτον ἐπὶ φιλοτίμου μᾶλλον καὶ φιλοτιμίας
οἰκεῖον ἐστίν. ὁ γὰρ φιλότιμός ἐστιν ὁ μόνος
βουλόμενος ἔχειν καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἄλλων
ὑπερέχειν· καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν οὖν, εἰ μέλλει ἀγαθὸν
εἶναι, τοιούτον δεῖν εἶναι.

Ἡ οὖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦναντίον διὰ τοῦτο ἂν δόξειεν 20

* Again the author appears to be stating the view of his opponents, not his own; the latter being that the pleasure is not the process of supplying a deficiency, but an activity of the soul while that process is going on. See §§ 7, 8 above.

- 17 The mistake of those who deny that Pleasure is good is in fact the mistake of those who being ignorant of nectar suppose the gods to drink wine, than which they imagine nothing is more delicious. But this is only through their ignorance. And so it is with those who declare that all pleasures are "processes" and not one is a good thing. It is because they are ignorant of all pleasures save those of the body, and see that these are, (as they think,) a "processes" and not morally good, that they suppose Pleasure as a whole to be no good thing.
- 18 To resume : since there is a pleasure which is felt when the natural state is being restored, and another when it is fully established,—the former class including replenishment after deficiency, and the latter, pleasures arising from sight, hearing, and the like—the activities which operate when the natural state is established will be better than the others ; for pleasures in both these senses of the term are "activities" (of the soul). It is clear, then, that the pleasures which arise from sight and hearing and thought will be the best kind, since the bodily pleasures are the result of a replenishment.
- (Nic. VII. = *Eud.* VI. xin. 5-7.)
- 19 Another objection was this : Pleasure is not a good thing, because it is not good to be enjoyed by all and common to all. What is good, they say, is the possession rather of the morally ambitious, and the fruit of his ambition ; for the ambitious man desires exclusive possession of something, wherein he would far surpass his fellows. So that Pleasure, too, if it is to be a good thing, must be something which can thus be monopolized.
- 20 But surely the exact opposite is true ; and Pleasure

to (3) that
all naturally
seek what
is good ;

1206 b

ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ὅτι πάντα τούτου ἐφίεται; τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ πάντα πέφυκεν ἐφίεσθαι, ὥστ' εἰ τῆς ἡδονῆς πάντ' ἐφίεται, ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη τῷ γένει ἢ ἡδονῇ

1206 a

Πάλιν καὶ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐμπόδιον ἢ ἡδονή, οὐκ 21
ἔφασαν αὐτὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. τὸ δ' ἐμπόδιον φά-
σκεν εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς σκοπεῖν φαίνεται αὐτοῖς.
οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν ἐμπόδιον ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ
πραττομένου ἡδονή· ἐὰν μέντοι ἄλλη, ἐμπόδιον,
οἷον ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς μέθης ἡδονή ἐμπόδιόν ἐστι τοῦ 22
πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὕτω μὲν καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης
ἐμπόδιον ἔσται· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέραις
ἐνεργεῖν. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἐπιστήμη, ἂν
ποιῇ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἡδονήν; καὶ πότερον
ἐμπόδιον ἔσται; ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πράξει; ἢ 23
γὰρ ἡδονὴ παρορμῇ πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον πράττειν ἀπ'
αὐτοῦ γινομένη, ἐπεὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ποιήσων πρᾶτ-
τειν τὰ κατ' ἀρετήν, καὶ ἡδέως ταῦτα πράττειν· ἄρα
οὐ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐνεργήσει κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν; καὶ
ἐὰν μὲν γε ἡδόμενος πράττῃ, σπουδαῖος ἔσται, ἂν
δὲ λυπούμενος τὰ καλὰ πράττῃ, οὐ σπουδαῖος. ἢ
γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τοῖς δι' ἀνάγκην ἐστίν, ὥστ' εἰ 24
λυπεῖται τις τὰ καλὰ πράττων, ἀναγκαζόμενος
πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης πράττων οὐ σπουδαῖος.

^a The above argument is an expansion of *Nic.* VII. xii.
§ 5. Contrast Schiller's *Gewissensscrupel* :

Gerne dien' ich den Freunden, doch thu' ich es leider mit
Neigung,
Und so wurmt es mir oft, dass ich nicht tugendhaft
bin.

The poet's own view is expressed in his "Ode to Joy" (*An die Freude*): *s.g.*

is proved to be a good thing just because it is the aim of all. All creatures by nature seek what is good ; so that if all seek Pleasure, Pleasure must be assigned to the class of good things.

- 21 Again, some have denied that Pleasure is a good thing on the ground that it is a "hindrance." It is clear that they only say this because they do not rightly consider the matter. For the pleasure which arises from the deed we are performing is no hindrance to it ; though another pleasure well may be.
- 22 The pleasure of intoxication, for instance, is one which hinders performance ; but in this way one kind of knowledge, too, may hinder another ; for the soul cannot lend its activity to both at the same time. But if some kind of knowledge is producing its own proper pleasure, does it therefore cease to be a good thing ? and will it thereby hinder its own activity ?
- 23 Surely not. Performance will on the contrary be stimulated, for the pleasure encourages the performance from which it arises. For suppose that the good man not only does virtuous deeds, but finds the doing of them pleasant. Will not the activity shown in his performance be thereby greatly enhanced ? Moreover, if a man does noble deeds with Pleasure, he will be a good man ; but if he performs them with Pain, he will not be good. For Pain is the accompaniment of deeds done by compulsion ; so that if a man feels Pain in doing noble things, he does them under compulsion ; and one who does noble deeds perforce is not himself good.^a

to (6) that
Pleasure
further
the Action
from which
it arises ;

Freude trinken alle Wesen
An den Brüsten der Natur ;
Alle Guten, alle Bosen
Folgen ihrer Rosenspur.

Ἄλλὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν γε μὴ λυπούμενον ἢ ἡδό- 24
 μενον τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράττειν· τὸ δ' ἀνὰ μέσον
 οὐκ ἔστιν· διὰ τί; ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐν πάθει, τὸ δὲ
 25 πάθος ἐν λύπῃ καὶ ἡδονῇ, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀνὰ μέσον οὐκ
 ἔστιν· δηλον οὖν ὡς καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ μετὰ λύπης ἢ
 ἡδονῆς· εἰ μὲν οὖν λυπούμενός τις τὰ καλὰ
 πράττει, οὐ σπουδαῖος· ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ
 μετὰ λύπης· μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἄρα· οὐ μόνον ἄρα οὐκ 25
 ἐμπόδιόν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ καὶ προτρεπτικὸν
 26 πρὸς τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται
 ἄνευ ἡδονῆς εἶναι τῆς ἀπ' αὐτῆς γινομένης.

Ἄλλος τὴν λόγος ὅτι οὐδεμία ποιεῖ ἐπιστήμη 28
 ἡδονήν· ἔστιν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές· οἱ γὰρ
 δειπνοποιοὶ καὶ στεφανοποιοὶ καὶ [οἱ] μυρεψοὶ
 ἡδονῆς εἰσιν ποιητικοί· [ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπι-
 στήμαις οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἡδονή ὡς τέλος, ἀλλὰ μεθ'
 30 ἡδονῆς τε καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς.] ἔστιν οὖν καὶ
 ἐπιστήμη ποιητικὴ ἡδονῆς.*¹

Ἐτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος ἐλέγετο, ὅτι οὐκ ἄριστον· ἀλλ' 27
 οὕτως μὲν καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ ἀναιρήσεις καὶ
 τὰς καθ' ἕκαστα λεγομένας ἀρετάς· ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἄριστον· ἀρ' οὖν διὰ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἀγαθόν;
 28 ἢ τοῦτ' ἄτοπον; ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· οὐδὲ
 ἡδονὴ διὰ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄριστον.

¹ Susemihl suggests transposition of the last two sentences, and I have followed this in translating.

* i.e. the one which Spengel supposes to have dropped out in § 3 above.

² τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονῆν μηδεμίαν, "no art devoted to the production of any form of pleasure" (Hackham, *Nic.* VII. xii. 6). The author seems here to have confused τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη, as English writers confuse the corre-

- 24 Yet again, the performance of virtuous deeds must needs be accompanied either by Pain or by Pleasure; indifference is impossible. Why is this?—Because Virtue deals with passion or feeling; and in passion, we feel Pain and Pleasure, and are not indifferent. Thus it is obvious that Virtue also is accompanied by Pain or by Pleasure. Now if a man performs noble deeds with Pain, he is not a good man. Virtue then cannot be accompanied by Pain; therefore it must
- 25 be accompanied by Pleasure. Pleasure, then, so far from being a hindrance, is an encouragement to performance; and indeed Virtue can in no wise exist apart from the pleasure which it evokes.
- 26 Another argument ^a was that no kind of science ^b produces Pleasure. This also is untrue. Cooks, wreath-makers, and perfumers are engaged in the direct production of Pleasure. There is therefore a branch of knowledge whereof this is the end; and even the other kinds, though Pleasure is not their end and aim, are nevertheless accompanied by it, and apart from it cannot exist.
- 27 Another objection was that Pleasure is not the best of all things. But the use of such an argument as this is equally fatal to the several particular virtues. Courage for instance is not the best of all things. Is it on that account not a good thing? Is not the consequence an absurdity? And so with the other virtues. No more, then, can Pleasure be denied goodness because it is not the best of all.

to (4) that Pleasure is the Object of some Kind of Science, and the inseparable Accompaniment of all;

to (5) that the same may be said of Courage and the several Virtues.

sponding terms. Cf. I. xvi. 10. But his argument that Scientific Knowledge is always accompanied by Pleasure is quite different from that of Eudæmus that Art produces the conditions of Pleasure, though not the Pleasure itself. (See Grant's and Burnet's notes, *ad loc.*)

1206 a

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις μεταβάς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν 28
τὸ τοιοῦτον. οἷον ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος κρατεῖ ποτε τῶν
παθῶν (φαμέν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς), καὶ τὰ πάθη
δὲ πάλιν ἀντεστραμμένως τοῦ λόγου κρατεῖ (οἷον
1206 b ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν συμβαίνει), ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ ἄλογον
μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχον τὴν κακίαν κρατεῖ τοῦ λόγου
εὖ διακειμένου (ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς τοιοῦτος), καὶ ὁ
λόγος ὁμοίως φαύλως διακείμενος¹ κρατήσεται τῶν
παθῶν εὖ διακειμένων καὶ ἐχόντων τὴν οἰκείαν
ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, συμβήσεται τῇ ἀρετῇ
κακῶς χρῆσθαι (ὁ γὰρ λόγος φαύλως² διακείμενος
καὶ χρώμενος τῇ ἀρετῇ κακῶς αὐτῇ χρήσεται). τὸ
δὴ τοιοῦτον ἄτοπον ἂν συμβαίνειν δόξειεν.

Πρὸς δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπορίαν ῥάδιον ἀντειπεῖν 29
καὶ λύσαι ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἡμῖν εἰρημένων ὑπὲρ
10 ἀρετῆς. τότε γὰρ φαμέν εἶναι ἀρετήν, ὅταν ὁ λόγος
εὖ διακείμενος τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχουσι τὴν οἰκείαν
ἀρετὴν σύμμετρος ᾗ, καὶ τὰ πάθη τῷ λόγῳ· οὕτω
γὰρ διακείμενα συμφωνήσουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὥστε
τὸν μὲν λόγον προστάττειν αἰεὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, τὰ δὲ
πάθη ῥαδίως εὖ διακείμενα ποιεῖν ὁ ἂν ὁ λόγος
15 προστάτῃ· ἂν οὖν ὁ λόγος φαύλως ᾗ διακείμενος, 30

¹ Mielach's conjecture for φαύλος· διὸ κακέως mss.

² Spengel's conjecture for λόγῳ φαύλῳ mss. Perhaps λόγῳ φαύλῳ (which I have translated) would be preferable: making the man, rather than his Principle, the subject of χρῆσθαι and χρήσεται.

* In the next three sections the author reverts to a problem already discussed (see note on § 29). Susemihl (Introd. pp. xiv foll.) suggests that these sections are based on a lost passage of *Eud.* which formed part of the fragment appearing in the better mss. as VIII. i.-iii. They certainly deal with 632

28 To approach another subject^a: the virtues too may suggest a difficulty of the following kind. It happens sometimes that Principle masters the passions, as we say it does in the man of self-control; and sometimes conversely that the passions master Principle, as in the case of the self-indulgent. Not only, therefore, may the unreasoning part of the soul, when tainted by vice, overcome the Rational Principle when the latter is in its right condition (such being the state of the self-indulgent); but Principle too, when ill conditioned, may equally overcome the passions when they are rightly conditioned and in possession of their own proper virtue or excellence. Now in this latter case it will follow that (the man) will use his own virtue viciously; for he who, having his Rational Principle corrupted, makes use of his own virtue, must needs use it viciously. And such a consequence would seem absurd.

Can we
make a
vicious
Use of
Virtue?

29 A difficulty of this kind is however easily answered; what we have already said about Virtue suffices for a solution.^b For Virtue, we say, is found only when rational Principle, rightly conditioned, is in harmony with the passions possessing their own proper excellence, and they in turn with it. Thus conditioned, they will agree with one another, so that Principle always enjoins what is best, and the passions, being
30 in right condition, readily execute its behests. If, therefore, the condition of Principle be evil, and that

the question discussed in VIII. 1., whether Virtue can be used to commit vicious acts.

^a Cf. I. xxiv. 23-26; and II. vi. 8, 9, 18, 19. The difficulty springs from the equivocal use of ἀρετή to denote (1) excellence of any kind and (2) moral excellence or "Virtue." Here we see that ἀρετή λόγου and ἀρετή παθῶν combine to produce Ἀρετή (ἡθική).

- τὰ δὲ πάθη εὖ, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρετὴ ἐκλείποντος τοῦ λόγου (ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ ἡ ἀρετῇ). ὥστ' οὐδὲ κακῶς χρῆσθαι ἐνδέχεται ἀρετῇ. ἀπλῶς δ' οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἴονται οἱ ἄλλοι, τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡγεμών ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὰ πάθη.
- 20 δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὁρμὴν ἄλογόν τινα πρῶτον ἐγγίνεσθαι (ὃ καὶ γίνεται), εἴθ' οὕτως τὸν λόγον ὕστερον ἐπιμνησκόντα εἶναι καὶ διακρίνοντα. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν παιδιῶν καὶ 31 τῶν ἀνευ λόγου ζώοντων· ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἀνευ τοῦ λόγου ἐγγίνονται ὁρμαὶ τῶν παθῶν πρὸς τὸ καλὸν
- 25 πρότερον, ὃ δὲ λόγος ὕστερος ἐπιγινώμενος καὶ σύμψηφος ὢν ποιεῖ πράττειν τὰ καλὰ. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀρχὴν λάβῃ πρὸς τὰ καλὰ, οὐκ¹ ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ πάθη ὁμογνωμονοῦντα, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐναντιοῦται· διὸ μᾶλλον ἀρχῇ ἔοικεν πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν τὸ πάθος εὖ διακείμενον ἢ ὁ λόγος.
- 30 VIII. Ἐχόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη τούτων εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδὴ 1 περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, περὶ εὐτυχίας. οἴονται γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον τὸν εὐτυχῇ εἶναι ἢ οὐκ ἀνευ γε εὐτυχίας, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἴσως· ἀνευ γὰρ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, ὧν ἡ τύχη ἐστὶ κυρία, οὐκ 35 ἐνδέχεται εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. διὸ ῥητέον ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ εὐτυχίας, καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁ εὐτυχῆς τίς ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τίσι καὶ περὶ τί.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ ταῦτ' ἂν τις ἐλθὼν καὶ 2 ἐπιβλέψας ἀπορῇσειεν. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν εἴποι τις τὴν τύχην ὥς ἐστὶ φύσις. ἢ γὰρ φύσις [ἀεὶ]² οὐ ἐστὶν

¹ οὐκ seems redundant, and is omitted by two mss. Perhaps *del* should be read in its place.

² [ἀεὶ] bracketed by Rieckher.

* Probably the Stoics (Susemihl, *Introd.* p. xii).

of the passions be good, the defect in the former precludes Virtue, since Virtue is the product of both. To make a vicious use of Virtue is accordingly impossible. And we may state without any qualification that, contrary to the opinion of other (moralists), "it is not Rational Principle which originally points the way to Virtue, but rather the passions. For first of all, there must needs arise (as we know there actually does) an unreasoning impulse towards what is noble and good ; afterwards, Principle must give its vote and verdict
 31 (on the suggested act). This is seen in the case of children and other unreasoning beings. In them there arise at first unreasoning impulses of the passions towards noble aims ; not till afterwards does Principle supervene, and by its approving vote bring about the performance of noble actions. On the other hand where Principle originally points to noble ends, the passions by no means (always) follow with their assent ; often they oppose it. Wherefore passion, if in right condition, has more claim than Principle to be the original motive force which inclines us to Virtue.

(*Eud.* VIII. ii.)

- 1 VIII. As we are discussing Happiness, we are next
 led to speak of Good Fortune or Luck. For most men
 suppose that the happy life is the fortunate life, or at
 any rate includes Good Fortune. And perhaps they
 are right. For without external advantages life cannot
 be happy ; and they are in Fortune's control. We are
 obliged, therefore, to speak of Good Fortune ; and in
 fact to define its nature, seat, and province.
- 2 On the first approach and survey, these questions
 present some difficulty. On the one hand, we can
 hardly assert that Fortune is part of Nature. For

Of Good
Fortune.

Is Good
Fortune
natural, i

1206 b

αἰτία, τούτου ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ ¹ ὡσαύτως ποιη-
 1207 a τικὴ ἐστίν, ἢ δέ γε τύχη οὐδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀτάκτως
 καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν· διὸ ἡ τύχη ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις λέγεται.
 οὔτε δὴ νοῦν γέ τινα ἢ λόγον ὀρθόν· καὶ γὰρ
 ἐνταῦθα οὐχ ἥττον ἐστὶ τὸ τεταγμένον καὶ τὸ αἰε
 ὡσαύτως, ἢ δὲ τύχη οὔ. διὸ καὶ οὗ πλείστος νοῦς
 5 καὶ λόγος, ἐνταῦθα ἐλάχιστη [καὶ] τύχη, οὗ δὲ
 πλείστη τύχη, ἐνταῦθ' ἐλάχιστος νοῦς.

Ἄλλ' ἄρα γε ἡ εὐτυχία ἐστὶν ὡς ἐπιμέλειά τις 3
 θεῶν; ἢ τοῦτ' οὐκ αἰνδοῦσιν; τὸν γὰρ θεὸν ἀξιούμεν
 κύριον ὄντα τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ἀξίοις ἀπονέμειν καὶ
 τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, ἢ δὲ τύχη καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς
 10 τύχης ὡς ἀληθῶς ὡς αἶν τύχη γίνεται. εἰ δέ γε τῷ
 θεῷ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπονέμομεν, φαῦλον αὐτὸν κριτὴν
 ποιήσομεν ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· τοῦτο δ' οὐ προσήκόν ἐστι
 [τῷ] θεῷ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔξω γε τούτων εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο 4
 τὴν τύχην αἶν τις τάξειεν, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τούτων
 αἶν τι εἴη. νοῦς μὲν δὴ καὶ λόγος καὶ ἐπιστήμη
 15 παντελῶς ἀλλότριόν τι ἔοικεν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ'
 ἡ ἐπιμέλεια καὶ ἡ εὐνοία παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξειεν αἶν
 εἶναι εὐτυχία διὰ τὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐγγίγνε-
 σθαι· τὸν δὲ θεὸν τῶν φαύλων οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐπιμελεῖ-
 σθαι. λοιπὸν τοίνυν καὶ οἰκειότατον τῆς εὐτυχίας 5
 ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις.

Ἔστιν δ' ἡ εὐτυχία καὶ ἡ τύχη ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐφ'
 20 ἡμῶν οὖσιν, μηδ' ὧν αὐτοὶ κύριοί ἐσμεν καὶ δυνατοὶ

¹ Reading ἐῖ αἰε ἢ > ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (Bonitz).

² Or reading οὗ for ἢ, "which that of Fortune lacks."

* For νοῦς in the general sense cf. note on vi. 33 above. λόγος, if it is to be distinguished from νοῦς, is the reasoned ruling or decision which νοῦς makes.

whatever Nature causes, it is wont usually if not invariably to reproduce. With Fortune it is never so. Its results are produced without order, and "fortuitously"; this being indeed the reason why we speak of Fortune as the cause of such events. On the other hand, it is surely impossible to regard Fortune as a kind of intelligent Perception^a or rational Ruling; rational, for their domain also exhibits an orderly sequence and invariability which Fortune lacks; so that where there is most of Intelligence and Rationality, there is least of Fortune or Luck; and most of the latter where there is least intelligence.

- 3 Can Good Fortune, then, be a kind of Divine providence? This we cannot believe; for we look to God, or providential? as controlling good and evil things, to apportion them in accordance with desert; whereas Fortune and its gifts are bestowed in very truth "fortuitously." If we attribute these gifts to God, we shall make Him either an incompetent judge or an unjust one; and
- 4 this is alien to His nature. And yet apart from these three, (Nature, Intelligence, God,) there is nothing to which Fortune can be ascribed; to one of them, accordingly, it must clearly belong. Now Intelligence, Reason and Knowledge appear to be something wholly foreign to it; nor again can we regard the providence and benevolence of God as Good Fortune, seeing that this latter befalls the bad as well as the good; and it is not likely that God provides for the
- 5 bad.^b It remains, therefore, to choose Nature as that which is nearest akin to Good Fortune.

Now Good Fortune and Luck operate in a sphere it is beyond our control beyond our competence, where we have no control

^b Contrast St. Matthew v. 45. The author seems here to diverge from the view of *Eud.* (VIII. ii. 24).

1207 a

πρᾶξαι. διὸ τὸν δίκαιον, ἧ δίκαιος, οὐθεὶς λέγει
 εὐτυχῇ οὐδὲ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν κατ'
 ἀρετὴν οὐδένα· ἐφ' ἡμῖν γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἔχειν
 καὶ μὴ ἔχειν. ἀλλ' ἤδη ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις οἰκειό-
 25 τερον τὴν εὐτυχίαν ἐροῦμεν· τὸν γὰρ εὐγενῇ εὐτυχῇ
 λέγομεν, καὶ ὅλως ᾧ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 ὑπάρχει, ὧν μὴ αὐτὸς κύριος ἐστίν.

Ἄλλ' ὅμως οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα κυρίως ἂν ἡ εὐτυχία θ
 λέγοιτο. ἔστιν δὲ πολλαχῶς ὁ εὐτυχῆς λεγόμενος·
 καὶ γὰρ ᾧ παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ συνέβη τι
 ἀγαθὸν πρᾶξαι, εὐτυχῇ φαμέν, καὶ ᾧ κατὰ λόγον
 30 ζημίαν ἦν λαβεῖν, τὸν τοιοῦτον κερδάναντα εὐτυχῇ
 φαμέν. ἔστιν οὖν ἡ εὐτυχία ἐν τῷ ἀγαθόν τι ὑπάρξαι γ
 παρὰ λόγον καὶ ἐν τῷ κακὸν μὴ λαβεῖν εὐλογον. ἀλλὰ
 μᾶλλον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἡ εὐτυχία ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι
 ἐν τῷ ἀγαθόν λαβεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν λαβεῖν
 καθ' αὐτὸ δόξειεν ἂν εὐτύχημα εἶναι, τὸ δὲ κακὸν
 35 μὴ λαβεῖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐτύχημα.

Ἔστιν οὖν ἡ εὐτυχία ἄλογος φύσις· ὁ γὰρ εὐτυχῆς θ
 ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνευ λόγου ἔχων ὁρμὴν πρὸς τὰγαθὰ, καὶ
 τούτων ἐπιτυχάνων, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ φύσεως· ἐν γὰρ
 τῇ ψυχῇ ἔνεστιν τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτον ᾧ ὁρμῶμεν
 1207 b ἀλόγως πρὸς ᾧ ἂν εὖ ἔχωμεν.¹ καὶ εἴ τις ἐρωτήσῃ 9
 τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, διὰ τί τοῦτο ἀρέσκει σοι οὕτω
 πράττειν; οὐκ οἶδα, φησὶν, ἀλλ' ἀρέσκει μοι,
 ὅμοιον πάσχων τοῖς ἐνθουσιάζουσιν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ
 ἐνθουσιάζοντες ἄνευ λόγου ὁρμὴν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ
 10 πράττειν τι.

¹ Or perhaps εὐτυχῶμεν, "our good fortune."

^a See I. ix. 7 above.

nor can take effective action. It is on this account that no one speaks of the just man as lucky in being just, nor the courageous or any other man of virtue (as owing his virtue to Luck); since the possession or absence of these qualities is within our own competence.^a There are, however, other advantages which we can attribute more appropriately to Luck. We say for example that the man of good birth is fortunate; and similarly any man endowed with the kind of good things that is beyond his control.

and is the
Achieve-
ment of
Good
contrary to
rational
Expectation

6 Yet even this is not the proper application of the word. There are more senses than one in which we term a man fortunate. We do so when he has happened to achieve something good beyond his own calculation; and when he who might reasonably expect to lose has gained instead, we say that he too is
7 lucky. Good Fortune, then, appears to consist in the enjoyment of some good which reason would not expect, or the avoidance of some ill which it would anticipate. It is, however, in the good we receive that Luck is more clearly and appropriately recognized. To receive something good is essentially a piece of luck; to escape something evil is so incidentally.

8 Luck, then, is a natural instinct, not guided by reason. For the fortunate man is he who has an unreasoning impulse towards good things, and moreover obtains them. But this comes by Nature: Nature has implanted in our soul something which
9 impels us irrationally towards our advantage. And should you ask one who is thus favoured why he thinks fit to act as he does, he will tell you he does not know, but merely sees fit to do so. His case is like that of men inspired; for they too have an unreasoning impulse towards some particular act.

other
through a
natural
Instinct

Τὴν δ' εὐτυχίαν οὐκ ἔχομεν οἰκείῳ καὶ ἰδίῳ 10
 ὀνόματι προσαγορεύειν, ἀλλ' αἰτίαν πολλάκις φαμέν
 εἶναι αὐτήν· ἢ δ' αἰτία ἀλλότριον τοῦ ὀνόματος. ἢ
 γὰρ αἰτία καὶ οὐ ἔστιν αἰτία ἄλλο ἔστιν, καὶ ἄνευ
 ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπιτυγχανούσης τῶν ἀγαθῶν· αἰτία
 10 λεγομένη, οἷον ἢ τοῦ κακὸν μὴ λαβεῖν ἢ πάλιν τοῦ
 μὴ οἰόμενον ἀγαθὸν λήψεσθαι ἀγαθὸν λαβεῖν. ἔστιν 11
 οὖν ἢ τοιαύτη εὐτυχία διάφορος ἐκείνης, καὶ ἔοικεν
 αὕτη ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς μεταπτώσεως γίνε-
 σθαι, καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐτυχία. ὥστ' εἰ καὶ ἢ
 τοιαύτη ἔστιν εὐτυχία, ἀλλ' οὖν πρὸς γε τὴν εὐδαι-
 15 μονίαν ἢ τοιαύτη ἂν εἴη εὐτυχία οἰκειοτέρα, ἥς ἐν
 αὐτῷ¹ ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὁρμῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστι τῆς
 ἐπιτεύξεως.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔστιν ἢ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς 12
 ἀγαθῶν, ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται ἀπὸ τῆς εὐτυχίας, οἷον
 ἀρτίως ἔφαμεν, συνεργὸς ἂν εἴη τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ.

IX. Περὶ μὲν οὖν εὐτυχίας τοσαῦτα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ 1
 20 ὑπὲρ ἐκάστης τῶν ἀρετῶν κατὰ μέρος εἰρήκαμεν,
 λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη καθόλου συνθέντας τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα
 κεφαλαιωσαμένους εἰπεῖν.

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐ κακῶς λεγόμενον τοῦνομα ἐπὶ 2
 τοῦ τελέως σπουδαίου, ἢ καλοκάγαθία. καλὸς
 κάγαθος γάρ, φασίν, ὅταν τελέως σπουδαῖος ᾖ.
 25 ἐπὶ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν καλὸν κάγαθόν λεγουσιν,

¹ Reading <ή> αἰτία λεγομένη.

² Or, reading αὐτῇ with Scaliger, "which contains in its own self the origin of that impulse which leads . . ."

* In "a piece of good luck" we cannot distinguish cause and effect; or rather, as *Eud.* (VIII. ii. 10) puts it, if it is a cause, it is a cause of which we can render no rational account (αἰτίαν ἀλογον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ).

1207^b οἷον τὸν δίκαιον καλὸν καγαθὸν φασί, τὸν ἀνδρεῖον,
τὸν σώφρονα, ὅλως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν.

Ἐπειδὴ οὖν εἰς δύο διαιροῦμεν, καὶ τὰ μὲν φαμεν³
εἶναι καλὰ τὰ δὲ [καὶ] ἀγαθὰ, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ
μὲν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ τὰ δὲ οὐ, καὶ καλὰ μὲν οἷον τὰς
30 ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς ἀπ' ἀρετῆς πράξεις, ἀγαθὰ δὲ [οἷον]
ἀρχὴν πλοῦτον δόξαν τιμὴν τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἔστιν οὖν
ὁ καλὸς καγαθὸς ᾧ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ
καὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς καλὰ καλὰ ἔστιν. ὁ τοιοῦτος γὰρ
καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός. ᾧ δὲ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ μὴ ἔστιν⁴
35 ἀγαθὰ, οὐκ ἔστι καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
ὑγιαίνειν ἂν δόξειεν ᾧ τὰ ἀπλῶς ὑγιεινὰ μὴ ὑγιεινὰ
ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ παραγινόμενά
τινα βλάπτειεν, οὐκ ἂν αἰρετὰ εἶη, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα
ὅσα αὐτὸν μὴ βλάψει, βουλήσεται αὐτῷ εἶναι. ὁ⁵
1208^a δὲ τοιοῦτος ὢν οἷος ὑποστελλόμενός τι τῶν ἀγαθῶν
πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν καλὸς
καγαθὸς εἶναι· ἀλλ' ᾧ τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα ὄντα ἀγαθὰ
ἔστιν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μὴ διαφθείρεται, οἷον ὑπὸ
πλούτου καὶ ἀρχῆς, ὁ τοιοῦτος καλὸς καγαθός.

6 X. Ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὀρθῶς πράτ-¹
τειν εἴρηται μὲν, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δέ. ἔφαμεν γὰρ τὸ
κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν· ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν τις
αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν ἐρωτήσκειν, τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
λόγον τί ποτ' ἐστί, καὶ ποῦ ἔστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος;

* See I. xxxiv. 1, 25, 26.

man, the brave man, the temperate man who is called "noble and good"; in a word, it is virtue that wins a man the name.

- 3 Now we are accustomed to distinguish between the things we call noble and those we call good; and to divide the latter again into those which are absolutely good, and those which are only relatively so. Among noble things we class the virtues and the deeds which arise from virtue; and among good things power, riches, glory, honour and the like. The noble and good man, then, is one to whom what is absolutely good is good and what is absolutely noble is noble;
- 4 for such a man is himself both noble and good. On the other hand, he to whom absolute goods are not good, cannot be noble and good; any more than we should regard as healthy one to whom things absolutely healthy are not healthy. For to a man who should be harmed by the accession of riches and power, those things would not be meet objects of choice; rather he will desire the possession of such
- 5 things as will do him no harm. But the sort of man who shrinks from the acquisition of some good thing would not be regarded as noble and good. It is the kind of man to whom all that is good is good—the man incorruptible by riches and power, or by any other good thing—who alone is noble and good.

(Cf. *Eud.* VIII. iii. 12-17.)

- 1 X. We have already spoken of acting rightly in accordance with the Virtues^a; but on that subject more remains to be said. For whereas we stated that <virtuous action> was action "in accordance with Right Principle," it is possible that someone might in ignorance ask us what we mean by this phrase; and where we are to look for this Right Principle or

We act in
Accordance
with Right
Principle

1208 a

ἔστιν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν, ὅταν τὸ 2
 10 ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς μὴ κωλύῃ τὸ λογιστικὸν
 ἐνεργεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν. τότε γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις
 ἔσται κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.

Ἐπειδὴ γάρ τι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἔχομεν
 τὸ δὲ βέλτιον, αἰεὶ δὲ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονος
 ἕνεκεν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς τὸ
 15 σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν, καὶ τότε ἑροῦμεν ἔχειν τὸ
 σῶμα καλῶς, ὅταν οὕτως ἔχη ὥστε μὴ κωλύειν,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβάλλεσθαι καὶ συμπαρορμᾶν πρὸς τὸ
 τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπιτελεῖν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον (τὸ γὰρ χεῖρον
 τοῦ βελτίονος ἕνεκεν, πρὸς τὸ συνεργεῖν τῷ βελ-
 τίονι). ὅταν οὖν τὰ πάθη μὴ κωλύωσι τὸν νοῦν τὸ 3
 20 αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἐνεργεῖν, τότε ἔσται τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
 λόγον γινόμενον.

Ναί, ἀλλ' ἴσως εἴποι τις ἄν, ὅταν πῶς ἔχωσι τὰ
 πάθη, οὐ κωλύουσι, καὶ πότε οὕτως ἔχουσιν; οὐ
 γὰρ οἶδα. τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ῥάδιον. 4
 οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ ἰατρός· ἀλλ' ὅταν εἴπῃ τῷ πυρέττοντι
 πτισάνην προσφέρεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ πυρέττειν πῶς
 25 αἰσθάνομαι; ὅταν, φησὶν, ὁρᾷς ὠχρὸν ὄντα· τὸ δ'
 ὠχρὸν πῶς εἰδήσω; ἐνταῦθα δὴ συνιέτω ὁ ἰατρός·

* In *Nic.* VI. 1. 6 τὸ λογιστικὸν is confined to that part of the rational soul which deals with the Contingent or Variable (= τὸ βουλευτικὸν of I. xxxiv. 3 above). Here, as elsewhere, it includes the entire reasoning faculties. See Burnet's note on the former passage.

^b For νοῦς see I. xxxiv. 13. Intuitive and Scientific Thought together make Wisdom (σοφία), the Virtue of the Scientific part of the soul. In this chapter, which corresponds on the whole with *Eud.* VIII. iii. 12-17, the rôle of the moral Virtues is to keep the passions from interfering with the exercise of the highest intellectual Virtue; whose work, according to *Eud.*, consists in the contemplation of God (τὴν

2 Rational Rule of Conduct? To this we reply that men act in accordance with Right Principle when the unreasoning part of the soul does not prevent the reasoning part^a from fulfilling its own proper activity; for under these conditions, the action will be in accordance with Right Rule.

when our irrational Part does not balk our rational Part.

This appears from the following considerations. The soul includes an inferior part as well as a superior one. Now the inferior always exists for the sake of the superior; for example, in the case of body and soul, the former exists for the sake of the latter, and we shall declare the body's condition to be good when it is such that so far from preventing the soul from completing its own task, the body assists and encourages it therein. For the inferior exists for the sake of the superior, so as to co-operate with it. And just in the same way, when the passions do not prevent the Intuitive faculty^b from being active in its own proper work, action takes place in accordance with a Right Rational Standard.

"Very true," someone may reply; "but what is the state of the passions when they permit the mind's activity? And when are they in that state?" 4 For of this I am ignorant." Such a question as this is not easy to answer. A physician may be faced with a similar difficulty, when for instance he prescribes a decoction of barley "in case the patient is feverish." "How do I perceive," (he may be asked,) "that he is feverish?" "When you see that he is pale." "But how am I to distinguish this pallor?" Then the physician has to realize (that he can do no

Diagnosis of Passions is to some extent intuitive.

τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρεῖν). Cf. *Nic.* X. vii., viii. One misses these noble "colophons" of *Nic.* and *Eud.* in the present work.

1208 a

εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔχεις παρὰ σαυτῷ, φησί, τῶν γε τοιού-
των αἰσθῆσιν, * * οὐκ ἔτι.¹ ὡσαύτως ὑπὲρ τῶν
ἄλλων κοινός ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων ὁ λόγος. ὁμοίως δ'
δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παθῶν τοῦ γνωρίζειν· δεῖ γὰρ
30 αὐτὸν συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς αἰσθῆσιν τι.

Ἐπιζητήσῃ δ' ἂν τις ἴσως καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον· ἀρά 6
γε ἔργῳ εἰδήσας ταῦτα καὶ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσομαι;
οἴονται γάρ. τὸ δ' ἐστὶν οὐ τοιοῦτον. οὐδεμία γὰρ
οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν παραδίδωσι τῷ μαν-
θάνοντι τὴν χρήσιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν
35 ἔξω μόνον· οὕτως οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα παραδίδωσιν τὸ
εἰδῆσαι ταῦτα τὴν χρήσιν (ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία ἐστὶν
ἐνέργεια, ὡς φαμέν), ἀλλὰ τὴν ἔξω, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ
εἰδέναι ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ τού-
τοις χρήσασθαι. τὴν δὲ χρήσιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν 7
τούτων οὐκ ἔστι ταύτης τῆς πραγματείας τὸ παρα-
1208 b διδόναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλη ἐπιστήμη οὐδεμία τὴν
χρήσιν παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἔξω.

XI. Ἐφ' ἅπασιν δὲ τούτοις ὑπὲρ φιλίας ἀναγ- 1
καῖόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, τί ἐστὶν καὶ ἐν τίσι καὶ περὶ
5 τί· ἐπεὶ δὴ γὰρ ὁρῶμεν παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον παρα-
τείνουσαν καὶ ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ, καὶ οὖσαν ἀγαθόν,
συμπαρηληπτέα ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἂ ἀπορεῖται καὶ ζητεῖται, 2
βέλτιον διελεῖν. πότερον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ φιλία ἐν

¹ Reading οὐκ ἐστι διδάξαι or the like. (The Aldine edition has οὐκ ἐστι.)

^a Something like this has to be supplied to complete the sense. But possibly *συνίτω* is corrupt, as Rieckher thinks.

^b The treatment of Friendship which occupies Books VIII. and IX. of *Nic.* (16 pp. in Bekker's text) is by *Eud.* 646

more).^a "If you cannot perceive this much yourself,"
 5 he will answer, "I cannot explain it." And this will
 apply equally to other cases of the kind. So, too, is
 it with the distinguishing of the passions. One must
 oneself contribute towards the perception (of their
 state).

6 Another question which may be asked is of this kind. "Supposing that I know all this, shall I in very
 truth straightway become a happy man?" For men
 fancy they will. But this is far from being the case.
 None of the other kinds of knowledge imparts to him
 who learns it the power to use and act upon it; but
 only the possession of it. No more in the present case
 does the knowledge of these things impart the power
 to use them—for happiness we define as an Activity
 —but only their possession; and Happiness does not
 consist in the knowledge of its components, but comes
 7 by making use of them. But the use of these things,
 and how to act upon them, it is not the task of our
 present treatise to impart; for indeed no other branch
 of knowledge imparts the use but only the possession
 of itself.

1 XI. Besides all this, it is incumbent on us to deal
 with Friendship:^b its nature, its abode, and its
 province. For seeing as we do that it extends
 throughout life and is present on every occasion, and
 that it is a good thing, we seem bound to admit it as
 an aid to Happiness.

2 It may be best to begin with an enumeration of the
 difficulties and questions it raises. In the first place,
 then, does Friendship flourish between those alike,
 (1) Is Like-
 ness or
 Unlikeness
 its Basis?

compressed into one Book (VII. of 12 pp.); in the present
 work (*M.M.* II. xi.-xvi.) it covers only 5 pp. Chapter xi.
 corresponds mainly to the first six chapters of *Eud.* VII.

1306 b

τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ καὶ λέγεται; καὶ γὰρ
 "κολοῖός" φασὶ "παρὰ κολοῖόν ἰζάνει," καὶ

10 αἰεὶ τοι τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον.

φασὶν δὲ καὶ κυνός ποτε αἰεὶ καθευδούσης ἐπὶ τῆς
 αὐτῆς κεραμίδος, ἐρωτηθέντα τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα, διὰ
 τί ποτε ἢ κύων ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς κεραμίδος καθεύδει,
 εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔχει τι τῇ κεραμίδι ὅμοιον ἢ κύων, ὡς
 15 διὰ τὸ ὅμοιον τὴν κῦνα φοιτῶσαν. πάλιν δ' αὖ
 δοκεῖ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον ἐγ-
 γίνεσθαι ἢ φιλία. "ἐρᾷ μὲν" γάρ, φασίν, "ὄμβρου
 γαῖα, ὅταν ξηρὸν πέδον;" τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον, φασίν,
 τῷ ἐναντίῳ βούλεσθαι φίλον εἶναι. ἐν μὲν γὰρ
 τοῖς ὁμοίοις οὐδὲ ἐνδέχεσθαι γίνεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ
 20 ὅμοιον, φασίν, τοῦ ὁμοίου οὐδὲν προσδεῖται, καὶ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα δῆ.

"Ἐτι δὲ πότερον ἔργον ἐστὶ φίλον γενέσθαι ἢ
 ῥάδιον γενέσθαι; οἱ γοῦν κόλακες ταχέως προσ-
 εδρεύσαντες φίλοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, φαίνονται δὲ φίλοι
 εἶναι.

"Ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπορεῖται, πότερον ἔσται
 ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ φαύλῳ φίλος; ἢ οὐ; ἢ μὲν γὰρ
 25 φιλία ἐν πίστει καὶ βεβαιότητι, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος ἥκιστα
 τοιοῦτος· καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ φαύλῳ, ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο;

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν διοριστέον ἂν εἴη ὑπὲρ φιλίας
 ποίας σκοποῦμεν. ἔστι γάρ, ὡς οἴονται, φιλία καὶ
 πρὸς θεὸν καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα, οὐκ ὀρθῶς. τὴν γὰρ
 φιλίαν ἐνταῦθά φαμεν εἶναι οὐ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖ-

* See *Odyssey* xvii. 218. The quotation is not exact.

* See Dindorf, *Poetas Scenici* (ed. 8), where the entire passage of Euripides is given (Frag. 839).

* This question and remark do not appear in *Eud.* or *Nic.* But cf. *Eud.* III. vii. 4, VII. iv. 7.

as men think and say? "Jackdaw"—so runs the proverb—"perches by jackdaw," and

Fair is like unto like, men say, through Destiny guided.^a

- There is also a story of a dog that always would sleep upon the same tile; and of how Empedocles, when asked why it did so, declared that there was some affinity between the dog and the tile which caused the former always to seek the latter. Others, however, believe that on the contrary Friendship arises between opposites. "Earth is of rain enamoured," they say, "when 'tis dry"^b; and so they maintain that opposite desires the friendship of opposite; for between those alike it is not even possible that such a relation should arise. For like, they say, has no need of like; and so forth.
- 4 Another question is whether to become a friend is a difficult task or an easy one? Certainly flatterers, who rapidly attach themselves to us, are not friends, though they appear to be.^{(2) Is it easy to attain?}
- 5 Moreover, there are such problems as whether a good man can be friend to a bad one? This seems impossible; for Friendship depends on loyalty and steadfastness, and of these qualities the bad man has but small store. Again, can a bad man be friend to another bad man? or is this equally impossible?^{(3) Can the Good be a friend to the Bad?}
- 6 First, then, we must make clear what kind of friendship is the object of our inquiry. Men fancy that friendship for God is possible, and also friendship for lifeless things. But they are mistaken. Friendship as we define it exists only where the friendly affection is returned.^d But the (so-called) friendship^{(4) Or the Bad to the Bad? Friendship requires mutual Affection.}

^a Cf. *Nic.* VIII. ii. 3 λέγουσιν . . . εὖνοίαν ἐν ἀντιπεπον-
θόσσι φιλίαν εἶναι.

1208 b
80 σθαι, ἢ δὲ πρὸς θεὸν φιλία οὔτε ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι
δέχεται, οὐθ' ὅλως τὸ φιλεῖν· ἀτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἴ
τις φαίη φιλεῖν τὸν Δία· οὐδὲ δὴ παρὰ τῶν ἀψύχων ἡ
ἐνδέχεται ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι. φιλία μέντοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ
ἄψυχα ἐστίν, οἷον οἶνον ἢ ἄλλο δὴ τῶν τοιούτων.

Διὸ δὴ οὔτε τὴν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν φιλίαν ἐπιζητοῦμεν
85 οὔτε τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐμψυχα,
καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖν.

Εἰ δὴ τις μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκέψαιτο τί ἐστὶ τὸ 8
φιλητόν, ἔστιν οὖν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰγαθόν. ἕτερον
μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ φιλητόν καὶ τὸ φιλητέον, ὥσπερ καὶ
τὸ βουλευτόν καὶ τὸ βουλευτέον. βουλευτόν μὲν γὰρ 9
1209 a τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, βουλευτέον δὲ τὸ ἐκάστω ἀγαθόν·
οὕτω καὶ φιλητόν μὲν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, φιλητέον
δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν φιλητέον καὶ
φιλητόν, τὸ δὲ φιλητόν οὐκ ἔστι φιλητέον.

Ἐνταῦθα οὖν ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡ ἀπορία, 10
5 πότερόν ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ φαύλῳ φίλος ἢ οὐ.
συνήπται γὰρ πῶς τὰγαθῷ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ
φιλητέον τῷ φιλητῷ, ἔχεται δὲ καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ
ἀγαθῷ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ εἶναι καὶ τὸ συμφέρον. ἡ μὲν 11
οὖν τῶν σπουδαίων φιλία ἐστίν, ὅταν ἀντιφιλῶσιν
ἀλλήλους· φιλοῦσι δὲ ἀλλήλους, ἢ φιλητοί· φιλητοί

* Cf. *Eud.* VII. iv. 5, *Nic.* VIII. vii. 4-6. Friendship of God and Man, which fills the Greek mythology, was banished by philosophy's higher and remoter conception of the Divine; but is restored by Christianity (St. John xv. 15).

* *Eud.* (VII. iv. 2) denies friendship between man and child, though there be mutual love.

* *Nic.* (VIII. ii.) starts with the threefold division of τὸ φιλητόν into τὰγαθόν, τὸ ἡδύ, and τὸ χρήσιμον. The following distinction seems first to have been drawn by the Stoics. It does not appear in *Nic.* or in *Eud.* (See Grant, Essay I. pp. 38, 39.)

for God admits of no such return, not even of affection on our part ; since it were an absurdity for a man to
 7 profess a friend's affection for Zeus.^a Equally impossible is the return of affection by things that are lifeless ; yet even towards them we may have a friendly feeling—as we have for wine and other things of the kind.

We are not, then, concerned with the so-called friendship for God or for things without life, but with that whose objects are living beings, and such living beings as can return the affection.^b

8 If we next proceed to inquire what things are naturally lovable, the answer is, only such things as are good.^c Now there is a difference between what is in itself lovable, and that which draws someone to love it ; just as there is between what is intrinsically

Things absolutely good are naturally lovable.

9 desirable, and what one is drawn to wish. Unqualified or absolute Good is desirable ; but each will wish that which is good for himself ; and in the same way what is absolutely good is lovable, but one is drawn to love what is good for oneself. It follows that whereas the object of one's love is always lovable, what is lovable does not (in every case) command one's love.

Things good for me command my Love.

10 Here and hence arises the problem whether or not the virtuous man can be friend to the bad man. For the individual's good is not unconnected with absolute good, nor what we are drawn to love with what is naturally lovable ; and the powers of affording pleasure and advantage attend on goodness, and
 11 follow in its train. Now friendship between the virtuous consists in their loving one another ; and they love one another inasmuch as they are lovable ; and they are lovable inasmuch as they are good.

Good Men are mutual Friends because both are lovable ;

10 δέ, ἢ ἀγαθοί. οὐκοῦν ὁ σπουδαῖος, φησὶν, τῷ 12
 φαύλῳ οὐκ ἔσται φίλος; ἔσται μὲν οὖν. ἐπειδὴ
 γὰρ τὰγαθῷ ἡκολούθει τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ἢ
 ἔστιν φαῦλος ὢν ἡδύς, ταύτῃ φίλος· πάλιν αὖ
 συμφέρων, ἢ συμφέρων, ταύτῃ φίλος. ἀλλ' οὐκ 13
 ἔσται γε κατὰ τὸ φιλητόν ἢ τοιαύτη φιλία. φιλη-
 15 τὸν γὰρ ἦν τὰγαθόν, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος οὐ φιλητός· οὐ
 γὰρ ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ φιλητέον· εἰσὶν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς
 παντελοῦς φιλίας, τῆς ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις, καὶ αὗται
 αἱ φιλίαι, ἢ τε κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἢ κατὰ τὸ
 συμφέρον.

Ὁ οὖν κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ φιλῶν οὐ φιλεῖ τὴν κατὰ τὸ 14
 ἀγαθὸν φιλίαν, οὐδὲ ὁ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον· εἰσὶν δὲ 15
 20 καὶ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, ἢ τε κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἢ
 κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἢ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον, οὐχ αἱ
 αὗται μὲν, οὐ παντελῶς δὲ οὐδὲ ἀλλότριαι ἀλλήλων,
 ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ταύτου πως ἡρτημέναι εἰσὶν. ὅλον φαμέν
 ἱατρικὸν τὸ μαχαίριον, ἱατρικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ
 25 ἱατρικὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην· ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως λέγον-
 ται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν μαχαίριον τῷ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς
 ἱατρικὴν ἱατρικὸν λέγεται, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος τῷ ποιη-
 τικὸς εἶναι ὑγιείας, ἢ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῷ αἰτία εἶναι
 καὶ ἀρχή. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ φιλίαι οὐχ ὡσαύτως, 16
 30 ἢ τε τῶν σπουδαίων ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἢ κατὰ τὸ
 ἡδὺ καὶ ἢ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον. οὐδὲ δὴ ὁμονύμως
 λέγονται, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰσὶν μὲν αἱ αὐταί, περὶ ταῦτα

* A somewhat obscure passage. It might be paraphrased thus. The good man, along with his goodness, has the power to please and to profit. The bad man is thus attracted to him, and exchanges with him his own pleasantness and profitableness. The good man has a complete capacity for friendship, and can enjoy the exchange of pleasure or profit with the bad as well as of true affection with

- 12 "Is it therefore impossible," we are asked, "for the virtuous to be friend to the bad?" Surely not. For since advantage and pleasantness, as we saw, follow in the train of goodness, even if a man be bad, he is yet friend (to the good man) inasmuch as he is pleasant (to him); and again, if he is advantageous, so far as this goes he is a friend. It is true that these friendships cannot be based on what is naturally lovable (for we saw that only goodness is such, and the bad man cannot be thus lovable)—but rather on what one is drawn to love. For even these friendships, which are on a footing of pleasure or advantage, spring from that full affection which exists in virtuous men.^a
- 14 Those, therefore, whose love springs from pleasure or from advantage do not experience the friendship whose basis is goodness. These kinds of friendship, in fact—the friendships of virtue, of pleasure, and of profit—are not identical; and yet they are not wholly alien to one another, but partake of a common principle. In the same way when we speak of a "medical" lancet, a "medical" man, and a "medical" science we apply the term in different ways. The lancet is called "medical" because it is useful in medicine, the man, because he is a purveyor of health, and the science as being the cause and origin thereof. Just so, when we speak of good men's friendship founded on virtue, and friendship founded on pleasure or on profit, we are using the term in different ways. These kinds of "friendship" are not synonymous with one another; they are different things, though their province and origin are the good. § 13 seems inconsistent with § 9, where we are told that what we are drawn to love is also naturally lovable.

and Good
and Bad
because
they are
mutually
pleasant or
profitable.

1209 ^a

δέ πως καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσὶν. εἰ δὴ τις λέγοι 17
 “ὁ κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ φιλῶν οὐκ ἔστιν φίλος τούτῳ· οὐ
 γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φίλος ἐστίν,” βαδίζει ὁ τοιοῦ-
 τος ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν σπουδαίων φιλίαν, τὴν ἐξ ἀπάν-
 των ταύτων οὔσαν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ
 35 ἡδέος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συμφέροντος, ὥστ’ ἀληθῶς οὐκ
 ἔστιν [κατ’] ἐκείνην γε τὴν φιλίαν φίλος, ἀλλὰ τὴν
 κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον.

Πότερον οὖν ἔσται ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ σπουδαίῳ 18
 φίλος, ἢ οὐ; οὐδὲν γὰρ προσδεῖται, φησὶν, ὁ ὅμοιος
 τοῦ ὁμοίου. ὁ δὴ τοιοῦτος λόγος ζητεῖ τὴν κατὰ
 1209 ^b τὸ συμφέρον φιλίαν· ἢ γὰρ προσδεῖται ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ
 ἑτέρου, ταύτῃ ὄντες φίλοι ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον
 φιλίᾳ εἰσὶν. ἀλλὰ ἑτέρα διώρισται ἢ κατὰ τὸ συμ- 19
 φέρον φιλία καὶ ἢ κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ ἡδονήν. εἰκὸς
 δὴ καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον τούτους· πάντα γὰρ αὐτοῖς
 6 ὑπάρχει, τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον.
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ φαύλῳ· ἢ γὰρ ἴσως
 ἡδύς, ταύτῃ καὶ φίλος. καὶ ὁ φαύλος γε τῷ φαύλῳ 20
 ἢ γὰρ ἴσως τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρει, ταύτῃ φίλοι.
 ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοῦτο γινώμενον, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ τὸ
 συμφέρον, φίλους τούτους διὰ τὸ συμφέρον, ὥστ’¹
 10 οὐδὲν κωλύσει καὶ φαύλοις οὔσιν ταυτὸν τι συμ-
 φέρειν.

Βεβαιωτάτη μὲν οὖν καὶ μονιμωτάτη καὶ καλ- 21
 λίστη ἢ ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις φιλία, ἢ κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ
 τὰγαθὸν οὔσα, εἰκότως. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἀμετά-
 πτωτον, δι’ ἣν ἢ φιλία, ὥστε εἰκὸς τὴν φιλίαν
 15 τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμετάπτωτον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον

¹ Reading *ὡς* for *ὥστ’* *miss.*

^a Lit. “walking.”

17 the same. If, then, one were to say "the man who loves another for pleasure is not really a friend to him, since his friendship is not based on virtue,"—such an one is looking ^a towards the friendship of good men, which is based upon all three, upon goodness, and pleasure and advantage. Quite truly, that man's friendship is not of this kind, but of the kind based only on pleasure or on profit.

18 This being so, can the good man be friend to the good, or not? For it is objected that like has no need of like. Now an argument of this kind is thinking of the friendship of profit; for those who are friends inasmuch as the one has need of the other are united

19 by this kind of friendship. We have, however, drawn a clear distinction between this friendship and those based on virtue and on pleasure. The probability is that good men will be far more inclined to friendship, possessing as they do all its three foundations, both
20 goodness and pleasantness and profitableness. And the good man will even be a friend to the bad man; for he may possibly be his friend in so far as he is pleasant to him. Moreover, the bad man may be friend to the bad man; for in so far as the same thing is advantageous to both, there is possibility of friendship. For it is a matter of experience that when men's interests are identical, they become friends through advantage; since nothing will prevent even bad men having some interest in common.

Bad Men
may be
Friends
if their
Interests
agree

21 Friendship between good men is in fact the firmest, the most enduring, and the most noble; the friendship whose basis is virtue and goodness. And this is only reasonable. Virtue, on account of which the friendship arises, is an unchangeable thing; so that one may reasonably infer the same of the friendship.

Friendship
between
the Good
is alone
enduring.

οὐδέποτε ταυτόν· διὸ ἢ διὰ τὸ συμφέρον φιλία οὐ
βεβαία, ἀλλὰ τῷ συμφέροντι συμμεταπίπτει· ὁμοίως 22
καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν βελτίστων φιλία ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν
γινομένη ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμ-
φέρον, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν τοῖς φορτικοῖς καὶ
τυχοῦσιν.

20 Συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὅταν φαύλοις 23
ἐντύχωσιν τοῖς φίλοις, καὶ θαυμάζειν· ἔστι δὲ
οὐδὲν ἄτοπον. ὅταν γὰρ ἡ φιλία λάβῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν
ἀρχήν, δι' ἣν φίλοι εἰσίν, ἡ τὸ συμφέρον, ἅμα ταῦτ'
ἀπολείπει καὶ ἡ φιλία οὐ διαμένει. πολλάκις δὲ 24

25 μένει μὲν ἡ φιλία, κακῶς δ' ἐχρήσατο τῷ φίλῳ,
διὸ ἀγανακτοῦσιν· ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄλογον. οὐ
γὰρ δι' ἀρετὴν ἡ φιλία σοι πρὸς τοῦτον ὑπῆρχεν,
διὸ οὐδ' ἄτοπον μηδὲν ποιεῖν αὐτὸν τῶν καθ'
ἀρετὴν. ἀγανακτοῦσιν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς. δι' ἡδονὴν
γὰρ ποιησάμενοι τὴν φιλίαν, τὴν δι' ἀρετὴν οἶονται
80 δεῖν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν· τὸ δ' οὐ δυνατόν· οὐ γὰρ
ἐστὶν ἡ δι' ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἀρετῆς ἐχομένη.
κοινωσάμενοι οὖν ἡδονῇ ἀρετὴν ζητοῦσιν, οὐκ 25
ὀρθῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ἡδονῇ καὶ τῷ συμ-
φέροντι ἡ ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀμφοτέρω ταῦτα
ἀκολουθεῖ. ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ μὴ τις οἴσεται τοὺς
σπουδαίους αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς ἡδίστους εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ
85 οἱ φαῦλοι, ὥς φησιν Εὐριπίδης, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἡδεῖς
εἰσίν· “κακὸς κακῷ” γὰρ “συντέτηκεν.” οὐ γὰρ

^a Cf. Ovid, *Ex Ponto*, II. iii. 7:

turpe quidem dictu, sed (si modo vera fatemur)
vulgus amicitias utilitate probat.

Advantage, on the other hand, is always changing :
 wherefore the friendship based thereon is not firm,
 22 but changes along with it. And the same is true of
 friendship based on pleasure.

The friendship, therefore, of the best men is the
 kind that springs up through virtue ; while that of
 the multitude is based on profit,^a and the friendship
 based on pleasure is found between coarse and com-
 monplace persons.

23 Men are sometimes indignant and surprised when
 they find their friends are bad. But there is nothing
 strange herein. For when friendship takes its origin
 from pleasure, and the friends are friends for pleasure's
 sake, or again, when profit is its origin, so soon as
 these things fail the friendship also passes with them.
 24 Often, however, even while the friendly feeling
 abides, the one whom we love treats us ill ; and we
 are angry on that account. Yet here too there is
 nothing unreasonable in the event. Your friendship
 for this man did not arise on account of his virtue ; so
 that if his actions are by no means in accordance with
 virtue, there is nothing strange in it. Men have no
 right, therefore, to be indignant. After contracting
 a friendship for the sake of pleasure, they expect to
 possess the kind whose origin is virtue ; and this is
 impossible, seeing that friendship for pleasure or for
 25 profit has nothing to do with virtue. Having formed
 an alliance of pleasure, men look for virtue ; and this
 they have no right to do. Virtue does not attend
 upon pleasure and profit ; but these conversely upon
 her. For it were strange not to suppose that good
 men are surpassingly pleasant to their like ; since
 even the bad, as Euripides tells us, are pleasing to one
 another. "The bad," he says, "are welded to the

1209 b

ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ἡδονῇ ἢ ἀρετῇ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀρετῇ ἢ ἡδονῇ ἀκολουθεῖ.

Πότερον δὲ καὶ δεῖ ἐν τῇ τῶν σπουδαίων φιλία 28
τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι, ἢ οὐ δεῖ; ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ μὴ
1210^a φάναι δεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ἀφελεῖς αὐτῶν τὸ ἡδεῖς εἶναι
ἀλλήλοις, ἄλλους ποιοῦνται φίλους εἰς τὸ συζῆν,
τοὺς ἡδεῖς· εἰς γὰρ τὸ συζῆν οὐδὲν μεῖζόν ἐστι τοῦ
ἡδεῖς εἶναι· ἄτοπον οὖν τὸ μὴ οἶεσθαι δεῖν τοὺς 27
σπουδαίους μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις συζῆν· τοῦτο δ' οὐκ
ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέος· δέοι ἂν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν,
μάλιστα τούτοις ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἡδέσθαι εἶναι.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ διήρρηται αἱ φιλίαι εἰς τρία εἶδη, καὶ ἐν 28
ταύταις ἡπορεῖτο, πότερον ἐν ἰσότητι ἢ φιλία ἐγ-
γίνεται ἢ ἐν ἀνισότητι· ἔστιν οὖν κατ' ἀμφοτέρα. ἢ
μὲν γὰρ καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἢ τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ἢ
τελεία φιλία· ἢ δὲ κατ' ἀνομοιότητα ἢ κατὰ τὸ
10 συμφέρον. τῷ γὰρ εὐπόρῳ ὁ πένης διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν
ὧν ὁ πλούσιος εὐπορεῖ φίλος ἐστί, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ
ὁ φαῦλος διὰ ταυτό· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἔνδειαν τὴν τῆς
ἀρετῆς, παρ' οὗ οἶεται αὐτῷ ἔσεσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο
τούτῳ φίλος. γίνεται οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἀνομοίοις φιλία 29
κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον· διὸ καὶ Εὐριπίδης

^a Dindorf, *Poetae Scenici* (ed. 8) gives

ἄνθρωπος δὲ χρηστός χρηστὸν οὐ μισεῖ ποτε,
κακῷ κακὸς τε συντέτθηκεν ἡδοναῖς·
φίλει δὲ θούμωφύλον ἀνθρώπους ἄγειν

from *Bellerophon* (Frag. 810). *Eud.* VII. v. 4 gives κακὸς
κακῷ <δὲ> συντέτθηκεν ἡδονῇ.

^b See § 10, and note on § 8. The reference to a classification given directly in *Nic.* but only indirectly here, strongly suggests, like the similar one in § 40 below, that we are dealing with a compilation. Cf. also I. xxxiv. 1 note d.

^c This seems to be a slip on the author's part, which he

bad." ^a Virtue, in fact, does not attend upon pleasure, but pleasure upon virtue.

- 26 Is it actually necessary that there be pleasure in the friendship of good men, or is it not? To deny it were absurd. For if we deprive them of pleasure in each other's society, they will provide themselves with other friends for companionship, friends who will give them pleasure; since for companionship
 27 nothing is more important than pleasantness. As, then, it is absurd to suppose that good men are not specially drawn to mutual companionship; and such companionship is impossible without pleasure: it would seem to follow that such men are specially endowed with the gift of pleasantness.

(*Eud.* VII. iii.-v. : *Nic.* VIII. vi. 7-viii.)

- 28 Again, since we have divided friendships into three classes,^b and the question was raised whether in these classes the friendship arises under conditions of equality or of inequality^c; we find that friendship does in fact exist under both conditions. The friendship of likeness is the friendship of good men, the perfect friendship; while that of unlikeness is the kind whose basis is profit. For the poor man is friend to the wealthy owing to his need of those things wherein the rich man abounds; and the bad man is friend to the good for the same reason; through his own lack of virtue, he is friend to one from whom he
 29 hopes to be supplied with it. Friendship based on profit arises, therefore, between the unlike; so that Euripides writes:

Pleasure attends the Friendship of the Good

Friendship of Likeness is between the Good, of Unlikeness, between those who seek Profit

repeats at the beginning of § 31. The question raised in § 2 and answered here is whether Friendship is based on Likeness or Unlikeness. There may be inequality even between those who are alike; cf. *Nic.* VIII. xiii. 1.

ἐρᾷ μὲν ὀμβρου γαῖ', ὅταν ξηρὸν πέδον·

ὥς ἐναντίοις οὖσιν τούτοις ἐγγίνεται φιλία ἢ διὰ τὸ συμφέρον. καὶ γὰρ εἰ θέλεις τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ποιῆσαι πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, ταῦτα ἀλλήλοισι χρήσιμα εἰσίν. τὸ γὰρ πῦρ φασί, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ ὕγρὸν, 30 φθείρεσθαι, ὥς τοῦτ' αὐτῷ παρασκευάζον ὥσπερ τροφήν τινά, ταύτην δὲ τοσαύτην, ὅσης κρατήσεις 20 <ἄν>· ἂν μὲν γὰρ πλείον ποιήσῃς τὸ ὕγρὸν, ἐπι-κρατήσαν <ποιήσει> φθείρεσθαι τὸ πῦρ, ἐὰν δὲ σύμμετρον, συνοίσει. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντιωτάτοις φιλία ἐγγίνεται διὰ τὸ συμφέρον.

Ἀνάγονται δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ φιλίαι, καὶ αἱ ἐν ἰσότητι 31 καὶ αἱ ἐν ἀνισότητι, εἰς τὰς διηρημένας τρεῖς.

25 "Εστὶν δ' ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς φιλίαις διαφορὰ γνω-μένη πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως φιλῶσιν ἢ εὖ ποιῶσιν ἢ ὑπηρετῶσιν ἢ ὅ τι ἂν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἐκτενῶς ποιῇ ὁ δ' ἐλλείπη, κατὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τὸ ἔγκλημα καὶ ἡ μέμψις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' 32 ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν τοιούτων ὣν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τέλος τῆς 30 φιλίας, οἷον εἰ ἀμφοτέρωι κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον ἀλλή-λοις φίλοι ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ κατ' ἀρετήν, εὐδηλος ἡ ἔλλειψις ἢ παρὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου, ἐὰν οὖν πλείω ἀγαθὰ σύ μοι ποιῇς ἢ ἐγὼ σοί, οὐδ' ἀμφισβητῶ ἔτι μὴ οὐ 33 δεῖν σε μᾶλλον ὑπ' ἐμοῦ φιλεῖσθαι· ἐν ᾗ δὲ φιλία μὴ 35 διὰ ταῦτό φίλοι ἐσμέν, μᾶλλον αἱ διαφοραί. ἄδηλος γὰρ ἡ ἔλλειψις παρ' ἑκατέρου. οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν δι'

^a See § 3 above.

^b Such as that contained in oil-fuel.

MAGNA MORALIA, II. xi. 20-33

Earth is of rain enamoured when 'tis dry,"

since between these opposites there springs up the friendship of profit or advantage. For if you choose to regard fire and water as of all things most utterly opposed, yet are they profitable the one to the other.

- 30 Fire, we are told, apart from moisture^b dies down; since the latter supplies it with a kind of nourishment, which must, however, be no more than it can overcome; for if we supply the moisture in excess, it will overcome the fire and cause it to die down; only in right proportion will it be profitable to it. It is clear, then, that even between things most utterly opposed there springs up friendship based on profit.

(*Eud.* VII. iv., v. : *Nic.* VIII. vii., viii., xiii., xiv.-IX. i.)

- 31 Every kind of friendship, whether between equals or unequals, may be referred to one of these three classes.

In all kinds of friendship differences will arise between the friends when love or benefit or service or the like is not equal on both sides. For when the one shows himself keen and active therein, and the other falls short of him, from this shortcoming arise

*Differences
between
Friends*

- 32 complaint and blame. It is, however, to be observed that in the case of those friends whose friendship has the same object—if both friends, that is, are friends for profit or for pleasure or for virtue—any shortcoming on the part of one is easy to discern; so that if you confer more benefits on me than I on you, I do not dispute that you have a claim to receive more love
33 from me. But if in our friendship we have diverse objects in view, differences are more serious, because shortcoming on either side is difficult to discern. Where, for instance, one is a friend for the sake of

1210 a

ἡδονὴν φίλος ἐστὶν ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ συμφέρον, ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ τῷ συμφέροντι ὑπερέχων ἀξίαν οἶεται τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι τοῦ συμφέροντος, οὔτε ὁ τῇ ἡδονῇ ὑπερέχων ἀξίαν τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐν τῷ συμφέροντι χάριν ἀπολαμβάνειν. διὸ μᾶλλον αἱ διαφοραὶ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις φιλίαις γίνονται.

1210 b

Οἱ δ' ἐν ἀνισότητι φίλοι ὄντες, οἱ μὲν ὑπερέχοντες 34 πλούτῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τοιούτῳ οὐκ οἶονται δεῖν αὐτοὶ φιλεῖν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνδεεστέρων οἶονται δεῖν αὐτοὶ φιλεῖσθαι· ἔστιν δὲ βέλτιον τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι. —τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖν ἐνέργειά τις ἡδονῆς καὶ ἀγαθόν, 35 ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι οὐδεμία τῷ φιλουμένῳ ἐνέργεια γίνεται.—ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον τὸ γνωρίζειν ἢ τὸ 36 γνωρίζεσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ γνωρίζεσθαι καὶ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ γνωρίζειν 37 καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις.—ἔτι τὸ εὐποιητικὸν εἶναι βέλτιον ἢ τὸ μή· ὁ μὲν οὖν φιλῶν εὐποιητικός, ἢ φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ φιλούμενος, ἢ φιλεῖται, οὐ.—ἀλλ' οἱ 38 ἄνθρωποι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον βούλονται ἢ φιλεῖν, διὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπεροχὴν 39 τινα εἶναι· αἰεὶ γὰρ ὁ φιλούμενος ὑπερέχει ἡδονῇ ἢ εὐπορίᾳ ἢ ἀρετῇ, ὁ δὲ φιλότιμος τῆς ὑπεροχῆς ὀρέγεται. καὶ οὐκ οἶονται δεῖν αὐτοὶ φιλεῖν οἱ ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ὄντες· ἀντιδιδόναι γὰρ ἐν οἷς ὑπερέχουσιν τοῖς φιλοῦσιν αὐτούς. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἥττους αὐτῶν 40 εἰσίν· διὸ οὐκ οἶονται δεῖν φιλεῖν ἀλλὰ φιλεῖσθαι. ὁ δ' ἐνδεὴς χρημάτων ἢ ἡδονῶν ἢ ἀρετῆς θαυμάζει

* Cf. Nic. IX. vii. 6: and xii. 4 below.

pleasure and the other for profit, there it is that disputes arise. The one who confers a surplus of profit does not consider the pleasure he receives is worth the profit he gives ; while he who confers a surplus of pleasure does not consider the profit he receives a worthy acknowledgement of the pleasure he gives. And so it is in friendship of this kind that differences mostly arise.

- 34 When there is inequality between friends, those who are superior in wealth or the like do not expect to love, but to be loved by their inferiors. But to love
 35 is better than to be loved. For love is an active pleasure and a good thing^a ; whilst merely to be
 36 loved creates no activity in the soul. To know, too, is better than to be known ; for while the latter, like being loved, is possible even for things without life,^b knowing, like loving, is only permitted to living
 37 beings. Again, the quality of beneficence is better than the lack of it : now he that loves, in so far as he loves, is conferring benefit ; while he who is loved, in
 38 so far as he is loved confers none. But ambition makes men desire to be loved rather than to love, because the former involves a certain superiority ; seeing that one who is loved is always superior in pleasantness, wealth, or virtue, and superiority is the aim of the
 39 ambitious. Those who possess superiority do not expect to love ; for they consider that they are repaying those who love them with the things in which they themselves are superior. The others too are on a lower level ; wherefore they claim, not to love them, but to be loved by them. On the other hand he who is lacking in property or pleasantness or virtue admires one who is his superior in these,

Loving is
better than
being loved

^a § 7 above.

1210 b

τὸν ὑπερέχοντα τούτοις, καὶ φιλεῖ διὰ τὸ τούτων ἢ τυγχάνειν ἢ οἶσθαι τεύξεσθαι.

Εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ τοιαῦται φιλίαι ἐξ ὁμοιοπαθείας, ἐκ 40
τοῦ τάγαθόν βούλεσθαι τινι εἶναι. οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ
25 ἡ ἐπὶ τούτων γινομένη φιλία πάντα ταῦτα ἔχουσα·
πολλάκις γὰρ ἄλλω μὲν εἶναι βουλόμεθα τάγαθά,
συζῆν μέντοι μετ' ἄλλου. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πότερον 41
φιλίας δεῖ εἰπεῖν, ἢ τῆς τελείας φιλίας τῆς κατ'
ἀρετὴν πάθῃ; ἐν ἐκείνῃ γὰρ τῇ φιλίᾳ πάντα
ταῦτα ἐνυπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ συζῆν μετ' οὐδενὸς
30 ἄλλου ἂν θέλοιμεν (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον,
καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ τῷ σπουδαίῳ ὑπάρχει) καὶ τάγαθὰ
τούτῳ μάλιστα βουλοίμεθ' ἂν, καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ
εὖ ζῆν οὐκ ἄλλω τινὶ ἢ τούτῳ.

Πότερον δ' ἔστιν αὐτῷ [φιλία]· καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν 42
φιλία, ἢ οὐ, νῦν μὲν ἀφείσθω, ὕστερον δ' ἐροῦμεν.
35 πάντα δὲ βουλόμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς· καὶ γὰρ συζῆν
μεθ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βουλόμεθα (ἴσως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ
ἀναγκαῖον) καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ βού-
λεσθαι* τάγαθόν, οὐκ ἄλλω τινὶ. ἔτι ὁμοιοπαθεῖς 43
ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς μάλιστα ἐσμέν· ἂν γὰρ προσπταίσωμεν
ἢ ἄλλω τινὶ περιπέσωμεν τῶν τοιούτων, εὐθὺς
λυπούμεθα. διὸ δόξειεν ἂν οὕτως εἶναι αὐτῷ πρὸς
1211 a αὐτὸν² φιλία.

¹ The mss. read αὐτῷ φιλία, αὐτὸ φιλία, or αὐτοφιλία. Sylburg deletes φιλία. Perhaps it would be better to delete καὶ also, and read πότερον δ' ἔστιν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία (which I have translated).

² Omitting [τὸ βούλεσθαι].

³ Bekker's text has αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν.

* Cf. § 27 above. The marks of Friendship are given serially in *Nic.* IX. iv. 1. See note on § 28.

[†] For this use of πάθος cf. *Eud.* III. v. 7 τὸ ἀλέγχετον τοῦ μεγαλοφύχου μάλιστα εἶναι πάθος ἴδιον.

and loves him because he either obtains them from him or hopes to do so.

- 40 There are, moreover, friendships of this kind (between those who are unequal) whose origin is a feeling of sympathy, that desires another's welfare. The friendship, however, which arises in this case does not possess all the characteristics of which we have spoken. We often wish for one man's welfare, 41 whilst preferring another's companionship.^a But are such things to be considered as accompaniments^b of Friendship in general, or only of the perfect friendship based on virtue^c? For they are all found in that kind of friendship. With none other than such a friend would we keep company (seeing that the good man possesses both pleasantness and profit and virtue); and for him especially would we desire welfare: long and happy life for him, as for no one else.^d
- 42 The question whether a man can be his own friend we will leave unsettled for the moment, but return later to answer it.^e In any case it is true that we desire all things for ourselves. We wish for our own company (as we can scarcely help doing); and long and happy life and everything that is good, for our- 43 selves as for none other. Moreover we feel a special degree of sympathy for ourselves. For if we suffer failure or other misfortune we at once feel distress. This at any rate points to the existence of friendship for oneself.

Can a Man
be his Own
Friend?

^a With these two sections cf. *Eud.* VII. vi. 3-9, vii. : and *Nic.* VIII. v. 3, vi. 4, IX. iv. 1, 2, iv. 10.

^d The discussion of the analogy between friendship for self and for another in §§ 42-44 and 47-50 corresponds to *Eud.* VII. vi. (cf. *Nic.* IX. iv.). The promise here made, and its definite fulfilment in § 47, are peculiar to the author. See Grant's note on *Nic.* IX. iv. 6.

Τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα, οἷον τὴν ὁμοιοπάθειαν καὶ τὸ εὖ 44
 ζῆν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἥτοι εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς
 φιλίαν ἀναφέροντες λέγομεν ἢ εἰς τὴν τελείαν· ἐν
 ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ
 5 [καὶ] τὸ συζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι βούλεσθαι καὶ τὸ εὖ
 εἶναι καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ἐν ταύταις ἐστίν.

Ἔτι δὲ ἴσως ἂν δόξειεν, ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ δίκαιον, ἐν 45
 τούτοις καὶ φιλίαν εἶναι· διὸ καὶ ὅσα περ δικαίων
 εἶδη, τοσαῦτα καὶ φιλιῶν. τὸ δὴ δίκαιόν ἐστιν καὶ
 ξένῳ πρὸς πολίτην καὶ δούλῳ πρὸς δεσπότην καὶ
 10 πολίτῃ πρὸς πολίτην καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα καὶ
 γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα, καὶ ὅσαι ἀπλῶς ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι
 καὶ φιλίαι ἐνεῖσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τούτων. βεβαιωτάτῃ 46
 δ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι τῶν φιλιῶν ἡ ξενική· οὐ γάρ
 ἐστὶν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς τέλος κοινὸν ὑπὲρ οὗ ἀμφισ-
 βητοῦσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς πολίταις· διαμφισβητοῦντες
 15 γὰρ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν οὐ μένουσιν
 φίλοι ὄντες.

Ἐχόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη νῦν τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν, πότερόν 47
 ἐστὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία, ἢ οὐ. ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν ὁρῶμεν,
 ὥσπερ καὶ μικρὸν ἐπάνω ἐλέγομεν, ὅτι ἐκ μὲν τῶν
 καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ φιλεῖν γνωρίζεται τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα
 20 αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἂν μάλιστα βουλοίμεθα (καὶ γὰρ
 τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι· ὁμοιοπαθέ-
 στατοι δ' αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ἐσμέν· καὶ συζῆν δὲ μεθ' ἑαυ-
 τῶν μάλιστα βουλοίμεθα). ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν καθ'
 ἕκαστα γνωρίζεται ἡ φιλία, τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα
 ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἂν βουλοίμεθα ὑπάρχειν, δηλὸν ἐστὶν
 25 ὥς ἐστὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς φιλία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν

^a With these two sections cf. *Nic.* VIII. ix.-xi.

^b § 42 above.

- 44 As for sympathy, then, and the desire for happy life, and the other things we have mentioned, in speaking of such things we can attribute them either to our (supposed) friendship for ourselves, or to the perfect friendship (between good men). They all exist in both alike ; the wish for companionship, and continued and happy existence and the rest are all found in them.
- 45 Again, it may perhaps be thought that where there exist reciprocal rights, there friendship is found also ; and accordingly that friendships correspond in kind to those rights. Now there are reciprocal rights between stranger and citizen, slave and master, citizen and citizen, son and father, wife and husband ; and in these and all other human relationships, friend-
 46 ships too are possible between the parties. Friendship between strangers might be supposed firmest of all, seeing that strangers have no common object for which they dispute with one another as fellow-citizens do. The latter, when competing for superiority they engage in violent dispute, cease to be friends.^a
- 47 At this point we must answer our previous question^b whether friendship towards oneself is possible or not. Now since we perceive, as we just now stated, that love or friendship is discerned by several characteristic desires ; and it is for ourselves that we pre-cminently desire them (for we desire good things for ourselves, and a long and happy existence ; and are also most in sympathy with ourselves ; and desire our own company rather than any other) :—if, then, love is discerned by its several characteristic desires, and these desires we feel for our own behoof : it clearly follows that love or friendship for ourselves does exist, even

Friendship
and Rights

1211 a ἔφαμεν πρὸς αὐτὸν εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἕτερος μὲν 48
 ὁ ἀδικῶν ἕτερος δὲ ὁ ἀδικούμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς δ'
 εἰς ἑστίν ἕκαστος, διὰ τὰ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἐδόκει
 εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικία· ἔστι μέντοι, ὡς ἔφαμεν
 σκοποῦντες ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἐστι
 30 πλείω, ὅταν ταῦτα μὴ ὁμονοῶσιν, τότε εἶναι πρὸς
 αὐτὸν τὴν ἀδικίαν. ὁμοίως οὖν τούτῳ καὶ ἡ φιλία 49
 δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι πρὸς αὐτόν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὁ φίλος
 ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν, ὅταν βουλώμεθα σφόδρα φίλον
 εἰπεῖν, μία φαμέν¹ ψυχὴ ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ τούτου· ἐπεὶ
 οὖν ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πλείω μέρη, τότε ἔσται μία
 35 ψυχὴ, ὅταν συμφωνῶσι πρὸς ἀλλήλα ὁ τε λόγος
 καὶ τὰ πάθη (οὕτω γὰρ μία ἔσται)· ὥστε μιᾶς
 γενομένης ἔσται πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία.

Αὕτη δ' ἔσται ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία ἐν τῷ σπου- 50
 daίῳ· τούτῳ γὰρ μόνῳ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εὖ ἔχουσιν
 μέρη πρὸς ἀλλήλα τῷ μὴ διαφέρεσθαι, ἐπεὶ ὁ γε
 40 φαῦλος οὐδέποτε ἐστὶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, μάχεται
 γὰρ αἰεὶ ἑαυτῷ. ὁ γοῦν ἀκρατής, ὅταν πράξῃ τι
 1211 b τῶν καθ' ἡδονήν, μετ' οὐ πολὺ μεταμελεῖται καὶ
 κακίζει αὐτὸς αὐτόν· ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακιῶν
 ὁ φαῦλος ἔχει. διατελεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ μαχό-
 μενος καὶ ἐναντιούμενος.

Ἔστιν δὲ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἰσότητι, οἷον ἡ μὲν τῶν 51
 5 ἐταίρων ἐν ἰσότητι ἀριθμῷ καὶ δυνάμει ἀγαθοῦ
 (οὐδέτερος γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἄξιος θατέρου πλέον
 ἔχειν οὔτε κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κατὰ δύναμιν
 οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἴσον· ἴσοι γὰρ τινες

¹ Omitting φαμέν.

* See I. xxxiii. 31-35 above.

48 as we said that injustice towards oneself exists. It is true that because he who commits injustice and he who suffers it are two different persons, whilst each individual self is one, on this account self-injury seemed at first sight impossible. It does however exist, as we declared in our survey of the parts of the soul. As these are several in number, we said that self-injury occurs
 49 when they are in discord one with another.^a Much in the same way it would appear that friendship for oneself arises. A friend, as we say when we desire to mark someone as eminently such, is "my soul and another's in one." And whereas each soul itself consists of several parts, it will only be "one soul" when rational Principle and the passions are in harmony with one another. Then indeed it will be one; and with a soul at unity in itself, the man will be his own friend and lover.

50 But such friendship for self will exist only in the good man; for in him alone the parts of the soul, being nowise at variance, are well-disposed towards one another. For the bad man, being ever at strife with himself, can never be his own friend. The self-indulgent indeed, when he has acted as pleasure suggests, soon repents and upbraids himself; and so, too, with the bad man's other vices; he is continually at strife and in opposition with himself.

Only the good man is his own friend.

(Cf. *Nic.* VIII. xii., xiii. 1.)

51 Of the friendship which flourishes under equal conditions, we may take as an example that between comrades, who exchange benefits equal in number and in potency. Neither of them claims a larger share of those benefits than the other, whether in number, potency, or magnitude, but only the same

Friendships (1) where the conditions are equal,

1211 b

ἐθέλουσιν εἶναι οἱ ἑταῖροι). ἐν ἀνισότητι δὲ ἡ 52
 πατὴρ πρὸς υἱόν, καὶ ἀρχομένου καὶ ἀρχοντος, καὶ
 10 κρείττονος καὶ χείρονος, καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός,
 καὶ ἀπλῶς ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ὁ τὴν τοῦ χείρονος καὶ
 κρείττονος τάξιν ἔχων ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν 53
 ἡ ἐν ἀνισότητι φιλία κατὰ λόγον. οὐδέποτε γὰρ
 ἐπ' ἀγαθοῦ δόσει οὐδεὶς ἴσον ἂν δοίῃ τῷ βελτίονι
 καὶ τῷ χείρονι, ἀλλὰ μείζον τῷ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ὄντι
 15 ἀεί. τοῦτο δ' ἴσον ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ· ἴσον γὰρ πῶς
 ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ ἔλαττον ἔχων ἀγαθὸν χείρων ὢν τῷ
 μείζον ἔχοντι κρείττονι ὄντι.

XII. Τῶν δὲ φιλιῶν ἀπασῶν τῶν εἰρημένων τού- 1
 των μάλιστα πῶς ἐγγίνεται τὸ φιλεῖν ἐν τῇ συγ-
 20 γενικῇ, καὶ ταῦτα ἐν τῇ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱόν. καὶ διὰ
 τί ποτε ὁ πατήρ τὸν υἱὸν μᾶλλον φιλεῖ ἢ ὁ υἱὸς τὸν
 πατέρα; πότερον οὖν, ὥς ἐνιοὶ λέγοντες ὀρθῶς
 πρὸς γε τοὺς πολλοὺς, ὅτι ὁ μὲν πατήρ εὐεργέτηκέν
 πῶς τὸν υἱόν, ὁ δ' υἱὸς χάριν ὀφείλει τῆς εὐερ-
 γεσίας; αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ αἰτία [καί] ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ 2
 25 συμφέρον φιλία δόξειεν ἂν ὑπάρχειν· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ
 κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὀρώμεν ἔχον, οὕτω πῶς ἔχει
 καὶ ἐν ταῦθα. λέγω δ' οἷον [ἐστὶν] ἔστι μὲν ὢν τὸ 3
 αὐτὸ τέλος τε καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι παρὰ
 τὴν ἐνέργειαν τέλος, οἷον τῷ αὐλητῇ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐνέρ-
 30 γεια καὶ τέλος (τὸ γὰρ αὐλεῖν καὶ τέλος αὐτῷ ἐστὶ
 καὶ ἐνέργεια), ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ οἰκοδομικῇ (καὶ γὰρ

* If affection is the appropriate makeweight, the son should give more of it than he receives. Actually, as the next chapter points out, he gives as a rule less. He is thus under a twofold obligation to render honour to his parents. (*Cf. Nic. VIII. iv. 2* τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας.)

share ; for comrades are willing to live under conditions approximately equal.

- 52 On the other hand, between father and son, subject and ruler, superior and inferior, wife and husband,—(2) where they need to be equalized by Proportion. wherever in fact one of the partners in the friendship holds an inferior position and the other a superior one—friendship still exists, but under conditions of
- 53 inequality. For this is the friendship between unequals, which is governed by proportion. In the distribution of benefit no one would assign the same share to superior as to inferior, but would always allot the greater share to the former.^a Thus equality is effected by proportion ; since where the inferior takes the lesser benefit, and the superior the greater one, a certain kind of equality is attained between them.

(*Eud.* VII. viii. : *cf.* *Nic.* IX. vi.)

- 1 XII. Of all the kinds of friendship we have mentioned, it is in the friendships between kindred that love is pre-eminently manifest ; and above all, in the friendship of father for son. Why is it, we ask, that the father loves the son more than the son the father ? Is it, as some with the approval of most men declare, because the father has conferred some benefit on his son, and the son owes him acknowledgement
- 2 therefor ? Such a cause as this would seem to operate in friendship based on profit ; but the present case resembles what we notice in the arts and sciences.
- 3 What I mean is that in some of these, end and activity are one and the same ; beyond the practice of the art, there is no ulterior aim. The flute-player's activity and aim are, for instance, identical ; to him, his playing is end and activity at once. But with the art of building it is otherwise ; besides the activity,

1211 b ἕτερον τέλος παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν). ἔστιν οὖν ἡ 4
 φιλία ἐνέργειά τις, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔστιν ἄλλο τέλος παρὰ
 τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ φιλεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτό. ὁ μὲν
 οὖν πατήρ ἐνεργεῖ πως αἰεὶ μᾶλλον παρὰ τὸ αὐτοῦ
 35 τι εἶναι ποίημα τὸν υἱόν. τοῦτο δ' ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἐπὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων ὅν· πάντες γὰρ πρὸς ὃ ἂν αὐτοὶ ποιή-
 σωσιν, πρὸς τοῦτό πως καὶ εὖνοι εἰσίν. ὁ οὖν 5
 πατήρ εὖνοεῖ πως πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ὄντα ποίημα,
 τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ τῇ ἐλπίδι ἀγόμενος· διὸ μᾶλλον φιλεῖ
 ὁ πατήρ τὸν υἱὸν ἢ ὁ υἱὸς τὸν πατέρα.

40 Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων φιλιῶν τῶν λεγο- 6
 1212 a μένων καὶ δοκουσῶν ἐπισκέφασθαι εἰ εἰσὶν φιλίαι.
 οἷον ἡ εὖνοια φιλία δοκεῖ. ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν 7
 δόξειεν εἶναι ἡ εὖνοια φιλία (πολλοῖς γὰρ πολλάκις
 ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκουσαί τι ὑπὲρ τινος
 5 ἀγαθὸν εὖνοι γινόμεθα· ἀρ' οὖν ἤδη καὶ φίλοι; ἢ
 οὔ; οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἦν Δαρείῳ εὖνους ἐν Πέρσαις
 ὄντι, ὥσπερ ἴσως ἦν, εὐθέως καὶ φιλία ἦν αὐτῷ
 πρὸς Δαρείον). ἀλλ' ἀρχὴ μὲν ἂν ποτε φιλίας ἡ 8
 εὖνοια δόξειεν εἶναι, γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡ εὖνοια φιλία,
 εἰ προσλάβοι βούλησιν τοῦ τὰγαθὰ δυνατὸς ὦν
 πρᾶξαι πράττειν ἐκείνου ἕνεκεν ᾧ ἔστιν εὖνους.—
 10 ἔστιν δ' ἡ εὖνοια τοῦ ἡθους καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἡθος· 9
 οὐδεὶς γὰρ λέγεται εὖνους οἶνω ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν
 ἀψύχων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἡδέων, ἀλλ' ἂν τις ἦ τὸ ἡθος
 σπουδαῖος, πρὸς τοῦτον ἡ εὖνοια.—οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ 10

¹ Reading παρὰ (τοῦ)το (τῷ) for παρὰ τὸ mis.

MAGNA MORALIA, II. XII. 4-10

4 there is a further aim. Now Friendship or Love is a species of activity ; and it has no aim beyond its own activity ; this is its sole end. The father's activity, however, is always of a fuller kind than this, because the son is his own creation. This we see in the case of other creators ; in one way or another, they are all favourably disposed to what they have themselves made. So the father has a favour towards the son as
 5 towards his own work, being led by memory and by hope ; and on this account he loves his son more than his son loves him.

(*Eud.* VII. vii. : *cf.* *Nic.* IX. v., vi.)

6 We have also to consider those other feelings which in common thought and parlance are classed as love or friendship, and to see if they are truly such. The feeling of Favour, for instance, is regarded as a species
 7 of friendship. Now, strictly speaking, Favour should not be accounted as friendship. In many cases through seeing someone, or hearing some good of him from another, we are favourably disposed to him. But do we thereby become his friends ? Surely not. For if when Darius was reigning in Persia some were favourably disposed to him, as it may well have been, yet this did not straightway constitute love or friend-
 8 ship towards him. On the other hand, Favour would sometimes appear to be the origin or source of friendship ; and may be turned into it by the addition of a desire to confer benefit, if one has the power, upon
 9 the favoured person. Favour is a feeling of character for character. We do not say that anyone is favourable to wine or anything else inanimate, whether good or pleasant ; but if a man's character
 10 be morally good, he attracts our favour. And Favour

Favour or
Goodwill

χωρὶς τῆς φιλίας ἢ εὐνοια, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ· διὸ
δοκεῖ φιλία εἶναι.

Ἡ δ' ὁμόνοιά ἐστιν μὲν σύνεγγυς τῇ φιλίᾳ, ἐὰν ¹¹
¹⁵ τὴν ὁμόνοιαν λάβῃς τὴν κυρίως λεγομένην. εἰ γάρ
τις Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ ὁμοίως ὑπολαμβάνει καὶ δοκεῖ
αὐτῷ τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι ἃ κακείνῳ, ἀρά γε οὗτος
Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ ὁμονοεῖ; ἢ οὐ; ἐπεὶ περὶ τι ἄλλο
τοιούτον.¹ πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια ἐν ¹²
τοῖς νοητοῖς ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς, καὶ ἐν τούτοις
²⁰ οὐχ ἥ νοοῦσι ταῦτόν, ἀλλ' ἥ ἅμα τῷ ταῦτόν νοεῖν
προαίρεσιν ἔχουσιν περὶ ἃ νοοῦσιν ἐπὶ ταῦτά. εἰ
γὰρ ἐννοοῦσιν ἀμφοτέροι ἀρχεῖν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αὐτόν
ὁ δ' αὐτόν, ἀρά γε ἤδη ὁμονοοῦσιν; ἢ οὐ; ἀλλ'
εἰ καὶ γὰρ ἐμαυτὸν βούλομαι ἀρχεῖν κακείνους ἐμέ,
οὕτως ἤδη ὁμονοοῦμεν. ἔστι δὲ ὁμονοεῖν ἐν τοῖς ¹³
²⁵ πρακτοῖς μετὰ βουλήσεως ταυτοῦ. περὶ ἄρχοντος
ἄρα κατάστασιν ἐν πρακτοῖς² τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἡ
ὁμόνοια ἢ κυρίως λεγομένη.

XIII. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστίν, ὥς φαμέν, αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν ¹
φιλία, πότερον ὁ σπουδαῖος ἔσται φίλαυτος ἢ οὐ;
³⁰ ἔστιν δὲ φίλαυτος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκεν πάντα πράττων
ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ λυσιτελέε. ὁ μὲν οὖν φαῦλος
φίλαυτος ἐστίν (αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἕνεκεν πάντα
πράττει). ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὰ τοῦτο γάρ

¹ Reading <τὸ τοιοῦτον> with Spengel.

² Omitting ἐν πρακτοῖς, after Susemihl's conjecture.

^a Or "in the same dispositions" (taking αὐτῷ as masculine).

^b xi. 47 above.

^c φίλαυτος usually carries an evil connotation like that of the English word "selfish."

is not far from friendship or love, but exists under the same conditions ^a ; and this is why they are supposed identical.

- 11 Concord approaches closely to friendship ; but only Concord.
if it be attained in the full sense of the term. For if a man holds the same opinions as Empedocles, and believes the world formed from the same elements as he did, is that man in concord with Empedocles ? Surely not ; since this kind of agreement lies in a different field. In the first place, Concord operates not in what we think and believe, but in what we plan to do. And in this practical sphere, we are in concord not merely in so far as we have the same things in mind, but in so far as besides this we have a determination about them which points in the same direction. For suppose we both have in mind some office, but each is minded that he himself shall fill it ; is this enough to constitute concord ? Surely not. But if I desire that I shall hold the office, and the other also desires that I shall, then we are really in
12 concord. Concord, then, must operate in the sphere of practice, (not merely in that of belief,) and is accompanied by desire for the same end. So that concord in the appointment of the same man as magistrate is an example of Concord in the full sense of the word.

(*Nic.* IX. viii.)

- 1 XIII. Since, as we maintain, it is possible for a man to feel love or friendship for himself,^b will the good man be a self-lover or not ? Now the man whose every act in matters of lucre is for his own behoof is a self-lover ^a ; so that the bad man, who always acts for his own behoof, is a self-lover, while the good man is not. For what makes him a good man is just this,

Self-love,
noble and
base.

1212 a

ἐστὶ σπουδαῖος, ὅτι ἄλλον ἔνεκεν τοῦτο πράττει·
 διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν φίλαυτος. ἀλλ' ὁρμῶσι μὲν ἅπαντες ²
³¹ ἐπὶ τὰγαθά, καὶ οἷονται αὐτοῖς δεῖν μάλιστα ὑπάρ-
 χειν. τοῦτο δέ ἐστι μάλιστα φανερόν ἐπὶ πλούτου
 καὶ ἀρχῆς. ὁ μὲν οὖν σπουδαῖος ἐκστήσεται τού-
 των ἄλλω, οὐχ ὡς οὐ προσήκον αὐτῷ μάλιστα, ἀλλ'
 ἂν ὁρᾷ ἄλλον δυνησόμενον μᾶλλον τούτοις αὐτοῦ
 χρῆσθαι· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι τοῦτο οὐ ποιήσουσι δι' ἄγνοιαν
^{1212 b} (οὐ γὰρ οἷονται κακῶς ἂν χρήσασθαι τοῖς τοιούτοις
 ἀγαθοῖς) ἢ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν τοῦ ἄρχειν. ὁ δὲ σπου- ³
 δαῖος οὐδέτερον τούτων πείσεται· διὸ οὐδὲ φίλαυτος
 κατὰ γε τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθά. ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, κατὰ τὸ
⁵ καλόν. τούτου γὰρ μόνον ἄλλω οὐκ ἂν ἐκσταίῃ, τὰ
 δὲ συμφέροντα καὶ ἡδέα¹ ἐκστήσεται. τὴν μὲν οὖν ⁴
 κατὰ τὸ καλὸν αἵρεσιν φίλαυτος ἔσται· τὴν δὲ κατὰ
 τὸ συμφέρον καὶ καθ' ἡδονὴν λεγομένην οὐκ ἔσται
 ὁ σπουδαῖος, ἀλλὰ ὁ φαῦλος.

XIV. Πότερον δέ ποτε ὁ σπουδαῖος φιλήσει ¹
 αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ οὐ; ἔστι μὲν οὖν αὐτὸς
¹⁰ αὐτὸν μάλιστα ὡς φιλήσει, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ. ἐπειδὴ
 γὰρ φαμεν τὸν σπουδαῖον ἐκστήσεσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 τῶν κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῷ φίλῳ, τὸν φίλον μᾶλλον
 αὐτοῦ φιλήσει. ναί, ἀλλ' ἢ τούτων ἐξιστάμενος τῷ ²
 φίλῳ αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν περιποιεῖται, ταύτῃ ἐξίσταται

¹ To avoid the harsh change of construction from the gen. to the acc. in dependence on ἐκστήσεται, Scaliger reads κατὰ for τὰ, and Spengel τοῦ δὲ συμφέροντος καὶ ἡδέος.

^a For ὁρμή see I. iv. 9.

^b For τὸ καλόν as the aim of Moral Virtue see I. xx., xxi. above.

that he acts in such matters for the sake of another ;
 2 and therefore he is no " lover of self." On the other hand, all men are naturally impelled ^a toward things good, each claiming them in a special degree for himself ; a fact especially manifest in the case of riches and office. Now the good man is ready to yield these things to another ; not that he lacks a pre-eminent claim to them, but if he perceives that another will be able to make better use of them than himself. Other men, on the contrary, will fail to do this, either through ignorance (for they do not believe that they would make bad use of these good
 3 things) or through the ambition to hold office. The good man, however, will be free from both failings ; so that in regard to such good things as these, he is not a " lover of self " If he is a self-lover at all, it is in regard to what is noble or morally beautiful.^b This and this only he will not yield to another ;
 4 advantages and pleasures he will yield.^c And so in his pursuit of what is noble he will be a " lover of self " ; whereas in the pursuit of profit and pleasure, which is usually called (love of self), not he, but the bad man will be a self-lover

- 1 XIV. Will the good man on any occasion love himself more than anyone else, or will he not ? In one sense, he will ; in another, he will not. Inasmuch as we declare that the good man will yield to his friend such things as are good in the sense of being profitable, he will love his friend more than himself.
 2 True ; but in the very yielding of these things to his friend, he secures for himself moral beauty or nobility.

^a Nic. IX. viii. 10 suggests that the good man " may on occasion give up to his friend the doing of noble acts " (Grant, *ad loc.*).

1212 b

15 τῶν τοιούτων. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ὥς τὸν φίλον αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον φιλεῖ, ἔστι δὲ ὥς αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μάλιστα· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ συμφέρον τὸν φίλον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μάλιστα· αὐτῷ γὰρ ταῦτα περιποιεῖται κάλλιστα ὄντα. ἔστι μὲν 3 οὖν καὶ φιλάγαθος, οὐ φίλαυτος· μόνον γάρ, εἴπερ 20 φιλεῖ αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν, ὅτι ἀγαθός. ὁ δὲ φαῦλος φίλαυτος· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει δι' ὃ φιλήσει αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν οἶον καλόν τι, ἀλλ' ἄνευ τούτων αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλήσει, ἢ αὐτός. διὸ καὶ οὗτος ἂν κυρίως λέγοιτο φίλαυτος.

XV. Ἐχόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη ὑπὲρ αὐταρκείας εἰπεῖν 1 καὶ τοῦ αὐτάρκους, πότερον ὁ αὐτάρκης προσδεή- 25 σεται φιλίας, ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ αὐτάρκης ἔσται καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο. λέγουσι γὰρ τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταί·

ὅταν δ' ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;

ὅθεν καὶ ἡ ἀπορία γίγνεται, πότερον ὁ πάντα 30 τὰγαθὰ ἔχων καὶ ὦν αὐτάρκης προσδεήσεται φίλου; ἢ τότε καὶ μάλιστα; τίνα γὰρ εὖ ποιήσει, ἢ μετὰ τοῦ συμβιώσεται; οὐ γὰρ δὴ μόνος γε διάξει. εἰ 2 τοίνυν τούτων δεήσεται, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ φιλίας, προσδέοιτ' ἂν ὁ αὐτάρκης φιλίας.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εἰωθυῖα ὁμοιότης 3 λαμβάνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐτ' ἐκεῖ ὀρθῶς οὐτ' ἂν

* For τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν see II. ix. above.

† Rackham. From Euripides, *Orestes* 667.

* See Rackham's note on ἐγκυκλίους in *Nic.* I. v. 6; and Grant's Appendix B "On the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι."

ARISTOTLE

1212 b

ἐνταῦθα εἶη χρήσιμος· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ὁ θεὸς ἐστὶν αὐτάρκης καὶ μηδενὸς δεῖται, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδ' ἡμεῖς οὐδενὸς δεησόμεθα. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοιοῦτός τις ἄλογος ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ λεγόμενος. ἐπεὶ γὰρ, φησί, πάντα ἔχει τὰγαθὰ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἐστὶν αὐτάρκης, τί ποιήσει; οὐ γὰρ καθευδήσει. θεάσεται δὴ τι,

1213 a

φησὶν· τοῦτο γὰρ κάλλιστον καὶ οἰκειότατον. τί οὖν θεάσεται; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι θεάσεται, βέλτιον θεάσεται τι αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἄτοπον, τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄλλο τι εἶναι βέλτιον. αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἄρα θεάσεται. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος [ὅς] ἂν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν κατασκοπῇται, ὥς ἀναισθήτῳ ἐπιτιμῶμεν. ἄτοπος οὖν, φησὶν, ὁ θεὸς ἔσται αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν θεώμενος.

Τί μὲν οὖν ὁ θεὸς θεάσεται, ἀφείσθω· ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς αὐταρκειᾶς οὐ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν σκέψιν ποιούμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπίνης, πότερον ὁ αὐτάρκης δεισεται φιλίας ἢ οὐ; εἰ δὴ τις ἐπὶ τὸν φίλον ἐπιβλέψας ἴδοι τί ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖός τις ὁ φίλος, * *¹ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἕτερος εἶναι ἐγώ, ἂν γε καὶ σφόδρα φίλον ποιήσης, ὥσπερ τὸ λεγόμενον "ἄλλος οὗτος Ἡρακλῆς, ἄλλος φίλος ἐγώ."² ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ χαλεπώτατον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν σοφῶν τινες εἰρή-
κασιν, τὸ γινῶναι αὐτόν, καὶ ἥδιστον (τὸ γὰρ αὐτόν

¹ Inserting <δόξειεν ἂν> or the like.

² Omitting ἄλλος φίλος ἐγώ. Or, transposing with Scaliger the first two words, "a friend is another self." See *Eud.* VII. xii. 13.

* These questions are raised by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* XI. vii., ix. The author here denies the utility of comparison (παραβολή) and contrast between the Divine and human life and consciousness as set forth by *Eud.* in VII.

unhelpful here as it is misleading there. For if we admit that God is self-sufficient and needs nothing, it does not prove that we men need nothing. For the argument about the Divine Being that we meet with is this. "Since God possesses all good things and is self-sufficient, in what will His action consist? For His existence will not be one long sleep. Nay, He will contemplate something: for this is the noblest kind of activity and the most suited to Him. What then will He contemplate? If He contemplates anything else, it must be something still better than Himself. But that anything should be better than God is absurd. It follows that He will contemplate Himself. But this too is absurd. If a man makes himself the object of his own research, we stigmatize him as a dullard. God in contemplation of Himself is therefore an absurdity." ^{it is not so with Man.}

5 With the object of the Divine contemplation we need not however concern ourselves. We are investigating the Self-Sufficiency not of God but of man: whether the self-sufficient man will or will not need friendship. Now supposing a man looks upon his friend and marks what he is and what is his character and quality; the friend—if we figure a friend of the most intimate sort—will seem to him to be a kind of second self, as in the common saying ^{A Friend is one's "second Self";} "This is my second Hercules." Now to know oneself is a very difficult thing—as even philosophers have told us—and a very pleasant thing, knowledge of self ^{as Aid to Self-Knowledge}

xii.; and he may possibly have felt that such discussions are beyond the scope of finite minds. It is to be noted that Aristotle denies to God the joy of the artist in creation, which Plato attributes to Him in the *Timaeus*. (Cf. *Tim.* c. vi., where it is said that He created the world "that all things should be as like Himself as they could be.")

1213 a

εἰδέναι ἡδύ), αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐ
 δυνάμεθα θεάσασθαι (ὅτι δ' αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς οὐ δυνά-
 μεθα, δηλὸν ἐξ ὧν ἄλλοις ἐπιτιμῶμεν, αὐτοὶ δὲ
 λανθάνομεν ταῦτα ποιοῦντες· τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται δι' 7
 εὐνοίαν ἢ διὰ πάθος· πολλοῖς δὲ ἡμῶν ταῦτα ἐπι-
 20 σκοτεῖ πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς). ὥσπερ οὖν ὅταν
 θέλωμεν αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν τὸ πρόσωπον ἰδεῖν, εἰς τὸ
 κάτοπτρον ἐμβλέψαντες εἶδομεν, ὁμοίως καὶ ὅταν
 αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς βουλευθῶμεν γινῶναι, εἰς τὸν φίλον
 ἰδόντες γνωρίσαιμεν ἂν· ἔστι γάρ, ὥς φαμέν, ὁ
 φίλος ἕτερος ἐγώ. εἰ οὖν ἡδύ μὲν τὸ αὐτὸν 8
 25 εἰδέναι, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδέναι ἄνευ ἄλλου φίλου,
 δέοιτ' ἂν ὁ αὐτάρκης φιλίας πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν
 γνωρίζειν.

Ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἶπερ ἐστὶν καλόν, ὥσπερ ἐστίν, τὸ 9
 εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχοντα τὰ παρὰ τῆς τύχης ἀγαθὰ, τίνα
 εὖ ποιήσει; μετὰ τίνος δὲ συμβιώσεται; οὐ γὰρ
 δὴ μόνος γε διάξει· τὸ γὰρ συμβιοῦν ἡδύ καὶ
 30 ἀναγκαῖον. εἰ τοίνυν ταῦτα καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ
 1213 b ἀναγκαῖα, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ φιλίας,
 προσδέοιτ' ἂν ὁ αὐτάρκης φιλίας.

XVI. Πότερον δὲ πολλοὺς κτητέον φίλους ἢ 1
 ὀλίγους; οὔτε δὴ πολλοὺς, ὥς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, οὐτ'
 5 ὀλίγους δεῖ [ἀε]. πολλῶν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἔργον ἐφ'
 ἕκαστον μερίσαι τὸ φιλεῖν. ἐφ' ἀπάντων γὰρ καὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων ἐξαδυνατεῖ ἡμῶν ἢ φύσις ἀσθενῆς οὔσα
 πρὸς τὸ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀφικνεῖσθαι. οὔτε γὰρ τῇ ὀψει
 ἐπὶ πολὺ ὀρώμεν, ἀλλ' ἐὰν πλέον ἀποστήσης τοῦ
 10 συμμέτρου, ἐλλείπει διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς φύσεως,
 οὐτ' ἐπ' ἀκοῆς, οὐτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἀπάν-

^a Cf. St. James i. 23, 24.

being (proverbially) pleasant. Direct contemplation of ourselves is moreover impossible, as is shown by the censure we inflict on others for the very things we ourselves unwittingly do—favour or passion being the cause, which in many of us blind our judgement. And so, just as when wishing to behold our own faces we have seen them by looking upon a mirror, whenever we wish to know our own characters and personalities, we can recognize them by looking upon a friend; since the friend is, as we say, our "second self." If, therefore, it be pleasant to know oneself, and this knowledge is impossible without another who is a friend, it follows that the self-sufficient man will need friendship in order to recognize what manner of man he is.^a

Again, if it is a noble act, as it certainly is, for one who is endowed with the good things of fortune to confer benefits in his turn, on whom will he confer them? Or with whom will he dwell? For surely he will not spend his life in solitude; companionship is necessary as well as pleasant. If, then, the things we have mentioned are noble and pleasant and necessary, and if without friendship they are not to be had, even the self-sufficient man will need the addition of friendship.

an Object
for Bene-
ficence;

and a
pleasant
Companion.

(*Eud.* VII. xii. 17 foll. : *cf. Nic.* IX. x., xi.)

XVI. Ought we to seek many friends, or few? We may say at once, neither the one nor the other. If we have many, it is a difficult task to give each his share of our love. As in all other matters, our weak nature finds it impossible to extend its action afar. Our eyes cannot see far; if we withdraw them beyond the distance that suits them, they fail in their task owing to their natural weakness. So it is with the hearing, and with all our other faculties.

The Number
of our
Friends
should
match our
Character
and Circum-
stances.

1213 b των. ἐλλείπων οὖν τῷ φιλεῖν δι' ἀδυναμίαν καὶ 2
 ἐγκλήματ' ἂν τις ἔχοι δικαίως, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 φίλος, μὴ φιλῶν γε ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ γε λόγῳ· ἡ δὲ
 φιλία οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται. ἔτι ἂν ὥσιν πολλοί, οὐκ 3
 ἔστιν παύσασθαι λυπούμενον· πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων
 15 εἰκὸς αἰεὶ περὶ ἓνα γέ τινα συμβαίνειν τι ἀτύχημα,
 ὧν γινομένων ἀναγκαῖον λυπεῖσθαι. οὗτ' αὖ πάλιν
 ὀλίγους, ἓνα ἢ δύο, ἀλλὰ συμμέτρους τῷ καιρῷ
 καὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ ὀρμῇ πρὸς τὸ φιλεῖν.

XVII. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη πῶς δεῖ 1
 φίλῳ χρῆσθαι. ἔστι δ' οὐκ ἐν ἀπάσῃ φιλίᾳ ἡ
 20 σκέψις, ἀλλ' ἐν ἣ μάλιστα ἐγκαλοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις οἱ
 φίλοι. οὐκ ἐγκαλοῦσι δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ὁμοίως,
 οἷον ἐν τῇ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλημα
 τοιοῦτον οἷον ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν ἐνίαις, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σοί,
 οὕτως καὶ σὺ ἐμοί, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνταῦθα τὸ σφοδρὸν
 ἐγκλημα· ἐν δὲ ἀνίστοις φίλοις οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἴσον, 2
 25 ἔστι δὲ ἡ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱὸν φιλία ἐν ἀνίσῳ, ὁμοίως
 ἡ γυναικὸς πρὸς ἄνδρα ἢ οἰκέτου πρὸς δεσπότην,
 καὶ ὅλως δὲ χείρονος καὶ βελτίονος. οὐχ ἔξουσιν
 δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγκλήματα. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἴσοις
 φίλοις καὶ ἐν τῇ (τοι)αύτῃ φιλίᾳ τὸ τοιοῦτον
 ἐγκλημα. ὥστε σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη τὸ πῶς δεῖ χρῆ-
 30 σθαι φίλῳ ἐν τῇ ἐν ἴσοις φίλοις φιλίᾳ. * *.

* Cf. the beautiful letter of Plinius Caecilius (VIII. xvi.) beginning "Confecerunt me infirmitates meorum . . ."

† Susemihl thinks that in this fragment the author is following a lost portion of the *Ethics of Eudemus* which came therein after VII. xii. See his note at the end of that Chapter.

2 If, then, through weakness one failed in loving, one would meet with just censures, and would not be a true friend. One would be loving in name only ;
 3 and that is not the meaning of Friendship. Moreover, if one's friends be many, one can have no respite from pain. Amid a large number, it is likely that one at least will always be suffering misfortune ; and for this we must needs feel pain.^a On the other hand, we need more friends than a mere one or two ; the number should be suited to our circumstances and to our individual impulse towards friendship.

- 1 XVII.^b We must next inquire how a friend should be treated. This inquiry does not concern every kind of friendship, but only that where the friends are most given to finding fault with one another. In the other kinds, they are less inclined thereto ; for example, between father and son there is no such fault-finding as that which in some kinds of friendship men think fit to indulge. "As I treat you," they say, "so you must treat me"—and if he does
 2 not, a bitter fault-finding ensues. But between friends who are unequal, this equal (balance of benefits) has no place. And the friendship of father with son is a friendship where the conditions are unequal, as is that of wife with husband, or slave with master, or in any case where one is inferior and the other superior. These cases, then, will admit of no such fault-finding. The kind of complaint of which we have spoken arises between friends who are equal, and in a friendship of that type. So the question we have to consider is how to treat a friend when the friendship is between equals. . . .

How
 Friends
 should be
 treated.

Complaints
 arise when
 Friendship
 is on equal
 Terms.

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

Analytica II. vi. 15. Four Books (*An. Priora* I., II., *An. Posteriora* I., II.) on Logic. In *An. Priora* the "Syllogisms" or forms of deductive reasoning are laid down by Aristotle.

Archelle I. xvii. 10. A proper name used (like Coriscus in *Eud.* VII. vi. 15) *exempli gratia*.

Artupagus I. xvi. 2. (See note there)

Clearchus II. vi. 33. Despot of Heraclea in Bithynia, 385-353 B.C. Quoted as an example of cruelty.

Darius II. xii. 7. The name of three Persian kings. The last acceded in 336 B.C. and was dethroned by Alexander of Macedonia in 331.

Dionysius II. vi. 38. Two despots of this name, father and son, ruled at Syracuse; the first from 405-367 B.C., the second from 367-356 and again from 340-338. Dark stories are told of their unscrupulousness and cruelty; probably with exaggeration.

Empedocles II. xi. 2, xii. 11. Of Agrigento in Sicily, where he flourished in the middle of the fifth century B.C. and was renowned as a statesman, orator, physician, magician and natural philosopher. Fragments of his poem on "Nature" are preserved, in which he ascribes the origin of the world to four elements (earth,

air, fire and water), mingled together by "Love" or separated by "Strife."

Ephesus II. vi. 15. A flourishing city at the mouth of the River Caystrus in W. Asia Minor, colonized by Ionian Greeks perhaps in the eleventh century B.C.

Empedocles II. xi. 25, 29: quoted also in II. xi. 3, xv. 1. An Athenian dramatic poet, 480-406 B.C., noted for his interest in natural philosophy and his friendship with the philosophers Anaxagoras and Socrates.

Hector I. xx. 8. Eldest son of Priam, king of Troy in the *Iliad*. His father and mother urge him not to meet the Greek champion Achilles in the field, but he remembers how he had neglected the advice of his friend Polydamas to lead the Trojans back to the city at nightfall, instead of bivouacking in the plain. This had cost many lives; and if he now shelters himself behind the walls, he anticipates his friend's reproaches. (*Iliad* xxi: cf. xviii. 248 foll.)

Heraclitus II. vi. 13. Of Ephesus, where he flourished towards the end of the sixth century B.C. He was noted for the obscurity of his writings, in which he maintained that all things are in continual process of change or flux (*panta pui*). Fire is the primal element out of which

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

other things arise and into which they are resolved

Heracles (Latin form of Greek *Hēraklēs*) II xv. 6 A hero famous in Greek legend for his wonderful feats of strength and courage

Homer (Greek *Hōmēros*) I. xv. 8: quoted also II xi. 2 A Greek poet of Asia Minor to whom the composition of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* was traditionally assigned

Hellas II vii. 12. A grammarian. (But see note there)

Indians I. xvii. 4. (See note there)

Lampyrus II vii. 12. A grammarian. Probably distinct from the famous musician of that name, mentioned by Plato (*Menæxenus*) and Nepos (*Vita Epameinondæ*). (See Fabricius, *Bibl. Gr.* II xv. 36)

Mentor I. xxiv. 20. A Rhodian captain who served successively under Artabazus (who revolted against King Artaxerxes II in 356), Nectanabhis (the last native king of Egypt), and Darius III. who made him governor of W. Asia Minor

Pursians II. xii. 7

Phalaris II. vi. 33. Despot of Agrigento in Sicily about 570-554 B.C. He had an unenviable reputation for cruelty

Plato (Greek *Plátōn*) I. I. 8, xxxii. 10 An Athenian philosopher, 428-347 B.C., founder of the "Academic" School in which Aristotle studied. His greatest work, the *Republic* or *Model State*, is cited in the above passages. In I. I. 12-26 is emphasised Aristotle's chief dissent from his

teaching: dualism, that is, of the self-existent Form or "idea" of Good to which Plato attributed the goodness in earthly things

Polydamas I. xx. 8. (See *Hector*)

Pythagoras I. I. 6: Pythagoreans (his followers) I. xviii. 12. A native of the Isle of Samos, who founded at Croton in S. Italy, the philosophical school or brotherhood called after his name. He flourished about 500 B.C. and was famous as a mathematician, astronomer and musician. He taught the transmigration of souls, and saw in numerical relations the groundwork of the material and moral worlds. The teaching of the Pythagorean Philolaus, who settled at Thebes, appears to have had a powerful influence on Plato's thought

Socrates I. i. 7, 20. ix. 7: xx. 4: xxiv. 25: II. vi. 2. Of Athens, B.C. 400-399. The master of Plato. He wrote nothing, but sought through conversation with others to attain, inductively, general notions, chiefly in the moral sphere. His view that virtue is merely a matter of knowledge, and vice merely a matter of ignorance, so that both are involuntary, is vigorously combated by Aristotle. Probably his extraordinary power of self-control made him under-rate the force of passion in others

Syllogism, Treatise on this. (See *Analytics*)

Zōus (cf. Latin *Jupiter*) II. xi. 6. The Greek god of the sky, son of Cronus and chief of the Olympian dynasty; worshipped as ruler of gods and men